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ESG (Environmental, social, and governance) investing is an investment philosophy to 
inform holistic and sound decision-making of investors for the purposes of both, nourishing a 
stable economy with acceptable rates of return while at the same time addressing 
stakeholders' non-financial concerns to preserve an inhabitable planet. Some scholars in 
finance argue that institutions subject to norms, i.e. responsible investors pay a financial cost 
from engaging in ESG activities. Moreover, they see ESG investing as distracting, 
inappropriate, risky and legally challenging. In response, several studies have emerged to 
show that ESG investing is a growing interest with investors, helps to mitigate financial risks, 
and does not need to represent a financial cost. Despite convincing evidence in a growing 
body of academic literature, many questions are still open to debate. Therefore, the principal 
objective of this thesis is to explore three dimensions of ESG investing, namely corporate 
environmental responsibility, renewable energy, and ESG disclosure quality. The research 
questions address issues relating to pension funds' investment decisions and legal obstacles 
resulting from utilising ESG information, financial return and risk implications of investing 
in renewable energy, substitutability of renewable energy for fossil fuel investments, and the 
effects of ESG disclosure quality on the expected cost of capital. To answer these questions, 
the thesis employs several standard and alternative empirical methods from the asset pricing 
and risk literatures. The thesis concludes the following. First, the integration of 
environmental responsibility into pension fund investment decision-making processes does 
not impede the financial and risk performance of pension funds. This means that pension 
funds should be allowed to consider such information in their investment decision making 
processes as the information does not reduce the overall financial return of the tested 
portfolios and does not violate trust law, i.e. the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA). Pension fund trustees have been prohibited to consider any non-financial criteria 
such as environmental, social, or governance criteria in their investment processes under trust 
law such as ERISA, when they could harm the finanical performance of the portfolio. To be 
more specific, a pension fund trustee breaches his fiduciary duties (the duty of loyalty and the 
duty of prudence), if he sacrifices the financial well-being of the pension fund for pursuing 
any other social goal (Langbein and Posner, 1980). In particular, the duty of loyalty is 
"...forbidding the trustee to invest for any object other than the highest return consistent with 
the preferred level of portfolio risk" (Langbein and Posner, 1980:98). Second, the thesis finds 
no evidence for sustained renewable energy equity premia. Furthermore, investments in 
Abstract
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renewable energy equity are considerably riskier than in fossil fuel energy equity, meaning 
that renewable energy firms are undergoing a period of high uncertainties related to their 
business model, low carbon prices, and lacking public and private infrastructure investment 
(Bohl et al., 2013; Kumar et al., 2012; Sadorsky, 2012b ). Finally, my thesis shows that 
companies with high ESG disclosure quality experience lower expected cost of equity and 
cost of debt financing, everything else equal. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Over the last decade, modern SRI (Socially Responsible Investing)1 and ESG-themed 
(Environmental, Social and Governance) investing has seen remarkable growth rates. Since 
2008, ESG investing has experienced more than a doubling of its global professionally 
managed assets from 5 to over 13 trillion US dollars (Eurosif, 2008; GSIA, 2013). A 
significant driving force behind this development has been the rapid growth of the Principles 
for Responsible Investment (PRI) and similar initiatives in promoting ESG investing across 
global financial markets (Della Croce et al., 2011; Eurosif, 2012).2 The United Nations 
supported initiative has been promoting the consideration and integration of ESG concerns 
into investment decision-making processes of institutional investors from its launch in 2006, 
and successfully so. Recent figures on PRI signatories reveal that 1,250 asset owners, asset 
managers, and professional service providers, with combined assets under management of 45 
trillion US dollars, have followed the lead to invest in accordance with the PRI's principles 
(PRI, 2014).  
 This development does not only illustrate the rapid growth of the PRI, but more 
importantly, shows the increasing awareness and willingness of institutional investors to 
engage in ESG investing (Derwall et al., 2011; Gifford, 2010; Sievänen et al., 2013).3 The 
predominant group of PRI signatories are long-term institutional investors including pension 
or retirement funds, endowment funds, unit trusts, and insurance companies (PRI, 2011). In 
recent years, this group of investors have grown so immensely large in size that they jointly 
own the majority of all global financial assets, which easily justifies the term 'universal 
owner', as many scholars have suggested (Hawley and Williams, 2007; Thamotheram and 
Wildsmith, 2007; Urwin, 2011). Due to their considerable size, the financial performance of 
these universal owners is widely contingent on the financial performance of entire financial 
markets instead of the returns on individual stocks. Therefore, universal owners should have 
a natural interest to consider ESG concerns and renewable energy in their investment 
decision-making processes, that affects entire economies as opposed to ESG concerns that 
                                                 
1 See the following for comprehensive literature reviews on modern SRI investing (Renneboog et al., 2008), SRI 
mutual fund performance (Chegut et al., 2011) and development of the term SRI (Eccles and Viviers, 2011). 
2 Not to mention the regulatory support across the globe that has helped SRI and ESG investing to grow (see e.g. 
Renneboog et al., 2008a; Renneboog et al., 2011).  
3 Given that much of the evidence pertaining to the financial performance of SRI and ESG investing has been 
positive (Beurden and Gössling, 2008; Derwall et al., 2005; Edmans, 2011; Gompers et al., 2003; Guenster et 
al., 2011; Kempf and Osthoff, 2007; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Statman, 2006). 
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individual corporations cannot externalise (Amalric, 2006; Hawley and Williams, 2007; 
Hawley and Williams, 2000; Mattison et al., 2011; Thamotheram and Wildsmith, 2007). 
 Despite institutional investors' interest and willingness to consider ESG information 
in their investment decision-making processes, the interpretation of fiduciary duties, to which 
investors are ultimately subscribed to, could present an obstacle to pursue such goals. In 
many common law jurisdictions, investors are under the impression that fiduciary duties 
restrict them from considering ESG and other non-financial information when making 
strategic investment decisions because it is understood that a fiduciary's main duty is only to 
achieve competitive returns and otherwise maximise financial returns (PRI, 2013; 
Richardson, 2006). Such narrow interpretations are common in the US context, where 
pension trustees are regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), under which fiduciaries are not encouraged to make investment decisions based on 
any factors other than financial ones (Interpretive Bulletin 2509.08-1). In the UK, fiduciaries 
were under similar impressions due to a widely misinterpreted case, Cowan v. Scargill, 
whereby fiduciaries were led to believe that their sole responsibility was to maximise 
financial returns (Cowan v. Scargill, 1 Ch. 270, 1985; Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005). 
To shed light on the conditions under which ESG information is permissible, a report by 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer gained prominence for its analysis of these conditions 
(Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005; Gitman et al., 2009). While the Freshfields report has 
provided a lot of conceptual clarity it probably left the most crucial practical uncertainty 
unanswered: What are the financial and risk implications of ESG criteria consideration on a 
pension fund equity portfolio that complies with the legal duty of prudent action for proper 
purpose?  
 Chapter 4 of my thesis aims to address this remaining uncertainty. Using the 
Freshfields report as a starting point, the chapter empirically investigates this research 
question by developing a test of the prudent (conservative) integration of any ESG criterion 
in hypothetical equity pension fund investment processes. More specifically, the empirical 
analysis compares the return and risk characteristics of synthetic equity portfolios of pension 
funds with different degrees of corporate environmental responsibility. The chapter concludes 
that the integration of environmental responsibility is not an obstacle to the financial 
performance and risk and that pension funds are not legally prohibited from utilising such 
criteria.   
 Closely related to the debate on whether institutional investors are permitted to 
integrate ESG information in their investment policies (asset allocation decisions, portfolio 
13 
construction, and stock-picking activities), is the steadily increasing demand and interest for 
renewable energy (World Economic Forum, 2011). To date, financial markets offer well over 
100 renewable energy themed mutual funds (Muñoz et al., 2013; US SIF, 2013), clean tech 
indexes (Ortas and Moneva, 2013), and more recently a rapidly growing number of green 
bonds (Bolger, 2014; International Finance Corporation, 2014). 
 This revived surge in attention is especially driven by both, increasing fears of new 
regulations that could potentially internalise external costs and vocal fossil fuel divestment 
campaigns (similar to powerful campaigns during the Apartheid regime) that encourage 
institutional investors to turn their back on fossil fuel energy stocks and instead pursue 
investments in renewable energy (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2014; Thomas et al., 
2007; Vittorio, 2014). As a consequence of recent environmental disasters including BP's oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico and Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear incident, the accountability of 
corporations and the role of governments to tackle corporate environmental misbehaviour is 
being challenged by the public (Bauer and Hann, 2010; Chazan and Crooks, 2013; Figge and 
Hahn, 2005). All over the world, debates are taking place about various policy instruments to 
protect the environment (Chava, 2011; Hirschl, 2009; Shin et al., 2014; Μichalena and Hills, 
2012). While Europe is at the forefront of pricing carbon through the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the US is discussing a carbon tax, cap-and-trade 
system, and even considering the implementation of new environmental legislations to favour 
the development of renewable energies (Chava, 2011; Mo et al., 2012). For example, some 
regulatory changes concerning renewable energy laws have already taken place over the last 
two decades in countries such as Canada and Germany. Ontario's Green Energy Act of 2009 
is strongly promoting the development of renewable energy generation in North America 
(Songsore and Buzzelli, 2014). Likewise, the German Renewable Energy Act of 2000 
encourages the wide-scale development of renewable energy technologies via feed-in-tariffs 
(Bohl et al., 2013). 
 Hence, it is vital for large institutional investors not only to understand that their 
portfolios have direct implications on societies and the natural environment, but more 
importantly, that these investors who seek protection against environmental risks develop an 
interest in monitoring externalities (Bauer and Hann, 2010; Mattison R. et al., 2011; Thomas 
et al., 2007). Strikingly, many of today's institutional investor portfolios are heavily exposed 
to those sectors of the economy that produce the highest negative environmental externalities, 
i.e. oil and gas sector (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2014; International Monetary Fund, 
2011). Given the rising discontent of society with respect to these externalities, calls for fossil 
14 
fuel divestment campaigns have become louder and could pose serious threats to the assets of 
fossil fuel energy producers to become obsolete and turn into "stranded assets" (Ansar et al., 
2013). Due to the heavy exposure to fossil fuel energy stocks, for many institutional investors 
the potential impact of stranded assets could pose a real challenge (Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance, 2014). 
 As a result of these pressures, large-scale asset transfers from fossil fuel energy to 
renewable energy are possible. Current forecasts addressing the issue of stranded assets 
predict a potential transfer in the scale of over five trillion US dollars from fossil fuel stocks 
to renewable energy (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2014). Although, this represents a 
unique opportunity for renewable energy investments, many uncertainties faced by 
institutional investors need to be addressed. 1) Is there a difference between the financial 
performance of international renewable equity stock indexes and conventional stock indexes? 
2) Does the financial performance of international renewable energy stock indexes differ over 
the first two EU ETS time periods? 3) Does the financial performance of renewable energy 
stock indexes depend on the investment region? 4) Does the risk of international renewable 
energy equity indexes relate to that of fossil fuel ones? 5) How does this relation differ 
geographically? 6) Do returns of renewable energy companies trail those of fossil fuel energy 
companies? 
 Chapters 5 and 6 of my thesis aim to address these research questions. Both chapters 
empirically investigate these research questions by testing the historical profitability and risk 
of global renewable energy equity indexes. Throughout my thesis, the term "risk" will refer to 
the deviation of an expected outcome (Ross et al., 2008). I measure the deviation of an 
expected outcome as systematic and idiosyncratic volatilities of returns, using investment risk 
proxies such as standard deviations, semi-standard deviations, lower partial moments, beta, 
absolute and relative tracking error volatilities, and downside tracking errors. 
More specifically, Chapter 5 of my thesis compares the static and dynamic financial 
performance of renewable energy indexes with conventional equity market ones, while 
Chapter 6 compares absolute and relative tracking error volatilities between renewable and 
fossil-fuel energy equity indexes. Chapter 5 concludes that institutional investors could reap 
financial benefits from investing in renewable energy equity indexes as long as they pay close 
attention to renewable energy style characteristics and increase their understanding of 
specific sub-segments of renewable energy. Chapter 6 concludes that investors require 
substantial risk-premia from renewable energy due to higher return volatilities as opposed to 
fossil fuel energy. As my findings indicate, renewable energy indexes are riskier than fossil 
15 
fuel energy indexes and riskier investments should compensate the investor with higher 
returns, in line with Modern Portfolio Theory. Considering both conclusions, renewable 
energy investments may substitute for fossil fuel energy investments once institutional 
investors account for the diversity within the renewable energy sector and expend additional 
resources on monitoring renewable energy risks. 
 Closely related to the debates on whether institutional investors shall be allowed to 
integrate corporate environmental sustainability information into their investment decision-
making processes and the steadily increasing demand and interest for renewable energy, is 
the rapidly increasing supply of corporate disclosures of environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) activities. In light of an increasing number of corporate scandals that have 
adversely impacted society and the economy, companies are under constant scrutiny by the 
public and investors alike. A recent PRI report (2014) suggests that large institutional 
investors such as pension and investment funds have called for more transparency by 
corporate managers with respect to their ESG activities. The report emphasises the growing 
demand "...for timely, comparable and material disclosure of corporate sustainability 
information to inform their investment decisions." (PRI, 2014). While investor's demand for 
increasing corporate ESG disclosures seems particularly appealing to companies who seek 
financing from equity and debt investors, the motivation for increased corporate disclosures 
on ESG activities could be driven by companies trying to re-build trust and re-gain their 
reputation following corporate scandals, as poorly managed ESG risks have shown to impact 
a company's reputation and sales (See e.g. Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Lii and Lee, 2012).  
 Institutional investors' strategic investment decision-making processes are guided by 
assessments of a company's cost of capital, which represents "...the expected return on a 
firm's stock." (Lambert et al., 2007:386). While most of the existing literature has focused on 
the effects of specific ESG criteria on either the cost of equity or debt, it has left the 
following uncertainty unaddressed: What is the effect of ESG disclosure quality on a 
company's expected cost of capital?  
 Thus, Chapter 7 of my thesis aims to address this uncertainty. My chapter investigates 
this research question by empirically testing the effects of ESG disclosure quality on the 
expected cost of equity and debt capital. My chapter concludes that companies with high 
ESG disclosure quality have lower expected cost of equity and cost of debt capital, 
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everything else equal.4 My empirical analysis is robust to several alternative methods, based 
on Graham and Harvey's (2015) survey of the expected market premium and inferred from 
asset pricing models consistent with general market equilibrium models and the Efficient 
Market Theory, to compute the expected cost of equity and a novel proxy for the cost of debt. 
1.2 Does pension funds' fiduciary duty prohibit the integration of 
environmental responsibility criteria in investment processes? A prudent 
investment test 
Chapter 4 of my thesis aims to investigate return and risk implications of the prudent 
integration of any ESG criterion in hypothetical equity pension fund investment processes. 
More specifically, this chapter aims to empirically extend the analysis of the Freshfields 
report on the debate, over whether equity pension funds are legally prevented to integrate one 
specific type of ESG information, namely environmental sustainability criteria, into their 
investment processes and policies (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005; Rounds, 2005). 
 The main contribution of this chapter is to examine empirically the financial return 
and risk implications in the context of prudent (conservative) integration of environmental 
sustainability criteria into equity pension fund investment processes. In addressing this 
crucial issue, my chapter adds clarity to the debate, over whether integrating ESG criteria 
sacrifices the returns of pension funds' equity portfolios and thereby violates trust law and the 
fiduciary liability of trustees under, for example, the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA). Under ERISA, pension fund trustees have been disallowed to consider 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria when such considerations damage the 
financial well-being of the beneficiary (Langbein and Posner, 1980, O'Brien-Hylton, 1992). 
Langbein and Posner (1980) explain that a fiduciary's duty of loyalty is forbidding the trustee 
to pursue any social motives other than the highest return given the preferred level of 
portfolio risk.5 However, pension funds are legally required to consider an ESG criterion, if 
there is a consensus amongst beneficiaries in favour of this criterion or the criterion is 
believed to be financially beneficial (Freshfields, 2005). As long as an ESG criterion does no 
financial harm, it may also be voluntarily considered.     
                                                 
4 To overcome potential issues related to reverse causality and simultaneity between ESG disclosure  quality and 
the cost of capital, I lag my ESG disclosure quality variable and all of my control variables by one year (See e.g. 
Harjoto and Jo, 2014; Oikonomou et al., 2014). In Chapter 7.3.5. 'Regression Models', I provide detailed 
explanations on my regression specifications.  
5 Thus, pension funds could even invest in hedge funds as long as the beneficiary's preferred level of portfolio 
risk is met and no financial harm caused. 
17 
This chapter aims to fill a gap in the literature by bridging two related literature streams. One 
stream is predominantly concerned about the relationship between ESG criteria and financial 
performance without considering the pension fund perspective (Kempf and Osthoff, 2007; 
Scholtens, 2008; Scholtens and Zhou, 2008), the other stream is mainly interested in pension 
funds' fiduciary duties with respect to ESG criteria without any empirical analysis of the 
financial and risk implications of ESG integration (Martin, 2009; Richardson, 2009; 
Sandberg, 2011). 
 The empirical analysis shows that the integration of environmental sustainability 
criteria into pension fund equity investment policies is not an obstacle to the financial return 
and risk performance and that equity pension funds complying with the fiduciary duty of 
trustees under ERISA are not prevented from informing their investment decisions with such 
criteria.  
 Chapter 4 is subject to several limitations. First, the findings are only directly relevant 
to the equity allocation of pension funds. However, pension funds' asset allocations also 
consist to a large degree of fixed income, cash and other alternative asset classes, whose 
implications this chapter does not analyse. Second, the findings are only directly applicable to 
corporate environmental sustainability criteria supplied by EIRIS. Other ESG dimensions 
related to social and governance issues from other ESG data providers such as KLD or MSCI 
will need to be analysed in the future. 
1.3 Static and dynamic multi-factor performance and investment style of 
international renewable energy stock indexes 
In the pursuit of simultaneously minimising investment risk and increasing financial return 
through the diversification of assets, sustainable equity investors seek alternative options to 
achieve this goal. Over the last decade, several alternative energy related equity investments 
have emerged such as Renewable Energy Equity Indexes. These thematic equity indexes aim 
to serve as a benchmark for the financial performance of listed renewable energy companies 
(Bohl et al., 2013; Henriques and Sadorsky, 2008; Ortas and Moneva, 2013). 
 Thus, the principal objective of Chapters 5 and 6 of my thesis is to investigate risk 
premia of renewable energy equity indexes before the launch and during the first two phases 
of the European Trading Scheme (EU ETS), using static and dynamic performance 
evaluation methods. In addressing this research objective, the my chapter helps institutional 
investors to better understand the financial prospects and characteristics of renewable energy 
investments.    
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 This chapter has the following contributions to the extant literature. First, the static 
and dynamic financial analysis is based on a multi-factor framework and thereby extends the 
methods of existing studies that investigate risk premia of renewable energy indexes using 
dynamic market models (Ortas and Moneva, 2013). Second, in applying this method to a 
global sample of renewable energy indexes, this chapter extends Bohl et al. (2013) sample, 
who purely focus on German renewable energy equity indexes. Third, it complements the 
literature by analysing the financial performance of renewable energy indexes over several 
phases of the EU ETS. 
  The main finding shows that risk premia in global renewable energy equity markets 
are not persistent and short-lived. During the first trading phase of the EU ETS, a significant 
outperformance of renewables is driven by small cap stocks, momentum trading, and positive 
investor sentiment. In contrast, the second phase of the EU ETS is marked by a performance 
reversal and renewable energy indexes become extremely risky and uncertain investments, 
likely driven by the financial crisis and over-expectations by irrational investors. 
 The empirical results are subject to several limitations. First, my findings indicate that 
the financial performance of renewable energy indexes is not driven by geographical 
differences but sector differences. Thus, further research should look into the diverse sub-
sectors of renewable energy and use sector rather than geographical benchmarks. Second, this 
chapter does not distinguish between pure-play6 and more liberal renewable energy equity 
indexes. While pure-play renewable energy indexes employ very strict sector screens to sort 
out any non-renewable energy companies, liberal renewable energy indexes could allow to 
include energy producers from the nuclear, gas, or bio-fuels sectors. A focus on these sector 
screens and a distinction between pure-play and non pure-play indexes could be fruitful. 
1.4 The Risks of Investing in Renewable and Conventional Energy Stock 
Markets 
Chapter 6 aims to investigate the risks of investing in international renewable energy equity 
markets. Investigating the risk relationship between renewable and conventional energy 
stocks is essential to the understanding in two ways. First, whether renewable energy 
investments can substitute for conventional fossil-fuelled energy stocks in the future; second, 
                                                 
6 Pure-play renewable energy equity indexes only benchmark energy companies that generate 100% of their 
energy from renewable sources such as wind, solar or hydro energy. Other renewable energy indexes are more 
liberal and also list energy companies generating energy through nuclear, gas, or bio-fuels.  
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to help institutional investors to better manage the risks of investing in these alternative 
energy equity indexes. 
 The principal contribution of this chapter is to investigate the risk behaviour of a 
sample of global renewable energy equity markets providing a direct comparison between the 
returns of traditional, fossil-fuelled energy equity indexes and renewable energy equity 
indexes. Furthermore, this chapter develops an alternative measure of relative risk, namely 
the downside tracking error that aims to capture the asymmetric risk behaviour of alternative 
asset classes. In addressing these objectives, this chapter aims to shed light on the debate, 
whether renewable energy equity indexes are more volatile than traditional energy indexes 
and therefore should be substituted in the future (Sadorsky, 2012a, b). This chapter aims to 
fill a gap in the literature by relating two literature streams. One stream is largely focussed on 
the relationship between oil prices and the impact on stock prices without considering 
renewable energies (Driesprong et al., 2008; Mohamed, 2012; Scholtens and Yurtsever, 
2012). The other stream investigates renewable energies and the effect of oil prices but 
ignores the risks of conventional fossil-fuel stocks (Kumar et al., 2012; Sadorsky, 2012b). 
 The empirical analysis shows that investing in renewable energy equity is 
considerably riskier than in traditional energy equity markets, using several absolute, relative, 
and downside risk measures to explain these findings. This chapter argues that renewable 
energy investing is faced with high uncertainties regarding renewable energy firms' current 
business model, low or non-existent carbon prices, and a lack of private and public 
investments in renewable energy infrastructure (Bohl et al., 2013; Kumar et al., 2012; 
Sadorsky, 2012b). 
 This chapter has the following limitations. First, the risk findings apply to investing in 
renewable energy equity markets only. More recently, the renewable energy sector has seen a 
growing demand for green bonds and fixed income products, which could reduce risk and 
increase institutional investment in the sector (Bolger, 2014; International Finance 
Corporation, 2014). Second, the results apply to renewable energy equity indexes in 
developed countries, while emerging renewable equity markets could illustrate a different 
risk behaviour. 
1.5 The Effects of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Disclosure 
Quality on the Cost of Capital 
In Chapter 7 of my thesis, I aim to empirically investigate the effects of Environmental, 
Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure quality on the expected cost of equity and debt 
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capital, using a large sample of US S&P 500 companies. Based on Heinkel et al.'s (2001) and 
Merton's (1987) theoretical framework, consistent with the Efficient Market Theory (which I 
discuss in Chapter 2 'Theory: The Efficient Market Theory'), I hypothesise that companies 
with high ESG disclosure quality have lower expected cost of equity and debt, everything 
else being equal. The theoretical mechanisms through which ESG disclosure quality could 
affect the expected cost of equity and debt are the depth's of a companies investor base, 
reductions in companies' beta or systematic risk, and future litigation and reputational risks 
(Lambert et al., 2007; Merton, 1987). The three mechanisms are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 7.2.1. 'ESG Disclosure and the cost of capital', as well as why ESG disclosure quality 
could be "priced" by the market (See Chapter 7.2.1.4. 'ESG Disclosure and Diversification'). 
 The main contribution of my chapter is the investigation of the relevance of 
companies' ESG disclosure quality for equity and debt investors. My chapter contributes to 
the existing literature by extending the research on voluntary ESG disclosure information 
(See e.g. Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Plumlee et al., 2010) as well as the effects of ESG on the 
expected cost of equity and debt, more generally (See e.g. Bauer and Hann, 2010; Chava, 
2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Oikonomou et al., 2014). My chapter contributes by using a 
novel indicator to measure the extent (or quality) of companies' ESG disclosure, alternative 
approaches to compute the expected cost of equity and debt capital, and by investigating the 
effects of ESG disclosure quality on the cost of debt, which, to the best of my knowledge, has 
not been studied before. 
 My empirical results suggest that ESG disclosure quality is negatively associated with 
all of my expected cost of equity and cost of debt variables, while also controlling for 
company-and bond-specific characteristics. This means that companies with high ESG 
disclosure quality have lower expected cost of equity and debt capitals, all else equal. My 
results of the relationship between ESG disclosure quality and the expected cost of equity and 
debt imply that the market prices a company's ESG disclosure quality along with other 
factors and that the market appears to be inefficient with respect to this information set. 
 Chapter 7 has the following limitations. First, my analysis is based on a sample of US 
S&P 500 companies and does not evaluate other countries. Thus, my results are only directly 
applicable to large companies in the US. My sample is consistent with realted studies in a US 
context (See e.g. Bauer and Hann, 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; 
Oikonomou et al., 2014; Plumlee et al., 2010; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008). Given different 
cultural and regulatory frameworks in other countries, an investigation beyond the US could 
yield different results. Second, my results are based on expected cost of equity estimates 
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inferred from asset pricing models and one cost of debt proxy. This means that my results are 
directly only relevant to equity and debt investors who compute the expected cost of equity 
and debt in a similar fashion. However, it seems unlikely that computing implied cost of 
equities (as in Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011) would change my results 
considerably, as prior findings also suggest that companies with high ESG have lower 
implied cost of equities. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
My thesis is structured in the following manner. Chapter 2 describes my theoretical 
background which is based on the Efficient Market Theory. Chapter 3 outlines my 
methodological position and research methodology. Chapter 4 is my first empirical chapter 
and it investigates whether integrating ESG criteria damages the returns of hypothetical 
pension funds' equity portfolios and thereby violates trust law and the fiduciary liabilities of 
trustees. Chapter 5 is my second empirical chapter and it studies whether ESG information 
sets in form of a renewable energy equity investment trading strategy generate persistent 
renewable energy equity premia relative to conventional equity benchmarks. Chapter 6 is my 
third empirical chapter and it investigates idiosyncratic risks of international renewable 
energy equity indexes relative to fossil-fuel equity indexes. Chapter 7 is my fourth empirical 
chapter which studies whether my third proxy for ESG, namely ESG disclosure quality 
affects a company's expected cost of equity and debt capital. Chapter 8 concludes with the 
implications of my results for the Efficient Market Theory, contributions to the extant 
literature, future research avenues, practitioner and policy relevance as well as limitations. 
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2 Theory: The Efficient Market Theory 
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2.1 Brief History of Efficient Market Theory 
The origins of the Efficient Market Theory can be traced back to Louis Bachelier's thesis, The 
Theory of Speculation, where he theorises information diffusion in the context of financial 
markets (Read, 2013). Bachelier, a mathematician by formation who was strongly influenced 
by probability theory, is most prominently credited with independently inventing and 
influencing Brownian Motion, Random Walk Theory, and the first sophisticated formula to 
price derivatives and options (Read, 2013).  
 Before the explicit formulation of the Efficient Market Theory and Efficient Market 
Hypothesis by Fama in the 70s, researchers developed an interest in the Random Walk 
Theory invented by Bachelier and later independently re-invented by Osborne in 1959 (Fama, 
1965). The Random Walk Theory is based on two assumptions: price independence and price 
distribution (Fama, 1965). Meaning that successive price changes should not be predictable 
and that prices should follow a certain distribution. Fama (1965) empirically tested both 
assumptions of the Random Walk Theory and concluded that successive price changes are 
indeed independent and return distributions follow a Paretian distribution (Fama, 1965). He 
showed that these conditions are "...consistent with the existence of an "efficient" market for 
securities" and "...given the available information, actual prices at every point in time 
represent very good estimates of intrinsic values" (Fama, 1965:90). Fama suspected that 
competition among sophisticated chart readers and analysts was contributing to price 
independence and market efficiency. Thus, boldly claiming that chart-reading techniques had 
no value to investors.      
 While Fama (1965) laid the foundations of the Efficient Market Theory in his 1965 
paper, he explicitly formulated and empirically tested the theory in 1970 (Fama, 1970). His 
groundbreaking paper provided a comprehensive review of existing theoretical and empirical 
evidence on the efficient markets model classifying three forms of market efficiency: (i) 
weak form market efficiency (ii) semi-strong form market efficiency, and (iii) strong form 
market efficiency (Fama, 1970). Weak form market efficiency tests incorporate information 
sets only related to the price or return history of a security. Semi-strong market efficiency 
tests incorporate information sets related to all publicly available information, and strong-
form market efficiency tests incorporate information sets related to public and private (or 
inside) information of a security. 
 Much research has been devoted to testing the three forms of market efficiency with 
diverse findings. During the 1950's up to the 1980's, weak and semi-strong form market 
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efficiency tended to hold well and were widely accepted (Jensen, 1978). For example, in a 
lengthy review of weak form market efficiency tests in the 70s (also Random Walk Theory), 
Fama (1970:414) concluded that the "results are strongly in support". Similarly, semi-strong 
form tests of market efficiency, where the speed of stock price adjustments to the release of 
new information is of interest, were largely accepted as well (Dimson and Mussavian, 1998; 
Fama et al., 1969; Jensen, 1978). However, strong form market efficiency was not fully 
accepted as it represented more of a conceptual addition to the previous two forms of market 
efficiency rather than a realistic condition (Dimson and Mussavian, 1998; Jensen, 1978).  
 Although the Efficient Market Theory has been extensively tested by proponents and 
critics, the evidence remains inconsistent and scholars continue in trying to empirically verify 
or refute it (Fama, 1991). The fact that market efficiency can only be tested in conjunction 
with a model of market equilibrium (e.g. capital asset pricing model) increases the 
complexity of this task, as all tests for market efficiency will be joint tests of market 
behaviour and models of asset pricing (Dimson and Mussavian, 1998). I will discuss this 
important issue in more detail in Chapter 2.7. 'Joint Hypothesis Problem: Simultaneous Tests 
of Market Efficiency and Models of Market Equilibrium'. 
 The empirical literature on market efficiency is so voluminous, that several reviews 
exist (Dimson and Mussavian, 1998; Kothari, 2001) and more recently (See e.g. 
Subrahmanyam, 2010; Fama and French, 2015; Jacobs, 2015) to comprehensively discuss the 
state of the Efficient Market Theory at different points in time. 
2.2 Definition of Market Efficiency 
Several definitions of market efficiency exist to date. According to the founding father of the 
Efficient Market Theory, efficient capital markets are "efficient in processing information" 
(Fama, 1976:133). This means that stock prices observed in capital markets are based on 
"correct" assessments of all information available at a given moment in time (Fama, 1970, 
1976). Thus, in an efficient capital market stock prices entirely incorporate all available 
information (Fama, 1970) which leads to the conclusion that given informational efficiency, 
"actual prices at every point in time represent very good estimates of intrinsic values" (Fama, 
1965:90). 
 As the difference between the price and the intrinsic value of a stock is the expected 
reward for investing in that stock, according to Fama's definition of an efficient market, that 
difference should be close to zero (Kothari, 2001). Meaning that there is no abnormal reward 
to be made and that the intrinsic value of a stock is reflected in its price. Thus, the Efficient 
25 
Market Theory posits that active investors7 will not be able to consistently outperform the 
market (Bodie et al., 2008). Based on this reasoning, proponents of the Efficient Market 
Theory argue that passive investment strategies, such as Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs)8 will 
be always superior relative to actively management mutual funds (Fama, 1970; Jensen, 
1968). Under the Efficient Market Theory, active management is seen as a wasted effort and 
merely understood to increase transaction costs which will reduce the performance of active 
funds net of fees (Jensen, 1968).  
 After his original definition of the Efficient Market Theory in the 70s, Fama amended 
his initial definition of market efficiency, to keep up with newly published evidence 
challenging the Efficient Market Theory, over the following years (Fama, 1991). In his 
dissertation, Fama (1965:90) defined an efficient market as one where "...given the available 
information, actual prices at every point in time represent very good estimates of intrinsic 
values." In a later paper, Fama (1995:56) revised his definition by stating that "...the actual 
price of a security will be a good estimate of its intrinsic value." It is not surprising that Fama 
revised his definition, given the published empirical evidence against even the weakest form 
of market efficiency, as new work found that stock returns can be predicted, for example, 
based on past returns or dividends (Fama, 1991). 
 A more general and economically relevant definition of Efficient Markets is provided 
by Michael Jensen, which Fama later acknowledged as "...an economically more sensible 
version of the efficiency hypothesis.", reads as follows (Fama, 1991:1575; Jensen, 1978): 
 
"A market is efficient with respect to information set t  if it is impossible to make economic 
profits by trading on the basis of information set t ." (Jensen, 1978:96)  
 
 This definition of efficient markets is more flexible as it implies that capital markets 
can be more or less efficient over time. Jensen's understanding of an efficient market is also 
more in line with Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) thought of non-constant market equilibrium. 
The authors note that a market for information will not be always in equilibrium if arbitrage 
is costly. Only those arbitrageurs who spend resources to gather information receive a 
compensation (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). In their model, information flows from the 
                                                 
7 Active investors are those investors who try to outperform their chosen general market index such as the S&P 
500 or MSCI All World. Generally, any fund manager who invests money of a third party, will be bound to 
some benchmark index specified in their investment policy.   
8 These are passive mutual funds that aim to replicate equity indexes. 
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"informed" to the "uninformed", whereby informed individuals bid up the price of a security 
when the return is going to be high and bid down the price when the return is going to be low 
(Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). 
 In relation to the Efficient Market Theory, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) reject Fama's 
definition of an efficient market, because if it were true, then informed traders could not 
make a return on using their information. There is mounting empirical and practical evidence 
to support the claim that informed traders do consistently beat passive investment strategies, 
such as broad equity market benchmarks (Berkshire Hathaway, 2014; Blake et al., 2013). 
Also, several real-world investors such as Warren Buffett, Walter Schloss, Charles Munger 
and many other prominent investors have managed to continuously outperform passive equity 
indexes such as the S&P500, over many years (Berkshire Hathaway, 2014; Buffett, 1984). 
2.3 Theoretical assumptions for perfect Efficient Markets 
Before addressing the theoretical assumptions for Efficient Markets in more detail and how 
they relate to ESG or Responsible Investment in this thesis, I briefly discuss the major 
assumptions for perfect markets to draw a distinction between perfect and efficient markets.  
Perfect Market Theory has had a substantial impact on Finance research during the 50s and 
60s, when it was applied to research questions related to stock price behaviour, corporate 
finance and capital asset pricing (Jensen et al., 1989). A perfect (competitive) market is 
generally characterised by the conditions of price takers, free entry and exit of companies, 
homogenous products, and perfect information (Mankiw, 2012).9  This means that the price 
of a product (or e.g. a security) is determined by supply and demand of competing economic 
agents and the market as a whole rather than certain individual economic agents (Mankiw, 
2012). While perfect markets are an unachievable ideal in real markets, they provide a 
theoretical benchmark to which real markets can be assessed against (Jensen et al., 1989). 
Thus, broadly speaking, it could be said that Fama's (1970) Efficient Market Theory was 
developed within the framework of Perfect Market Theory in the context of stock price 
behaviour. A well-known theory of stock price behaviour is the random walk theory, on 
which the Efficient Market Theory is ultimately based on (See Chapter 2.1. 'Brief History of 
Efficient Market Theory). The motivation of the Efficient Market Theory is therefore not to 
                                                 
9 As the market consists of many buyers and sellers whose buying and selling activities have an insignificant 
impact on the market and the price of a product, they take the price as given and are therefore called 'price 
takers' (Mankiw, 2012). Companies do not have any barriers of entering or exiting a desired market and also sell 
the same product (Mankiw, 2012). Finally, perfect information implies that buyers and sellers have full 
transparency of the conditions of the market as well as that the information is freely and costlessly available 
(Mankiw, 2012).  
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establish whether markets are perfect, as this is an ideal state, but to establish whether 
markets are efficient in processing information and thereby accurately determine stock prices 
(accurate estimates of value) (Fama, 1976). To conclude, perfect markets imply efficient 
markets, however, capital markets can be efficient without being perfect (Welch, 2011).  
 According to Fama (1970:387), in a market where the current price of a security 
"fully reflects" all available information, the following three conditions or assumptions are 
sufficient for markets to be efficient. 10 Violations of any of the following three assumptions 
could be seen as a potential source for market inefficiency: 
i)  No transaction costs in trading securities 
ii)  Asset markets are frictionless, and all information is costlessly and simultaneously 
available to all investors. 
iii) Investors are price-takers and have equivalent (homogenous) expectations on the 
implications of current information for the current price and distributions of future 
prices of securities. 
These assumptions are extreme and non-existent in real-world capital markets (Fama, 1970). 
However, in the following paragraph, I will aim to discuss the implications of each of the 
core assumptions of the Efficient Market Theory and compare how they differ from 
conventional relative to socially responsible investor portfolios, to see if any has a greater 
potential for market inefficiency. 
 i) Transaction costs of buying and selling securities do not differ between 
conventional and responsible investor portfolios because the responsible investor draws from 
the same, although more restricted stock universe, relative to the conventional investor. 
However, transaction fees for investment in mutual funds, such as management fees and load 
fees (front-end and back-end fees)11, are perceived to differ to some extent (see e.g. 
Renneboog et al., 2008). One would expect socially responsible mutual funds to be more 
expensive due to their costs of engaging with and actively monitoring companies on socially 
responsible issues (Gil-Bazo et al., 2010). However, after comparing the fee differential 
                                                 
10 Models of market equilibrium, such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), to test for market efficiency 
rest on the beforementioned and three additional assumptions (Copeland et al., 2005; Shih et al., 2014): 
iv) Investors are risk-averse and rational, aiming to maximise the expected utility of their wealth. 
v) The quantities of assets are fixed, and all assets are marketable and perfectly divisible. 
vi) There exists a risk-free asset at which investors may borrow or lend unlimited amounts. 
11 Load fees pay for trading costs and marketing expenses; management fees tend to pay for managerial 
compensation (Renneboog et al., 2008a) 
28 
between socially responsible and conventional mutual funds, Gil-Bazo et al. (2010) come to 
conclude that fund fees are not statistically significantly between the two groups.12 
 ii) In the context of social responsibility and ESG information, the assumption that all 
information is costlessly and simultaneously available to all investors, does not apply. Not all 
companies voluntarily disclose and report on their sustainable performance. In order to fill 
this information gap for investors, third party ESG data providers have specialised in 
collecting and standardising this information. Sources for ESG information vary from one 
data provider to another, but predominantly rely on written questionnaires and interviews 
with company managers, in addition to public information (Aslaksen and Synnestvedt, 2003; 
EIRIS, 2011d). To compensate for collecting and standardising ESG information, data 
providers such as EIRiS charge fees for their data and research services. Thus, in contrast to 
the assumption of costlessly and simultaneously available information to all investors, in the 
context of ESG information, not all investors will have access to this information at the same 
time. The fact that ESG information is costly and not simultaneously available to all investors 
has implications for the Efficient Market Theory. As a result, it could be argued that given the 
cost and access to ESG information, the semi-strong form of the Efficient Market Theory 
does not hold with respect to this kind of information. Further, this condition could be seen as 
a potential source for stock market inefficiency, according to Fama's definition of an efficient 
market (Fama, 1970). 
 iii) The third assumption for efficient markets posits that investors have homogenous 
expectations on the current information for the current price and distributions of future prices 
of securities (Copeland, 2005; Fama, 1970). This assumption is likely the largest source for 
market inefficiency and a great challenge to the Efficient Market Theory. According to Fama 
(1970), stock markets could be inefficient with respect to this third assumption, if there are 
investors who will consistently make superior assessments of current publicly available 
information relative to the information already incorporated in market prices (and assessed by 
the market13). While Fama (1970:388) originally argued that disagreement among investors 
does not imply markets to be inefficient, Fama and French (2007:672) updated the original 
statement by concluding that "...without complete agreement, testable predictions about how 
expected returns relate to risk are also lost." According to Fama and French (2007), 
disagreement between investors can be explained by two groups of investors, the informed 
                                                 
12 Average fund expenses for socially responsible mutual funds relative to conventional mutual funds are 134.45 
and 135.58, respectively. Average total load fees for socially responsible mutual funds amount to 181.55 relative 
to 213.34 for conventional mutual funds (See Gil-Bazo et al., 2010).  
13 The market represents all investors such as informed and uniformed investors (Fama and French, 2007). 
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and the misinformed. While the group of informed investors will know the distribution of 
future prices of securities, the misinformed will misperceive it (Fama and French, 2007). 
Thus, disagreement between informed and misinformed investors will lead to informed 
investors to overweight (underweight) assets that are underweighted (overweighted) by 
misinformed investors due to their "erroneous" beliefs14 about the distribution of future prices 
of securities (Fama and French, 2007).  
 One the one hand, if socially responsible investors falsely estimate the future prices of 
securities by integrating ESG information into their analysis, the large share of informed 
investors would not be able to erase fully the price effect of socially responsible investors 
(Fama and French, 2007). The price effect would last until socially responsible investors or 
the misinformed learn that they are misinformed (Fama and French, 2007). As long as 
socially responsible investors do not correct their erroneous beliefs, markets would be 
theoretically less efficient (Fama and French, 2007). However, this is only possible if socially 
responsible investors or investors with erroneous beliefs represent a large share of invested 
assets (Fama and French, 2007). In today's stock markets, socially responsible assets 
represent about 30 percent of the total global invested assets, which means that social 
responsibility or ESG information would not make the stock markets entirely inefficient 
(GSIA, 2014). Also, predictions about expected returns and risk will have meaning 
"...without complete agreement..." (Fama and French, 2007:672).  
 On the other hand, if socially responsible investors rightly estimate the future prices 
of securities by considering ESG information in their analysis, and ESG criteria matters, then 
stock markets would be inefficient. Several studies have shown that investors do not use 
value-relevant or "priced" ESG information in their decision-making processes (See e.g. 
Campbell and Slack, 2011; Clarkson et al., 2013; Hamilton et al., 1993) 
 To sum up, two out of the three main assumptions underlying the Efficient Market 
Theory could be potential sources for stock market inefficiency. First, ESG information is 
costly and not simultaneously available to all investors. Second, investors do not have 
homogenous expectations on the current information for the current price and distributions of 
future prices of securities, as some investors have shown to be able to consistently assess 
publicly available information better than others (Copeland, 2005; Fama, 1970). The 
following chapter discusses the pricing of ESG information in stock markets. 
                                                 
14 "Erroneous" beliefs are defined as investment tastes of investors that lead to a departure of rational prices, 
such as socially responsible investing, loyalty, home bias, favourite sports team and so on (Fama and French, 
2007).   
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2.4 Empirical Tests of Market Efficiency 
Since Fama's formulation of weak, semi-strong, and strong-form market efficiency in the 70s, 
hundreds of papers have empirically tested market efficiency and as Fama (1991:1575) notes 
himself, "The literature is now so large that a full review is impossible...". In this spirit, the 
subsequent chapter will briefly review the most relevant articles that have appeared on each 
of the three forms of market efficiency. Further, I will aim to highlight the position of my 
thesis with respect to existing empirical tests of market efficiency. 
2.4.1 Weak Form Tests 
Weak form tests of market efficiency were performed to test the price or return independence 
assumption of the Random Walk Model (or Random Walk Theory) (Fama, 1965). In other 
words, markets are said to be weak form efficient when technical traders cannot use 
information incorporated in historical prices to predict future prices. Meaning that prices or 
returns should be independent of each other. In order to test this assumption, Fama (1965) 
computed serial correlation coefficients, runs tests15, and Alexander's filter techniques on 
daily, four-day, nine-day, and sixteen-day stock market price changes, to conclude that there 
is no evidence of dependence, and that the independence assumption of the Random Walk 
Model can be confirmed. In the light of subsequent research (see e.g. Lo and MacKinlay, 
1988), Fama (1991:1580) corrected his initial conclusion that returns could not be predicted. 
He argues that "...recent research is able to show confidently that daily and weekly returns are 
predictable from past returns." Not only did scholars find that past returns help predict future 
returns, other variables such as inflation, interest rates, dividend yields, earnings/price ratios, 
helped predict stock returns (Bodie, 1976).  
2.4.2 Semi-Strong Form Tests, i.e. Event Studies 
The goal of short-term semi-strong form market efficiency tests is to examine whether stock 
markets16 use available information correctly in setting stock prices (Fama, 1976), and the 
speed at which stock prices adjust to the release of new information (Fama, 1970). The 
dominant empirical tool to test for short-term semi-strong market efficiency is the event study 
methodology, using the CAPM or the market model (See e.g. Equation 4) (Dimson and 
Mussavian, 1998). Essentially, event studies examine the short-term price behaviour of 
securities around specific events such as changes in legislation, earnings announcements, or 
                                                 
15 Fama (1965:74) defines a runs test "as a sequence of price changes having the same sign". 
16 Aggregate decisions of individual investors (Fama, 1976) 
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stock splits (Binder, 1998). Fama et al. (1969) was the first study to perform an event study. 
To empirically test how quickly prices adjust to new information, Fama et al. (1969) 
investigated the effect of stock splits on securities' stock prices.17 The authors concluded that 
the stock market "almost immediately" incorporates stock split information after the 
announcement date (Fama et al., 1969:20). In relation to stock market efficiency, their 
findings implied that stock markets are indeed efficient given the rapid adjustment of stock 
prices to that particular event. Subsequent event studies have used various events to 
investigate how stock prices react to the arrival of new information in the form of mergers 
and acquisitions (Halpern, 1983), seasoned equity offerings (Akhigbe and Whyte, 2015), 
sovereign debt rating announcements (Michaelides et al., 2015), corporate social 
responsibility (Krüger, 2015), environmental regulation (Ramiah et al., 2013), and 
environmental programmes (Fisher-Vanden & Thorburn, 2011) have been studied 
extensively.   
 In the context of socially responsible investing, many event studies have been 
performed to investigate the stock price behaviour of firms to the arrival of new information 
in relation to environmental, social, and governance information and its implications for 
market efficiency (Frooman, 1997). Frooman's meta study of 27 published works on this 
topic revealed that shareholder wealth decreases if firms act in an irresponsible or illegal 
manner (Frooman, 1997). In particular, he observed significantly negative abnormal returns 
for firms with many controversial and illegal incidents (or events) such as criminal 
misconduct, fraud, pollution, product recalls, fines for safety violations, and price fixing. 
These findings are in line with recently published works (Krüger, 2015). Similarly, Hamilton 
(1995) finds that firms with higher pollution events such as air emissions or toxic spills 
experience significantly negative abnormal returns after the announcement. Klassen and 
McLaughlin (1996) even observe significantly positive abnormal returns for firms with 
strong environmental management initiatives. 
 With respect to the implications for stock market efficiency, the predominant view 
held among scholars using the event study methodology in this field is that usually new 
events related to environmental, social, and governance issues tend to be relatively quickly 
incorporated into the stock prices of firms (See e.g. Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2010; 
Endrikat, 2015; Jacobs et al., 2010; Little et al., 1995). As such, stock markets tend to be 
efficient relative to new publicly available information in the short-term. The emphasis on the 
                                                 
17 More technically, the residual from the estimated market model shows whether stock splits have any effect on 
the return of a firm, after controlling for an economy wide factor (Binder, 1998).  
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short-term is important, as the event study methodology is not capable of assessing whether 
the market is efficient over longer periods of time, and whether market efficiency persists or 
not. In the following chapter I will review studies testing market efficiency over longer time 
periods. 
2.4.3 Strong-form Tests 
The strong-form of the Efficient Market Theory implies that all available information (public 
and private information) is entirely reflected in stock prices (Fama, 1970). As the theory 
distinguishes between public and private information, it is important to explain what is meant 
by private information. The literature distinguishes between two types of private information, 
a) inside information held by corporate insiders, and b) private information held by 
professional investment managers, which could be in form of private assessments based on 
public information (e.g. an analyst's assessment report) (Fama, 1970, 1991). Thus, the goal of 
strong-form market efficiency tests is to investigate the long-term profitability of mutual fund 
managers and investment trading strategies with specialist information (Dimson and 
Mussavian; Fama, 1970). These tests are concerned with the ability of investors or trading 
strategies to consistently outperform the market, which should not be possible if the market is 
truly efficient (Fama, 1970). Jensen (1968) was probably one of the first and most 
comprehensive tests of this kind of strong form market efficiency tests, at the time. He 
analysed the investment performance18 of 115 mutual funds over the period from 1945 to 
1964, using an "absolute" measure of investment performance, i.e. the multiperiod Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) based on Lintner (1965) and Sharpe's (1964) single-period 
model (See e.g. Equation 4), and found very little evidence that mutual funds outperformed 
the market significantly, even before deducting mutual fund fees of a fund manager (Jensen, 
1968). Based on his evidence, he concluded that markets are efficient and investors are better 
off with a passive buy-and-hold strategy (Jensen, 1968).  
 However, since the 70s "There is evidence that some security analysts (e.g., Value 
Line) have information not reflected in stock prices", Fama concluded in his second extensive 
review on the strong-form market efficiency (Fama, 1991:1603). He argues that some 
scholars (see e.g. Copeland and Mayers, 1982; Stickel, 1985) have found evidence that Value 
Line and other security analysts produce private information and when that information is 
revealed to the market it leads to stock price adjustments. These adjustments occur because 
producing private information is costly and investors are compensated for incurring these 
                                                 
18 Which is defined as the "predictive ability" of a portfolio manager (Jensen, 1968). 
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costs (Fama, 1991). This implies that the stock market is less efficient because there will be 
some private information that is not entirely reflect in stock prices (Fama, 1991).   
 In the context of socially responsible and ESG investing, and similar to Jensen's work 
on mutual funds, several studies have investigated the financial performance of socially 
responsible mutual funds relative to conventional funds over the long term (Barnett and 
Salomon, 2006; Bauer et al., 2005; Geczy, et al., 2005; Hamilton et al., 1993; Kreander et al., 
2005; Renneboog et al., 2008a). The main conclusion of these studies tends to be that socially 
responsible funds neither significantly outperform nor underperform relative to conventional 
funds19. In terms of the implications for market efficiency, this research would indicate that 
markets seem to be efficient in the long term.  
 However, in addition to studies on mutual funds, much research has assessed whether 
certain investment trading strategies based on ESG information generate abnormal returns 
over the long term (See e.g. Edmans, 2011; Gompers et al., 2003; Kempf and Osthoff, 2007), 
which would imply that markets are not efficient with respect to certain environmental, 
social, and governance information. As these studies find that investment trading strategies 
based on high social responsibility, good corporate governance, and positive employee 
relations generate significant abnormal returns, one could question whether markets are truly 
efficient in the long run with respect to certain information sub-sets. 
 In my thesis, the efficiency of capital markets is understood along the lines of Jensen's 
somewhat more economically relevant definition of an efficient market (See Chapter 2.2. 
'Definition of the Efficient Market Theory'. This means that stock markets are efficient based 
on a certain information set as long as it is impossible to make economic profits based on that 
information set (Jensen, 1978). I will address the implications of each of my empirical 
findings for the efficiency of capital markets based on Jensen's definition. Having reviewed 
several studies that test Fama's weak, semi-strong, and strong-form tests of market efficiency, 
my thesis is most similar to the kind of market efficiency tests conducted by Jensen (1968), 
that aim to investigate the long-term profitability of investment trading strategies (portfolio 
trading strategies), equity indexes, and companies, rather than market efficiency tests in the 
strictest sense such as studies on insider trading20 (See e.g. Tavakoli et al., 2012). In this 
spirit, the studies closest to mine are those of Edmans (2011), Gompers et al. (2003), Kempf 
and Osthoff (2007), and Schröder (2007).  
                                                 
19 While some studies tend to find a significant outperformance of socially responsible mutual funds relative to 
conventional mutual funds (See e.g. Mallin et al., 1995). 
20 For example, Tavakoli et al. (2012) conclude that insider trading activity has predictive power in excess of 
publicly available information which challenges the strong-form market efficiency. 
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2.5 Efficient Market Theory and ESG information 
2.5.1 Pricing of ESG information 
The theoretical debate about socially responsible investing (which is the incorporation of 
environmental, social, and governance criteria into investment processes) in the context of 
traditional Finance theories such as the Efficient Market Theory have led to the development 
of alternative hypotheses (see Bauer et al., 2005; Hamilton et al., 1993). In the context of 
informationally efficient markets and Efficient Market Theory, the question whether ESG 
information is a "priced" risk factor matters to a great extent. To answer the question whether 
ESG is "priced" in stock markets, scholars tend to refer to the theoretical debate on demand 
differences (or tastes) for different types of stocks (Fama and French, 2007; Galema et al., 
2008; Hamilton et al., 1993). For example, excess demand for socially responsible stocks and 
a shortage in demand for conventional stocks will overprice socially responsible stocks 
(Galema et al., 2008). This explanation is in line with Heinkel et al.'s (2001) capital market 
equilibrium model, which is also consistent with efficient capital markets, and shows that 
when socially responsible investors do not have a preference for irresponsible companies due 
to their differences in tastes for certain assets (See e.g. Fama and French, 2007), then fewer 
investors are available to hold the shares of irresponsible companies, which will reduce 
diversification (risk-sharing) and increase a companies' cost of capital (Heinkel et al., 2001). 
 To empirically test whether social responsibility is priced in the traditional finance 
context, Hamilton et al. (1993:63) suggest the following three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: (Risk-adjusted) expected returns of socially responsible portfolios are 
equal to (risk-adjusted) expected returns of conventional portfolios. 
Hypothesis 2: (Risk-adjusted) expected returns of socially responsible portfolios are 
lower than the expected returns of conventional portfolios. 
Hypothesis 3: (Risk-adjusted) expected returns of socially responsible portfolios are 
higher than the expected returns of conventional portfolios. 
According to Hamilton et al. (1993), social responsibility or ESG information will not be 
priced if expected returns are equal. This is because "...responsible investors who sell stocks 
find enough conventional investors ready to buy that the prices of the stocks do not drop." 
Hamilton et al. (1993:63). The second hypothesis (underperformance hypothesis) is 
consistent with a view where social responsibility or ESG information is priced by the 
market. As Heinkel et al. (2001) explain, when fewer conventional investors are available to 
hold the shares of a responsible company, this wil reduce diversification (risk-sharing), lower 
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the stock price, and increase the company's cost of capital. The third hypothesis 
(overperformance hypothesis) is also consistent with a view where social responsibility or 
ESG information is priced, however, mispriced. Hamilton et al. (1993:64) argue that this is 
possible when a significantly large share of investors "consistently underestimate the 
probability that negative information will be released about companies that are not socially 
responsible" (Bauer et al., 2005). To give one example, conventional investors who 
consistently underestimate the likelihood of chemical firms having issues with uncontrolled 
chemical spills, will see a drop in the stock prices of these chemical firms following the spill. 
While reduced stock prices will lower the returns of conventional portfolios holding chemical 
stocks, portfolios of socially responsible investors will be unaffected (See e.g. Hamilton, 
1995)21. In such a situation, stock markets do not price social responsibility correctly (Bauer 
et al., 2005; Hamilton et al., 1993; Moskowitz, 1972).  
 After Hamilton et al.'s first study on this topic, many empirical studies have followed 
in testing the performance differential of socially responsible and conventional portfolios and 
the implications for social responsibility as a "priced" risk factor. 
 In support of the underperformance hypothesis of socially responsible portfolios, 
Renneboog et al. (2008a) document that socially responsible investment funds domiciled in 
Europe, North America, and Asia-Pacific significantly underperform their conventional 
market benchmarks by -2.2 to -6.5 percent per annum. Thus, in line with the 
underperformance hypothesis, the authors conclude that ESG screens tend to negatively 
impact on the returns of socially responsible investment funds. Any additional screen reduces 
the financial performance by 1 percent per annum, all else equal (Renneboog et al., 2008a). 
The implications of their findings support the theoretical notion that social responsibility is 
priced by the market, but that socially responsible investment funds are overpriced (Galema 
et al., 2008; Hamilton et al., 2003). 
 Much of the empirical evidence is in support of the equal-performance hypothesis, 
whereby neither socially responsible portfolios nor conventional stock portfolios over-or 
underperform relative to each other.  In other words, most studies find no significant 
difference between the risk-adjusted returns of socially responsible portfolios relative to 
conventional portfolios (Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Bauer et al., 2005; Geczy, et al., 2005; 
Kreander et al., 2005). These findings are consistent with a view that social responsibility is 
                                                 
21 Hamilton (1995) found that investors experienced negative abnormal returns holding publicly traded stocks, 
following the disclosure of negative news on environmental pollution as proxied by the EPA's Toxic Release 
Inventory (TRI). 
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not priced by the stock market (Hamilton et al., 1993). On a sample of US socially 
responsible mutual funds, Geczy et al. (2005) conclude that socially responsible screens 
impose a cost of merely 1 to 2 basis points per month. Similarly, Bauer et al. (2005) find no 
evidence of German, UK and US socially responsible mutual funds to perform significantly 
different relative to conventional funds, over the sample period from 1990 to 2001. Barnett 
and Salomon (2006) find a U-shaped relationship between the amount of socially responsible 
screens and the financial performance of socially responsible investment funds. More 
specifically, they argue that initially socially responsible investors pay a price for employing 
socially responsible screens, however, as the screening intensity reaches a maximum, the 
risk-adjusted returns are improved again (Barnett and Salomon, 2006). Finally, using a 
matched-pair technique on a sample of 60 socially responsible and conventional funds, 
Kreander et al. (2005) find no significant difference in the risk-adjusted returns between the 
two types of funds.  
 According to Hamilton et al.'s (1993) third hypothesis, if socially responsible 
portfolios have higher returns relative to conventional portfolios, stock markets will 
incorrectly price social responsibility. Such mispricing has been reported in several empirical 
and meta studies22 investigating socially responsible investment portfolios and several 
dimensions of social responsibility and ESG information (Beurden and Gössling, 2008; 
Kempf and Osthoff, 2007; Mallin et al., 1995; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 
2003). Based on a matched sample of UK ethical mutual funds relative to non-ethical mutual 
funds, Mallin et al. (1995) find ethical funds to outperform both, their non-ethical 
counterparts and conventional equity market benchmarks. A related study (see e.g. Kempf 
and Osthoff, 2007) investigates the implications of two competing investment trading 
strategies of buying stocks with high social responsibility and selling stocks with low social 
responsibility. The authors report that such a long/short trading strategy is capable of 
generating abnormal returns of 8.7 percent per annum (Kempf and Osthoff, 2007). Some 
evidence of socially responsible criteria not being fully valued by the stock markets has also 
been reported (Edmans, 2011). The study finds an abnormal performance of an investment 
trading strategy, based on a portfolio of firms with strong employee satisfaction, that 
outperforms conventional portfolios by 3.5 percent per annum (Edmans, 2011). One reason 
for the outperformance, the author suggests, is related to mispricing, whereby high employee 
                                                 
22 Several meta studies (see e.g. Beurden and Gössling, 2008; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003) 
document a slightly positive performance difference in favour of socially responsible portfolios relative to 
conventional ones. 
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satisfaction causes higher firm value which the stock market fails to recognise immediately 
(Edmans, 2011). The mispricing, i.e. the abnormal performance of socially responsible 
criteria found in Edman's study persists for several years until it is corrected by the stock 
market.23 This finding is at odds with the Efficient Market Theory, as social responsibility or 
any ESG variable that is beneficial to the value of a firm should be quickly incorporated and 
not lead to any prolonged excess returns over time (Edmans, 2011). 
 In summary, whether social responsibility or ESG information is "priced" by the stock 
market has been intensely debated in the empirical literature and to a much lesser extent in 
the theoretical literature (Three formal theoretical approaches have been proposed by Dam 
and Scholtens, 2015; Heinkel et al, 2001; Mackey et al., 2007)24. To empirically analyse 
whether ESG information is "priced" by the market, Hamilton et al. (1993) suggest three 
alternative hypotheses (equal performance, underperformance, or overperformance) based on 
the risk-adjusted returns of socially responsible portfolios relative to conventional portfolios. 
The under- or overperformance hypotheses are consistent with a world where socially 
responsible criteria is "priced" by the markets. The underperformance hypothesis indicates 
excess demand for socially responsible firms and leads to overpricing of these firms (Galema 
et al.,2008; Hamilton et al., 1993). In contrast, the overperformance hypothesis indicates that 
investors "consistently underestimate the probability that negative information will be 
released about companies that are not socially responsible" (Hamilton et al., 1993:64). In a 
world where the equal performance hypothesis holds, social responsibility is not priced by the 
market. A lot of empirical evidence has been devoted to testing Hamilton et al.'s three 
hypotheses, with mixed results. 
2.6 Systematic risk, Idiosyncratic risk, and Diversification 
The Theory of Efficient Markets assumes investors to be "...rational, profit-maximizers 
actively competing, with each trying to predict future market values of individual 
securities..." (Fama, 1995:4). These rational investors are essentially interested in earning the 
highest returns possible given a chosen level of risk (Fama, 1970). One possibility, as Fama 
notes is "to posit that equilibrium prices (or expected returns) on securities are generated as in 
                                                 
23 Edmans (2011) shows that abnormal returns declined and completely disappeared after 5 years. 
24 Building on the theoretical frameworks of Heinkel et al. (2001) and Mackey et al. (2007), Dam and Scholtens 
(2015) argue that from an external (investor) perspective, social responsibility is associated with a higher market 
value relative to book value, as the assets of socially responsible companies are priced higher than the assets of 
irresponsible companies due to less demand for irresponsible companies. As mentioned previously, this 
argumentation links up to the theoretical debate on demand differences (See e.g. Fama and French, 2007; 
Galema et al., 2008; Hamilton et al., 1993).   
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the 'two parameter' Sharpe [40]  Lintner [24,25] world" (Fama, 1970:384). The "two 
parameter world" Fama refers to in his paper, is also known as the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1964). 
 In the CAPM model, risk is represented by the "beta coefficient", which is also 
referred to as "systematic risk" (Ross et al., 2008:418). Beta can be computed by the sum of 
the sample covariance between the excess returns on a portfolio (x) and the excess returns on 
a market index (y)25 (Black et al., 1972; Brooks, 2008). The CAPM model can be formally 
expressed by the following equation: 
( ) [ ( ) ]* (1)i f M f iE R R E R R     
where, fR  is the return on some risk-free rate. ( )M fE R R , represents the risk-adjusted 
return on a market index. i , refers to systematic risk.  
 In other words, beta measures the exposure of portfolio (x) to the movements of 
market index (y) (Bodie et al., 2008). Thus, in an efficient market, rational investors will be 
compensated with a higher expected return if they take on more risks or higher beta 
portfolios/stocks (Fama, 1970).   
 Systematic risks refer to those risks that affect all firms in a portfolio or stock market 
that cannot be simply eliminated by diversification (Bodie et al., 2008). For example, 
Statman (1987) argues that at least 30 stocks are required for a well diversified portfolio. 
Other commentators suggest to hold over 30 stocks domestically and internationally (Solnik, 
1995). The risk that remains after diversification is systematic (Bodie et al., 2008). Examples 
of systematic risks generally relate to macro-economic variables such as interest rates, 
inflation, industrial production, oil prices, regulations, economic recessions, and war (Chen et 
al., 1986; Gilson and Kraakman, 2014; Hamilton, 1983). While systematic risks have been 
predominantly associated with economic factors in the past, more recently, systematic risks 
have also been associated with environmental, social and governance risks. Environmental 
risks such as climate change risks increase the likelihood of earthquakes and other weather 
anomalies that could affect entire stock markets (see e.g. Liesen, 2012; Pinkse and Kolk, 
2009). Systematic risks related to governance issues could be political risks (Bekaert et al., 
2014; Click, 2005). For example, these risks could include governments seizing private assets 
and imposing unexpected taxes or royalties on company profits across entire stock markets 
                                                 
25 Or more formally expressed in the following equation (Brooks, 2008): 2
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(Bekaert et al., 2014; Brewer, 1983). Other examples of political risks are driven by social 
upheaval and could include terrorism and civil war (Click, 2005).  
 Several scholars (see e.g. Aupperle and Van Pham, 1989; Oikonomou et al., 2012) 
have found evidence that environmental, social, and governance risks increase systematic 
risk. In particular, Oikonomou et al., (2012) show that a firm's community concerns26 are 
positively related to measures of systematic risk (proxied by beta, as computed in Equation 
2), based on a large sample of US firms.    
 Legislation is one of the channels through which external systematic risks related to 
environmental, social, and governance issues become internalised. Legislation is a systematic 
risk because once a law is in place it will affect all companies in a portfolio or stock market. 
ESG related legislation would be no exception. For example, Renneboog et al., (2008b) and 
Richardson (2008) provide excellent summaries of national legislatory initiatives in the 
context of socially responsible investing in different countries. The authors expect the 
number of ESG related legislation to increase in the future27. 
 In contrast to systematic risks, risks that can be diversified away are referred to as 
unsystematic, diversifiable, or idiosyncratic risks (Bodie et al., 2008). These risks are usually 
firm, or industry-specific. According to the Efficient Markets Theory and Modern Portfolio 
Theory, rational investors receive higher compensation for taking higher systematic risks 
(Markowitz, 1952). As idiosyncratic risks can be eliminated through diversification in an 
efficient market, systematic risks tend to be the risks rational investors care about 
(Markowitz, 1952).  
 However, idiosyncratic risks matter as well, especially in the context of socially 
responsible investors, who include environmental, social, and governance (ESG) risks in their 
asset allocation decisions.28 According to the Efficient Market Theory, socially responsible 
investors are not seen as fully rational investors, but as investors with "...an extreme form of 
tastes for assets of consumption goods...", rather than rational investors who purely focus on 
maximising risk-adjusted returns (Fama and French, 2007:675). Thus, the socially 
responsible investor's utility is not only constrained to maximising risk-adjusted returns, but 
environmental, social, and governance considerations matter to a great extent, whereby 
                                                 
26 These are defined as "Investment controversies, negative economic impacts, tax disputes, and other concerns" 
(Oikonomou et al., 2012:493). 
27 Some examples of ESG-related regulatory initiatives can be found in the UK's amendment to the Pensions Act 
(1995), German Renewable Energy Act, or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404.  
28 In contrast to proponents of the Efficient Market Theory and the rational agent model, Behavioural Finance 
scholars argue that idiosyncratic risks matter more to Arbitrageurs relative to systematic risks as they tend to be 
highly specialised and less diversified investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
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socially responsible investors are willing to accept lower returns if their portfolio's social 
aims are met (Renneboog, 2008a). Bollen (2007) calls the socially responsible investor's 
utility a "multi-attribute" utility function that also incorporates personal and social beliefs. 
2.6.1 Diversification and ESG information 
Critics of socially responsible investing tend to argue that socially responsible portfolios will 
always underperform relative to conventional portfolios due to diversification29 penalties 
(Hoepner, 2010; Kurtz, 2005; Rudd, 1981). They argue that under Modern Portfolio Theory, 
ESG screens (or any screen for that matter) reduce the investible universe and leave the 
investor with a suboptimal portfolio (Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964). A suboptimal 
portfolio within the mean-variance efficiency frontier that is tilted towards a less favourable 
risk-return tradeoff relative to conventional portfolios (Renneboog et al., 2008a). 
 While this seems plausible from a theoretical perspective, empirical evidence has 
shown that a reduced stock universe does not necessarily lead to less diversified portfolios 
and lower risk-adjusted returns.30 For example, Bello (2005) investigates the effect of 
diversification on investment performance between socially responsible funds relative to 
conventional funds and finds no difference between these funds. Other studies report that 
even passive socially responsible investment portfolios, such as socially responsible equity 
indexes, generate competitive risk-adjusted returns relative to conventional equity indexes 
(Kurtz, 2005; Schröder, 2007). Thus, the return reducing effects of ESG screens on the 
diversification of portfolios are not certain (Bello, 2005). 
 More recent studies (see e.g. Hoepner, 2010) even challenge the widely held belief 
that ESG screens negatively affect portfolio diversification on the following two grounds. 
First, ignoring ESG screens could be financially detrimental. This results from the fact that 
diversification recommends investors to spread their assets across sectors and asset classes, 
regardless of whether certain assets are involved in controversies that could potentially harm 
their future financial value (e.g. BP's oil spill or Fukushima Daiichi's nuclear disaster)31. 
Second, several studies have highlighted the idiosyncratic risk mitigating effect of employing 
ESG screens (see e.g. Bauer et al., 2009; Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria, 2004; Lee and Faff, 
                                                 
29 Portfolio diversification is a function of a) number of stocks, b) correlation between stocks, and c) standard 
deviation of stocks (Markowitz, 1952).  
30 Kacperczyk et al. (2005) show that skilled mutual fund managers could deviate from well-diversified 
portfolios to more concentrated holdings in industries when they believe to have informational advantages. On a 
sample of US mutual funds, the authors find that more concentrated funds perform better than well-diversified 
funds (Kacperczyk et al., 2005). 
31 Both of which have led to substantial fines for BP and Daiichi. For example, BP's oil spill will cost the 
company about 90 billion US Dollars in environmental liabilities (Chazan and Crooks, 2013).   
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2009; Mishra and Modi, 2013). Although advocates of Modern Portfolio Theory would argue 
that diversification alone eliminates idiosyncratic risks, as mentioned previously, portfolio 
diversification is a function of a) number of stocks, b) correlation between stocks, and c) 
standard deviation of stocks (Markowitz, 1952), whereby c) includes both, systematic and 
idiosyncratic risks (Hoepner, 2010). If the literature on the idiosyncratic risk reducing effect 
through ESG screens is correct, then a risk reduction will also affect the total risk, i.e. 
standard deviation and therefore the diversification of portfolios.  
 Not only from the perspective of socially responsible investors, conventional Finance 
scholars have started to question the power of diversification also (see e.g. Pukthuanthong 
and Roll, 2015). Empirical findings show that the annualised volatilities of portfolios are 
often about half as large as the volatilities of the same portfolios' constituents (Pukthuanthong 
and Roll, 2015). Even very well-diversified portfolios can be extremely volatile 
(Pukthuanthong and Roll, 2015). The authors show that on a portfolio basis, the S&P 500 had 
an average annualised volatility of 16.3 percent, while the individual constituents of the S&P 
500 in aggregate amounted to an average annualised volatility of 36.1 percent, over the same 
time period. 
2.7 Joint Hypothesis Problem: Simultaneous Tests of Market Efficiency and 
Models of Market Equilibrium 
Any empirical test of the Efficient Market Theory is subject to the so called "Joint Hypothesis 
Problem", which is regarded a serious issue in market efficiency tests (Fama, 1970, 1976). 
According to Fama (1991) the "Joint Hypothesis Problem" increases the complexity of 
testing for market efficiency. In fact, any test for market efficiency will always be a joint test 
of market behaviour and models of asset pricing (Dimson and Mussavian, 1998). Thus, if a 
study concludes that stock markets are inefficient, it could well be that the asset pricing 
model used in the study to test for market efficiency is a bad model of expected returns, for 
example, due to misspecifications relating to omitted variables or insufficient explanatory 
power (Dimson and Mussavian, 1998). 
 If anomalies (or stock market inefficiencies) persist over time and remain after testing 
different specifications of asset pricing models, then one could have found a real market 
inefficiency. However, this is not guaranteed. As the distinction between real market 
inefficiency and bad model of market equilibrium is very "ambiguous" (Fama, 1991:1576).  
As a result, the Efficient Market Theory is not an empirically testable proposition because 
one can never be entirely certain whether the observed anomaly is attributable to market 
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inefficiency or driven by a poor model of market equilibrium (Alajbeg et al., 2012). Or as 
Fama puts it, "The joint-hypothesis problem is more serious. Thus, market efficiency per se is 
not testable." (Fama, 1991:1575). 
2.8 Critics of the Efficient Market Theory 
In the following chapter, I will address the main critics of the Efficient Market Theory. The 
first camp of critics is generally supportive of the notion of efficient capital markets, 
however, criticise the models of market equilibrium used to test for efficient capital markets, 
as they continue to find stock market anomalies (or potential profit opportunities). The 
second camp of critics is more fundamental and questions one of the cornerstones of market 
efficiency: the rational agent model (Barberis and Thaler, 2002). Both camps provide 
alternative perspectives on the shortcomings of the Efficient Market Theory.      
2.8.1 Stock Market Anomalies32 
As mentioned in Chapter 2.2 "Definition of the Efficient Market Theory", according to the 
Efficient Market Theory, no investment strategy should yield abnormal risk-adjusted returns. 
Yet, the academic finance community has identified and documented over 100 investment 
strategies, i.e. stock market anomalies, that outperform passive investment strategies such as 
passive equity indexes, in the past (Subrahmanyam, 2010; Jacobs, 2015). The appearance of 
anomalies or potential profit opportunities is not consistent with the Efficient Market Theory 
(Schwert, 2003). Among the many stock market anomalies, the first to be documented was 
the value anomaly (Basu, 1977, 1983). Basu (1977) showed that firms with low 
Price/Earnings ratios financially outperformed firms with high Price/Earnings ratios by over 
7% per annum. Based on these findings, Basu (1977) concluded that firms trading at different 
Price/Earnings ratios have been incorrectly priced by the market and therefore offer 
"abnormal" returns. The value anomaly uncovered by Basu (1977) was followed by another 
well documented anomaly: the size anomaly or the "small-firm effect" (Banz 1981; 
Reinganum 1981). From 1931 to 1975, Banz (1981) found that the 50 smallest stocks on the 
New York Stock Exchange outperformed the 50 largest stocks by about 1% per month. Banz' 
(1981) finding of a size anomaly was confirmed in different stock exchanges all over the 
world (See e.g. Dimson and Marsh, 1989). Since the discovery of the "small-firm effect" in 
the literature, the anomaly seems to have disappeared (Schwert, 2003). The disappearance of 
an anomaly would strengthen the argument that an actual market inefficiency existed, but had 
                                                 
32 These are also referred to as "Cross-sectional tests of return predictability" (Kothari, 2001:110) 
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been corrected after its publication. In addition to the value and size anomalies reported in the 
literature, other well elaborated stock market anomalies are related to calendar and seasonal 
effects such as January, Weekend, Month of the year, Week of the month, Day of the week, 
and Hour of the day effects (Ariel, 1987; French, 1980; Harris, 1986; Keim 1983; Reinganum 
1983; Rozeff and Kinney, 1976). Studies of calendar and seasonal effects tend to find 
empirical evidence for abnormal (positive or negative) returns during these periods. 
However, explanations for why calendar and seasonal effects exists are inconsistent (Dimson 
and Mussavian, 1998).  
 Another well known anomaly is the momentum effect (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; 
Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). While Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that investment 
strategies based on buying past winners and selling past losers in the short-term generate 
abnormal returns of about 12 percent over the sample period from 1965 to 1989, on average, 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) show that investment trading strategies buying past losers and 
selling past winners in the long-term outperforms. It is therefore not surprising that 
investment opportunities based on momentum investing have been found to appear and 
disappear depending on the time period tested (Schwert, 2002).  
 Finally, some anomalies such as the Initial Public Offerings (IPO) effect are still 
debated fiercely (Ritter, 1991). The IPO anomaly indicates that an investment strategy 
investing in IPO's over the sample period from 1975 to 1984 substantially underperformed 
their benchmarks in the long-term (Ritter, 1991). It seems that over-optimistic investors tend 
to systematically over-estimate the value of freshly listed growth companies which results in 
stock price reversals and financial underperformance over the long-term (Ritter, 1991). 
 While the existence of stock market anomalies would generally indicate capital 
market inefficiency, this cannot be concluded with certainty for mainly two reasons. First, 
scholars who have discovered anomalies in stock markets in the past have most likely 
contributed to the efficiency of capital markets by explicitly highlighting successful trading 
strategies to investors in the real world. The disappearance, reversal, or re-appearance of past 
anomalies strengthens this point (Schwert, 2003). Second, due to the joint hypothesis issue, 
the existence of an anomaly does not necessarily deem capital markets inefficient, as the 
inefficiency could also lie with the tested model of market equilibrium, i.e. asset pricing 
model (Schwert, 2003)33. 
                                                 
33 I discuss the Joint Hypothesis Problem in more detail in Section 2.7. "Joint Hypothesis Problem: 
Simultaneous Tests of Market Efficiency and Models of Market Equilibrium". 
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 With the joint hypothesis issue in mind, several authors have claimed that stock 
market anomalies are driven by methodological biases and are not the result of actual market 
inefficiencies. Based on the size and value anomalies reported in the literature (see e.g. Banz, 
1981; Basu, 1977, 1983; Reinganum 1981), and the apparent failure of the CAPM to explain 
the cross-section of average stock-returns, Fama and French (1992, 1993) have suggested to 
include two risk factors that proxy for the observed size and value anomaly, to extend the 
CAPM to a three-factor model (Fama, 2007). Similarly, as Fama and French's three-factor 
model did not account for the momentum anomaly, which was comprehensively documented 
in Jegadeesh and Titman's (1993) study, Carhart (1997) proposed a four-factor model that 
incorporates a momentum variable and extends Fama and French's three-factor model.  
 The bottom line is that observed stock market anomalies are always exposed to the 
Joint Hypothesis Problem. Whether one has found an actual stock market anomaly, or 
whether the anomaly appears to be driven partly or fully by a faulty equilibrium market 
model is very ambiguous. Thus, one will hardly conclude with certainty whether observed 
anomalies make the market inefficient. 
2.8.2 Behavioural Finance Critique 
While the base assumption of the anomalies literature is that of market efficiency in the spirit 
of Fama, the Behavioural Finance critique is more fundamental and questions one of the 
cornerstones of market efficiency: the rational agent model (Barberis and Thaler, 2002). The 
behavioural critique argues that financial markets are not expected to be efficient, and that 
"...systematic and significant deviations from efficiency are expected to persist for long 
periods of time." (Shleifer, 2000:1). The two main critiques of Behavioural Finance 
proponents on the Efficient Market Theory are limits to Arbitrage and psychological biases 
that make investors less rational than the rational agent model assumes (Barberis and Thaler, 
2002; Bodie et al., 2008; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). According to the Efficient Market 
Theory, rational arbitrageurs quickly eliminate all mispricing of security prices (at zero cost), 
which in turn discourages active investors to search for mispriced securities (making it 
impossible to profit from mispricing). The Arbitrage argument is criticised by proponents of 
Behavioural Finance because mispricing in stock markets could persist due to risky and 
costly Arbitrage strategies, which could lead to considerable mispricing for some time 
(Barberis and Thaler, 2002; Shleifer, 2000). Arbitrage strategies have been found to be 
exposed to the following two risks: Fundamental and Noise trader risk (Barberis and Thaler, 
2002; De Long et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Fundamental risk is the risk of 
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falling stock prices that rational arbitrageurs eliminate by simultaneously investing in one 
security and shorting an identical substitute security (Barberis and Thaler, 2002). This 
investment strategy is problematic because perfect substitute securities only rarely exist 
(Shleifer, 2000). Another limit to arbitrage, Noise trader risk, is related to the idea that 
mispricing opportunities turn into mispricing threats for rational arbitrageurs, due to a 
worsening of their Arbitrage position (Barberis and Thaler, 2002). De Long et al. (1990) 
argue that noise traders, these are traders with erroneous beliefs who trade on noise rather 
than information, make it difficult for rational arbitrageurs to exploit mispricing. The 
unpredictability of noise traders' future opinions about stocks could lead to a persistent 
divergence of the stock's fundamental value (Barberis and Thaler, 2002). Behavioural 
Finance scholars also oppose the idea of costless Arbitrage strategies. They argue that 
transaction costs such as commissions and other fund related fees can increase the cost of 
Arbitrage and thereby reduce the attractiveness of such opportunities (see e.g. Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997).    
 In addition to the limits of Arbitrage, proponents of Behavioural Finance criticise the 
rational agent model because they have found evidence that agents are prone to certain 
cognitive biases when forming beliefs. For example, the works of psychologists (see 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1974; Weinstein, 1980) have shown that people tend to be subjected 
to the following psychological biases when making decisions and forming beliefs under 
uncertainty: Anchoring, Availability Biases, Conservatism, Overconfidence, 
Representativeness, Optimism, and Wishful Thinking.34 To give one example, Weinstein 
(1980) has found that people tend to be overoptimistic when estimating probabilities about 
future events. Other psychological biases such as Anchoring show that when people estimate 
probabilities and are given an arbitrary starting value, their estimate will be strongly 
influenced by this starting value and not deviate too much from the "anchor" (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1974).   
 To sum up, the Behavioural Finance critique addresses the cornerstone of the 
Efficient Market Theory: the rational agent model. Proponents of Behavioural Finance argue 
that limits to arbitrage and cognitive biases tend to question the rationality of agents. More 
specifically, they argue that mispricing of security prices can persist because arbitrage 
strategies could be costly and risky, as opposed to the traditionally held view among Efficient 
                                                 
34 For more insights on Behavioural Finance and cognitive biases, the reader is referred to an extensive literature 
survey by Barberis and Thaler (2002). 
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Market Theorists that such strategies are costless and risk-free. Furthermore, agents are 
subject to cognitive biases that can lead to substantial deviations from rationality. 
2.9 Conclusion 
To conclude, my chapter aimed to discuss the theoretical roots of my thesis within the context 
of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. In so doing, I outlined the brief history, definitions, 
theoretical assumptions, and previous empirical tests of Market Efficiency and the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis. The second part of my chapter was concerned with the relevance of ESG 
information in light of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. To be more specific, my chapter 
seeked to contrast systematic and idiosyncratic risks as well as outline the role of 
diversification (under Modern Portfolio Theory) with respect to ESG information. Further, 
my chapter highlighted the complexity of interpreting empirical tests or findings of Market 
Efficiency via the Joint Hypothesis Problem (bad model vs. real market inefficiency). 
Overall, the chapter was a starting point to locate my thesis and my underlying 
methodological approach within the Efficient Market Theory as well as to guide me in 
outlining my empirical results and their implications for Market Efficiency.     
  
47 
3 Methodological Positions and Research Methodology 
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3.1 Introduction 
The principal goal of this chapter is to explore the core philosophical assumptions (ontology, 
epistemology, human nature, and methodology) and well established research paradigms 
about the nature of social science and society, to elaborate on the assumptions related to each 
paradigm, and to then be able to position my thesis within the context of a research paradigm. 
Further, this chapter aims to discuss the research paradigm most commonly followed in 
Finance research and my thesis as well as to delineate potential limitations of my chosen 
research paradigm with respect to the approaches and methods that characterise it. The 
second part of this chapter will focus and expand on the choice of my research methodology 
and highlight the nature of my empirical methods applied in this thesis.  
 The methodological positioning of my thesis is guided by Burrell and Morgan's 
(1979) influential work on social theory. Burrell and Morgan's framework categorises 
existing sociological and organisational theories into specific research paradigms based on 
the underlying philosophical assumptions embedded in a theory (Louis, 1983). The 
framework has had an immense impact as it helped researchers better understand and classify 
theories and other researchers' approaches and methods. Thus, to locate my research within 
one of Burrell and Morgan's (1979) research paradigms, requires the identification of my 
approach to social science on a spectrum of the subjective-objective nature of science. Burrell 
& Morgan (1979) outline four core assumptions concerning ontology, epistemology, human 
nature, and methodology to delineate the subjective or objective nature of science.  
Ontology describes assumptions made regarding the phenomena under study. On one 
extreme, the phenomenon is objective and external to the researcher, while on the other 
extreme, the phenomenon is subjective and the product of the researcher’s mind (Bettner et 
al., 1994; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Lagoarde-Segot, 2015).  
Epistemology describes assumptions made concerning the nature of knowledge. It 
helps to define how a researcher perceives knowledge creation, whereby the researcher 
distinguishes between knowledge that exists external to the researcher and can be acquired, 
and knowledge that comes to existence through personal experiences (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979; Lagoarde-Segot, 2015).  
Human nature is concerned with the interaction of human beings with each other and 
their external environment (Bettner et al., 1994; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Lagoarde-Segot, 
2015).  
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Methodology is concerned with the approaches to research and how one can create 
meaning of the phenomena under study and the social world in which it is situated (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). While the nomothetic approach is characterised by testing hypotheses 
about phenomena that are distant to the researcher using quantitative methods to analyse data, 
the ideographic approach is analysing phenomena closer to the researcher using in-depth 
ethnographic techniques to obtain knowledge about specific phenomena (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979; Hurt and Callahan, 2013). 
 In addition to identifying where I stand on the subjective or objective dimension of 
the nature of science, it is equally important to discuss assumptions about the nature of 
society (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Burrell and Morgan (1979) suggest to discuss 
assumptions about the nature of society along the regulation-radical change dimension. The 
regulation dimension is concerned with "the need for regulation in human affairs", and 
assumes unity of society in the status quo (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:17; Lagoarde-Segot, 
2015). In contrast, the radical change dimension is concerned about the emancipation of 
people within existing structures that hinder their potential for development, and assumes 
disagreement of society, intending to break the status quo and developing alternatives 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979:17; Lagoarde-Segot, 2015).   
3.2 The Burrell and Morgan Matrix 
Figure 1 depicts Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) Four Paradigm Model of Social Theory in a 2 
by 2 matrix, distinguishing between four mutually exclusive research paradigms: Radical 
humanist, Radical structuralist, Interpretive, and Functionalist (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Figure 1: Four Paradigm Model of Social Theory (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) 
SUBJECTIVE 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGE 
OBJECTIVE 
'Radical humanist' Radical structuralist' 
'Interpretive' 'Functionalist' 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF REGULATION 
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3.2.1 Interpretive 
The Interpretive paradigm views the social world as socially-constructed by individuals 
(Ardalan, 2003). Therefore, it believes that the social world is influenced by human values 
and objective analysis will be unable to uncover the truth (Hurt and Callahan, 2013). This 
research paradigm is characterised by seeking to understand and provide meaning to the 
social world (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Researchers are subjective and initially analyse 
phenomena by observation techniques to later access, deepen and confirm their observations 
to generate meaningful understanding of the phenomenon (Ardalan, 2003; Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979).  
3.2.2 Radical humanist 
The Radical humanist research paradigm, similar to the Interpretive paradigm is a subjectivist 
approach which views the social world as socially-constructed (Hassard, 1991). In this 
research paradigm individuals are seen as "...the prisoners of the (social) world they create", 
and are therefore in a constant battle to challenge and critique ideological superstructures and 
domination by empowering and emancipating individuals to change the status quo (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979; Hassard, 1991:278). Researchers are subjective and in addition to 
describing certain phenomena, they aim to instil change by critique and alternative action 
plans on challenging the status quo (Hurt and Callahan, 2013). 
3.2.3 Radical structuralist 
The Radical structuralist research paradigm views the social world as existing and factual 
(Hassard, 1991). Thus, it seeks to uncover domination struggles within existing social 
structures, to inform and convince individuals stuck in those structures to revise and change 
the structures (Hurt and Callahan, 2013). In order to uncover power struggles, the Radical 
structuralist highlights flaws in structural relationships in society (Hurt and Callahan, 2013). 
Researchers are objectivists, meaning that quantitative research is valid in this paradigm 
(Bettner et al., 1994). 
3.2.4 Functionalist 
This research paradigm assumes that society concretely exists and rules dictate a certain order 
(Ardalan, 2003). The functionalist paradigm is characterised by seeking rational explanations 
to social affairs, highly pragmatic, and described as a problem-oriented approach which seeks 
"to provide practical solutions to practical problems" (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:26; Hurt and 
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Callahan, 2013). Researchers are objectivists and analyse phenomena by excluding 
themselves from the object under study and analyse it by empirical and technical means, 
similar to how natural scientists operate (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
 In the following chapter, I will aim to position my thesis within the context of the 
Functionalist research paradigm with a focus on Finance research. 
3.3 Functionalist Paradigm in Finance Research 
"Academic finance probably constitutes one of the best examples of the functionalist 
paradigm within the social sciences" (Lagoarde-Segot, 2015:6). Many authors have come to 
conclude that the functionalist research paradigm is the framework for finance research 
(Ardalan, 2003, 2005, 2010; Bettner et al., 1994; Lagoarde-Segot, 2015). The functionalist 
reserach paradigm has been applied in various contexts in finance research such as money 
and capital market theories (Ardalan, 2003; Bettner et al., 1994; Lagoarde-Segot, 2015). 
 In order to position how the functionalist paradigm applies to finance research and my 
thesis, I aim for a brief analysis of the four underlying core assumptions with respect to 
ontology, epistemology, human nature, and methodology that characterise the nature of 
science and society of the functionalist paradigm in the context of finance. 
 With respect to Ontology, finance research finds its roots in the objectivist ontology. 
Capital markets (e.g. stock market) are treated similar to the natural world, assuming stable 
and tangible structures (Lagoarde-Segot, 2015). Finance researchers perceive capital markets 
as objective and external to themselves (Lagoarde-Segot, 2015). Further, financial institutions 
and financial behaviour, which are both parts of the capital market, also exist separately in 
the social world (Lagoarde-Segot, 2015). 
 In terms of Epistemology, finance research is driven by a positivist Epistemology. 
The object under study (such as the capital market) is seen as an external entity that is 
governed by certain regulations which the researcher can uncover by using cause and effect 
mechanisms such as statistical causality (Bettner et al., 1994; Lagoarde-Segot, 2015).  
 Assumptions about Human nature in finance research generally describe human 
beings as profit seeking and rational agents (Lagoarde-Segot, 2015). Individual rational 
investors thus contribute to the efficient allocation of capital and price determination in the 
market. External shocks such as macro-economic influences (e.g. unemployment estimates) 
cause the investors to rapidly re-allocate capital and to determine new price levels of assets 
(Lagoarde-Segot, 2015). 
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 Finally, the methodology of finance research commonly uses quantitative 
methodologies to measure and explain certain financial activity. It assumes that any and all 
financial activity is quantifiable, and therefore can be used as input for statistical analysis 
(Bettner et al., 1994).  
3.4 Functionalist Paradigm in my Thesis 
The functionalist research paradigm is the perspective of this thesis. While I acknowledge the 
existence of other worldviews and potential alternative truths, I accept the limitations that 
arise from the functionalist research paradigm. 
 Finance theories such as the Efficient Market Theory, Modern Portfolio Theory, or 
Capital Asset Pricing Theory are generally assessed from the functionalist research paradigm 
(Ardalan, 2003). It is assumed that finance theories can be objectively evaluated by reference 
to empirical evidence, and based on that evidence accepted or rejected (Ardalan, 2003). To 
give one example, and in the case of the Efficient Market Theory, Fama (1970:384) notes, 
that a statement describing efficient markets, in that "efficient market prices fully reflect 
available information" is too broad and general for any empirical test and therefore should be 
more specifically formulated. To make Efficient Market Theory empirically testable, Fama 
suggested three sub-groups of market efficiency: weak, semi-strong, and strong-form 
efficient markets (Fama, 1970). In order to support or refute the Efficient Market Theory, 
numerous empirical studies have since been performed (Dimson and Mussavian, 1998; Fama, 
1970; Kothari, 2001).  
 To give one example, from the functionalist perspective, assumptions about the 
human nature of the Efficient Market Theory are based on some form of basic general 
equilibrium model (e.g. fair game expected return model see Fama, 1970). Individuals who 
participate in stock investing are assumed to be rational human beings with the utility to 
maximise profits. Within the functionalist paradigm, one stock price is treated as any other 
stock price and is only influenced by new information on system-wide economic 
developments such as inflation, interest rates, unemployment figures and company specific 
information such as earnings, contracts, cost reductions. These information flows are external 
to the rational agent who is buying and selling stocks. Meaning that the agent is merely 
playing a passive role and the forces of setting the stock price are determined by the external 
environment (Ardalan, 2003).  
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3.5 Limitations of the Functionalist Research Paradigm 
The major limitation to explicitly or implicitly view the world from one specific research 
paradigm could be the distortion of the "truth" (Hurt and Callahan, 2013:37). What seems to 
be the finding about a phenomenon under study from one perspective, might not reflect the 
same finding from another perspective. Using a fairy tale to describe Burrell and Morgan's 
four research paradigms, Hurt and Callahan (2013) illustrate that unless a researcher adopts 
all four world views, he will most likely never uncover the truth. The "home paradigm" in 
finance research is most closely related to the functionalist research paradigm as outlined 
previously.  
 For example, the functionalist paradigm in finance research requires financial 
activities to be quantifiable. Bettner et al. (1994) illustrate that finance researchers treat the 
concept of debt similar to how a natural scientist treats protons. The capital structures of 
corporations are treated equally, debt in one company is indistinguishable from debt in 
another company (Bettner et al., 1994). However, in some cases financial activity might not 
be perfectly quantifiable as with debt. Also, it could be that more than one proxy describe the 
same phenomena under study, or even worse, none of the chosen proxies describe what we 
think they describe. To give one example, a company's goodwill is hard to proxy for as it 
represents corporate reputation in excess of the book value of a company that could be 
perceived subjectively from one potential acquirer to another. Thus, having to deal with 
imperfect proxies could be seen as a major limitation to the functionalist paradigm in finance 
research. 
 Another possibly more important limitation of the functionalist paradigm in finance 
research is related to the assumption about human nature, i.e. rational human beings with 
their only utility to maximise profits. This assumption is a cornerstone of the Efficient Market 
Theory (Fama, 1970). In the context of socially responsible investors this assumption can be 
somewhat relaxed. Socially responsible investors' utility is not only targeted at financial 
outcomes, but social outcomes of their investments matter as well (Hamilton et al., 1993). As 
Fama (2007:675) notes, socially responsible investors are not seen as rational investors in the 
traditional finance view of the world, however, as investors with "...an extreme form of 
tastes...". Meaning that because of their tastes for certain assets, i.e. socially responsible or 
ethical assets, they are willing to sacrifice financial returns, which rational investors would 
not do. 
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 Similarly, proponents of Behavioural Finance seem to question the assumptions of 
investor rationality on the basis of limits to arbitrage35 and psychological biases which have 
been documented in the literature (Barberis and Thaler, 2002; Bodie et al., 2008). To the first 
point, they argue that mispricing in stock markets could persist due to very risky and costly 
arbitrage strategies (Barberis and Thaler, 2002). Thus, the limits to arbitrage can allow 
substantial mispricing and prices to be "wrong" for a very long time (Barberis and Thaler, 
2002; Shleifer, 2000). The work of psychologists shows that actual people make choices and 
form expectations very different to a rational person. The work of Kahneman and Tversky 
(1974) has shown that people are prone to cognitive biases, such as Representativeness, 
Availability, and Adjustment and Anchoring, which all have effects on how they judge the 
probability of future outcomes. Other examples of psychological biases include 
Overconfidence, Optimism and Wishful Thinking (Barberis and Thaler, 2002; Shleifer, 
2000). Chapter 2.8.2. 'Behavioural Finance Critique', discusses the Behavioural Finance 
critique of the Efficient Market Theory in somewhat more detail. 
 In conclusion, Burrell and Morgan's (1979) influential Four Paradigm Model of 
Social Theory has guided me in defining the methodological position of my thesis, which can 
be best described by the functionalist research paradigm. Traditional empirical and theoretical 
Finance research such as the Efficient Market Theory, predominantly rely on the functionalist 
world view, because it is rooted in an objectivist Ontology, positivist Epistemology, rational 
Human Nature, and quantitative Methodologies. I have also shown major limitations to the 
core assumptions of the functionalist research paradigm in Finance. In particular, how the 
assumptions about the rationality of human beings have been challenged by socially 
responsible and behavioural finance scholars. 
3.6 Research Methodology 
Having discussed my methodological position in the previous chapter, this chapter will 
concentrate and expand on the choice of my research methodology and the nature of my 
empirical methods used in this thesis.  
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, methodology is concerned with the approaches 
to research and how one can make meaning of the phenomena under study and the social 
world (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Thus, based on the underlying assumptions of the four 
                                                 
35 Arbitrage is an investment strategy that provides "riskless profits at no cost" (Barberis and Thaler, 2002). For 
example, if a company is listed on two different stock exchanges qouted at different prices, then an Arbitrageur 
could buy the cheaper stock in one exchange and immediately sell the expensive stock in the second exchange, 
making a profit on the price differential between the two exchanges (Bodie et al., 2008). 
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research paradigms analysed in the previous chapter, each research paradigm is characterised 
by certain approaches to methodology. For example, the "nomothetic" approach is concerned 
with hypothesis testing and quantitative methods to analyse data, while the "ideographic" 
approach uses ethnographic techniques (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Hurt and Callahan, 2013). 
Scholars have come to characterise different approaches to methodology as qualitative, 
quantitative, or a combination of both, qualitative and quantitative research (see e.g. Bryman 
2004; Harwell, 2011). In my thesis, the functionalist perspective predominantly relies on a 
research methodology that is of a quantitative nature and is therefore more in line with the 
"nomothetic" approach described by Burrell and Morgan (1979). The quantitative research 
methodology is particularly prominent for studies in the field of finance, but also within the 
field of socially responsible investing, which can be understood as the intergration of 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) concerns into investment decision making, as it 
aims to empirically test hypotheses that correspond to research questions on the relationship 
between ESG concerns and the financial performance of companies (See e.g. Frooman, 1997; 
Orlitzky et al., 2003; Horváthová, 2010).  
 Quantitative researchers obtain findings by quantifying information, analysing data, 
testing hypotheses, and presenting implications of their findings in relation to the theoretical 
background (Bryman, 2004). This means that quantitative research is typically undertaken in 
a deductive manner, whereby hypotheses are deducted from theory, secondary data collected, 
and then empirically tested using statistical models (Bryman, 2004). However, not all 
quantiative research includes the explicit formulation of a hypothesis, rather "theory acts 
loosely as a set of concerns in relation to which the social researcher collects data" (Bryman, 
2004:63). 
 The distinct advantages and main concerns to quantitative researchers are those of 
"Causality", "Generalization", "Measurement", and "Replication" (Bryman, 2004; Harwell, 
2011). Quantitative research is interested in objectively explaining why certain relationships 
exist and go beyond describing them (Bryman, 2004). The aim is to quantify concepts and to 
test the casual relationships or make predictions based on the quantified concepts, which are 
generally referred to as dependent and independent variables (Brooks, 2008). Once a 
quantitative researcher has established that his empirical findings have not occured by 
chance, generalisations beyond the analysed sample to a wider population are very likely and 
perceived as an advantage over other forms of research methodologies (Given, 2008). Related 
to the concept of generalisation, another advantage of quantitative research is replicability 
(Bryman, 2004). The concept of replicability is essential to quantitative research and refers to 
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the ability of a researcher to replicate an existing study carried out by another researcher 
(Bryman, 2004). Thus, if a study lacks replicability, then it has only very little value for 
quantiative research (Given, 2008)36. 
 However, a main disadvantage of quantitative research is the notion of a lack of 
subjectivity (Bryman, 2004). In the pursuit of objectivity, quantitatitve researchers distance 
themselves from the object under study, assuming a separation between the social world and 
the objects within it (Bryman, 2004). This hinders the quantitative researcher in gaining in-
depth access and information of the objects under study (Bryman, 2004). In contrast, 
qualitative research does not make this distinction which allows it to engage with the object 
more closely and appreciate how the object understands and interprets its social world 
(Given, 2008). 
 In the following chapter, based on the beforementioned advantages and concerns to 
quantitative research, I will discuss the concepts of reliability and validity in the context of 
quantitative research, in somewhat more detail. 
3.6.1 Reliability and Validity 
In quantitative research, the two concepts of reliability and validity of an empirical analysis 
are seen as fairly crucial (Davis and Bremner, 2008). Reliability is concerned with the 
consistency of empirical relationships between concepts or variables (Davis and Bremner, 
2008). Most commonly, the consistency of relationships or outcomes can only be established 
through replication (Bryman, 2004; Davis and Bremner, 2008). Meaning that, observed 
realtionships or outcomes should not change substantially from one researcher to another, and 
neither over time. To give one example, quantitative researchers that observe a significantly 
positive relationship between ESG concerns and the financial performance of a firm should 
conclude the same findings independent of each other. Another aspect of judging the 
reliability of an empirical analysis is to investigate its stability (Bryman, 2004). More 
specifically, tests of temporal stability enable the quantitative researcher to conclude that the 
observed relationships between concepts or variables are consistent through time (Davis and 
Bremner, 2008). A simple test for temporal stability of an observed relationship is to analyse 
different sub-sample time periods based on a full sample time period. Ideally, the variation of 
the outcome should be low (Davis and Bremner, 2008). In other words, relationships are 
                                                 
36 This also explains the need for transparency regarding research methodologies and particularly research 
methods. A lack of transparency could increase the probability that researchers adpot an alternative 
interpretation or research process that leads to conflicting research findings. 
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considered stable only when the findings from the full sample time period do not differ 
substantially relative to its various sub-sample time periods.  
 In quantitative research, validity refers to internal and external validity, as well as the 
measurement problem of an empirical analysis, a concept, or a variable (Bryman, 2004; 
Given, 2008; Harwell, 2011). While internal validity is concerned with how well an empirical 
analysis has been performed by a researcher, external validity is concerned with the 
generalisability of empirical findings (Bryman, 2004). The measurement problem refers to 
the idea that a variable can only be a valid proxy for certain phenomena, when it explains 
what it claims to explain (Given, 2008; Harwell, 2011). Internal validity therefore refers to 
the inside of a study and is concerned with whether a study and empirical analysis was 
performed correcly with an emphasis on "...the procedures and operations used to conduct a 
research study..." (Leighton, 2010:620). To give one example, a study that investigates the 
relationship between ESG concerns and the financial performance of a company will achieve 
high internal validity if it concludes that no other variable such as the size of a company and 
other confounding effects, except ESG concerns caused the financial performance. External 
validity is concerned with the outside of a study and whether findings can be generalised to 
other contexts beyond the sample studied (Bryman, 2004; Leighton, 2010). The advantage of 
generalising findings of one study to a wider population is "...that the findings can be of 
benefit to many and not just a few." (Leighton, 2010:467). Thus, the concept of external 
validity adds to the replicability concern discussed above, highlighting the desire for 
consistent empirical findings between quantitative researchers, but also between different 
samples. For example, studies with high external validity (or generalisable research findings) 
will find the same relationship between ESG concerns and the financial performance in the 
US as well as in the UK and other countries. Finally, measurement validity is concerned with 
the appropriateness of a proxy for a certain concept or phenomena under study (Bryman, 
2004). For example, some financial activity is better quantifiably than others. The variables 
used to measure certain financial concepts are not always perfect and ideal. To give one 
example, stock prices or stock returns are meant to describe the market-based financial 
performance of a company. There are however many different variables that could describe 
the financial performance of a company such as book-value-based financial performance 
variables.37 Thus, studies with high measurement validity use appropriate proxies for the 
concept they would like to investigate and are clear on what and how they measure these 
                                                 
37 For example, profitability, income, return on equity (ROE). 
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concepts. In the following chapter, I will outline my approach to the data collection and 
discuss the features of secondary data. 
3.6.2 Data Collection and Sources 
This chapter provides a very brief discussion about my data, the data types, and the main data 
sources and providers that I have used in my thesis. For more specific information on my 
selected sample size, geographical coverage and sample period, in any of my empirical 
chapters, the reader is referred to (Chapter 4.3.2. 'Investment universe, portfolio construction 
and ESG integration; Chapter 5.4. 'Data Section'; Chapter 6.3. 'Data Description'; Chapter 
7.3.1. 'Sample Selection'). 
 Generally, quantitative researchers make use of secondary data that has been collected 
by third parties. Bryman (2008) notes that using secondary data has the advantages of high 
quality, standardisation, and substantial geograhical coverage. Usually, data sets that have 
been collected by third parties such as Bloomberg or Thomson Reuters Datastream tend to be 
of high quality, as they are consistently monitored and collected through rigorous procedures. 
Thus, my thesis relies predominantly on four data sources including Bloomberg, EIRIS, 
StyleResearch, and Thomson Reuters Datastream.  
 My financial data can be characterised as historical time-series and "continuous" data 
(Brooks, 2008). Essentially, continuous data types such as stock returns can take any value 
and are only limited by the desired precision of the researcher (Brooks, 2008). The main 
financial data types in my thesis are data such as total stock returns, interest rates, market 
capitalisation, total assets, intangible assets and liabilities. To compute returns from total 
return data38 for stock portfolios, indexes, or individual companies, in any of my empirical 
chapters, I generally use the following formula for continuously compounded returns as 
follows (See e.g. Brooks, 2008): 
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,i tr  denotes continuously compounded returns for asset i at time t. , ,i t i tP D is the stock price 
plus any dividend paid to investors for asset i at time t. , 1i tP  denotes the stock price of asset i 
from the previous observation.  
                                                 
38 Total return data includes capital gains (or the appreciation of the stock price) and any dividend payments that 
have been made to investors (Brooks, 2008). I use total return data instead of stock price data because it 
considers dividend payments. Not accounting for divident payments could lead to an underestimation of total 
returns (Brooks, 2008).  
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 My non-financial data can be characterised as ordinal data, which means that it can be 
ordered or ranked (Brooks, 2008). EIRIS analyses and surveys companies to obtain 
information on a wide range of topics concerning their Environmental, Social, and 
Governance (ESG) performance. In total, EIRIS collects over 700 fine-grained sub-criteria 
relating to the three "E", "S", and "G" dimensions. While EIRIS collects and updates any of 
the over 700 sub-criteria throughout the year, the data is made available at the end of each 
year, beginning in 2004. For a detailed explanation on how I use ESG criteria to create 
portfolios, the reader is referred to Chapter 4.3.2. 'Investment universe, portfolio construction 
and ESG integration'. 
3.6.3 Research Methods 
This chapter provides a somewhat broader understanding of the kind of quantitative research 
methods selected in my thesis, however, for more detailed explanations of the actual research 
methods applied in any of my empirical chapters, the reader is referred to Chapter 4.3.5. 
'Financial performance assessment', Chapter 4.3.6. 'Risk management opportunities', Chapter 
5.3. 'Empirical Analysis', Chapter 6.4. 'Methods', Chapter 7.3.5. 'Regression Models'. 
 To test for different forms of stock market efficiency, finance scholars have 
developed a range of specific research methods (See Chapter 2.4. 'Empirical Tests of Market 
Efficiency'). Empirical tests for long-term stock market efficiency are generally based on 
investigations of the financial performance of portfolios of stocks, mutual funds, or equity 
indexes, because the financial performance tends to have implications for stock market 
efficiency. Thus, in my thesis, I use research methods based on correlation and regression 
analysis to evaluate the long-term financial performance and its implications for stock market 
efficiency of portfolios and equity indexes with a preference for environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) concerns. Correlation and regression analysis is one of the most common 
research methods for quantitative researchers (Brooks, 2008).  
3.6.3.1 Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis can be defined as the "degree of linear association", aiming to measure 
the extent to which one variable is associated with another variable (Brooks, 2008:28). This 
means, correlation is a useful research method to establish the relation between two variables. 
However, correlation does not imply causality and therefore the researcher is not able to 
investigate how and to what extent one variable causes the other (Brooks, 2008).  
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3.6.3.2 Regression Analysis 
To investigate causal relationships between variables, I will use regression analysis. In 
contrast to correlation analysis, regression analysis does not treat variables in a symmetrical 
way, rather it allows the researcher to define dependent and independent variables, which can 
then be used to test for causal relationships (Brooks, 2008). Another advantage of regression 
analysis is the potential inclusion of more than one independent variable, i.e. multiple 
regression analysis, that cause the dependent variable (Brooks, 2008). In other words, 
regression analysis "is an attempt to explain movements in a variable by reference to 
movements in one or more other variables" (Brooks, 2008:27).    
 As previously mentioned, the quantitative research methodology in general, and 
regression analysis in particular, is very popular among studies in the field of finance and 
more specifically, socially responsible investing (See e.g. Frooman, 1997; Orlitzky et al., 
2003; Horváthová, 2010). The studies closest to my thesis tend to employ a range of specific 
regression analysis methods to analyse the financial performance of investment trading 
strategies of mutual funds, investment portfolios, or equity indexes and its implications for 
market efficiency. Such investment performance evaluation methods are commonly known as 
Asset Pricing Models, which I have discussed in Chapter 2.4. 'Empirical Tests of Market 
Efficiency' (Fama, 1970; Huberman and Kandel, 1987; Jensen, 1968).  
 The earliest and one of the most widely applied investment performance evaluation 
methods is referred to as "Jensen's alpha" (Jensen, 1968), which is based on the static one-
period Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)39 of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). Jensen's 
alpha evaluates the returns generated by a mutual fund, investment portfolio, or equity index 
relative to the risk-adjusted returns of a market benchmark portfolio (Kreander et al., 2005). 
Jensen's measure can be formally stated as follows: 
, , , , ,( ) (4)i t f t i i m t f t i tr r r r        
Where, ,i tr denotes the continuously compounded returns for asset i at time t. ,f tr refers to the 
risk-free rate, generally proxied by a national T-bill. ,m tr  denotes continously compounded 
returns for a selected market benchmark. i  is the intercept of the regression and is refered to 
as "Jensen's alpha", an indicator of the financial performance of an asset. i  represents the 
regression's estimated beta coefficient and indicates an asset's exposure to the selected market 
benchmark. ,i t  is the error term. Several scholars in the socially responsible investment field 
                                                 
39 See Equation 1. 
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have applied Jensen's alpha to investigate the financial performance of socially responsible 
mutual funds (including ethical funds) relative to conventional mutual funds (See e.g. 
Gregory et al., 1997; Luther and Matatko, 1994; Kreander et al., 2005; Mallin et al., 1995). 
 However, the critique of the stock market anomalies literature on the Efficient Market 
Theory has revealed shortcomings in using Jensen's alpha as the single investment 
performance evaluation method (See Chapter 2.8.1. 'Stock Market Anomalies'). The criticism 
is driven by scholars who find empirical evidence of persistent profitable investment trading 
strategies (also known as stock market anomalies) relative to passive investment strategies, 
which should not exist in the world of the Efficient Market Theory. The Efficient Market 
Theory posits that no profitable investment trading strategy shall persist over the long term. 
However, several scholars have reported empirical evidence of such persistent profitable 
investment strategies (See e.g. Subrahmanyam, 2010; Jacobs, 2015). As already noted earlier 
in Chapter 2.8.1. 'Stock Market Anomalies', the first and most prominent stock market 
anomalies are the size and value anomalies (Banz 1981; Basu, 1977, 1983; Reinganum 1981). 
To address the shortcomings of the CAPM and Jensen's Alpha and to account for the value 
and size anomalies, extensions to the method have been proposed by Fama and French (1992, 
1993). In order to incorporate the two anomalies, Fama and French (1993) propose the 
following three factor model: 
, , , , , , ,( ) ( ) ( ) (5)i t f t i i m t f t i smb t i hml t i tr r r r s r h r          
Where, ,smb tr denotes the returns on the difference between a portfolio of companies with 
small market capitalisations relative to a portfolio of companies with large market 
capitalisations. ,hml tr denotes the returns on the difference between a portfolio of companies 
with high book to market ratios relative to a portfolio of companies with low book to market 
ratios. is  and ih  represent the coefficients of exposure to both difference portfolios based on 
size and value, respectively. Many scholars in the field of socially responsible investing have 
used Fama and French's extended and similarly adjusted methods to assess the financial 
performance of mutual funds (See e.g. Gregory et al., 1997; Kreander et al., 2005).  
 While Fama and French's extended method is able to account for the value and size 
anomalies reported in the literature, their model has been criticised of not being able to 
account for another well-known stock market anomaly, the momentum effect (Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1997). As described in my previous chapter, the momentum anomaly was found to 
be a successful investment strategy to persistently generate abnormal returns. To address the 
shortcoming of Fama and French's extended version to account for the momentum anomaly, 
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Carhart (1997) proposed to extend the existing model once more with a proxy for the 
momentum effect as follows: 
, , , , , , , ,( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (6)i t f t i i m t f t i smb t i hml t i mom t i tr r r r s r h r m r           
Where, ,hml tr denotes the returns on the difference between a portfolio of companies with high 
stock returns over the previous year relative to a portfolio of companies with low stock 
returns over the previous year. im is the coefficient of exposure to the momentum variable. 
Carhart's extended version of the multi-factor model has been applied widely to investigate 
the financial performance of conventional and socially responsible mutual funds and 
investment portfolios. The studies closest to my thesis (Edmans, 2011; Gompers et al., 2003; 
Kempf and Osthoff, 2007; Schröder, 2007; Renneboog et al., 2008a) have applied the same 
or variations of my selected research methods. 
 In summary, my research methods chapter was meant to give the reader a somewhat 
better understanding of the kind of quantitative research methods applied in my thesis. To 
assess the long-term financial performance of portfolio returns and equity indexes with a 
preference for environmental, social, and governance (ESG) concerns, and its implications 
for stock market efficiency, I use research methods based on correlation and regression 
analysis. For more details on my specific research methods, sample sizes, and sample 
periods, the reader is referred to the respective empirical chapters (Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7). 
3.6.3.3 Limitations of selected Research Methods 
A limitation commonly voiced about correlation and regression analysis is that of changing 
and time-varying empirical relationships between variables (Bryman, 2004; Davis and 
Bremner, 2008). This limitation clearly addresses the reliability concern of quantitative 
research methods, as outlined in Chapter 3.6.1 "Reliability and Validity". To address this 
limitation and to ensure consistent and stable empirical relationships between variables, 
regression analyses should be replicable from one researcher to another and stable to different 
sub-samples. Thus, in my thesis, I aim to transparently document and disclose my selected 
data sources and data transformations, portfolio constructions, applied research methods, and 
other important aspects to allow other researchers to easily replicate my chapters. 
Furthermore, to overcome the stability issue of empirical relationships between variables in 
any of my empirical chapters, I apply several sub-sample regression analyses, and modern 
forms of dynamic regression analyses (see e.g. the application of the Kalman Filter in 
Chapter 5.3.2. "Dynamic Performance Analysis").  
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3.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter aims to outline my methodological positions as well as the choice 
of my research methodology and the nature of my empirical methods used in this thesis. In 
establishing my methodological positions, I was guided by Burrell and Morgan's (1979) 
influential framework on social theory. Based on my core philosophical assumptions 
regarding ontology, epistemology, human nature, and methodology, I come to conclude that 
the Funcionalist research paradigm is the perspective of my thesis, which also represents the 
"home" paradigm of Finance research. Traditional empirical and theoretical Finance research 
such as the Efficient Market Theory, predominantly rely on the functionalist world view, 
because it is rooted in an objectivist Ontology, positivist Epistemology, rational Human 
Nature, and quantitative Methodologies. I have also shown major limitations to the core 
assumptions of the functionalist research paradigm in Finance. In particular, how the 
assumptions about the rationality of human beings have been challenged by socially 
responsible and behavioural finance scholars. 
 The second section of this chapter concentrates on the choice of my research 
methodology. I can conclude that my research methodology is related to the nomothetic 
approach described by Burrell and Morgan (1979), which is closely related to a quantitative 
approach to methodology. Further, I do not only highlight the importance of Reliability and 
Validity in quantitative research, but also discuss the issues of Causality, Generalization, 
Measurement, and Replication (Bryman, 2004; Harwell, 2011). Finally, I discuss the primary 
research methods used in my thesis such as correlation and regression analysis, and their 
potential limitations with respect to Reliability and Validity in quantitative research. 
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4 Does pension funds' fiduciary duty prohibit the integration of 
environmental responsibility criteria in investment processes? A 
prudent investment test 
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Abstract 
Pension funds have recently developed an increasing interest in environmental, social or governance 
(ESG) criteria, but critics claim that the integration of any of these non-financial criteria into pension 
fund investment processes conflicts with fiduciary duties. On this matter, the 2005 Freshfields report 
concluded that pension funds’ fiduciary duties (e.g. prudent action for proper purpose) only permit the 
consideration of an ESG criterion, if this process has no detrimental financial effects. Thus, this 
chapter aims to investigate the financial and risk implications of integrating any ESG criterion into an 
investment process from the perspective of equity pension funds, whose unique financial and legal 
characteristics require a specialised research design (e.g. a prudent, very large scale investment 
process). To study this effect, I develop a test of the prudent integration of ESG criteria in 
hypothetical equity pension fund investment processes. I analyse over 1,500 firms from 26 developed 
countries over the sample period starting in January 2004 and ending in May 2010, using aggregated 
and disaggregated corporate environmental responsibility ratings supplied by EIRIS. My results are 
twofold. First, I find no indications that the integration of aggregated or disaggregated corporate 
environmental responsibility ratings into equity pension fund investment processes has any 
detrimental financial effect. Second, findings from my risk analysis even support integrating corporate 
environmental criteria into equity pension fund investment processes, as it helps to lower downside 
volatilities. Robustness tests for temporal consistency and sector bias confirm these findings. Hence, I 
conclude that pension funds’ fiduciary duties do not appear to prohibit the integration of 
environmental responsibility criteria into their investment processes. Future research might want to 
investigate the effect of integrating other ESG criteria into a realistic prudent pension fund investment 
process. 
 
 
  
                                                 
40 Material from Chapter 1 forms the basis of an essay that is currently revised to be re-submitted to 
Environment and Planning A with two co-authors Andreas Hoepner (supervisor) and Sebastian Siegl. 
Does pension funds' fiduciary duty prohibit the integration of 
environmental responsibility criteria in investment processes? 
A prudent investment test40 
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4.1 Introduction  
Pension funds have recently shown an increasing interest in considering environmental, 
social or governance (ESG) criteria in their investment processes (Cox et al., 2004; Cumming 
and Johan, 2007; Haigh and Shapiro, 2013; Petersen and Vredenburg, 2009; Sievänen et al., 
2013). Proponents argue that this practice has many advantages not only for pension funds 
but also for those economies, on whose financial wellbeing pension funds depend and whose 
citizens depend on pension funds. Their main argument is simple. Pension funds with their 
enormous investor strength have the ability to ensure not only economic stability but also 
stable environmental, social and corporate governance conditions in those global economies, 
to which their internationally diversified portfolios are exposed.41 As a consequence, this 
stability allows these economies to flourish, which leads to healthy financial returns for 
pension funds (Clark and Hebb, 2005; Hawley and Williams, 2007; Sethi, 2005). Critiques, 
however, fear inappropriate political influence in pension fund decision-making and exposure 
to financial risks. Especially, they argue that the integration of ESG criteria into pension fund 
investment processes “subvert[s] .. a fiduciary’s common law duty of undivided 
loyalty”(Rounds, 2005:76).  
 The conditions under which ESG consideration is permissible appeared hidden in a 
complex web of legislation until 2005, when a report by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 
gained prominence for its analysis of these conditions. The report concludes that pension 
funds are legally required to consider an ESG criterion, if there is a clear consensus amongst 
beneficiaries in favour of this criterion or the criterion is believed to be financially beneficial. 
Pension funds may also voluntarily consider an ESG criterion in case it does no financial 
harm, but otherwise pension funds are legally prohibited from integrating any ESG criteria in 
their investment process (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005; Langbein and Posner, 
1980). This conclusion has become widely accepted (Gitman et al., 2009).42 
 While the analysis and conclusions of the Freshfields report have provided a lot of 
conceptual clarity, the report did not represent a practical breakthrough as it left many 
practical uncertainties untouched (Collie and Myers, 2008; Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 
                                                 
41 Given that pension funds represent one of the largest institutional investor portfolios with assets worth 29.8 
Trillion USD, they seem to have a natural interest in the sustainable long-term performance of companies they 
invest in, as well as, the sustainable development of an economy as a whole (Hawley and Williams, 2007; 
OECD, 2014). As pension funds invest in the entire market, their portfolios will be exposed to positive and 
negative externalities created by individual companies, which gives them a genuine interest in managing a 
sustainable long-term development of an economy (Hawley and Williams, 2007). These attributes make pension 
funds the ideal candidate for empirical tests of the integration of ESG criteria. 
42 Especially in common law countries such as the UK and US (Gitman, et al., 2009). 
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2005; OECD, 2007; Richardson, 2006; Richardson, 2011; Sandberg, 2011; Taylor and 
Donald, 2007; Woods and Urwin, 2010). Further, Sandberg argues that the Freshfields report 
does not call for much optimism, as it does not explain what type of ESG considerations can 
be made (Sandberg, 2011). Above all, the majority of institutional investors continue to 
ignore ESG considerations (Sandberg, 2011; UNEP FI 2009; Woods and Urwin, 2010). 
 The possibly most important remaining uncertainty relates to the following research 
question:  
What are the financial and risk implications of ESG criteria consideration on a 
pension fund equity portfolio that complies with the legal duty of prudent action 
for proper purpose? 
I analyse this question using the Freshfields report as a starting point and with a special 
emphasis on fiduciary duties such as the standard of prudence which is a fiduciary's legal 
duty to act in the best interest of pension scheme members (Davis and Hu, 2009), without a 
thorough analysis of other obstacles pension funds might encounter when considering ESG 
such as market short-termism or incentive structures (Friends Provident Foundation, 2011; 
Lydenberg, 2009; Poerio et al., 2011). 
 To the best of my knowledge, this research question is unexplored to date. My study 
closely relates to two streams of literature pursuing slightly different research objectives. One 
stream conducted many quantitative studies of the relationship between ESG criteria and 
investment performance but ignored the pension fund perspective with its unique research 
design requirements resulting from pension funds’ financial characteristics and legal duties 
(e.g. Kempf and Osthoff, 2007; Lo and Sheu, 2007; Scholtens, 2008; Scholtens and Zhou, 
2008). Another stream provided detailed explorations of pension funds’ fiduciary duties with 
respect to ESG criteria but did not undertake any empirical analysis of the financial and risk 
implications of ESG integration (Martin, 2009; Richardson, 2009; Sandberg, 2011; Woods 
and Urwin, 2010). Hence, I consider this chapter to represent an attempt to bridge the gap 
between these two literature streams and investigate this research question. 
 To analyse my research question, I develop a test of the prudent integration of any 
ESG criterion in synthetic pension fund investment processes.43 I ensure a prudent integration 
of ESG criteria by only using standard assets and investment transactions with a relatively 
                                                 
43 ESG criteria is used to construct hypothetical pension fund equity portfolios based on different degrees of 
corporate environmental responsbility. They are needed for the construction of my portfolios and to contrast the 
financial performance and investment risk between hypothetical pension portfolios with different tastes for 
corporate environmental criteria. For example, to contrast hypothetical equity pension portfolios investing in 
companies who represent environmental leaders relative to environmental laggards. 
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low risk. The realistic nature of the pension fund investment processes derives from aspects 
such as their assets under management, their investment universe, or the sample period 
starting in January 2004 and ending in May 2010. I use corporate environmental 
responsibility ratings from EIRIS, which also supplies to several large pension funds and 
asset managers.44 My test compares the return and risk characteristics of 25 hypothetical 
equity portfolios with five different degrees of responsibility in five different corporate 
environmental responsibility criteria (one aggregated measure and four disaggregated 
measures). My econometric analysis appears reliable, as it explains between 89% and 98% of 
return variation of all tested hypothetical equity pension portfolios. 
 My results provide no indications that the integration of aggregated or disaggregated 
corporate environmental responsibility criteria into investment processes has detrimental 
financial performance effects for equity pension fund portfolios. More interestingly, I find 
evidence that the inclusion of corporate environmental responsibility criteria considerably 
reduces the downside risk of pension funds' financial performance. Related studies 
investigating the relationship between corporate social responsibility and financial risk 
support my findings. These studies collectively conclude that social irresponsibility carries a 
cost, unlike social responsibility which provides "insurance-like" protection of firm value 
against negative events (Godfrey et al., 2009; Jo and Harjoto, 2012; Jo and Na, 2012; 
Oikonomou et al., 2012). 
 In line with the literature, my results suggest that fiduciary duties are not a constraint 
for the integration of corporate environmental responsibility standards into equity pension 
fund investment processes in any of the nine large jurisdictions studied by Freshfields and us 
(US, UK, Canada, Australia, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and Spain) (Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005). 
 The chapter is structured as follows. Chapter 4.2. 'Background' discusses legal 
interpretations of the relationship between pension funds, fiduciary duty and ESG criteria. 
Chapter 4.3. develops the research design. In Chapter 4.4. 'Results', I report the findings of 
both, financial and risk implications of integrating corporate environmental criteria. Chapter 
4.5. 'Robustness Tests' reports robustness test results. Chapter 4.6. concludes. 
  
                                                 
44 While I design my prudent investment test to apply to any ESG criteria, I apply this test to one criteria, 
namely corporate environmental responsibility. The reason for this scope limitation is the recent public focus on 
issues of environmental damage. I select a set of corporate environmental responsibility criteria for my analysis 
in this chapter and hope to see future research investigating other ESG criteria. 
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4.2 Background 
4.2.1 The debate on pension funds and ESG criteria 
Historically, the use of non-financial criteria was solely a moral or religious statement and 
not an investment strategy (Bengtsson, 2008a, b; Richardson and Cragg, 2010; Sparkes and 
Cowton, 2004). Today’s situation is quite different with the integration of environmental, 
social or governance (ESG) criteria in investment strategies increasingly attracting attention 
of a vast number of different institutions such as asset managers, pension funds, 
governmental or non-governmental organisations (Derwall et al., 2011; Emel, 2002; Gifford, 
2010). 
 As a consequence of this surge in attention and perceived potential, a heated debate 
emerged on the question, if ESG criteria represent relevant and appropriate considerations in 
investment processes of pension funds. Proponents usually argue along three lines. First, they 
suggest that, at least in some cases, the consideration of ESG criteria, especially ESG risks, 
simply represents a pension fund investment strategy that delivers stable returns (Clark and 
Hebb, 2005; Kiernan, 2007; Sethi, 2005). Second, proponents argue that pension funds and 
other institutional investors such as insurance companies have grown so enormously large in 
size over recent decades that they now jointly own the majority of all financial assets 
worldwide and deserve to be titled ‘universal owner’. Due to their sheer size, the financial 
performance of those universally owning pension funds will largely dependent on the 
performance of financial markets as a whole instead of the returns to individual assets. 
Hence, universal owners have an incentive to integrate any ESG criteria which affects the 
world economy into their investment processes instead of just considering those ESG criteria 
that individual corporations cannot externalise (Amalric, 2006; Hawley and Williams, 2007; 
Hawley and Williams, 2000; Mattison et al., 2011; Thamotheram and Wildsmith, 2007). 
Third, some proponents consider it to be simply an implicit responsibility of pension funds to 
be concerned about the wellbeing of society and the natural environment and therefore 
integrate ESG factors in their investment approaches (Berry, 2011; Lydenberg, 2007; 
Richardson, 2009; Solomon, 2009). 
 Critiques of ESG criteria consideration by pension funds originate from a more 
extremely held view and are fewer in numbers than proponents, but as vocal as possible 
(Entine, 2005; Munnel and Sundén, 2005; Rounds, 2005). They also argue broadly along 
three lines, as they consider ESG integration (i) to represent an inappropriate political 
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interference in pension funds’ investment strategies, (ii) to be financially risky and (iii) to 
undermine the fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty (ibid.). 
4.2.2 Common Law Legal interpretations of pension funds’ fiduciary duty with respect to 
ESG criteria 
As noted above, some critiques of ESG considerations claim that ESG is in conflict with 
pension fund trustees' legal obligations to invest in a prudent way. 
 Since many defined benefit pension schemes are facing deficits these days, the 
pension fund industry sees risk management as a top priority (Franzen, 2010; McKillop and 
Pogue, 2010). Consequently, the question of what impact ESG considerations might have on 
the financial risks and returns of a pension fund is of paramount importance. For example, 
CalPERS Global Principles of Accountable Corporate Governance states: “CalPERS believes 
that environmental, social, and governance issues can affect the performance of investment 
portfolios to varying degrees across companies, sectors, regions, and asset classes over time.” 
(Mercer, 2011: ii; The California Public Employees' Retirement System (Calpers), 2010: 15)  
 While some regulatory changes concerning the fiduciary responsibility of pension 
funds in relation to ESG investment have taken place over the last decade in countries such as 
Australia, France, Germany or the UK, there is little evidence to suggest that the legal 
interpretation of the duties of (especially common law countries) pensions has dramatically 
changed (Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005; Richardson, 2008, 
2011; Richardson and Cragg, 2010; Sandberg, 2011; Sturm and Badde, 2001).45 
 According to the ‘traditional interpretation’ of pension funds’ fiduciary duties, a 
pension fund should follow certain generally accepted principles such as utilising 
diversification to achieve competitive risk-adjusted returns in accordance with the risk 
parameters specified in the investment policy. All decisions are to be made in good faith for 
the economic benefit of the beneficiaries (Berry, 2011; Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 
2005; Richardson, 2006). Recent KPMG reports encapsulate the traditional view in a 
straightforward way, whereby the fiduciary duties of institutional investors implicitly 
emphasise maximising financial returns (KPMG, 2005, 2011). 
 Often, in a US context, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA) is mentioned since it was clarified in a 2008 US Department of Labor Bulletin, that 
ERISA prohibits investment decisions based on any factors other than economic (financial) 
                                                 
45 Recent calls for a re-interpretation of fiduciary obligations such as the one by Berry (2011) for Fair Pensions 
are recognised. However, the degree of their success remains to be seen. 
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ones (Interpretive Bulletin 2509.08-1). If nothing else, sound risk and return management 
over a portfolio is the focal point of  ERISA (Richardson, 2008). 
 However, in Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, 1989 none of Baltimore City’s 
three employee pension plans were allowed to remain invested in companies doing business 
in or with South Africa. While Baltimore City’s Ordinance No.765 was challenged by the 
Board of Trustees of each pension plan on constitutional grounds, it was upheld by the court 
(Board of Trustees of Employee Retirement System of the City of Baltimore v. City of 
Baltimore 317 Md., 1989; Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005; Richardson, 2008; Smith, 
1990). This was, however, not the first example of US case law dealing with the use of ESG 
criteria. In 1978 the Associated Students of the University of Oregon challenged the opinion 
that divesting corporations operating in South Africa would violate Oregon’s prudent 
investment rule (Richardson, 2008). 
Nowadays, more than a few large US pension funds subscribe to various methods of 
ESG investing such as CalPERS (California Public Employees' Retirement System), or 
TIAA-CREF (Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association - College Retirement Equities 
Fund) (Mercer, 2011; Richardson, 2008). The growing acceptance for responsible investment 
practices originates from a number of reports prompting increased investment values and 
decreased risks (Mercer, 2011). 
 Similarly, the UK view on pension fund’s ESG consideration has moved beyond the 
traditional view held in the famed Cowan v. Scargill 46 where the purpose of a trust is seen as 
to act in the “best interests” of the beneficiaries, which has been translated into best financial 
interests (Cowan v. Scargill, 1 Ch. 270, 1985; Thornton and Fleming, 2011). 
 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, for example, argues that Cowan v. Scargill is widely 
misinterpreted, whereby investment decision makers have come to believe that they are 
required to maximise financial goals in each individual investment. Additionally, Freshfields 
Brukhaus Deringer contend that the profit-maximisation approach commonly said to 
                                                 
46 Cowan v. Scargill represents the earliest case, in UK case law, that has attracted a lot of attention in the 
finanical industry (Richardson, 2008). In this case, the National Coal Board started legal proceedings against the 
National Union of Mine Workers, both of which were appointed trustees who governed the Mineworkers' 
Pension Scheme (Freshfields, 2005; Richardson, 2008). The Union of Mine Workers disagreed on a proposal by 
the National Coal Board, to increase foreign investment and energy investments that could compete with coal 
(Richardson, 2008). Robert Megarry, the judge, concluded that trustees must act in the best interest of 
beneficiaries, where he argued that "the best interests of the beneficiaries normally mean their financial 
interests" (Cowan v. Scargill, 1 Ch. 270, 1985; Freshfields, 2005; Richardson, 2008:228). The case has been 
(mis)used by many commentators to aid the view that the sole responsibility of pension trustees is to maximise 
profits (Freshfields, 2005). While Megarry, the judge, later clarified that he did not support this view, 
commentators continued to misunderstand the case.   
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characterise Cowan v. Scargill is questionable47, and that the duty is to implement an 
investment strategy which incorporates risk and return objectives suitable to the trust 
(Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005). For example, my analysis in this chapter shows that 
even naive contemporaneous ESG investment strategies are capable of achieving this goal 
without breaching trustees' fiduciary duties. 
 Another famous UK court case on ESG investing is Harries v. Church Commissioners 
in which the court emphasised the trustees' obligation to abide by the purpose of the trust 
(Harries v Church Commissioners 1 WLR at 1247, 1992; Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 
2005). Further, the Charity commission, supervising charities under the 1993 UK charities 
act, has made it clear that charities shall only aim to invest for best possible financial results, 
as long as it advances the organisation’s charitable purpose (CharityCommission, 2011; 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005; Richardson, 2008). 
 Martin v. Edinburgh (City) District Council, 1988 is another UK case. According to 
Richardson (2008) this case shows that a UK court interpreted the duty of loyalty as to seek a 
reasonable rate of return not as to maximise financial returns. However, Penner (2012) notes 
that the decision to divest companies with South African interests was found to be a breach of 
trust, due to the fact that the divestment was made without considering the best financial 
interests of the beneficiaries. Thornton and Fleming (2011: 52) brings the discussion together 
by stating "...the fundamental duty of pension fund trustees must be the proper fiscal 
management of the fund to provide reasonable returns to the benficiaries" (ibid.). 
 As long as the overriding objective (sound fiscal management) is adhered to, ESG 
considerations are acceptable (while some would argue in fact that ESG consideration would 
be a criteria for sound fiscal management). This standard is noticeable in the so called ‘tie-
break’ principle by which a pension fund trustee has the power to select an investment over 
another based on environmental or social considerations when the investments are expected 
                                                 
47 According to Article 172 of the Companies Act (2006), the duty of a company director is "to promote the 
success of the company". The success of the company is for the benefit of its members, i.e. shareholders. 
Similar to the Cowan vs. Scargill case, Article 172 of the Companies Act (2006) this could be seen as to 
maximise profits for the shareholders. The Companies Act (2006) is, however, more specific with regard to the 
fiduciary duties of company directors and ESG information. In line with the fiduciary duties of pension fund 
trustees, the Companies Act (2006) requires directors of companies to follow fiduciary duties. Meaning that, 
according to Article 174 of the Companies Act (2006), company directors have the "duty to excercise 
reasonable care, skill and diligence". The Companies Act (2006) is also more specific with regard to the duties 
of company directors in relation to ESG information, and under Article 417(5)(b)(i), states that in case a 
company is quoted, the business review must incorporate environmental matters "including the impact of the 
company's business on the environment". The problem with this article is that a) it does not tell the company 
director what kind of environmental information must be integrated and b) how it should be integrated. 
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to have the same financial benefits (Baker and Nofsinger, 2012; Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer, 2005; PensionsRegulator, 2007). 
 Finally, on the topic of fiduciary duty in the UK, The Companies Act 2006 has 
obligated corporate directors to include community and environmental interests in their 
decision-making process. According to section 172, the long-term success of a company, 
called 'enlightened shareholder value' should be pursued (Richardson, 2008; Thornton and 
Fleming, 2011; UNEP FI, 2009). 
 The legal situation is even less elaborated on in other major economies such as 
Australia and Canada. Due to a lack of case law on the fiduciary duties of trustees and the 
scope for ESG investing in these countries, the UK with the richest case law tends to guide 
fiduciaries in the Australian and Canadian pension sector (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 
2005; Richardson, 2008). Particularly, the widely misinterpreted Cowan v. Scargill case is 
heavily relied upon. One example of continuing misinterpretations of fiduciary duties in 
general, and Cowan v. Scargill in particular, can be found in Australia's largest industry 
pension fund, Australian Superannuation Fund. The pension fund's ESG investment beliefs 
state, "Our fiduciary duty to members is critical. Appropriate ESG investment activities will 
be explored, but will not be undertaken at the expense of its fiduciary duty." (Australian 
Super, 2013; Financial Services Institute of Australasia, 2012). The funds' investment 
philosophy implicitly mirrors the profit maximisation intent and highlights that ESG 
integration may be costly (or perceived as an expense). Another example that illustrates the 
profit maximisation intent is the so called “sole purpose test”, which constrains trustees' to 
ensure that funds are managed solely in the best monetary interests of the members 
(Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005). In short, a portfolio should be characterised by 
sound risk and return objectives (Richardson, 2008). Nevertheless, critics argue that the sole 
purpose test of fiduciary duty, which constitutes the duty of loyalty, takes a narrow focus on 
solely maximising financial benefits to beneficiaries, thus, encouraging investments in highly 
unethical investment opportunities because of their potential rewards (Gray, 2012). Further, 
critics perceive the sole purpose test as a major barrier to ESG adoption (Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005). However, according to Keith Johnson, in a commentary to Gray 
(2012: 18), this is a "popular misconception about fiduciary duty for at least two reasons." 
First, he argues that fiduciaries are required by law to ensure a sustainable balance between 
short- and long-term risks and returns. Second, fiduciary duties, including the sole purpose 
test are dynamic fiduciary laws (evolved and re-interpreted over time) with the purpose of 
guiding rather than prescribing trustees' investment decisions (Hawley et al., 2011). More 
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recently, proponents of the sole purpose test conclude that it is not seen as a major barrier to 
ESG integration, however, calls for more guidance on how to integrate ESG issues, from 
institutions such as the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), have been 
voiced (Carlisle, 2011). 
 Although, Canadian legislation on ESG investing is rather scarce, some regional 
developments in the provinces of Manitoba and Ontario are noteworthy. For example, 
amendments have been made to Manitoba's Trustee Act in 1995 and Pension Benefits 
Amendment Act, 2005, enabling trustees to lawfully consider non-financial criteria as long as 
the trustees exercise the judgment and care that a prudent person would do (Manitoba Law 
Reform Commission, 1993). As long as trustees demonstrate duty of care, investment 
decisions can be based on non-financial factors such as ESG criteria (Richardson, 2008). 
Similarly, in the province of Ontario, "Ethical" investing is permitted, if the positions are 
disclosed in the funds' statement of investment policies (SIP) and clearly communicated to 
the members of the plan (Financial Services Commission of Ontario, 1992; Richardson, 
2008). 
 Furthermore, Ontario was the first Canadian province to enforce the South African 
Trust Investments Act in 1990 with the aim of discouraging Ontarian trusts, charities, and 
pension funds from making investments in companies with ties to the Apartheid system.  
 Despite countrywide legislation in Canada still being in its infancy, calls for increased 
disclosure on ESG concerns by pension funds and other financial institutions remain high. 
For example, a recent report urges Canadian pension funds to disclose, a) the degree to which 
ESG information is utilised in investment decisions, b) how this information is considered in 
proxy voting and corporate engagement activities, c) proxy voting activities (National Round 
Table on the Environment and the Economy, 2007). Other Canadian legislation, such as, 
Canada's Bank Act, S.C. 1991, however calls for, among other things, adequate portfolio 
diversification (Richardson, 2008). 
 After having reviewed landmark legal cases on the fiduciary duties of pension funds 
in common law countries in the last decade,48 I come to conclude that several regulatory 
changes support a development towards increased flexibility, sustainability, and transparency.    
However, while there seems to be increasing advocacy for considering ESG issues in pension 
funds from a legal perspective, acts and initiatives are rather vague and it is far from clear 
                                                 
48 For a comprehensive review of fiduciary duties related to ESG investing in civil law countries the reader is 
referred to the Freshfields Report (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005). There may have been further legal 
developments in civil law countries since its first publication in 2005. 
75 
how pension funds can actively integrate ESG criteria in a sensible way, without 
compromising their duty to act in the best interest of their beneficiaries. From a practical 
perspective, I see strict negative screening (promoted by the widely misinterpreted Cowan v. 
Scargill case) as major barrier to advance the topic. Thus, I advise pension funds to 
implement contemporaneous ESG investment strategies, many of which already incorporate 
corporate governance and related concerns into investment processes, as these are less likely 
to compromise fiduciary duties. 
  While pension fund legislation in the largest developed economies based on civil law 
(France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain) is possibly a little more open to ESG considerations 
than its common law counterparts, it can be barely interpreted to include any meaningful 
support of pension funds’ ESG integration. As the traditional interpretation of pension funds 
legal duties is problematic for proponents of pension funds’ ESG consideration especially in 
common law countries and foremost in the US, I limit my legal analysis to common law 
countries.49 
 
4.3 Research Design 
4.3.1 Rationale for Research Design 
To address my research question, I develop a prudent test of the financial impact of the 
integration of ESG criteria into Defined Benefit (DB) and Defined Contribution (DC) pension 
fund equity investment strategies.50 Although, my test applies more to DB pension plan types, 
due to their different underlying liabilities, ESG integration can also benefit DC pension 
plans (Sievänen et al., 2013). I limit my test to equity investment strategies for three reasons. 
First, motivating, developing and analysing realistic and prudent tests of large and potentially 
complex pension fund portfolio processes for multiple asset classes is simply beyond the 
scope of an individual chapter. Second, equities and fixed income are by far the largest asset 
                                                 
49 It should be noted though that a few countries exist worldwide, whose pension funds legislation includes 
(some) support of the integration of ESG criteria in pension fund investment processes. Examples are the 
Netherlands and Sweden (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005; Hamilton and Eriksson, 2011; Renneboog et 
al., 2008b). 
50 My 25 hypothetical pension fund portfolios appear to be imitating one of four basic pension fund models 
established in Clark (2000). This type of pension fund is large and internally managed, and thus most commonly 
associated with Defined Benefit (DB) plans. I therefore implicitly assume that I integrate social responsibility 
criteria into DB pension funds' investment processes. Sievänen et al. (2013), however, recently determined that 
the funding type of pension plans is not a substantial driver of social responsibility in the European pension fund 
market. Based on their findings, it seems plausible to argue that my analysis is not only relevant for DB, but also 
DC and other hybrid pension fund models. While I aim to integrate sustainability criteria in all pension scheme 
types, I am aware of the different underlying liabilities of defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) 
pension schemes. 
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classes in international pension fund portfolios51, and jointly represent the vast majority of 
pension funds’ assets (OECD, 2013). Third, the integration of ESG criteria into investment 
portfolios is, from a financial performance perspective, criticised much more for equities than 
for fixed income which appears to be relatively compatible with the consideration of ESG 
risk factors (Derwall and Koedijk, 2009; Geczy et al., 2005; Menz, 2010; Munnel and 
Sundén, 2005)  
 In designing my test, I put special emphasis on two aims. First, I aim to embed my 
test in a doubtlessly prudent investment process to comply with the legal duty of prudence. 
With this ambition, I follow in the footsteps of three of the founding fathers of ESG 
investment, who aimed to outline an “investment policy … [that] is legally justifiable as a 
sophisticated attempt to maximise .. economic return[…] and therefore need not be defended 
- and cannot be attacked - as a social pursuit” (Simon et al., 1972: 137). To develop a 
doubtlessly prudent investment process, I select the prudent (conservative) option whenever I 
have any discretion on any aspect of the investment process (e.g. I use long only investment 
and do not engage in complex and potentially risky financial engineering products). Further, 
my prudent investment approach is motivated by recent findings on pension fund investor 
sophistication and rationality. Dreu and Bikker (2012) find varying degrees of investor 
sophistication across pension funds. They establish that pension funds with low investment 
expertise tend to be more risk-averse. Generally, pension funds' investment policies signal 
investor (un)sophistication by rounding asset allocations to multiples of five percent, 
investing little to nothing in complex asset classes and favouring home markets. Additionally, 
Clark (2010, 2012) argues that individuals (including pension fund managers, but possibly to 
a lesser extent) are exposed to "self-defeating", or behavioural biases that strongly influence 
decision-making in a non-optimal manner. 
 Second, I aim to embed my test in a realistic and generic equity pension fund 
investment process, which can be customised according to any asset manager’s investment 
style preferences, to achieve a high practical value for my results and therefore (substantially) 
reduce the uncertainties of real pension fund decision makers.52 Indeed, my aim appears in 
line with a recent trend towards increased practical relevance not only in business ethics 
journals but more generally in research published across numerous journals which 
                                                 
51 For example, US pension funds allocate approximately 50 percent to equities and 25 percent to fixed income 
(See OECD, 2013) 
52 In this ambition, I am inspired by Young (2007: 1), who assumes that “[t]he challenge for business ethics is 
not so much enunciating the unyielding call of moral perfection but rather providing practical wisdom relevant 
to the needs of business decision-makers.” 
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investigates the relation between ESG factors and various aspects of business (e.g. Clark, 
2012; Clark and Monk, 2011; Clark et al., 2008; Clark and Urwin, 2008; Figge and Hahn, 
2004; Martin, 2009; Nilsson et al., 2008; Thamotheram and Wildsmith, 2007; Thomas et al., 
2007; Woods and Urwin, 2010).  
 Technically, I develop my test by making research design choices on seven aspects: 
(i) investment universe, (ii) portfolio construction, (iii) ESG integration, (iv) ESG data 
provider, (v) ESG criteria, and (vi) financial performance assessment, and (vii) risk 
management assessment. 
4.3.2 Investment universe, portfolio construction and ESG integration 
I select stocks listed in the world’s developed economies as the investment universe, since 
equity investments in emerging markets might be perceived as imprudent due to higher risks. 
Since I aim to nest my test in a doubtlessly prudent investment process, I limit myself to 
constructing long only portfolios and prohibit more complex and potentially risky 
transactions such as short selling or derivatives.53 Similarly, to ensure prudent diversification, 
I value-weight all equities in my portfolios and prohibit other approaches such as equal- 
weighting.54  
 To realistically and prudently integrate ESG criteria into equity pension fund 
investment processes, I define three objectives: First, I need to construct equity portfolios 
which reflect the size of large pension funds and hence hold assets worth several billion US$ 
(Ferreira and Matos, 2008; OECD, 2010; Thamotheram and Wildsmith, 2007). Second, I aim 
to integrate ESG criteria into baseline equity pension fund portfolios, which asset managers 
can subsequently customise in any way according to investment style preferences (e.g. in 
terms of country, industry or small cap exposure). This aim allows my research design to 
                                                 
53 Besides my concern for a prudent investment process, this research design practice acknowledges that some 
jurisdictions limit the types of assets selectable by pension funds and even the practice of loaning out pension 
fund shares to allow other financial market participants to short sell these. This practice is under close scrutiny 
from regulators, who are concerned about the effect of the resulting downward market pressure on the pension 
funds’ and the economy’s long term financial performance. Apart from legislative restrictions, most pension 
funds are simply too large to engage in less liquid trading activities at reasonable transaction costs or negative 
price impacts due to personal trading. For instance, the sheer size of many pension funds prevents them from 
short selling activities, as there are simply no market participants to lend them a meaningful number of shares 
given the size of their portfolios (Financial Services Authority, 2002; Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005; 
OECD, 2010)  
54 This research design choice recognizes the large size of many pension funds. Having several billions US$ 
assets under management (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; OECD, 2010; Thamotheram and Wildsmith, 2007), these 
pension funds can unlikely equal- weight their entire portfolio without potentially affecting market prices 
themselves as consequence of their asset re-allocation. If I permitted equal- weighting, this scenario would 
represent a possibly substantial bias of my results. 
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isolate the effect of ESG integration from effects of other investment style choices.55 Third, to 
prudently integrate ESG criteria into pension fund investment processes, I require a very 
simple integration approach which does not constrain portfolio diversification. 
 I meet these objectives by simply dividing my very large developed country 
investment universe in several, still very large, sub-universes according to the constituents’ 
ESG ratings. For instance, I group all firms with the worst ESG rating in one portfolio, all 
firms with the second worst ESG rating in another portfolio and so on. In essence, I am 
creating prudent equity investment portfolios with different ESG ratings and study their 
monthly returns to inform my research question about the financial impact of ESG integration 
on equity portfolios of pension funds. This portfolio construction approach is inspired by 
Gompers et al. (2003) and recently common practice in the ESG Finance literature (Bebchuk 
et al., 2009; Edmans, 2011; Kempf and Osthoff, 2007). I illustrate my portfolio construction 
approach in Figure 2. My initial investment universe is drawn from the original equity 
universe of the FTSE All World Developed Index. The companies listed on the FTSE All 
World Developed Index are the ones that EIRIS aims to fully rate. For each year in my 
sample, I have obtained constituent lists from FTSE. Constitutent lists contain a list of active 
and dead firms that have been listed in a particular year on the FTSE All World Developed 
Index. My initial sample was then reduced by firms with no available total return data, no 
valid EIRIS criteria, and double or triple share class listings56. This resulted in my sample 
investment universe comprising on average 1,519 firms at the beginning of each year 
following an EIRIS end of year assessment (2004: 1,504 / 2005: 1,465 / 2006: 1,551 / 2007: 
1,520 / 2008: 1,541 / 2009: 1,531 / 2010: 1,519). In Table 1, I report the actual number of 
equities per any of my 25 constructed portfolios per annum.  
 
  
                                                 
55 With the aim to accommodate a flexible set of practical investment styles, which could be implemented in my 
ESG criteria considering baseline pension fund portfolios.  
56 Some companies appear more than once on the FTSE All World Developed Index due to double or triple 
share class listings. As EIRIS rates the company rather than the share class of a company, I combine different 
share classes to one share class by equally-weighting their financial returns. This approach to combine different 
share classes of the same company has been used in previous studies (See e.g. Da et al., 2008). 
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Figure 2: Synthetic Pension Fund Construction 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates my hypothetical pension portfolio construction for the criterion "Quality of corporate environmental policy and 
commitment". I repeat the following procedure for the five portfolios: First, I retrieve EIRiS' five point assessment for 'corporate environmental policy 
and commitment' (‘inadequate’, ‘weak’, ‘moderate’, ‘good’, or ‘exceptional’) for each firm (1 to N) in the FTSE All-World equity universe. Then, I group 
all firms with the same rating and update the groups at the beginning of each year. Third, I value-weight my portfolios and update each firm's weight 
annually. I identify the weights of each firm in the portfolio by its market capitalisation. Value-weighting is a realistic approach for my empirical tests 
because it distinguishes between the weights for smaller and larger companies proportionally. 
 
 To reflect potential changes in ESG ratings, I update my portfolios annually at the end 
of December. Since I do not make any investment style choice prior to the construction of 
these baseline equity pension fund portfolios, I isolate the ESG integration from any other 
step in a pension fund portfolio construction. As long as I do not construct an excessive 
number of portfolios, even the smallest of my portfolios should be of sufficient size and 
diversification for a reliable analysis of the financial effects resulting from the integration of 
ESG criteria in equity pension fund investment processes. Since some researchers argue that 
the relationship between ESG criteria and financial performance is parabolic (e.g. U-shaped 
or inverted U-shaped) instead of linear (Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Ullmann, 1985), I aim to 
construct an unequal number of portfolios per ESG rating to analyse the financial 
performance difference between a median ESG rated portfolios and its peers with a more 
extreme ESG rating.57 In addition, having a median value is helpful for the comparison and 
                                                 
57 This research design cannot only be understood as a test of pension fund ESG integration at the portfolio 
level, it can equivalently be interpreted as analysis of the aggregated results from thousands of tests of pension 
fund ESG consideration at the level of an individual stock. In fact, if researchers wanted to conduct a statistical 
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interpretation of different degrees of corporate environmental responsbility. Furthermore, 
EIRIS' survey data is based on questionnaires that provide five possible outcomes for each 
environmental criteria. Thus, I use the same five groups to distinguish different degrees of 
corporate environmental responsbility.     
4.3.3 ESG data  
The Freshfields report suggests that any ESG criteria not harming financial performance 
should be voluntarily considered. Inevitably, I can only investigate if pension funds’ fiduciary 
duties prohibit the integration of certain environmental, social or governance criteria. I cannot 
investigate in a single chapter if pension funds’ fiduciary duties permit the integration of any 
environmental, social or governance criteria. Hence, I aim for modesty and select a feasible 
set of environmental, social or governance criteria thereby accepting the inevitable limitation 
that the investigation of my research question with regard to other ESG criteria will remain a 
challenge for future research.  
 Motivated by very large scale corporate environmental disasters (BP’s Gulf of 
Mexico oil spill, Tepco’s Fukushima nuclear catastrophe), which I expect to concern many 
pension fund beneficiaries across the world for years to come, I restrict my test to a set of 
corporate environmental responsibility assessments. Specifically, I employ EIRIS’ 
assessments in four core processes of corporate environmental responsibility: (i) quality of 
corporate environmental policy and commitment, (ii) quality of corporate environmental 
management systems which implement the corporate environmental policy, (iii) 
improvements of actual environmental performance by corporation as result of the 
environmental policy and management systems, and (iv) quality of corporate environmental 
reporting on the previous three processes. All four criteria are assessed by EIRIS on a five 
point scale. The three quality measurements (environmental policy, environmental 
management, environmental reporting) are assessed from the worst to the best judgement as 
‘inadequate’, ‘weak’, ‘moderate’, ‘good’, or ‘exceptional’ quality of the respective process. 
The actual environmental performance rating is assessed from the worst to the best 
judgement as ‘no or inadequate data’, ‘no improvement’, ‘minor improvement’, ‘major 
improvement’, or ‘significant improvement’. In addition to these four individual 
(disaggregated) ratings, I calculate the average of these four ratings by transforming the 
                                                                                                                                                        
analysis of pension fund ESG integration at the level of the individual stock, it is very likely that they would 
employ a conceptually very similar research design, since statistical analysis always requires a sufficient high 
number of individual observations (i.e. ESG integrations at the individual stock level), which can be grouped or 
otherwise classified along a variable. 
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ordinal textual assessments in consecutive integer values following previous studies based on 
EIRIS data (e.g.Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Cox et al., 2004; Cox et al., 2007; Dam and 
Scholtens, 2013). I use this ‘average environmental rating’ as fifth (aggregated) rating, 
whereby I sort the firms in five groups according to quintiles of the rating scale (i.e. firms 
rated with values in the smallest 20% of the rating scale are categorised in the worst rated 
group, companies with values above 20% but no larger than 40% of the rating scale are 
clustered in the second worst group and so on).  
 I have access to EIRIS’ end of calendar year assessments from 2003 to 2009 for 
constituents of the FTSE All World Developed, one of the leading global stock market 
indexes for developed countries. During my sample period, this index listed companies from 
26 developed countries and is hence an ideal investment universe for realistic prudent equity 
pension fund investment test. These 26 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel (upgraded to 
developed country in 2008), Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, 
Portugal, Singapore, South Korea (upgraded to developed country in 2009), Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, US. This investment universe comprises, on average, around 1,850 firms, 
whereby a double-digit number of firms are listed with multiple share classes (i.e. A and B 
shares) each year. EIRIS makes every attempt to provide corporate ESG assessments for each 
firm in this investment universe, but naturally it needs a bit of operational time to react to 
each addition to FTSE’s constituent list. This operational time lag effect and some random 
occasional unavailability of financial data from Datastream resulted in my sample investment 
universe comprising on average 1,519 firms at the beginning of each year following an EIRIS 
end of year assessment. The following list shows the annual mean number of firms with 
available ESG assessments:  
2004: 1,504 
2005: 1,465 
2006: 1,551 
2007: 1,520 
2008: 1,541 
2009: 1,531 
2010: 1,519  
In columns 7 to 13 in Table 1, I report the actual number of firms with valid ESG data for 
each portfolio from 2004 to 2010. As EIRIS is specialised in assessing a company's ESG 
performance, they also track the behaviour of a company's changes of its ESG performance 
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over time. Whenever new information about a company's ESG performance becomes 
available EIRIS changes its ratings accordingly. To give one example, when a company has 
introduced a new environmental policy, then EIRIS will respond to that change by adjusting 
their rating upwards for that company. Generally, it is common for ESG criteria to change 
over time. To account for ESG rating changes, I update (re-balance) the constellation of my 
constructed portfolios based on ESG data at the end of each year. Updating my portfolios 
annually ensures that companies with improved ESG performance will be upgraded to a 
portfolio with higher ESG ratings, while companies with worsening ESG performance will be 
downgraded to a portfolio with lower ESG ratings.   
4.3.4 ESG data provider EIRIS 
I obtain my corporate environmental ratings from EIRIS, which are characterised by the 
following five features. First, EIRIS currently provides ESG data to large pension funds such 
as French FRR or Danish ATP. It is a reputable ESG ratings provider with its data being used 
by the FTSE4Good index series and other large asset managers such as BlackRock, Legg 
Mason, Legal & General or Morgan Stanley (EIRIS, 2011c). Second, EIRIS is an 
independent, non-for-profit organisation with over 25 years of experience in assessing and 
engaging with corporate ESG performance which does not offer any additional financial or 
legal advice to its clients (EIRiS, 2003, 2007, 2011a; Jahn, 2004; MISTRA, 2005; Schäfer et 
al., 2006). Third, EIRIS is a non-for-profit organisation that provides its clients with a broad 
selection of hundreds of individual ESG rating items in over 80 ESG research areas (EIRIS, 
2011b; Schäfer et al., 2006). Fourth, EIRIS tends to have a good track record with academics 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Although, some critique has been raised 
regarding the importance, validity, reliability, and reproducability of ESG data,58 other ESG 
ratings data provider such as KLD are also affected (Chatterjii and Levine, 2006; Chatterjii et 
al., 2009; Dam and Scholtens, 2010; Dam et al., 2007; Delmas and Blass, 2010; Entine, 2003; 
Rowley and Berman, 2000; Semenova, 2010; Sharfman, 1996). EIRIS’ standing with 
charities appears excellent, as leading charities such as Oxfam or WWF trust its ESG data. 
                                                 
58 Some common issues related to the importance, validity, reliability, and reproducability of ESG data are ESG 
raters' lack of transparency with regard to their methodologies, data quality issues, and data standardisation 
across sectors (Chatterjii and Levine, 2006; Chatterjii et al., 2009; Dam and Scholtens, 2010; Dam et al., 2007; 
Delmas and Blass, 2010; Entine, 2003; Rowley and Berman, 2000; Scholtens, 2009; Semenova, 2010; 
Sharfman, 1996 2006). For example, many ESG raters do not fully disclose the methodologies of their data 
generation process (Scholtens, 2009). While this protective behaviour helps ESG raters to compete, it hampers 
the transparency and validity of ESG data. It has also been noted that some ESG raters outsource the collection 
of ESG ratings to lower-cost economies such as India and Mauritius, which could lead to data quality issues 
(Young et al., 2011).     
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WWF, for instance, employs EIRIS data for its own corporate ESG assessment reports and 
Oxfam even requests EIRIS to check its ethical supplier questionnaire (EIRIS, 2011c; Oxfam, 
2004; WWF, 2007). Fifth, EIRIS’ corporate ESG assessments are based on a number of 
information sources including public company data, a company questionnaire, NGO reports, 
information from other media sources or data provided by regulators. Information is collected 
by EIRIS’ analysts based in its London, Boston or Paris office or its international partners in 
countries such as Australia, Germany or South Korea. For the interpretation of data points, 
EIRIS employs dedicated sector specialists, who analyse the information collected by their 
colleagues and update EIRIS corporate ESG assessment, whenever required due to relevant 
new ESG information. EIRIS is committed to reliable and valid corporate ESG ratings by ex-
post audits of its ESG data (EIRIS, 2007, 2011d) 59. 
4.3.5 Financial performance assessment 
For this sample universe, I retrieve monthly simple return data and market valuations for all 
firms from Datastream for my 77 months sample period from January 2004 to May 2010.60 
The return data is inclusive of distributions and both data types are denoted in US$. Based on 
these simple return data, I construct 25 large equity portfolios, whereby each portfolio only 
includes firms with one of the five assessment steps of my five corporate environmental 
responsibility criteria. The portfolios are value weighted based on one month lagged 
information with multiple share classes being appropriately considered. The portfolio 
constituents are updated at the beginning of each January as reaction to EIRIS’ new 
environmental responsibility assessments supplied annually at the end of December. Once 
portfolio returns are calculated based on the simple returns of the individual firms, the 
portfolio returns are transformed into continuously compounded returns to avoid an upwards 
bias in my statistical analysis. In line with Jensen’s (1968) original data transformation, I 
subsequently deduct the continuously compounded risk free rate from my continuously 
compounded portfolio returns to calculate the continuously compounded excess returns of my 
portfolios. As the risk-free rate for my developed country universe, I employ the monthly 
investment yield on a thirteen weeks US Treasury bill supplied by Datastream, as I 
                                                 
59 EIRIS seeks and obtains feedback from assessed companies and updates its ESG data accordingly. 
60 I select this sample period because EIRIS' corporate environmental ratings become available at the end of 
2003 and are limited to the end of 2009 for this study. The sample period under investigation inlcludes the 
financial crisis of 2007/2008. The principal objective of this chapter is to investigate the financial and risk 
implications of ESG criteria consideration on naive equity pension fund portfolios over a historical time period. 
The research question did not intend to test specifically the financial and risk implications during the financial 
crisis of 2007/2008 or other economic crises.   
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acknowledge that the US is (still) the most powerful and hence potentially least risky 
economy in the world. A potential downgrade on US Treasuries might result in increasing 
interest rate yields, signalling an increasingly risky economy. 
 To assess the financial performance of my 25 large equity portfolios, I use the Carhart 
(1997) model, which has been used in related equity portfolio studies (Bauer et al., 2005; 
Kempf and Osthoff, 2007; Statman and Glushkov, 2009) and pension fund performance 
studies (Goyal and Wahal, 2008; Tonks, 2005). As performance measurements of 
institutional investors (including public and private retirement plans, endowments, and multi-
employer unions) have been found to be sensitive to the choice of model employed, I follow 
Busse, Goyal and Wahal (2010) who also use a four-factor model. In particular, they find 
performance persistence using Fama and French's 3-factor model, however, the evidence 
vanishes after employing unconditional and conditional versions of Carhart's 4-factor model. 
The Carhart model can be written as in Equation (6). 
, , , , , , , ,( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (6)i t f t i i m t f t i smb t i hml t i mom t i tr r r r s r h r m r           
 where ri,t and rm,t represent the return of an equity pension fund portfolio (p) and my 
value-weighted investment universe of an average 1,519 firms denoted m. rf,t represents the 
risk free asset return. In the Carhart model, the financial performance assessment measure is 
αi. It represents the financial performance differential between the portfolio and the 
investment universe benchmark controlling for the known equity portfolio performance 
drivers size (smbt), value versus growth (hmlt) and share price momentum (momt) (Carhart, 
1997; Fama and French, 1992, 1993). βi denotes the portfolio’s systematic exposure to the 
investment universe’s equity market benchmark, while si, hi, and mi measure the exposure of 
a portfolio to the respective driver of equity performance. εi,t captures the random 
components of a pension fund’s portfolio’s excess return for each observation (t). 
 For an equivalent developed country universe, I construct the control factors 
representing the known equity performance drivers ‘size’, ‘value vs. growth’, and 
‘momentum’ using the online research tool of Style Research Limited, which are based on 
the Worldscope database and have been used extensively in previous research (e.g. Bauer et 
al., 2007; Bauer et al., 2005; Hoepner et al., 2011; Renneboog et al., 2008a). The size factor 
SMB is generated as the return difference between a portfolio of stocks in the lower half of 
the market capitalisation ranked investment universe and a portfolios of stocks in the upper 
half of the same universe. The value vs. growth factor (HML), is based on the investment 
universe ranked according to book value to market value ratio. It represents the difference 
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between the return of a portfolio of the Top 30% stocks and the return of a portfolio of the 
Bottom 30% stocks. The momentum factor (MOM) originates from the investment universe 
ranked according to each stock’s return over the previous twelve months. It is calculated as 
the return difference between a portfolio of the Top 30% stocks (previous winners) and a 
portfolio of the Bottom 30% stocks (previous losers) in this ranking. The MOM factor is 
updated monthly, while the SMB and HML factor are updated annually at the end of June in 
line with Fama and French (1993). All six portfolios underlying my three control factors are 
value weighted based on one month lagged information and their returns are continuously 
compounded.61 
4.3.6 Risk management opportunities 
Risk management is a central concern to pension funds of all funding types which are found 
to substantially change their asset management strategies depending on risk management 
ability and success (An et al., 2013; Rauh, 2009).62 Hence, the impact of ESG integration on 
risk is the second big question to address in order to understand if fiduciary duty prohibits 
ESG integration (Becker and Strömberg, 2012; Warburton, 2011).  
 Inspired by Blake, Rossi, Timmermann, Tonks, Wermers (2013), I empirically 
examine the risk of my 25 hypothetical equity pension fund portfolios by comparing several 
risk performance measures. The risk analysis comprises the following four total, 
idiosyncratic, and downside risk performance measures: a) Standard deviation, b) Semi 
Standard Deviation, c) Lower partial moments (LPM), and d) Worst-Case Loss. 
 My first risk measure, standard deviation, is commonly used to calculate a portfolio's 
exposure to total volatility and risk (systematic and idiosyncratic risks). Generally, total 
volatility measures portfolio risk of upside and downside return swings. I therefore calculate 
total risk as in Equation (7), 
2
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61 As Style Research does not offer the construction of the size (SMB) and value vs. growth (HML) factor 
precisely according to Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997), I follow Renneboog et al.’s (2008a) slightly 
amended procedure. Renneboog et al. (2008a) find that their ‘factors are virtually identical’ to the ones of Fama 
and French (1993) . 
62 Besides return and risk, Goyal and Wahal (2008) show that the termination of investment managers by 
pension trustees is not always due to financial underperformance, but can also result from non-performance 
related attributes such as personnel turnover, merger of investment firms or regulatory actions. 
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 where sxp,t represent the standard deviations of the excess return on each of my 25 
hypothetical equity pension portfolios. ,xp tr  is the mean excess return of pension portfolio i at 
time t. 
 My second risk measure, semi standard deviation, can be seen as a special case of the 
conventional standard deviation, where only negative deviations below the mean are taken 
into account. From the perspective of a portfolio manager, a distinction between upside 
(good) and downside (bad) variance is very desirable, because "good" variance increases 
portfolio returns, whereas "bad" variance decreases them. I compute the semi standard 
deviation as follows (Maginn et al., 2007) : 
2
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 where ssdxp,t are semi standard deviations of the excess returns on each of the 25 
hypothetical pension portfolios. The condition r r restricts the inclusion of returns below 
the mean. 
 Lower Partial Moments (LPM) is my third risk measure that is commonly applied to 
compute downside volatility/risk in more severe market conditions. The model assumes 
highly risk-averse investors, such as prudent pension funds because it punishes larger 
negative returns stronger than smaller negative returns. Generally, the magnitude of risk-
aversion increases when the exponent of the LPM increases (Eling and Schuhmacher, 2007; 
Kaplan and Knowles, 2004; Maginn et al., 2007). I calculate LPM as in Equation (9), 
33, , ,
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 where lpmxp,t are the lower partial moments of the excess returns on the 25 
hypothetical pension portfolios. I use an exponent and square root of 3. 
 Finally, to assess the highest possible loss of my hypothetical pension portfolios, 
during turbulent market conditions, I compute the worst-case loss over the invested sample 
period. Results of the highest loss provide a good indication, whether integrating ESG 
information into pension portfolios protects highly risk-averse investors. I calculate the risk 
measure as follows: 
, ,min (10)xp t xp tloss   
 where minxp,t represents the minimum excess return on each of the 25 hypothetical 
pension portfolios. 
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4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
I display descriptive statistics for my 25 hypothetical equity pension fund portfolios in Table 
1, which offer five interesting indications. First, I succeeded in constructing large investment 
portfolios most of which holding hundreds of firms. Of course, pension funds would in reality 
never own 100% of all firms in each of my constructed portfolios. Hence, I make the prudent 
conservative assumption that an equity pension fund portfolio would own 1% of each firm in 
my entire portfolios, which still results in all my pension fund portfolios being worth, on 
average, between 7 and 115 billion US$. Second, firms average environmental rating and 
especially their actual environmental performance increases over the years with the better 
rated portfolios including proportionally more companies. This might reflect an increase in 
environmental awareness among developed countries’ firms and populations as found by 
Barkemeyer et al. (2009).63 
 Third, the 25 equity portfolios of the pension funds' standard deviations are relatively 
evenly distributed, which indicates that there appears to be no diversification advantage for 
more or less environmentally responsible portfolios. The two portfolios with the lowest 
standard deviation (moderately rated on environmental management and significant 
improvement in environmental performance) include a medium and a small number of 
stocks, respectively. This suggests that all portfolios are well diversified, as larger portfolios 
do not seem to have any diversification benefits. Fourth, mean excess returns are also 
relatively evenly spread across portfolios with different ESG ratings implying that financial 
performance differences between them might be small. Fifth, while mean returns, standard 
deviations and maximum returns are all evenly spread across ESG assessments, minimum 
returns are not. Curiously, the portfolio with the best rating has clearly the lowest minimum 
return in case of any ESG criteria. 64 This suggests that portfolios with high corporate 
                                                 
63 My sample is survivor-bias adjusted. See Chapter 4.3.2. 'Investment universe, portfolio construction, and ESG 
integration', for a more detailed discussion on how I adjust my sample for survivorship-bias. 
64 As suggested by my examiners, I also test the effects of my ESG variables (environmental management, 
environmental policy, environmental performance and environmental reporting) on companies' excess returns 
using panel regressions with random and fixed effects. In my panel regressions, I include all of the companies in 
my sample and regress companies' excess returns on my ESG variables, separately, and over my full sample 
period from 2004 to 2010. Overall, my results show a negative association between my four ESG variables 
(environmental management, environmental policy, environmental performance and environmental reporting) 
and companies' excess returns. While the coefficients on my four ESG variables are negative (environmental 
management: -0.000013; environmental policy: -0.000160; environmental performance: -0.003178; 
environmental reporting: -0.001809), they are generally not statistically significant (z-ratios of -0.02; -0.15; -
2.79; and -1.53, respectively) and considerably small in magnitude. With one exception, the coefficient on 
environmental performance is statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level. Using panel regressions 
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environmental responsibility ratings could have additional goodwill based on their good 
rating that protects them from extreme losses. This finding is similar to Godfrey et al. (2009) 
who find that firms with strong ESG activities suffering a negative event, benefit from 
insurance-like protection through their strong ESG engagement.  
 To prepare for my regression analysis in the next chapter, I present correlations 
between my independent variables to test for Multicollinearity in Table 2 with the following 
results. As expected, the excess returns on the value-weighted market benchmark factor 
correlate somewhat with the SMB, HML, and MOM factors. My independent variables with 
the highest correlation are between the market and the SMB factor, with a positive correlation 
of 63.7 percent.65 In Table 2, my correlation matrix also indicates that the HML and MOM 
factors negatively correlate with 55 percent. These correlations are statistically significant at 
the 1 percent significance level.66 In conclusion, I can observe that although the factors are 
not orthogonal to each other, some correlation is expected, as originally observed by Fama 
and French (1993) and Carhart (1997).  
    
                                                                                                                                                        
with fixed effects, my results show a consistently negative association between my four ESG variables 
(environmental management, environmental policy, environmental performance and environmental reporting) 
and companies' excess returns. The coefficients on my ESG variables are negative (environmental management: 
-0.014452; environmental policy: -0.014850; environmental performance: -0.012744; environmental reporting: -
0.017520), and statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level (t-ratios of -4.84; -4.50; -5.30; and -
5.46, respectively). To determine which of my tested panel models (fixed vs. random effects) is more efficient in 
producing the estimators, I also conduct the Hausman specification test (Brooks, 2008). My results of the 
Hausman specification test show that the random effects model is the more appropriate model for all four panel 
regression specifications (Chi Squared values for environmental management: 27.18; environmental policy: 
23.46; environmental performance: 21.85; environmental reporting: 29.55). Based on my results, I can conclude 
that my ESG variables do not have an effect on companies' excess returns, except for one of my ESG variables, 
namely, environmental performance. In other words, increased environmental performance seems to reduce 
companies' excess returns, however, the relationship is not very strong. The reader is also advised that my panel 
regressions do not include any control variables to control for company-specific characteristics such as company 
size or company leverage and sectors, which could potentially have an influence on the association between my 
ESG variables and companies' excess returns. 
65 Fama & French (1993) observe correlations of 32 percent between the market and the SMB factor, and -38 
percent between the market and the HML factor.  
66 Carhart's (1997) correlations between the HML and MOM factor are -16 percent. 
89 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of pension fund portfolios 
Criteria EIRiS Rating Portfolio Excess Return Number of Firms  Market Values (in billion US$) Mean Std. Dev. Max Min 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
A
v
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g
e
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n
t
a
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a
t
i
n
g
 
5th Quintile 0.0093 0.0483 0.1454 -0.1886 733 634 631 597 598 549 523 84,746 78,010 81,383 81,982 72,546 34,698 43,662 
4th Quintile 0.0080 0.0481 0.1243 -0.1816 179 180 195 181 169 177 184 27,561 23,505 28,886 33,061 29,963 19,485 32,261 
3rd Quintile 0.0085 0.0492 0.1180 -0.1917 193 232 246 241 253 247 255 24,998 44,593 47,419 55,374 62,574 36,220 38,594 
2nd Quintile 0.0074 0.0470 0.1143 -0.1805 283 297 339 350 360 386 397 52,432 52,668 59,621 71,651 69,169 42,638 66,642 
1st Quintile 0.0083 0.0486 0.1183 -0.1427 116 122 140 151 161 172 160 19,926 26,693 44,205 53,019 54,711 35,418 47,447 
E
n
v
i
r
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n
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e
n
t
a
l
 
P
o
l
i
c
y
 
Inadequate 0.0089 0.0495 0.1459 -0.1902 633 387 391 516 520 467 434 70,782 43,589 45,070 59,796 53,092 23,829 31,868 
Weak 0.0116 0.0497 0.1440 -0.2129 99 77 84 109 102 105 112 10,669 7,394 10,917 20,310 18,134 11,842 15,299 
Moderate 0.0104 0.0489 0.1340 -0.1766 200 175 180 216 219 225 219 24,671 20,936 25,846 41,194 38,019 20,757 26,560 
Good 0.0074 0.0455 0.1021 -0.1749 493 503 536 589 609 622 634 90,274 93,904 111,895 144,458 146,898 90,820 121,570 
Exceptional 0.0089 0.0558 0.1650 -0.1512 79 94 104 90 91 112 120 13,268 20,753 26,701 29,329 32,819 21,211 33,309 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
 Inadequate 0.0089 0.0482 0.1440 -0.1813 644 542 549 507 509 462 429 76,140 69,435 74,423 72,129 64,340 29,967 36,823 
Weak 0.0082 0.0542 0.1293 -0.2318 64 46 47 58 66 68 80 7,970 5,022 7,176 12,250 12,022 7,295 12,818 
Moderate 0.0086 0.0447 0.1065 -0.1686 251 283 298 293 275 284 297 39,014 46,994 55,065 69,704 59,652 37,503 48,578 
Good 0.0075 0.0498 0.1104 -0.2015 201 228 239 231 252 266 262 37,100 47,409 48,860 53,691 61,518 38,840 57,970 
Exceptional 0.0082 0.0485 0.1325 -0.1598 344 366 418 431 439 451 449 49,439 56,609 75,991 87,313 91,432 54,854 72,318 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
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P
e
r
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o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 No or inadequate data 0.0085 0.0478 0.1374 -0.1869 746 618 704 652 667 620 566 102,382 80,929 89,391 89,979 85,586 46,350 55,311 
No improvement 0.0090 0.0571 0.1572 -0.2284 121 156 207 194 168 175 233 20,475 34,764 36,933 30,794 34,314 18,010 36,541 
Minor improvement 0.0083 0.0457 0.0993 -0.1719 153 198 323 310 303 300 321 27,313 41,598 59,073 74,751 57,960 37,751 50,254 
Major improvement 0.0069 0.0481 0.1253 -0.1793 113 125 250 273 298 330 305 25,919 32,543 53,112 64,991 72,269 47,505 58,678 
Significant improvement 0.0062 0.0447 0.0991 -0.1275 30 31 67 91 104 104 94 9,558 9,191 23,005 34,573 38,464 18,557 27,823 
E
n
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Inadequate 0.0089 0.0462 0.1287 -0.1746 926 868 890 857 850 819 809 111,834 122,334 130,987 140,260 132,388 73,665 92,530 
Weak 0.0076 0.0607 0.1781 -0.2328 159 161 170 168 177 163 160 18,861 16,689 20,157 25,276 30,806 12,185 17,259 
Moderate 0.0072 0.0465 0.1153 -0.1860 283 286 330 326 348 380 382 55,271 51,117 65,680 74,156 71,086 48,021 72,747 
Good 0.0093 0.0605 0.1615 -0.2440 55 55 45 50 45 43 48 7,296 8,173 7,358 12,437 8,592 4,090 6,329 
Exceptional 0.0079 0.0477 0.1203 -0.1330 81 95 116 119 121 126 118 16,401 27,156 37,333 42,959 46,091 30,497 39,640 
Notes: This Table reports descriptive statistics on each of the 25 pension fund portfolios, which are updated at the beginning of each year. The first column displays the environmental criteria integrated in the respective 
portfolios. The second column represents the rating of the respective portfolio. The subsequent four columns provide the descriptive statistics each portfolio’s excess return (mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum)
over the sample period from 01/2004 to 05/2010. The number of firms included in each portfolio is displayed as of January of each year in the following seven columns. The last seven columns display the market value (in 
billion US$) of a pension fund portfolio as of January of the respective year, whereby I make the prudent conservative assumption that a pension fund portfolio would own 1% of each firm in my constructed portfolios (see 
Research Design chapter for my portfolio construction approach).  
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Table 2: Correlations between Independent 
Variables 
  MKT SMB  HML  MOM  
MKT 1 
SMB  0.6372 *** 1 
(6.5631) 
HML  0.3256 *** 0.2279 * 1 
(2.7331)  (1.8575) 
MOM  -0.4122 *** -0.2963 -0.5455 *** 1 
(-3.5908)  (-2.4628)  (-5.1663) 
Notes: This table reports correlation coefficients between my four 
independent variables: Excess returns on the value-weighted 
market portfolio, SMB, HML, and MOM benchmark factors. I 
compute the correlations over the full sample period from 01/2004 
to 05/2010. ***, **, and *, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Below each 
correlation coefficient, I report t-statistics in brackets.  
4.4.2 Return results 
4.4.2.1 Aggregated  Measure: Average Environmental Rating 
I begin my discussion of my financial performance assessment results discussing the five 
portfolios constructed according to the aggregate measure (average environmental rating) to 
see, if there is any general trend. My results displayed in Table 3 show that not a single 
portfolio out- or underperforms the investment universe benchmark at any statistical 
significance level (1, 5 or 10 percent)67. Hence, the values of the α-coefficients, which are 
anyway small in absolute size, appear meaningless since there is a high probability that they 
occurred purely by chance. These results are highly reliable as shown by the Adjusted R-
squared values of between 92.4% and 97.2%, which represent the degree to which my 
econometric (Carhart) model is able to explain the excess return variation of my equity 
portfolios. In other words, there is only a little bit of excess return variation left, which my 
model cannot explain, and the smaller the unexplained component in a regression analysis the 
larger is the confidence that the respective results are empirically ‘true’ and are not 
potentially biased by any omitted explanatory variable. However, this result for average 
                                                 
67 Since the returns of the MKT and SMB factors as well as HML and MOM factors correlate somewhat (see 
Table 2), I repeat my analysis with orthogonalised benchmark factors. The orthogonalisation procedure helps to 
reduce the correlations between my independent variables. Different versions of the procedure have been 
applied in the literature (See e.g. Elton et al., 1993; Hoepner et al., 2011; Schröder, 2007). The results of my 
regressions with orthogonalised benchmark factors are consistent with my previous results: None of my 
portfolios significantly out- or underperforms the investment universe benchmark.   
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environmental rating does not necessarily mean that the integration of individual, 
disaggregated corporate environmental responsibility portfolios in pension fund investment 
processes may not be financially detrimental. 
 
Table 3: Aggregated Measure: Average Environmental Rating 
Environmental 
Criteria EIRiS Rating 
Carhart Model 
α   β   SMB   HML   MOM   Obs. 
Adj. 
R2 
Average 
Environmental 
Rating 
5th Quintile -0.0012  0.9196*** -0.1936 ** -0.0212 0.0087 77 0.9572
4th Quintile -0.0021  0.9464*** -0.1261  0.0372 0.0764** 77 0.9450
3rd Quintile -0.0003  0.9806*** -0.3089 *** 0.0297 0.1091*** 77 0.9722
2nd Quintile -0.0007  0.9409*** -0.3308 *** 0.0746 0.0951*** 77 0.9724
1st Quintile 0.0001  0.9700*** -0.2962 ** -0.0985 0.1461*** 77 0.9241
Notes: This table reports Carhart model estimations over the full sample period from January 2004 to May 2010 for portfolios representing 
quintiles of average environmental rating, whereby the first (fifth) quintile portfolio includes firms with the highest (lowest) average 
environmental rating. Using market value weighted portfolios, I estimate the regressions according to equation (1) displayed in the text. The 
third column reports the results of the intercept (α). The next column is the market beta estimate. Column five to seven are coefficients of the 
common investment style factors size (SMB), intangible assets (HML), and momentum (MOM). The last two columns report the number of 
observations and the adjusted Rsquared, which can be understood as the percentage of explanatory power of my regressions. Coefficient 
covariances and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent based on Newey and West (1987). ***, **, and * 
indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.   
4.4.2.2 Disaggregated Measures: Environmental Policy, Environmental Management, 
Environmental Performance, and Environmental Reporting 
The results for the equity pension fund portfolios with different assessments on the four 
disaggregated criteria are shown in Table 4. The estimations for the portfolios rated on 
environmental policy, environmental performance and environmental reporting are very 
similar to the overall results for the aggregated corporate environmental responsibility rating. 
No portfolio significantly under- or outperforms its market benchmark and α-coefficients are 
small in size. The Adjusted Rsquared values are again very high (89% to 98%), which 
indicates the reliability of the observation that my baseline equity pension fund portfolios 
considering corporate environmental responsibility perform financially insignificantly 
different from the market portfolio. 
 Of all 25 pension fund portfolios, only one of the five portfolios constructed based on 
corporate environmental management scores significantly underperforms its market 
benchmark. This equity pension fund portfolio comprises firms with a weak environmental 
management and does not only statistically significantly underperform but also has an 
absolute α-coefficient that is twice as large as any other α-coefficient. Hence, an investment 
in this portfolio can clearly not be recommended from a financial perspective. Pension funds 
with a preference for companies with weak environmental management would experience 
detrimental financial effects from integrating corporate environmental responsibility scores 
92 
into their investment process. However, pension funds currently interested in the integration 
of corporate environmental responsibility criteria into their investment processes have a 
preference for high(er) degrees of environmental responsibility and might even disapprove of 
firms scoring low in this regard. Hence, the statistically and economically significant 
underperformance of a portfolio of firms with below average environmental management is 
not problematic but beneficial for them, as they aim to underweight these less responsible 
firms in their portfolio.  
 In summary, I have found no evidence that equity portfolios of pension funds with 
sub-standard environmental responsibility assessments outperform market benchmarks or that 
pension fund portfolios with average of above assessments underperform the investment 
universe. The adjusted R2 values of all my econometric estimations provide us with a high 
degree of confidence regarding the reliability of my findings. Thus, I interpret my overall 
results as clear empirical support for the view that the integration of environmental 
responsibility criteria in the investment processes of equity pension funds concerned about 
the environment does not harm their financial performance. Hence, based on my results I 
conclude that pension funds’ fiduciary duty does not appear to prohibit the integration of 
environmental responsibility criteria into their investment processes, at least with respect to 
environmental responsibility data supplied by EIRIS. 
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Table 4: Disaggregated Measures: Environmental Policy, Management, Performance & Reporting 
Environmental 
Criteria EIRiS Rating 
Carhart Model 
α   β   SMB   HML   MOM   Obs. 
Adj. 
R2 
Environmental 
Policy 
Inadequate -0.0019 0.9558*** -0.2048** -0.0299 0.0099 77 0.9639 
Weak 0.0009 0.9110*** -0.0882 0.0479 0.0828** 77 0.9096 
Moderate 0.0007 0.9358*** -0.1109 -0.0292 0.0755*** 77 0.9648 
Good -0.0007 0.9325*** -0.3346*** 0.0516 0.1203*** 77 0.9765 
Exceptional 0.0005 1.0589*** -0.2279 -0.0619 0.1229* 77 0.9185 
         
Environmental 
Management 
Inadequate -0.0014 0.9153*** -0.2427*** 0.0279 0.0093 77 0.9492 
Weak -0.0057** 1.1058*** 0.0130 -0.1035 0.1178*** 77 0.9301 
Moderate 0.0003 0.8951*** -0.3060*** 0.0199 0.0934*** 77 0.9626 
Good -0.0004 1.0010*** -0.3418*** 0.0582 0.1179*** 77 0.9589 
Exceptional -0.0006 0.9556*** -0.2131** -0.0476 0.1044*** 77 0.9615 
         
Environmental 
Performance 
No or inadequate -0.0019 0.9232*** -0.1570* -0.0325 0.0217 77 0.9582 
No improvement -0.0012 1.1263*** -0.2665*** -0.0448 0.0755*** 77 0.9692 
Minor improvement -0.0001 0.9238*** -0.2914*** -0.0221 0.1248*** 77 0.9734 
Major improvement -0.0013 0.9545*** -0.2861*** 0.0918** 0.0944*** 77 0.9702 
Significant -0.0012 0.8614*** -0.3057** -0.0274 0.1291*** 77 0.8902 
         
Environmental 
Reporting 
Inadequate -0.0006 0.8960*** -0.2154*** 0.0086 0.0560** 77 0.9616 
Weak -0.0026 1.1745*** -0.1964* 0.0629 0.0513 77 0.9609 
Moderate -0.0012 0.9239*** -0.2716*** 0.0647 0.0873*** 77 0.9692 
Good -0.0012 1.1903*** -0.3773** 0.0341 0.1525*** 77 0.9115 
Exceptional 0.0001 0.9645*** -0.3756*** -0.1188* 0.1554*** 77 0.9064 
Notes: This table reports Carhart model estimations over the full sample period from January 2004 to May 2010 for portfolios of firms with four different ratings with respect to 
four EIRiS corporate environmental responsibility criteria (environmental policy, environmental management, environmental performance, and environmental reporting). Using 
market value weighted portfolios, I estimate the regressions according to equation (1) displayed in the text. The third column reports the results of the intercept (α). The next 
column is the market beta estimate. Column five to seven are coefficients of the common investment style factors size (SMB), intangible assets (HML), and momentum (MOM). 
The last two columns report the number of observations and the adjusted Rsquared, which can be understood as the percentage of explanatory power of my regressions. 
Coefficient covariances and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent based on Newey and West (1987). ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 
10% significance level, respectively.   
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4.4.3 Risk results 
I continue my discussion of my risk analysis assessment for 25 hypothetical equity pension 
portfolios based on aggregated and disaggregated corporate environmental sustainability 
criteria. 
4.4.3.1 Aggregated Measure: Average Environmental Rating 
Figure 3 shows standard deviations across all 25 hypothetical pension portfolios. On the 
aggregated level, I find all pension funds to have undistinguishable total monthly volatilities 
below 5 percent. The results suggest very evenly distributed standard deviations and no 
diversification benefits for better or worst rated corporate environmental pension portfolios. 
Semi standard deviations are displayed in Figure 4. I can observe that some equity pension 
funds with outstandingly rated corporate environmental criteria have experienced lower 
downside volatilities relative to equity portfolios with weaker rated environmental criteria. 
This suggests that on average, exceptionally rated environmental portfolios provide 
somewhat better risk protection. This finding is intensified when I adopt the perspective of a 
highly risk averse investor, such as with the LPM risk measure. Figure 5 indicates that my 
'Best' rated equity pension portfolio has a significantly lower downside variance relative to 
the 'Worst' and 'Median' rated equity portfolios, on average. My results are statistically 
significant at the 10 and 5 percent significance levels. For example, the difference between 
the downside variance of the 'Best' and 'Worst' rated pension portfolios is a remarkable 6.84 
percent per annum. I can observe an even higher annual difference between the 'Best' and 
'2nd Worst' with 8.52 percent. These findings highlight the downside risk protection potential 
of pension funds with good corporate environmental ratings. My final risk measure takes the 
perspective of an extremely risk averse investor. In Figure 6, I present my findings on worst-
case losses or minimum values across all 25 hypothetical equity pension fund portfolios. On 
average, the 'Best' rated portfolio protects the investor against large losses and excels in 
preserving value. Remarkably, the difference between pension portfolios based on 
outstanding as opposed to poor environmental responsibility is 4.6 percent. Although the 
differences between portfolios can be large, they are not statistically significant for the worst-
case losses.  
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Figure 3: Standard Deviation of portfolios with varying EIRiS environmental responsibility ratings 
 
Notes: This figure shows standard deviations of annually updated investment portfolios including stocks with a specific EIRiS 
environmental responsibility rating. The horizontal axis (x-axis) displays the five corporate environmental ratings from EIRiS: Average 
Environmental Rating, Environmental Policy, Environmental Management, Environmental Performance and Environmental Reporting. The 
Average Environmental Rating is calculated as the mean rating from the other four. For each environmental rating, five value-weighted 
portfolios with increasing environmental performance are calculated. The grey bars represent the portfolios with the "best" environmental 
rating, whereas the white bars represent portfolios rated lower than "best", such as, "2nd best", "median", "2nd worst", and "worst". The 
numbers on top of each bar represent the number of average constituents in that portfolio. Statistical significances for the mean difference 
between the "Best" portfolio relative to the "2nd Best", "Median", "2nd Worst", and "Worst" portfolios are computed using a t-test. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance levels at the 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical significance. 
 
Figure 4: Semi Standard Deviation of portfolios with varying EIRiS environmental responsibility ratings 
 
Notes: This figure shows semi standard deviations of annually updated investment portfolios including stocks with a specific EIRiS 
environmental responsibility rating. The horizontal axis (x-axis) displays the five corporate environmental ratings from EIRiS: Average 
Environmental Rating, Environmental Policy, Environmental Management, Environmental Performance and Environmental Reporting. The 
Average Environmental Rating is calculated as the mean rating from the other four. For each environmental rating, five value-weighted 
portfolios with increasing environmental performance are calculated. The grey bars represent the portfolios with the "best" environmental 
rating, whereas the white bars represent portfolios rated lower than "best", such as, "2nd best", "median", "2nd worst", and "worst". The 
numbers at the bottom of each bar represent the number of average constituents in that portfolio. Statistical significances for the mean 
difference between the "Best" portfolio relative to the "2nd Best", "Median", "2nd Worst", and "Worst" portfolios are computed using a t-test. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance levels at the 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical significance. 
 
***   ***  *** *** ***           *** ** 
* **             ** **              * 
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Figure 5: Lower Partial Moment - Kappa 3 of portfolios with varying EIRiS environmental responsibility ratings 
 
Notes: This figure shows lower partial moments of annually updated investment portfolios including stocks with a specific EIRiS environmental 
responsibility rating. The horizontal axis (x-axis) displays the five corporate environmental ratings from EIRiS: Average Environmental Rating, 
Environmental Policy, Environmental Management, Environmental Performance and Environmental Reporting. The Average Environmental Rating 
is calculated as the mean rating from the other four. For each environmental rating, five value-weighted portfolios with increasing environmental 
performance are calculated. The grey bars represent the portfolios with the "best" environmental rating, whereas the white bars represent portfolios 
rated lower than "best", such as, "2nd best", "median", "2nd worst", and "worst". The numbers at the bottom of each bar represent the number of 
average constituents in that portfolio. Statistical significances for the mean difference between the "Best" portfolio relative to the "2nd Best", 
"Median", "2nd Worst", and "Worst" portfolios are computed using a t-test. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance levels at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent statistical significance. 
 
Figure 6: Minimum (worst-case) returns of portfolios with varying EIRiS environmental responsibility ratings 
 
Notes: This figure shows minimum returns of annually updated investment portfolios including stocks with a specific EIRiS environmental 
responsibility rating. The horizontal axis (x-axis) displays the five corporate environmental ratings from EIRiS: Average Environmental Rating, 
Environmental Policy, Environmental Management, Environmental Performance and Environmental Reporting. The Average Environmental Rating is 
calculated as the mean rating from the other four. For each environmental rating, five value-weighted portfolios with increasing environmental 
performance are calculated. The grey bars represent the portfolios with the "best" environmental rating, whereas the white bars represent portfolios 
rated lower than "best", such as, "2nd best", "median", "2nd worst", and "worst". The numbers at the bottom of each bar represent the number of 
average constituents in that portfolio. Statistical significances for the mean difference between the "Best" portfolio relative to the "2nd Best", 
"Median", "2nd Worst", and "Worst" portfolios are computed using a t-test. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance levels at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent statistical significance. 
**             **  * **              ** 
**  * 
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4.4.3.2 Disaggregated Measures: Environmental Policy, Environmental Management, 
Environmental Performance, and Environmental Reporting 
In this chapter, I continue my risk analysis assessment by separately investigating equity 
pension portfolios based on four individual environmental sustainability criteria. Figure 3 
shows the distributions of standard deviations per portfolio. Broadly in line with my previous 
findings on aggregated environmental criteria, I find that standard deviations tend to be 
generally equally distributed. One exception is the 'Environmental Policy' portfolio whose 
total risk ranges between 4.45 to 6 percent. My findings indicate that none of the observed 
portfolios enjoy diversification benefits. Disaggregated semi standard deviations displayed in 
Figure 4, show that 'Best' rated portfolios have lower semi standard deviations relative to the 
'2nd Worst' rated portfolios. My results are consistent across three corporate environmental 
responsibility criteria and statistically significant at the 10 and 5 percent significance levels. 
One pension portfolio, 'Environmental Policy', tends to display marginally higher downside 
volatility than its peers, however, the difference is not statistically significant. My LPM risk 
results for the individual pension portfolios are shown in Figure 5 and indicate downside risk 
protection for 'Best' rated environmental portfolios relative to '2nd Worst' rated portfolios, 
and some evidence for better downside risk management for the 'Best' rated portfolios 
relative to 'Worst' rated portfolio. In particular, the 'Best' Environmental policy portfolio 
tends to outperform the '2nd Worst' portfolio, but performs rather equal to the 'Worst' 
Environmental policy portfolio. My results are statistically significant at the 10 and 5 percent 
significance levels for two corporate environmental responsibility criteria such as corporate 
environmental performance and corporate environmental reporting. Once again, my final risk 
measure, worst-case loss, shows preservation of investor value for the 'Best' rated pension 
portfolio across all disaggregated environmental ratings. These findings suggest that 'Best' 
rated pension funds tend to outperform their peers and protect institutional investors, such as 
extreme risk-averse pension funds, against large losses. For example, for two disaggregated 
portfolios I can observe a minimum difference of 2.2 percent (Environmental Management) 
and a maximum difference of 5.9 percent (Environmental Performance) between the "Best" 
and 'Worst' rated hypothetical pension portfolios. My findings are statistically significant at 
the 10 and 5 percent significance levels for two corporate environmental responsibility 
criteria including environmental management and environmental reporting.  
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4.5 Robustness tests 
I conduct two broad sets of robustness tests, one for temporal stability of returns and another 
for sector bias. To investigate whether my findings are robust to different time periods, I 
divide my full sample into two sub-samples that cover the period from January 2004 to 
February 2007 and from March 2007 to May 2010. Table 5 and Table 6 indicate as per my 
previous findings over the full sample period, I do not find any statistically significant 
evidence of above and/or below average environmental responsibility in either sub-sample. 
My second set of robustness tests addresses the issue of sector bias. To eliminate the 
suspicion that my results are driven by certain sectors, I account for sector bias, by re-running 
Equation [1] with additional sector controls for clusters of ten industry groups in the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB). These include Oil & Gas (0001), Basic Materials (1000), 
Industrials (2000), Consumer Goods (3000), Health Care (4000), Consumer Services (5000), 
Telecommunications (6000), Utilities (7000), Financials (8000), and Technology (9000). 
Table 7 shows that my additional regressions are not qualitatively different to the original 
analysis. Thus, I can confidently conclude that my analysis is stable over time and robust to 
sector bias. 
 
Table 5: Aggregated & Disaggregated Measures - Sub-Period One (01/2004 to 02/2007) 
Environmental 
Criteria EIRiS Rating 
Carhart Model 
α   β   SMB   HML   MOM   Obs. 
Adj. 
R2 
    
Average 
Environmental 
Rating 
5th Quintile -0.0009 0.8236*** -0.1152 -0.1454 -0.0154 36 0.8395
4th Quintile 0.0012 0.9493*** -0.3380 *** -0.1471 0.0610 36 0.8838
3rd Quintile 0.0001 1.0600*** -0.4878 *** -0.0315 0.0931 36 0.9061
2nd Quintile -0.0013 0.9089*** -0.2637 ** 0.0027 0.0176 36 0.8666
1st Quintile 0.0028 0.8840*** -0.4818 ** -0.0824 0.3728*** 36 0.7429
    
Environmental 
Policy 
Inadequate -0.0015 0.8177*** -0.1312 -0.0397 -0.0306 36 0.8315
Weak 0.0059** 0.7533*** -0.0885  -0.2446** 0.2392** 36 0.7560
Moderate 0.0015 0.9927*** -0.2234  -0.1568 0.0319 36 0.8841
Good 0.0009 0.9148*** -0.4652 *** -0.0517 0.1369*** 36 0.9181
Exceptional -0.0017 1.1125*** -0.3581  0.0060 0.3566** 36 0.7915
         
Environmental 
Management 
Inadequate -0.0011 0.8199*** -0.1260 -0.1467 -0.0359 36 0.8055
Weak 0.0028 0.9281*** -0.0828  -0.0743 0.1593 36 0.8432
Moderate 0.0007 0.9454*** -0.4372 *** -0.0721 0.0193 36 0.9208
Good -0.0003 0.9923*** -0.4423 *** -0.0287 0.1490*** 36 0.8525
Exceptional 0.0002 0.9081*** -0.2954 -0.0482 0.1777 36 0.8145
         
Environmental 
Performance 
No or inadequate -0.0007 0.8917*** -0.1614 -0.1131 -0.0711 36 0.8852
No improvement -0.0003 1.1571*** -0.3868 *** -0.0067 0.0362 36 0.9000
Minor 0.0009 0.9266*** -0.2782 *** -0.0307 -0.0107 36 0.8681
Major -0.0007 1.0403*** -0.4957 *** -0.0468 0.1029* 36 0.8654
Significant 0.0012 0.9976*** -0.5794 *** -0.1937 0.1650 36 0.6223
         
Environmental Inadequate -0.0005 0.8635*** -0.2012 -0.1287* 0.0367 36 0.9149
99 
Reporting Weak 0.0023 1.0461*** -0.4220 ** 0.0775 0.0116 36 0.7315
Moderate -0.0008 0.9401*** -0.3911 *** -0.0807 0.0723 36 0.9045
Good 0.0003 1.0095*** -0.1497 0.3299** -0.0642 36 0.7068
Exceptional 0.0014 0.8857*** -0.4358 ** -0.0534 0.3102*** 36 0.7403
Notes: This table reports Carhart model estimations over the first sub-period from January 2004 to February 2007 for portfolios of firms with five different 
ratings with respect to five EIRiS corporate environmental responsibility criteria (average environmental rating, environmental policy, environmental 
management, environmental performance, and environmental reporting). Using market value weighted portfolios, I estimate the regressions according to 
equation (1) displayed in the text. The third column reports the results of the intercept (α). The next column is the market beta estimate. Column five to seven 
are coefficients of the common investment style factors size (SMB), intangible assets (HML), and momentum (MOM). The last two columns report the number 
of observations and the adjusted Rsquared, which can be understood as the percentage of explanatory power of my regressions. Coefficient covariances and 
standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent based on Newey and West (1987). ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
 
 
Table 6: Aggregated & Disaggregated Measures - Sub-Period Two (03/2007 to 05/2010) 
Environmental 
Criteria EIRiS Rating 
Carhart Model 
α   β   SMB   HML   MOM   Obs. 
Adj. 
R2 
    
Average 
Environmental 
Rating 
5th Quintile 0.0000 0.9270*** -0.1427* 0.0393 0.0516*** 41 0.9669
4th Quintile -0.0040 0.9344*** -0.0537 0.0447 0.0862* 41 0.9447
3rd Quintile -0.0011 0.9709*** -0.2237** 0.0210 0.1172*** 41 0.9749
2nd Quintile -0.0009 0.9401*** -0.3271*** 0.0835 0.1038*** 41 0.9768
1st Quintile -0.0021 0.9433*** -0.2400* -0.1797** 0.0963** 41 0.9398
    
Environmental 
Policy 
Inadequate -0.0015 0.9641*** -0.1362 0.0026 0.0476*** 41 0.9727
Weak 0.0006 0.9100*** -0.0852 0.0394 0.0702* 41 0.9167
Moderate 0.0002 0.9251*** -0.0536 -0.0149 0.0869*** 41 0.9686
Good -0.0018 0.9216*** -0.2826*** 0.0407 0.1190*** 41 0.9786
Exceptional -0.0011 1.0334*** -0.2314 -0.1448 0.0616 41 0.9283
         
Environmental 
Management 
Inadequate -0.0003 0.9245*** -0.2026** 0.0987 0.0563*** 41 0.9612
Weak -0.0104*** 1.0871*** 0.0910 -0.1690 0.0944* 41 0.9376
Moderate 0.0003 0.8953*** -0.2370** 0.0451 0.1208*** 41 0.9646
Good -0.0008 0.9933*** -0.3300*** 0.0357 0.1044** 41 0.9642
Exceptional -0.0022 0.9375*** -0.1590 -0.0841* 0.0867*** 41 0.9675
         
Environmental 
Performance 
No or inadequate -0.0015 0.9268*** -0.0962 0.0160 0.0611*** 41 0.9656
No improvement -0.0017 1.1228*** -0.1847 -0.0489 0.0918** 41 0.9737
Minor 0.0004 0.9267*** -0.2605** -0.0080 0.1429*** 41 0.9775
Major -0.0018 0.9463*** -0.2632*** 0.0628 0.0799*** 41 0.9739
Significant -0.0030 0.8383*** -0.2854** -0.0559 0.1021*** 41 0.9286
         
Environmental 
Reporting 
Inadequate 0.0002 0.8972*** -0.1730* 0.0557 0.0861*** 41 0.9640
Weak -0.0076*** 1.1559*** -0.0743 -0.0068 0.0408 41 0.9747
Moderate -0.0017 0.9133*** -0.2025* 0.0767 0.1011*** 41 0.9723
Good -0.0020 1.2022*** -0.3017 0.0153 0.1799** 41 0.9215
Exceptional -0.0013 0.9522*** -0.3868** -0.1970** 0.1052** 41 0.9231
Notes: This table reports Carhart model estimations over the second sub-period from March 2007 to May 2010 for portfolios of firms with five different ratings 
with respect to five EIRiS corporate environmental responsibility criteria (average environmental rating, environmental policy, environmental management, 
environmental performance, and environmental reporting). Using market value weighted portfolios, I estimate the regressions according to equation (1) 
displayed in the text. The third column reports the results of the intercept (α). The next column is the market beta estimate. Column five to seven are 
coefficients of the common investment style factors size (SMB), intangible assets (HML), and momentum (MOM). The last two columns report the number of 
observations and the adjusted Rsquared, which can be understood as the percentage of explanatory power of my regressions. Coefficient covariances and 
standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent based on Newey and West (1987). ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance level, respectively.   
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Table 7: Aggregated & Disaggregated Measures - Sector Cluster Controls  
Environmental 
Criteria EIRiS Rating 
Carhart Model 
α   
Industry 
Cluster 1   
Industry 
Cluster 2   
Industry 
Cluster 3   
Industry 
Cluster 4   
Industry 
Cluster 5 
Obs. Adj. R2 
      
Average 
Environmental 
Rating 
5th Quintile -0.0002  0.0454 0.2642*** 0.0306 0.0667 0.0773 77 0.9850 
4th Quintile -0.0014  0.1292 0.1875*** 0.0547 0.0596 0.1208 77 0.9593 
3rd Quintile -0.0007  0.0634 0.0282 0.1282*** 0.1381** 0.0470 77 0.9762 
2nd Quintile -0.0013  0.1050 0.0361 0.0168 -0.0601 0.0713** 77 0.9691 
1st Quintile -0.0005  -0.0170 0.1171 0.2127*** 0.0457 -0.1928 77 0.9271 
      
Environmental 
Policy 
Inadequate -0.0013  0.0505 0.2007* -0.0108 0.0639 0.0409 77 0.9774 
Weak 0.0028 * 0.0612 0.4044 0.1461*** -0.1026 0.0373 77 0.9360 
Moderate 0.0007  0.0898 0.0566 0.0814** 0.1163* 0.1227 77 0.9720 
Good -0.0011  0.0867* 0.0656 0.1069*** 0.0248 0.0348 77 0.9788 
Exceptional -0.0009  -0.0897 0.1637 0.1764*** 0.0903 -0.2562 77 0.9159 
           
Environmental 
Management 
Inadequate -0.0003  0.0508 0.2960*** 0.0085 0.0922* 0.0469 77 0.9827 
Weak -0.0048 * 0.1194 0.0426 0.0899 -0.1919 0.1843 77 0.9284 
Moderate 0.0004  0.1333*** 0.1017** 0.1103*** 0.1455*** 0.0191 77 0.9760 
Good -0.0010  0.0391 0.0597 0.1006 -0.1256 0.1742 77 0.9602 
Exceptional -0.0014  0.0298 0.0733 0.1077*** 0.0691 -0.1007 77 0.9549 
           
Environmental 
Performance 
No or inadequate -0.0005  0.0639 0.2532 0.0335 0.0677 0.1052* 77 0.9887 
No improvement -0.0012  0.0114 0.0229 0.0995** 0.0432 0.0002 77 0.9682 
Minor improvement 0.0006  0.0917 0.0139 0.0493 0.0059 0.0647 77 0.9682 
Major improvement -0.0016  0.0833 0.0636 0.1547*** -0.0381 0.1092* 77 0.9716 
Significant -0.0015  -0.0307 0.0183 0.2228*** 0.2821* -0.1813 77 0.9006 
           
Environmental 
Reporting 
Inadequate -0.0001  0.1056*** 0.1941*** 0.1033*** 0.1310*** 0.0723 77 0.9888 
Weak -0.0032  0.1469 0.1360 -0.0302 -0.1254 -0.2079 77 0.9536 
Moderate -0.0016  0.0646 0.0446 0.0286 0.0075 0.0956 77 0.9687 
Good -0.0003  -0.0633 0.0001 -0.1702 -0.3252* 0.1310 77 0.9091 
Exceptional -0.0004  -0.0372 0.1070 0.2146*** 0.0222 -0.1878 77 0.9166 
Notes: This table reports Carhart model estimations in addition to five industry cluster controls for portfolios of firms with five different ratings with respect to five EIRiS corporate environmental responsibility 
criteria (average environmental rating, environmental policy, environmental management, environmental performance, and environmental reporting). Using market value weighted portfolios, I estimate the 
regressions according to Equation [1] displayed in the text. The third column reports the results of the intercept (α). The next column is Industry Cluster 1 which includes the Oil&Gas, Materials, and Utilities 
sectors. Column five is Industry Sector 2 representing the Industrials sector. Column six shows Industry Cluster 3 which includes Telecommunications, Technology, and Healthcare. In Column seven, I 
report coefficients for Industry Cluster 4, which includes Consumer Goods and Services. The next column shows Industry Cluster 5 representing the Financials sector. The last two columns report the 
number of observations and the adjusted Rsquared, which can be understood as the percentage of explanatory power of my regressions. Coefficient covariances and standard errors are made 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent based on Newey and West (1987). ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.   
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4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I aim to extend the analysis of the Freshfields (2005) report. In line with other 
commentators, I recognise the Freshfields report as welcome contribution due to its 
conceptual value, but do not consider it to represent a practical breakthrough due to several 
uncertainties, which it leaves unaddressed. The possibly most important unaddressed 
uncertainty results from the Freshfields report providing little guidance on the question ‘what 
are the financial and risk implications of the consideration of an ESG criterion on a pension 
fund portfolio that complies with the legal duty of prudent action for proper purpose?’ I seek 
to empirically investigate this research question. 
 To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to empirically analyse this question. For 
my analysis, I develop prudent pension fund equity investment processes with realistic 
characteristics (e.g. billion US$ size, developed country universe) and integrate specific ESG 
data in these from January 2004 to May 2010. My specific ESG dataset comprises five 
corporate environmental responsibility ratings supplied by EIRIS for a universe of over 1,500 
firms from 26 countries. As each rating includes five assessment steps, I generate 25 equity 
pension fund portfolios of firms sharing an assessment in one of the ratings. My two main 
results are as follows: First, my tests provide no indications that the integration of corporate 
environmental responsibility criteria into equity pension fund investment processes has 
detrimental financial performance effects, at least with respect to equity pension portfolios 
with a preference for corporate environmental responsibility as assessed by EIRIS. Second, 
my complementary risk analysis shows that from a risk management perspective specific 
ESG criteria have a positive effect on the downside risk protection of pension portfolios. The 
findings of my risk analysis are in line with related studies who investigate the association 
between ESG criteria and systematic/idiosyncratic risks and the risk mitigating effect of using 
ESG screens (See e.g. Bauer et al., 2009; Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria, 2004; Lee and Faff, 
2009; Mishra and Modi, 2013; Oikonomou et al., 2012). These studies provide evidence that 
ESG criteria lowers the systematic and idiosyncratic risk of firms. Their findings seems 
plausible as some types of ESG criteria have been found to create "moral capital or goodwill" 
that preserves companies' financial performance from negative events such as monetary fines 
and sanctions (Godfrey et al., 2009). Under Modern Portfolio Theory, some scholars may 
argue that screened portfolios are riskier propositions than unscreened portfolios due to a 
potential diversification penalty (See e.g. Kurtz, 2005; Markowitz, 1952; Rudd, 1981; 
Sharpe, 1964). They argue that portfolios considering ESG criteria will represent a sub-set of 
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the entire investable universe and therefore be less diversified and more risky. However, 
recent empirical evidence has shown that a reduced stock universe does not necessarily lead 
to less diversified, thus riskier portfolios (Bello, 2005; Kacperczyk et al., 2005; Schroeder, 
2007). 
 Thus, based on my analysis, I conclude that the integration of corporate 
environmental responsibility criteria into the investment processes of pension funds does not 
seem to have any significant detrimental financial and risk implications. As the Adjusted R-
squared values of my 25 analyses are very high (between 89 and 98%) and my results are 
consistent over time. Hence, I find that fiduciary duties or other legislation do not appear to 
prohibit the integration of environmental responsibility standards into pension fund 
investment processes in any of the nine large jurisdictions studied by Freshfields and us (US, 
UK, Canada, Australia, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and Spain). As such, this finding is in 
line with previous findings in the literature (Bauer et al., 2005; Galema et al., 2008; 
Renneboog et al., 2008a).  
 My study is, however, subject to a few limitations. First, I do not consider the expense 
a pension fund incurs in acquiring the environmental responsibility assessments from a data 
provider such as EIRIS. However, in relation to the billions of pension fund assets, 
subscription prices for ESG data are fairly small. Furthermore, Gil-Bazo et al. (2010) recently 
observed ESG integrating mutual funds to have similar expense ratios as equivalent peers 
with an alternative active investment strategy, which indicates that ESG integration is no 
more or less expensive than the average active management strategy. Second, my results are 
directly only applicable to the large equity component in pension fund portfolios. While 
equities and fixed income are arguably the most important asset classes for pension funds’ 
financial performance (Aglietta et al., 2012; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; OECD, 2013), the less 
volatile asset classes bonds and cash are also relevant. Cash investments and low risk bond 
investments are very useful to manage liquidity or reduce a portfolio’s leverage but they have 
a marginal impact on pension funds’ financial performance compared to an equivalently 
leveraged market universe. Hence, their consideration would unlikely change my results in 
any meaningful way. The integration of ESG criteria into higher risk bonds could lead to a 
result different from mine. However, research on ESG criteria and bonds outside of pension 
fund investment processes does not observe any relevant harmful financial effects of ESG 
integration (Derwall and Koedijk, 2009; Menz, 2010). Third, my results directly only apply 
to corporate environmental responsibility criteria and of these only to those produced by 
EIRIS. Therefore, promising routes for future research might lie in conducting similar 
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analyses for different ESG criteria, possibly using bond instead of equity investment 
processes in some cases. 
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5 Static and dynamic multi-factor performance and investment style of 
international renewable energy stock indexes 
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Abstract 
This chapter investigates risk premia and dynamic investment styles of global and regional renewable 
energy equity indexes. Risk premia are not persistent and very short-lived. My findings also show that 
positive investor sentiment, momentum trading, exposure to small capitalisation stocks, and high 
volatilities are likely causes for the beneficial performance of renewable energy indexes towards the 
end of the first phase EU ETS. Static multi-factor attribution models tend to explain return and risk 
variations of the renewable energy equity indexes well, but dynamic state-space multi-factor models 
provide substantially more detailed insight into the temporal behaviour of renewable energies during 
the first two phases of the EU ETS. I conclude that sustainable investors will be able to reap financial 
benefits from certain specialised renewable energy indexes that have been carefully monitored. 
  
 
  
Static and dynamic multi-factor performance and investment style 
of international renewable energy stock indexes 
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5.1 Introduction 
While Europe is at the forefront of pricing carbon to reduce total greenhouse gas emissions 
through market policies such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
and ambitious national renewable energy targets, governments elsewhere in the world are 
devising and implementing policies to develop low carbon economies. With the overarching 
aim of reducing total CO2 emissions, many of these polices foster the development of low-
carbon energy infrastructures with increasing investments in renewable energy technologies. 
Consequently, the demand for renewable energies worldwide has risen drastically in recent 
years (World Economic Forum, 2011). 
 In light of these developments, it seems plausible that Chia et al. (2009) find a 
renewable energy equity premium in financial markets. They observe an international 
portfolio of renewable energy firms to perform superior to their benchmark at a statistically 
significant level over a sample period from May 2005 to May 2008. Notably, they explain 
that the statistically significant outperformance of renewable energy stocks remains after 
controlling for renewable energy firms’ tendencies to be smaller in size, more volatile and 
less value tilted than the average stock. Their result concurs with more recent evidence from 
Bohl et al. (2013), who find renewable energy equity indexes to significantly outperform 
their benchmarks in the German renewable energy sector between 2004 to 2007. A renewable 
energy equity premium is also theoretically plausible, if one assumes financial market 
participants to consistently underestimate the legislatively supported demand for renewable 
energies. 
 This persistent positive performance may, however, not be as straightforward as 
suggested by Ortas and Moneva (2013). During periods of market in-stability, they find 
renewable energy equity premia to differ geographically. While they observe a negative 
performance of renewable energy indexes with geographically focused investment objectives 
such as Asian, European and North American indexes, they find a significant positive 
performance of renewable energy indexes with global investment reach.  
 Nevertheless, a persistent renewable energy premium appears questionable based on 
Bohl et al. (2013) powerful bubble tests that indicate the explosive price behaviour of 
renewable energy stocks in the mid 2000s. While they find renewable energy indexes to be 
substantially exposed to high beta stocks (Sadorsky, 2012b), small caps and growth stocks, in 
line with Chia et al. (2009) self-selected renewable energy portfolio, they do not observe 
renewable energy indexes to consistently outperform their benchmarks. Similarly, Kumar et 
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al. (2012) further shed light on the performance of three global renewable energy indexes and 
find that none leads to consistent positive risk premia. 
 The difference between studies supporting as opposed to rejecting the existence of a 
persistent renewable energy premium could be the result of omitted mutual fund management 
fees, or the careful self-selected composition of Chia et al.'s (2009) renewable energy 
portfolio that led to an abnormally good financial performance of its portfolio. 
 In this chapter, I explore whether a persistent renewable energy equity premium exists 
in financial markets while at the same time analyse pollution reduction through renewable 
energy equity indexes from the perspective of an investor.  
 I contribute to the extant literature by investigating the static and dynamic financial 
performance of a large international sample of renewable energy equity indexes, in a multi-
factor framework, before the launch and during the first and second phase of the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 68. For example, my analysis spans over the entire life, 
since the inception, of each renewable energy equity index as well as the two phases of the 
EU ETS. The reason to also study the financial performance of renewable energy equity 
indexes over the two phases of the ETS is driven by the decisions of the European Union and 
governments elswhere in the world to commit to ambitious renewable energy targets to 
reduce CO2 emissions and increase the share of renewable energy generated electricity.69  
My analysis is neither exposed to a potential bias of self-selecting a stock portfolio nor is it 
affected by fees or management skills of (active) mutual funds and their managers. Thus, I 
investigate the following research questions:  
1) Is there a difference between the financial performance of international 
renewable equity stock indexes and conventional stock indexes? 
 2) Does the financial performance of international renewable energy stock 
indexes differ over the first two EU ETS time periods (P1:2005-2007 and 
P2:2008-2012)?  
3) Does the financial performance of renewable energy stock indexes depend on 
the investment region? 
                                                 
68 The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is a market-based policy instrument and seen as 
the cornestone of Europe's climate policy to reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Oberndorfer, 2009). The 
principal aim of the EU ETS is to reduce the overall amount of Greenhouse Gases in circulation and to make 
energy producers more efficienct (European Union, 2013). The EU ETS is running over three phases or trading 
periods with increasing restrictions on Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Phase I: 2005-2007, Phase II: 2008-2012, 
Phase III: 2013-2020, and Phase IV: 2021-2028 (European Union, 2013).   
69 For example, the EU ETS' New Entrants' Reserve (NER) 300 fund demands that 300 million allowances are 
set aside to fund the integration of innovative renewable energy technologies and their deployment (European 
Commission, 2015).   
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My results, in brief, are as follows. My static and dynamic attribution analysis shows 
substantial differences in the behaviour of renewable energy indexes' financial performance, 
risk, and investment styles. In terms of financial performance, Global and Regional 
renewable energy indexes tend to underperform their respective benchmarks, on average. 
Some interesting patterns emerge when I dynamically investigate sub-samples such as phase 
1 and 2 of the EU ETS. In particular, during the first phase EU ETS, I observe positive 
financial performance across renewable energy indexes and three even significantly 
outperform their benchmarks. Over the same period, two dynamic investment styles, size and 
momentum, indicate strong exposure to small capitalisation stocks and positive momentum 
exposure. It seems that the good financial performance of renewable energy indexes during 
the first phase EU ETS, or pre-crisis period likely benefited from small capitalisation stocks, 
momentum trading and positive investor sentiment. Remarkably, the positive financial 
performance during the first phase is extremely short-lived and does not persist. After the 
peak in mid 2007 and as a result of the financial crisis, all renewable energy indexes perform 
poorly. Additionally, corresponding to the same time period, momentum investing turns 
negative. My risk analysis shows time-varying beta coefficients to be substantially larger 
relative to conventional market benchmarks and in particular for global renewable energy 
indexes. Towards the end of 2007, beta coefficients tend to evolve particularly stable and 
noticeably below 1. This finding indicates that during the first phase EU ETS investors 
perceived renewable energy indexes as a lower risk investment than conventional equity 
market benchmarks. During the financial crisis, betas become more volatile and increase in 
size. This finding also indicates that investor risk increases substantially. Finally, my 
investment style findings show renewable energy indexes with strong exposure to small 
capitalisation stocks over the entire sample period. Over time, my dynamic size factor, SMB, 
is positive and significantly above zero during the first phase EU ETS and towards the end of 
2007. In early 2008, the size factor decreases substantially for the majority of indexes. I argue 
that a decreasing size factor could be a result of increased bankruptcies in the renewable 
energy sector. In other words, liquidity constraints during the crisis may have forced 
renewable energy companies into bankruptcy, causing de-listings on renewable energy 
indexes. This could also explain the more recent exposure to mid- and larger sized renewable 
energy firms by renewable energy indexes. 
 The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Chapter 5.2. 'Background', is a 
comprehensive review of the related literature. Chapter 5.3. 'Empirical Analysis' introduces 
the empirical analysis and the static and dynamic multi-factor performance model employed. 
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In Chapter 5.4. 'Data Section', I describe my sample of renewable energy indexes and 
characterise investment objectives and market benchmark data. Chapter 5.5. 'Main Results' 
describes the main findings of my empirical analysis. Chapter 5.6. 'Conclusion' summarises 
and concludes. 
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5.2 Background 
This study is also related to a substantial empirical literature that attempts to understand the 
relationship between environmental concerns and the financial performance of corporations 
(Hart and Ahuja, 1996; King and Lenox, 2001; Konar and Cohen, 2001). Yet, existing studies 
are largely unable to reach a collective agreement on the direction of the Environmental 
Performance (EP) and Financial Performance (FP) relationship, as results are inconclusive. 
Horváthová's (2010) meta-analysis therefore attempts to find explanations for such 
heterogeneity. Her meta study investigates 37 empirical studies with 64 outcomes on the EP 
and FP link. Across her sample of studies, she finds the majority of outcomes to indicate a 
positive relationship, approximately 20 are insignificant and only 10 indicate a negative 
relationship. She concludes that results are incredibly sensitive to the choice of empirical 
method employed. While simple correlations tend to increase the odds to find a negative 
relation, event studies and panel regressions indicate otherwise. Furthermore, as Derwall et 
al. (2005) and Griffin & Mahon (1997) point out, substantial variation in study outcomes are 
not only caused by different methodologies employed, but also by the different understanding 
and multitude of financial and environmental performance proxies. 
 Generally, the majority of studies use tangible and quantifiable environmental data 
related to corporate pollution such as toxic waste, chemical and oil spills, waste generation 
and CO2 emissions as a measure for environmental impacts (Cordeiro and Sarkis, 1997; 
Cormier et al., 1993; Hart and Ahuja, 1996). As the proxy for environmental performance 
tends to affect the outcome of the EP and FP relationship, Horváthová (2012) attempts to 
overcome this shortage by aggregating several environmental variables into a unified 
pollution-weighted index of environmental degradation. She weights the importance of her 93 
environmental variables according to environmental harmfulness of each variable. This is 
similar to King and Lenox (2002) approach, who create an aggregated variable for 246 toxic 
chemicals, weighted by its toxicity. Although, both studies find a positive relationship 
between environmental and financial performance, King and Lenox (2002) argue that 
pollution reductions do not directly lead to positive financial performance, while pollution 
prevention does. Horváthová (2012) provides additional insight as she finds that pollution 
reduction may not lead to an immediate financial gain (costly in short-term), but rather 
materialises into a financial gain in the long-term.  
 A second stream of studies uses environmental variables such as comprehensive 
corporate environmental ratings from Innovest, KLD or other similar data vendors. 
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Investigating whether eco-efficiency increases the market value of US corporations, 
Guenster, Bauer, Derwall, & Koedijk (2011) conclude that more eco-efficient companies 
increase their operating performance and market value over time, whereas less eco-efficient 
companies experience the opposite. The advantages of using readily supplied scores are their 
multi-dimensional character and the ex-post and ex-ante assessment of corporate 
environmental performance (Guenster et al., 2011). The major downside in using prepared 
environmental scores is the non-transparency of raters' methodologies. This, in fact, increases 
the difficulty in understanding how different environmental sub-dimensions are aggregated 
and weighted.  
 More recently, there is a growing trend to study environmental performance from an 
investors' portfolio perspective, whereby hypothetical investment trading strategies are 
related to environmental activities or initiatives. Following the portfolio approach, Derwall et 
al. (2005) produce two mutually exclusive portfolios based on companies with high (low) 
environmental eco-efficiency ratings to compare the stock return performance between the 
two portfolios. The authors find a positive and significant outperformance for the highly rated 
eco-efficient portfolio. In an earlier study, Cohen, Fenn, & Konar (1997) use the same 
approach to distinguish low polluting from high polluting US company portfolios. The 
environmental ratings are based on a collection of different measures primarily 
noncompliance penalties and chemical and oil spills from the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC). In support to Derwall et al.'s (2005) study, their findings suggest 
that the low polluter portfolio performs at least as well and even better than the high polluter 
portfolio.  
 Furthermore, Halkos & Sepetis (2007) construct a "green" portfolio of Greek firms 
that apply systems of environmental management based on ISO 14000 certification and Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) participation. Their findings indicate that a green 
portfolio reduces systematic risks. Using a similar approach, Ziegler et al. (2011) form a 
hypothetical trading strategy of buying stocks of companies with strong climate change 
disclosure and selling stocks of companies with no disclosure on climate change. They argue 
that a climate change leaders portfolio performed well in Europe between 2004 and 2006, but 
find no convincing green premium in the US. 
 All reviewed studies investigating the relationship between environmental and 
financial performance use some form of ex-post, ex-ante, or a combination of both, pollution 
reduction metric to proxy for the environmental performance of individual companies or 
portfolios of companies. 
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 In this chapter, I investigate corporate pollution mitigation that particularly aims to 
reduce CO2 emissions in the atmosphere and is an important climate policy instrument in 
many countries around the globe, i.e. renewable energy companies. At the same time I 
contribute to the recent debate on the environmental and financial performance of CO2 
reducing equity investments from an investors' portfolio perspective. 
 Several developments document the importance of renewable energies for mitigating 
climate change. First, many large utility and non-utility companies are increasingly 
generating electricity from renewable energy sources such as solar or wind energy. To give 
one example, non-utility companies such as IT giant Google claims to be the forerunner in 
powering their data centres from 100 percent renewable energy, planning to expand existing 
renewable energy capacities in the near future (Clark, 2013). In particular, Google invested 
12 million USD in a South African solar power project and more recently signed a long-term 
deal to purchase electricity from a Swedish wind farm over the next ten years (Clark, 2013). 
Other large IT companies such as Yahoo and Facebook are following suit and lead the sector 
by its green initiatives (Greenpeace, 2012). Similarly, in the energy sector, conventional 
fossil-fuelled energy producers and utilities slowly increase their share from renewable 
energies to total electricity generation output. Hereby, traditional oil companies create new 
renewable energy ventures investing in renewable energy technologies. One example is EDF 
Energy Renewables which is a joint venture between EDF Energy and EDF Energies 
Nouvelles. The increasing interest of conventional energy producers and utilities in 
renewable energies seems to be driven less by rising demands and more by reputational 
objectives to improve corporate images.  
 Second, renewable energies have a strong potential for future growth. The IEA 
forecasts that renewable energy electricity generation will contribute 39 percent to the world 
total electricity generation mix by 2050 (Apergis et al., 2010). 
 Third, increasing the share of renewable energy produced electricity to 20 percent of 
the total energy mix, is besides establishing the EU Carbon Trading Scheme the cornerstone 
of the European Union's climate policy instrument to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
2020. Worldwide, 66 countries are following suit in establishing national renewable energy 
targets to increase the use of renewables (Ren21, 2007). While developing countries set softer 
renewable targets that are predominantly related to increasing production capacities or 
primary energy from renewable sources, many developed countries pursue more ambitious 
targets such as increasing final energy consumption or electricity generation from renewable 
energies (International Renewable Energy Agency, 2012a, b, c, 2013). 
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 Despite the beforementioned important developments in the renewable energy sector, 
very little is known about the price and return behaviour of renewable energy equity indexes 
worldwide. Henriques & Sadorsky's (2008) study is the first to shed some light on the 
financial performance of a sample of renewable energy companies. Using vector 
autoregression models, in particular Granger causality, the authors test the predictive 
causality between renewable energy stock prices, oil prices, technology stock prices and 
interest rates70. They find that oil prices and technology stock prices have an effect on the 
stock prices of renewable energy stocks. More recently, Kumar, Managi, & Matsuda (2012) 
extend the Henriques and Sadorsky study by investigating the attractiveness of renewable 
energy stocks under rising oil prices and higher carbon prices, applying the same econometric 
method. In particular, they test the hypothesis that oil prices and the prices of three clean tech 
indexes (Wilder Hill New Energy Global Innovation Index, Wilder Hill Clean Energy Index 
and S&P Global Clean Energy Index) are positively correlated. The authors present two 
interesting findings: Firstly, oil prices are significantly positively correlated with the returns 
of the three renewable energy indexes and secondly, carbon prices do not seem to be a 
significant driver for investors to move into renewable energies due to their potentially low 
price. While oil and technology stock prices seem to influence renewable energy stock prices, 
Bohl et al. (2013) further advance the understanding of the explosive price behaviour of 
German renewable energy stocks, using powerful bubble detection tests71. In particular, the 
authors find strong positive outperformance of two German renewable energy indexes 
between 2004 and 2007 followed by a significantly negative performance after 2008. 
Thereby showing that German renewable energy stock prices have been in a speculative 
bubble for some time. Finally, Ortas & Moneva (2013) study shows on a sample of 21 clean 
energy indexes, using a dynamic market model, that clean tech indexes outperform broad 
equity market benchmarks during periods of market stability and strongly underperform 
during the financial crisis. In other words, structural changes during the financial crisis 
negatively influence the return behaviour of renewable energy indexes which results in strong 
underperformance. 
 Thus, I add to the existing literature in several ways. First, to the best of my 
knowledge, this study complements the existing literature by analysing a comprehensive 
                                                 
70 Brooks (2008:298) clarifies that "...'causality' is somewhat of a misnomer, for Granger-causality really means 
only a correlation between the current value of one variable and the past values of others; it does not mean that 
movements of one variable cause movements of another" 
71 Bubble detection tests are tests to identify speculative bubbles in asset prices (Bohl et al., 2013). Modern 
techniques to detect asset price bubbles are the Augmented Dickey-Fuller, and Markov regime-switching 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (see e.g. Bohl et al., 2013). 
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international sample of renewable energy risk premia using static and dynamic multi-factor 
asset pricing models before, during, and after the EU ETS. Second, I investigate renewable 
energy as a new form of corporate pollution mitigation from an investor perspective. Third, I 
investigate the static and dynamic financial performance in a multi-factor framework, thereby 
extending Ortas & Moneva (2013) renewable energy state-space market model by Fama & 
French's (1993) size and value factors and Carhart's (1997) momentum investment style 
factor. Fourth, I benchmark return and risk dynamics of renewable energy indexes against 
several tailored conventional market benchmarks to increase the accuracy of my estimates. 
 Renewable energy indexes as an asset class have been under-researched because they 
are a relatively new form of thematic indexes and therefore a very young asset class with 
some data limitations. Linear time-series investigations with less than 30 observations might 
not produce any meaningful results. In this study, I at least double the requirement as I have a 
minimum of 56 and maximum of 158 monthly observations, over the full sample period. 
Furthermore, the advantage of measuring the financial performance of renewable equity 
indexes over other equity related financial products, such as mutual funds or individual firms, 
is the opportunity to measure the impact of renewable energy screening more directly 
(Schröder, 2007). In other words, studies that investigate mutual funds, fund of funds and 
portfolios of individual stocks have to control for other factors that could potentially distort 
the financial performance, for example adjustments for imposed fee loadings (such as 
transaction costs and management fees), timing abilities of fund managers, different 
management skills and differences in investment policies. For example Gil-Bazo & Ruiz-
Verdú (2009) and Gil-Bazo, Ruiz-Verdú, & Santos (2010) find that poor performing US and 
US SRI mutual funds tend to charge higher management fees than good performing mutual 
funds. 
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5.3 Empirical Analysis 
5.3.1 Static Performance Analysis 
In analysing the return and risk behaviour, as well as investment styles of my sample of 
fourteen renewable energy indexes, I follow a recent strand of literature using modifications 
of Carhart's multi-factor model to price renewable energy assets such as Bohl et al. (2013), 
Ortas & Moneva (2013), and Sadorsky (2012b). The model is based on the static Capital 
Asset Pricing framework developed by Treynor (1962), Sharpe (1964), and Lintner (1965). 
Later, empirically verified and extended by the size and value factors, SMB and HML, 
respectively (Fama and French, 1993). Carhart (1997) shows that the additional factors for 
size and value improve the accuracy of the model, however, some of the variation in stock 
returns is left unexplained. To improve the cross-sectional variation of stock returns he 
includes an additional factor to account for the momentum anomaly described by Jegadeesh 
& Titman (1993). I estimate Equation (6) as follows: 
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Where,  
where ri,t and rm,t represent the monthly logged return of renewable energy index i and equity 
benchmark i, in month t. rf,t represents the risk-free asset return. α is the intercept and 
measures the proportion of over- or underperformance of renewable energy index i relative to 
the respective equity market benchmark.  smbt is the return series for the size premium, which 
is the difference between small cap and large cap stock portfolio returns in month t. hmlt 
represents returns for the value premium, which is the difference between high book-to-
market and low book-to-market portfolio returns in month t. momt is the momentum return 
series, which is computed as the difference between high and low portfolio returns over the 
last year in month t. Coefficients si , hi,, and mi  measure the sensitivities towards small cap 
versus large cap firms, value versus growth firms, and momentum versus contrarian 
investment strategies, respectively.  is the error term. 
5.3.2 Dynamic Performance Analysis  
Financial performance evaluation methods such as the commonly used four-factor Carhart 
rely on coefficient estimates from linear OLS regressions, which tend to stay constant over 
some investigation period. Recent studies show that systematic risk and style factors of stock 
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returns are highly time-varying (Bauer et al., 2009). For example, mutual fund managers 
follow highly dynamic investment strategies, frequently adjusting their investment style 
exposures and asset allocations (Swinkels and Van Der Sluis, 2006).  
 As the basic assumption of constant factor loadings for risk and style factors across 
entire sample periods is very restrictive, two streams of literature attempt to relax this 
assumption by using (i) rolling-window and (ii) conditional macro-economic estimates. Both 
methods allow for some time-variation in estimated coefficients. According to Swinkels and 
Van Der Sluis (2006) rolling windows only partially solve the issue, for the following two 
reasons. First, empirical studies arbitrarily choose window lenghts between 26 and 60 
months. Second, the estimated coefficients are still constant over the selected rolling window 
length. Another stream of literature uses macro-economic factors to inform future average 
coefficient estimates. Ferson and Schadt (1996) use conditioning information on so called 
public information variables (macro-economic variables that have been found to predict stock 
returns, such as dividend yields and interest rates). Although, conditional approaches can lead 
to more reliable average coefficient estimates they are obtained by linear OLS regression 
with the same basic assumption of constant factor loadings. Thus, in any case, estimated 
coefficients of OLS regressions are static over specific sample periods.  
 I overcome the shortcoming of constant OLS estimates by using a dynamic and time-
varying method. In particular, I use the Kalman filter to allow for time-varying alphas and 
betas. The distinct advantages of using time-varying methods to forecast coefficients such as 
the Kalman filter over static OLS methods are the following: a) Accurate coefficient forecasts 
(Mamaysky et al., 2008) b) Capture of changing factor exposures over time due to business 
cycles (Bauer et al., 2009; Ferson and Harvey, 1999), market timing of fund managers 
(Mamaysky et al., 2008), style investment of fund managers (Swinkels and Van Der Sluis, 
2006), and more generally volatile energy stock indexes (Bohl et al., 2013). 
 Time-varying alphas and betas are latent variables inferred from monthly stock 
returns.72 For the latent alpha and beta coefficients I assume a pure random walk process. I 
estimate the following system of equations in linear state space form for each of the fourteen 
renewable energy indexes': 
                                                 
72 Latent variables cannot be directly observed, but I can infer them from other variables that can be directly 
observed. 
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The coefficient vectors it and it at time t, are alphas and betas based on previously observed 
observations plus unobservable innovations. Equations (12) and (13) show that the coefficient 
vectors vary over time according to a first-order vector autoregression (Durbin, 2000). I 
assume these innovations or error terms ,it it   to be normally distributed and independent 
over the sample period with zero mean and variances 
2 2,i i   and diagonal covariance matrix
Q. 
ktF  represents four independent variables, including monthly logged excess returns of the 
respective benchmarks, size, value, and momentum premium from Equation (11). The system 
of equations contains the signal or observation equation (Equation. (11)), and the two state or 
transition equations (Equations (12) and (13)). As the Kalman filter is a recursive algorithm, 
the recursion begins with some starting values or prior values for alpha and beta at time t. I 
obtain my starting values from the static performance analysis conducted previously, i.e. 
estimated coefficients from Carhart's multi-factor model. The recursion is updated by one 
observation at a time and is performed until it reaches the end of the respective renewable 
energy index' sample period.  
 Since the returns of SMB (size factor) correlate with HML (value factor), I apply an 
orthogonalisation procedure. The following procedure and variants of it have been applied 
elsewhere (Elton et al., 1993; Hoepner et al., 2011; Schröder, 2007). I orthogonalise the value 
factor by estimating the following Equation (14): 
(14)HM L SMB HMLt t tr r     , 
, where r represent excess returns. Then, I re-estimate equations (12) and (13) using the 
residual of Equation (14) HMLt , which represents the return variation that is not explained by 
the size factor SMB and is uncorrelated to the HML factor.  
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5.4 Data Section 
5.4.1 Renewable Energy Indexes and Benchmarks 
My sample consists of fourteen renewable energy indexes for which I collect monthly total 
return data from three different data sources, Thomson Reuters Datastream, Global Financial 
Data (GFD), and Ardour Global (Alternative Energy Indexes). As I aim to understand the 
long-term financial performance of renewable energy indexes, I use monthly data instead of 
the more volatile daily or weekly data.73 Also, some scholars (see e.g. Dimson, 1979; Roll, 
1981; Scholes and Williams, 1977) report a trading infrecuency bias, that tends to 
overestimate the risk-adjusted returns of less frequently traded firms and underestimate the 
returns of more frequently traded firms. This bias tends to be of particular concern with short-
interval data such as daily or weekly observations (Roll, 1981). I calculate monthly excess 
returns by reducing total returns, denominated in US Dollars, by the three month US Treasury 
Bill, which I also obtain from Thomson Reuters Datastream.  
 I restrict my attention to renewable energy indexes which track the performance of 
energy producing firms, specialised in renewable energy (such as solar, wind, and hydro), 
alternative fuels (bio-fuels) and related renewable technologies (such as storage and 
efficiency of clean energy). In defining whether a company qualifies as clean or renewable, 
the index providers employ the following three broad screens: (i) sector, (ii) clean income, 
and (iii) liquidity screens. First, the sector screen rules out any firms not having any business 
activities related to alternative energy firms. Second, the clean income screen ensures that 
companies generate sufficient revenues or net income from renewable business activities to 
be classified as clean. Third, renewable energy index providers use a liquidity screen, either a 
liquidity ratio74 or minimum trading volume and market capitalisation, to screen out less 
frequently traded firms. The implementation of these screens across index providers varies to 
some extent. For example, indexes with global investment objectives tend to be broader and 
less selective in their inclusion of energy businesses. In contrast, among the specialised 
indexes are NASDAQ Clean Edge index, HFRX Alternative Energy, Ardour Global 
Alternative Energy Solar and S&P Asia Alternative Energy. The majority of indexes use a 
                                                 
73 This is in line with related studies using the same methodology (See e.g. Carhart, 1997; Renneboog et al., 
2011; Renneboog et al., 2008a) 
74 Liquidity ratios are calculated average 3-month daily trading volume divided by the average 3-month market 
capitalisation. 
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clean income threshold of over 50 percent75, except for Ardour Global Alternative Energy 
Solar who uses 66 percent of gross revenues or net income. Finally, approximately half of the 
sample uses minimum average trading volumes of 1 million USD and average free-float 
market capitalisations of 100 million USD to keep more liquid renewable energy businesses. 
 Table 8 describes data characteristics and annualised summary statistics of my sample 
of fourteen renewable energy indexes' raw returns and their respective conventional market 
benchmarks. To accurately assess the return and risk dynamics of renewable energy indexes, 
I use geographically similar equity market benchmarks. In total, I use six market benchmarks 
for two reasons. First, as renewable energy indexes have different geographical investment 
objectives, using tailored benchmarks increases the robustness of my findings. Second, my 
diversified equity market benchmarks are commonly used indexes to evaluate financial 
performance. Third, whenever available, I use an index provider's self reported benchmark 
from its prospectus or factsheet.  
 More recently, additional renewable energy indexes have come into existence, but I 
focus on the ones with sufficient observations for reliable statistical estimates. Thirteen out of 
fourteen indexes are active, with a minimum of four year's monthly data. The European 
Renewable Energy Index was discontinued in January 2012. The first set of clean energy 
indexes were launched just at the end of the speculative dot.com bubble in January 2000. The 
latest addition is the S&P Asia Alternative Energy Index with increasing attention of 
developing economies in renewable energy businesses. Thus, on average I have 117 monthly 
observations available for analysis and define the sample period from the launch of the first 
index in December 1999 to February 2013. The indexes benchmark the performance of clean 
energy firms in various regions including Asia, Europe, US and Worldwide. In particular, 
eight have a global focus, three purely focus on US clean energy firms, two exclusively track 
European firms and one with Asian focus. S&P Asia Alternative Energy is the youngest 
index in my sample. 
 Panel A of Table 8 shows that annualised average returns for nine out of fourteen 
renewable energy indexes are negative. With the exception of the following four renewable 
energy indexes: DaxGlobal Alternative, S&P Global Alternative, NASDAQ Clean Edge and 
European Renewable Energy have positive annualised average returns of 1.14, 1.98, 3.28 and 
                                                 
75 A threshold of either 50 percent gross revenues or net profit allows conventional energy producers (coal, 
nuclear and oil) to be included in virtually any of the nine renewable energy indexes. From a purist perspective, 
energy producers might join for the wrong reasons. As (Collison et al., 2009) study shows, companies that 
joined the FTSE4Good index are mainly concerned with their reputational rather than their environemtnal and 
social impact to society. In this chapter, I am primarily interested in the direct financial performance of 
renewable energy indexes and not their degree of ‘renewable purity’. 
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1.08 percentage points, respectively. The results are not likely driven by geographies as the 
positive performance comes from European, US and two Global indexes. The only Asian 
renewable energy index, SPAALE$, displays the highest negative annualised mean return of -
13.02 percent. Two related studies observe similar return dynamics of renewable energy 
indexes. While, Bohl et al. (2013) observe negative mean returns for German renewable 
energy indexes, Ortas & Moneva (2013) find negative mean returns for a sample of 21 clean 
tech indexes. 
 Renewable energy indexes' total risk as proxied by the standard deviation indicates 
very volatile investments. Generally, annualised standard deviations are in the range of 35 to 
40 percent. In line with my risk findings, Henriques & Sadorsky (2008) and Kumar et al. 
(2012) find that renewable energy companies tend to be twice as volatile as conventional 
benchmarks. Reviewing return distributions of renewable energy indexes, I find all fourteen 
indexes to have non-normal distributions with normality hypotheses strongly rejected, using 
Jarque-Bera's normality test. In addition, I find negative Skewness and Kurtosis exceeding 
three, which also indicates a leptokurtic return distribution with negative symmetry.  
 While the Ardour Global Solar index performed worst compared to all other clean 
energy indexes in absolute terms, with annual average returns of -15.67 percent, worst loss of 
-54.79 percent, and annualised standard deviation of 54.63 percent, the NASDAQ Clean 
Edge index performed best with the highest maximum return, a worst loss of only -21.88 
percent and an extremely low annualised volatility of just 17.72 percent. 
 Panel B of Table 8 summarises my conventional market benchmarks. To increase the 
reliability of my performance estimates, I assign to each renewable energy index a suitable 
conventional market benchmark that has the same investment scope. This results in six 
market benchmarks such as MSCI World, MSCI Europe, S&P World, S&P 500, S&P Asia, 
and NASDAQ Composite index. 
 Annualised mean returns are positive for all six equity benchmarks. The absolute 
performance lies between 2 and 3 percent per annum. The S&P Asia and NASDAQ 
Composite benchmark indexes have the highest observed annualised mean return of 7.48 
percent and 6.92 percent, respectively. The improved absolute performance for S&P Asia is 
driven by higher absolute risk, but not for NASDAQ. While total volatilities for all 
benchmark indexes range between 16 and 21 percent, S&P Asia has a standard deviation of 
25.68 percent, clearly above the others. Testing return distributions of my selected equity 
benchmarks, I observe that the null hypothesis of normality is strongly rejected for all six 
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indexes. Meaning that none of the index' returns are normally distributed. Skewness and 
Kurtosis statistics show return distributions with fat tails and negative symmetry. 
 
Table 8: Summary Statistics of Renewable Energy Indexes and Conventional Market Benchmarks 
Index 
Data 
Availabilit
y From 
Ann. 
Mean 
Ann. 
Median 
Ann. 
Std.Dev 
Jarque- 
Bera Skewness Kurtosis Market 
Conventional 
Market 
Benchmarks 
Panel A: Renewable Energy Indexes 
AGIGL 31/12/1999 -0.0515 0.1755 0.3795 66.47*** -0.9045 5.6123 World MSCI World 
AGIXL 31/01/2000 -0.0790 0.1058 0.3869 82.58*** -0.9955 5.9428 World MSCI World 
AGINA 31/12/1999 -0.0737 0.0019 0.3977 25.20*** -0.5270 4.6483 
N. 
America 
S&P 500 
AGIEM 30/06/2005 -0.0950 0.1371 0.4063 56.24*** -1.0789 6.1646 Europe MSCI Europe 
SOLRX 31/12/2004 -0.1086 0.2196 0.5463 22.26*** -0.9441 4.3730 World MSCI World 
DAXGAK$ 29/12/2000 0.0114 0.1545 0.2839 20.40*** -0.5916 4.3979 World MSCI World 
RENIXXI 31/01/2002 -0.1567 0.1251 0.3943 26.92*** -0.8038 4.5075 World MSCI World 
SPGATE$ 28/11/2003 0.0198 0.2274 0.2747 
134.20**
* -1.4888 7.4888 World 
S&P World 
SPAALE$ 30/06/2008 -0.1302 -0.0810 0.3570 5.96* -0.6600 3.8999 Asia S&P Asia 
HFRXALE 31/01/2006 -0.0714 0.2146 0.3618 
181.09**
* -1.7386 8.2023 World 
MSCI World 
NASCEUL 30/11/2006 0.0328 0.0723 0.1772 99.08*** -1.4447 7.4301 US NASDAQ Composite 
SPGCLE$ 28/11/2003 -0.0880 0.2122 0.3569 28.60*** -1.1807 4.8913 World S&P World 
ERIXIN$ 30/09/2003 0.0108 0.1831 0.4110 85.21*** -1.2547 6.7620 Europe MSCI Europe 
WHNEGI$ 29/12/2000 -0.0090 0.1638 0.2976 
140.73**
* -1.3086 7.0354 
US/Worl
d 
S&P 500 
Panel B: Benchmarks 
MSCI World 31/12/1999 0.0223 0.1021 0.1685 37.43*** -0.8328 4.7063 World  
MSCI 
Europe 31/12/1999 0.0211 0.1070 0.1610 19.21*** -0.6658 4.0696 
Europe  
S&P World 31/12/1999 0.0293 0.0778 0.2036 29.77*** -0.7553 4.4965 World  
S&P 500 31/12/1999 0.0267 0.1213 0.1731 36.27*** -0.8309 4.6575 US  
S&P Asia 31/12/1999 0.0748 0.1589 0.2568 12.95*** -0.5339 3.9096 Asia  
NASDAQ 31/10/2003 0.0692 0.1732 0.1834 13.81*** -0.6911 4.0114 US  
Notes: This table summarises general information for each of the 14 Clean Energy Indexes and their Conventional Peers. The first column 
indicates the identifier of an Index. The second column indicates data availabilities for each renewable and conventional benchmark index. The 
following six columns report annualised summary statistics including mean, median, standard deviation, Jarque-Bera, skewness, and kurtosis. 
 
5.4.2 Benchmark Factors 
As my sample of clean energy indexes have diverse investment objectives76, I account for 
this diversity in my benchmark selection to avoid potential mismatches. I initially assign 
renewable energy indexes to market benchmarks specified in their respective index 
factsheets. A similar approach is used in mutual funds studies, where market benchmarks are 
allocated to mutual funds according to fund prospectuses. Using the index providers' self-
reported benchmark increases the accuracy of my coefficient estimates for financial 
performance and risk, thus avoiding misclassifications of funds (Angelidis et al., 2013). In 
addition to equity market benchmarks, I collect data for the following three independent 
                                                 
76 See Table 2 for additional details on renewable energy indexes' investment objectives and benchamarks. 
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variables: size premium, value premium and momentum factor. The variables are based on a 
value-weighted, all-industry classification following ICB (Industry Classification 
Benchmark)77.  
 In particular, I compute three investment style factors that represent difference 
portfolios of stocks and control for size, value vs. growth, and momentum investing. In line 
with previous studies, I name these three factors SMB (small minus big), HML (high minus 
low) and MOM (momentum), respectively. I create all investment style variables with 
StyleResearch's Markets Analyzer as follows: The SMB (small minus big) or size premium is 
the difference of small market capitalisation stocks (0-50 percent) and big market 
capitalisation stocks (50-100 percent). I compute the HML benchmark factor by taking the 
difference of high price to book securities (70-100 percent) and low price to book securities 
(0-30 percent). The securities of the SMB and HML factors are rebalanced annually, always 
at the end of June.78 Finally, I construct the MOM factor by taking the difference of past 
outperforming return portfolios (70-100 percent) and past underperforming portfolios (0-30 
percent) with a monthly rebalance date at the end of June each year. In the construction of the 
three benchmark portfolios SMB, HML and MOM I closely follow Renneboog, Ter Horst, & 
Zhang (2008a). Their computed benchmark variables correlate to 99 percent with Fama and 
French's original benchmark factors and are therefore identical. 
 
  
                                                 
77 ICB classifies industries into 10 groups including: Oil&Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, Consumer Goods, 
Health Care, Consumer Services, Telecommunications, Utilities, Financials and Technology. 
78 The SMB and HML factors are constructed following Fama and French's (1992, 1993) portfolio formation 
methodology. Fama and French (1993:429) explain that portfolios are formed at the end of June "To ensure that 
the accounting variables are known before the returns they are used to explain." 
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5.5 Main Results 
5.5.1 Static Performance Analysis 
Table 10 summarises my main results of assessing the static financial performance for my 
sample of fourteen renewable energy indexes and their respective market benchmarks over 
different sample periods. In Panel A of Table 10, I report findings for Carhart's multi-factor 
model over the full sample period from December 1999 to February 2013. While my analysis 
shows no significant over- or underperformance for Asian, European, or US renewable 
energy indexes, there is evidence of a significant underperformance for several Global 
renewable energy indexes. 7 out of 8 global indexes show a significant negative alpha, with 
the exception of DaxGlobal Alternative Energy Index. On average, the worst performers are 
Renewable Energy Index (Renix) and Ardour Solar with -2.63 and -2.33 percent, 
respectively. Although this finding clearly speaks against a consistent risk premium for 
renewable energy firms as observed by Chia et al. (2009), a natural question is whether the 
patterns I observe can also be generalised to different time periods and particularly persist 
over the two phases of the EU ETS. 
 In Panel B of Table 10, I report my findings for the financial performance of my 
sampled renewable energy indexes over the first phase of the EU ETS. In contrast to the 
findings of the full sample period, I observe the first phase as extremely beneficial for all 
renewable energy indexes. Three indexes even outperform their respective benchmark 
considerably. Nasdaq, S&P Global, and Wilderhill generate remarkable alphas of 1.04, 2.5, 
and 2.02 percent, respectively. 
 Despite the beneficial first phase of the EU ETS, the second phase was hit by the 
financial crisis and thus shows devastating performances across all renewable indexes. The 
initial outperformance completely reverts to a clear underperformance of virtually all 
renewable energy indexes. In particular, 12 out of 14 renewables experience significantly 
negative alphas ranging from -1.85 to -5.15 percent. Related research supports my findings 
and shows that during stable market conditions renewable energy indexes tend to over-
perform broad equity market benchmarks, but during financial crises, renewable energy 
indexes become even riskier and as a result substantially underperform (Ortas and Moneva, 
2013). It appears that the somewhat more restricted stock universe of the renewable energy 
indexes due to their environmental screens relative to the more diversified conventional 
indexes leads to a riskier investment strategy during the financial crisis (Ortas and Moneva, 
2013). In accordance with Modern Portfolio Theory, more diversified portfolios should 
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outperform less diversified or screened portfolios79. In Chapter 2.6.1. 'Diversification and 
ESG information', I discuss the potentially reducing performance implications of employing 
environmental, social, and governance screens on the optimal diversification of portfolios 
within the context of Modern Portfolio Theory. Similarly, Bohl et al. (2013) discover that 
German renewable energy indexes have been fuelled by a speculative bubble during 2004 to 
2007, and turned into substantial underperformers after the financial crisis in 2008. 
 Over the trading periods of the EU ETS, renewable energy subsidies played a role in 
the promotion of innovate renewable energy technologies (Fischer and Newell, 2008). Table 
9 shows worldwide subsidies to renewable energies rising from 57 billion USD in 2009 to 
120 billion USD in 2013. On average, the renewable energy sector is estimated to have 
received about 86.4 billion USD in subsidies, over that period. While these figures may 
indicate a committment to tackling climate change by governments worldwide, renewable 
energy subsidies have been tiny compared to the heavy amount of subsidies supplied to the 
fossil fuel sector. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) (see Table 9), fossil-
fuels received at least 5 times the amount of subsidies compared to renewables over the same 
period. The IEA estimates that fossil-fuel subsidies have increased from 90 billion USD in 
2005 to over half trillion USD in 2013. These figures reveal that there is a clear 
misconception about energy subsidies. As a result, investors receive mixed signals about the 
future prospects of the energy sector which could affect their capital investment decisions 
(Morales, 2014; Overseas Development Institute, 2013). 
Table 9: Worldwide Energy Consumption Subsidies80 
  
Renewable Energy 
(in billion USD) 
Fossil Fuel Energy 
(in billion USD) 
Difference 
(in billion USD) 
Ratio Fossil to Renewable 
 
2013 120 550 430 5 
2012 101 544 443 5 
2011 88 523 435 6 
2010 66 409 343 6 
2009 57 299 242 5 
2008 Not reported 557 na na 
2007 Not reported 342 na na 
2006 Not reported 300 na na 
2005 Not reported 90 na na 
Notes: Figures are based on annual International Energy Agency (IEA) subsidy estimates and collected from annual "World Energy 
Outlook" reports.  
  
                                                 
79 However, several studies have shown that this is not always the case and that environmental, social, and 
governance screens could actually improve the financial performance of screened portfolios (See e.g. Hamilton 
et al., 1993). 
80 Access to accurate subsidy figures is difficult to obtain, measure and not always readily available (REF). IEA 
energy subsidies in this table are based on estimates and not actual values. 
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 Table 10 further discusses relative risk characteristics, i.e. regression beta coefficients 
of my static multi-factor model for my diverse sample of renewable energy indexes. Over the 
full sample period I find the majority of renewable energy indexes to have beta coefficients 
substantially larger than 1. This is particularly the case for renewable energy indexes with 
global investment objectives. Previous studies investigating the risk behaviour of renewable 
energy firms document that renewables tend to be among the riskiest investments and at least 
twice as risky as their conventional market benchmarks (Henriques and Sadorsky, 2008; 
Sadorsky, 2012b). Kumar et al. (2012) and Sadorsky (2012a) explain that renewable energy 
risk is highly driven by the strong correlation of renewable stock prices to technology stock 
prices, meaning that technology companies have much in common with renewable energy 
companies, considering their high future uncertainty as a result of few specialised renewable 
projects, especially during the start-up phase. 
 Surprisingly, I find 11 out of 14 beta coefficients to be noticeably lower during the 
first phase of the EU ETS compared to the second phase. This finding indicates that although 
renewable energy firms have likely benefited from positive investor sentiment between 2005 
and 2007 they became extremely risky during and after the financial crisis in 2008.  
 Rather than only examine the market model, I extend the analysis in Table 10 to 
include a full-fledged investment style analysis of renewable energy indexes. In my style 
analysis, particularly the size factor, I show a significant positive correlation between 
renewable energy indexes' excess returns with the SMB investment factor. Meaning that 
renewable energy indexes invest in companies with small market capitalisations. I observe 
this for 13 out of 14 renewables over the full sample period, 12 out of 14 during the first 
phase EU ETS, and 8 out of 14 during the second phase EU ETS. Evidence on whether 
renewable energy indexes prefer growth over value companies is, however, less conclusive. 
While there is some minor evidence of positive momentum investing over the full sample 
period, I find strong evidence of positive momentum especially during the first phase EU 
ETS. In particular, 13 out of 14 renewable energy indexes experience positive momentum, 
which subsequently disappears during the second stage of the EU ETS. My finding reinforces 
the evidence of explosive price behaviour of German and potentially other renewable energy 
indexes such as European, Global, and US indexes before the crisis (Bohl et al., 2013). My 
investment style findings are very similar to Chia et al. (2009) study, whereby their portfolio 
of renewable energy companies includes small cap, growth and above average volatility 
stocks. 
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 The adjusted R2 from my static Carhart regression give a simple indication for how 
closely renewable energy index returns are related to variations in conventional market 
benchmark excess returns and investment styles. In the last column of Table 10, I report 
adjusted R2 values and show that my regressions have an average adjusted R2 of 66 percent 
across all renewable energy index regressions over the full sample period.  
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Table 10: Static Carhart Four-Factor Performance 
Renewable 
Energy Benchmark  
Carhart Model   
Obs. Adj. R2 α 
 
β 
 
SMB 
 
HML 
 
MOM 
 
Panel A: Full sample period 12/1999 - 02/2013 
AGIGL MSCI World -0.0089* 1.7440*** 0.6640** -0.0818 -0.0364 158 0.676 
AGIXL MSCI World -0.0105* 1.8399*** 0.4521*** -0.2211 -0.0029 157 0.699 
AGINA S&P 500 -0.0089 1.6611*** 0.8093*** 0.2196 0.0293 158 0.598 
AGIEM MSCI Europe -0.0102 1.6518*** 1.1566*** -0.0034 0.0752 92 0.759 
SOLRX MSCI World -0.0233* 2.2935*** 1.3365*** 0.1959 0.5017* 98 0.583 
DAXGAK$ MSCI World -0.0062 1.3742*** 0.4349*** 0.0393 0.1562 146 0.646 
RENIXXI MSCI World -0.0263*** 1.6636*** 0.8111*** -0.0347 0.2325 133 0.515 
SPGATE$ S&P World -0.0087** 1.4130*** 0.5763*** 0.1150 0.2450* 111 0.794 
SPAALE$ S&P Asia -0.0105 0.8418*** -2.0345** -0.0863 -0.5334*** 56 0.433 
HFRXALE MSCI World -0.0181*** 1.8182*** 0.5685*** 0.0182 0.2472* 111 0.723 
NASCEUL NASDAQ Comp. US 0.0018 0.6137*** 0.3685*** 0.2151*** 0.0980 85 0.583 
SPGCLE$ S&P World -0.0134** 1.5996*** 0.4434** -0.1423 0.1272 75 0.793 
ERIXIN$ MSCI Europe -0.0062 1.6843*** 1.0654*** 0.0432 0.0908 100 0.684 
WHNEGI$ S&P 500 -0.0061 1.4762*** 0.5417*** 0.1812*** 0.0736 146 0.716 
Panel B: ETS Phase I 01/2005 - 12/2007 
AGIGL MSCI World 0.0045 1.5148*** 0.3902** -0.9269*** 0.5680** 36 0.613 
AGIXL MSCI World 0.0034 1.4546*** 0.3268 -1.0456*** 0.5674** 36 0.575 
AGINA S&P 500 -0.0012 1.3888** 0.5822* -0.2036 0.8655** 36 0.356 
AGIEM MSCI Europe 0.0040 1.4827*** 0.9478*** -0.0986 1.5422*** 30 0.690 
SOLRX MSCI World 0.0222 0.2655 1.7022*** 0.2271 1.5296* 36 0.333 
DAXGAK$ MSCI World 0.0142 0.7893* 0.5221* 0.2294 1.2386*** 36 0.507 
RENIXXI MSCI World 0.0147 0.9492*** 0.7984*** -0.2668 1.3022*** 36 0.505 
SPGATE$ S&P World 0.0065 1.4082*** 0.3973*** -0.2293 0.5631*** 36 0.733 
SPAALE$ S&P Asia 
HFRXALE MSCI World 0.0091 1.2851*** 0.4647* -0.5264* 0.8022*** 36 0.616 
NASCEUL NASDAQ Comp. US 0.0104** 0.5922*** 0.7875*** 0.4692 0.8095* 23 0.521 
SPGCLE$ S&P World 0.0250** 0.1962 0.2622 -1.1702*** 0.0263 13 0.261 
ERIXIN$ MSCI Europe 0.0124 1.8443*** 0.6801*** -0.1345 1.0495*** 36 0.616 
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WHNEGI$ S&P 500 0.0202*** 0.9986*** 0.8767*** -0.0560 0.6174** 36 0.600 
Panel C: ETS Phase II 01/2008 - 12/2012 
AGIGL MSCI World -0.0260*** 1.6473*** 0.5272** 0.0010 0.0200 60 0.821 
AGIXL MSCI World -0.0289*** 1.6770*** 0.3785 -0.0912 -0.0335 60 0.800 
AGINA S&P 500 -0.0185** 1.5344*** 0.5254*** 0.1345* 0.2484 60 0.758 
AGIEM MSCI Europe -0.0239*** 1.5127*** 1.1121*** 0.3510 -0.0924 60 0.809 
SOLRX MSCI World -0.0515*** 2.3422*** 0.3463 -0.2699 0.0263 60 0.695 
DAXGAK$ MSCI World -0.0191*** 1.2177*** 0.4035** 0.0754 0.0267 60 0.765 
RENIXXI MSCI World -0.0445*** 1.4525*** 0.6225 -0.1114 -0.1864 60 0.657 
SPGATE$ S&P World -0.0204*** 1.3421*** 0.6149*** 0.1314 0.0719 60 0.838 
SPAALE$ S&P Asia -0.0114 0.8542*** -2.2087** -0.0715 -0.5731*** 54 0.443 
HFRXALE MSCI World -0.0356*** 1.7868*** 0.3577 -0.0777 -0.0189 60 0.775 
NASCEUL NASDAQ Comp. US -0.0005 0.5965*** 0.3008** 0.1951*** 0.0056 60 0.631 
SPGCLE$ S&P World -0.0212*** 1.6289*** 0.3829 -0.1650 0.0815 60 0.845 
ERIXIN$ MSCI Europe -0.0236* 1.5613*** 1.0853*** -0.0204 -0.1833 49 0.750 
WHNEGI$ S&P 500 -0.0221** 1.5424*** 0.4282** 0.1614** -0.1091 60 0.751 
Notes: This table presents Carhart four-factor regression results for the sample of fourteen clean energy indexes over three different sample periods using eq. 6:
( )REN f M f SMB HML MOMt t i i t t i t i t i t tr r r r r r r             . Panel A shows regression results for the full sample period from December 1999 to February 2013. Panel B presents estimations over 
the first phase of the ETS from January 2005 to December 2007. Panel C reports estimations over the second phase of the ETS from January 2008 to December 2012. Alpha (α) represents the risk-adjusted 
excess return, which I obtain by regressing each of the fourteen clean energy indexes excess return on the respective market benchmarks, size (smb), value (hml), and momentum (mom) premiums. Beta (β) is 
the systematic risk exposure of the indexes, relative to their benchmarks. I compute T-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance levels at 10, 5, and 1 percent signficance, respectively. 
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5.5.2 Dynamic Performance Analysis 
In Tables 11 and 12, I report the results of investigating the dynamic financial performance 
and investment styles of my renewable energy sample, using a dynamic state-space multi-
factor model. This analysis adds to my previous static analysis, as it provides substantially 
more insight into the temporal development of alphas, betas, and investment styles of 
renewable energy firms and the transition through two phases of the EU ETS. To give one 
example, findings based on the static analysis are prone to changing significances depending 
on the observed sample period. In contrast, my dynamic analysis based on the Kalman filter, 
illustrates the continous development of investment performances and styles over the entire 
sample period, within at least the 90 percent confidence interval (or at least 10 percent 
significance levels). Meaning that the Kalman filter allows me to compute smoothed state 
estimates as well as confidence intervals or significance levels for those estimates.      
 The first column of Tables 11 and 12 show time-varying alpha coefficients from the 
inception date of each renewable energy index. While some alphas appear very smooth over 
time, others are somewhat more erratic. This nicely reflects the dynamic return behaviour of 
renewable energy indexes.  
 During 2004 to 2007, the first phase of the EU ETS, the financial performance of 11 
out of 14 renewable energy indexes tends to move around zero. This indicates that renewable 
energy indexes neither over- nor underperformed their respective conventional benchmarks 
significantly. Towards the end of the first phase EU ETS in 2007, I observe substantially 
increasing dynamic alphas, which were likely driven by positive investor sentiment. The 
increase in alphas is, however, short-lived and does not persist. The performance drastically 
collapses as a consequence of the financial crisis at the end of 2007. I can observe the same 
pattern (alphas substantially falling below zero) across numerous renewable energy indexes. 
To be more precise, renewable energy indexes with Global, European, and Asian focus 
performed worst after their peak performance mid 2007. My findings are in line with Bohl et 
al. (2013) study, who find the same pattern for German renewable energy equity indexes and 
argue that the steep and short-lived increase at the end of 2007 is a clear indication for the 
creation of a market bubble. While Ortas and Moneva (2013) find that renewable energy 
indexes with global focus tend to be more profitable relative to specific regionally focused 
indexes, I can support their findings for only one renewable energy index with global 
investment objectives, Dax Global Alternative. In contrast, one of the regional indexes, 
Nasdaq Clean Edge US Liquid, seems to be very profitable compared to its broader equity 
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benchmark Nasdaq composite. All remaining global renewable energy indexes perform as 
badly as regional renewable energy indexes in my sample. 
 One might argue that if global renewable energy indexes perform badly, regional 
renewable energy indexes will be unprofitable, too, as they are believed to be based on the 
same stock universe. Therefore, I investigate this dilemma further by observing index 
components of global and regional renewable energy indexes. I find differences in the 
composition of companies, whereby some global renewable energy indexes do not 
necessarily list the same companies, regional indexes list. In other words, the composition of 
renewable energy companies can differ from regional to global, and even from global to 
global indexes. For example, Nasdaq Clean Edge US Liquid lists only companies on US 
stock exchanges. Some US companies on the Nasdaq tend to be different US companies on 
other global indexes. In particular, while Nasdaq lists approximately 55 US companies, S&P 
Global lists about 13 US companies and Renix World lists only 6 US companies. As a result, 
I believe the performance differential between global and regional renewable energy indexes 
not to be driven by geographical differences, but rather sector driven. In other words, the 
composition of renewable energy companies within sub-sectors of the renewable energy 
equity index seem to matter more.  
 In column two of Tables 11 and 12, I present time-varying beta coefficients of all 
sampled renewable energy indexes. Renewable energy betas tend to move clearly above 1, 
which indicates higher risk exposure compared to the respective general market. This risk 
finding is well established in the literature (Bohl et al., 2013; Henriques and Sadorsky, 2008; 
Sadorsky, 2012b). Although, the variation of dynamic beta is not substantial in most cases, 
few indexes can experience variations of approximately one beta over time. Examples 
include Renewable Energy Index, Ardour Solar, all three S&P Renewable Energy Indexes, 
and Wilderhill New Energy Index.  
 My investigation shows that towards the end of phase one of the EU ETS and shortly 
before the financial crisis, beta coefficients become relatively stable. This situation changes 
dramatically at the beginning of the second phase and after the financial crisis. With 
increasing volatility after the financial crisis, I find beta coefficients to increase for 5 out of 
14 renewable energy indexes, to decreases for 6, and to be unchanged for 3 indexes. 
Remarkably, no matter whether beta coefficients tend to increase, decrease, or stay 
unchanged they all seem to revert to similar beta coefficients in ranges of approximately 1.2 
and 2.5, after the financial crisis. These findings are similar to my static beta findings from 
the previous chapter. In particular, I established that during the first phase EU ETS beta 
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coefficients were generally somewhat lower than during the second phase EU ETS, on 
average. Findings from my time-varying risk analysis shed more detailed insight into the 
temporal dynamics of renewable energy indexes' beta exposure. 
 Columns 3 to 5 in Tables 11 and 12, show the findings of my dynamic investment 
style analysis of renewable energy indexes. The size factor SMB, measuring the exposure 
towards small cap. versus large cap. stocks, is positive and clearly above zero for 10 out of 14 
renewable energy indexes, over the entire respective sample periods. After the financial 
crisis, the size factor decreases for the majority of indexes. This finding indicates that before 
the financial crisis, primarily small cap companies have been listed on renewable energy 
indexes, which could explain the outstanding financial performance of renewables during 
2004 and 2007. As a possible result of liquidity constraints and bankruptcies during and after 
the financial crisis, many of the initial small cap companies could have been delisted. This 
would also explain the more recent exposure to mid- and larger sized renewable energy 
businesses by renewable energy indexes.81 
 My controls for additional dynamic investment style variables such as HML (value 
versus growth exposure) show significantly more insight compared to the static HML factor 
from the previous chapter. In particular, I find HML coefficients to be generally negative. In 
line with previous studies, this means that renewable energy indexes have a preference for 
growth companies. However, the observed exposure does not apply over the entire sample 
period. From 2004 to 2007, HML coefficients tend to steadily revert towards zero, which 
could indicate a change of index components to increasingly reduce the number of growth 
companies listed. Alternatively, increasing HML coefficients could indicate changes in 
investor valuations of renewable energy companies. As the HML factor is based on 
companies' price-to-book ratios, sharp increases in the share prices of renewable energy 
companies could have increased HML coefficients, everything else equal. Renewable energy 
companies experienced such rapid share price increases during the first phase of the EU ETS 
(See e.g. Bohl et al., 2013). The trend of the HML coefficient tends to peak at the end of 2007 
and stagnate through the second phase EU ETS. This means that the returns of renewable 
                                                 
81 My dynamic performance analysis allows me to observe changing factor exposures over time such as the 
declining factor exposure of the SMB factor. A negative SMB factor indicates exposure to firms with larger 
market capitalisations. One potential reason for a negative SMB factor could be the de-listing of firms with 
smaller market capitalisations due to bankruptcies in the renewable energy sector. For example, Bohl et al. 
(2013:41) show that due to the economic downturn, many "once pioneering German solar companies had to file 
for insolvency...". Similarly, bankruptcies of wind farm companies such as Prokon, Breeze Two Energy and 
others could explain the declining factor exposure of the SMB factor (Latsch et al., 2014). Alternatively, the 
negative exposure to the SMB factor could be related to an increase in the market capitalisation of renewable 
energy stocks given their sharp price increases between 2004 and 2007 (Bohl et al., 2013). 
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energy indexes, from the inception date, had initially more in common with the returns of 
growth companies, but over time and the first phase of the EU ETS the returns have become 
more similar to the returns of value companies, peaking approximately at the financial crisis 
and continuing to stagnate at this new level. This finding could either mean that the 
renewable energy sector saw a substantial consolidation of small renewable energy firms that 
had been forced out of business by not being able to penetrate the market with their one 
specific renewable energy technology, and as a result were bought by larger renewable 
energy firms with more diversified technologies, or changes in investor valuations of 
renewable energy companies, driven by the sharp share price increases of renewable energy 
companies during the first phase of the EU ETS.   
 Finally, my last investment style factor measures each renewable energy index 
exposure to momentum investing over time. Generally, I can observe some dynamic 
behaviour of the momentum factor, but for the majority of indexes this variation is fairly 
stable. In particular, renewable energy indexes tend to have positive momentum exposure 
during 2004 to 2007, and negative momentum from 2008 to 2013. I observe this pattern for 
the majority of renewable energy indexes, particularly 9 out of 14 sampled indexes. These 
findings could indicate that momentum traders were bidding up the prices of renewable 
energy firms with high expectations for the second phase of the EU ETS. 
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Table 11: Dynamic Carhart Four-Factor Performance 
              Alpha         Beta  SMB             HML          MOM 
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Table 11: Dynamic Carhart Four-Factor Performance 
              Alpha         Beta  SMB             HML          MOM 
Notes: This table shows dynamic multi-factor model regression results for my sample of 14 renewable energy indexes from the individual inception date to 
February 2013 using equations [7]-[9]. For each index I display five graphs that represent my estimated dynamic coefficients from the dynamic multi-factor 
model including alphas, betas, smb, hml, and momentum exposures over time. Solid lines represent time-varying coefficients and dashed lines are 10% 
significance level boundaries. 
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Table 12: Dynamic Carhart Four-Factor Performance - Standardised Y-Axes 
              Alpha         Beta  SMB             HML          MOM 
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Table 12: Dynamic Carhart Four-Factor Performance - Standardised Y-Axes 
              Alpha         Beta  SMB             HML          MOM 
Notes: This table shows dynamic multi-factor model regression results for my sample of 14 renewable energy indexes from the individual inception date to 
February 2013 using equations [7]-[9]. For each index, I display five graphs that represent my estimated dynamic coefficients from the dynamic multi-factor 
model including alphas, betas, smb, hml, and momentum exposures over time. Solid lines represent time-varying coefficients and dashed lines are 10% 
significance level boundaries. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
This study comprehensively investigates renewable energy indexes' return, risk, and 
investment style characteristics using static and dynamic multi-factor models and a sample of 
global and regional renewable energy equity indexes. I provide new evidence on time-
varying investment styles and their influence on the financial performance of renewable 
energy investments. My main findings are as follows:  
 First, renewable energy equity premiums are not persistent over time. In particular, I 
find alpha coefficients to evolve dynamically. Alpha variation can be substantial. Second, 
positive investor sentiment, significant momentum trading, and a strong exposure to small 
capitalisation renewable energy firms, could be reasons for the exceptional performance of 
renewable energy indexes during the first phase of the EU ETS and before the financial crisis 
in 2008. It could be that herding behaviour of investors caused substantial positive 
momentum with subsequent steep stock price appreciations of renewable energy indexes. 
Further, I find the initial strong exposure of renewable energy indexes to small cap stocks to 
be substantially declining during the second phase of the EU ETS and after the financial 
crisis. It could be that a declining size factor is the result of liquidity constraints of renewable 
energy businesses during the crisis with subsequent defaults. In other words, it could be that 
renewable energy businesses violated obligatory liquidity threshold set by index providers 
and were de-listed from the indexes. This could explain the increasing factor exposure 
towards mid-and large sized firms after the financial crisis. Fourth, renewable energy indexes 
temporal risk exposure is generally stable and high, with beta coefficients clearly above one. 
After the financial crisis, variation in beta coefficients temporarily increases, while beta 
coefficients revert back to about twice the size (1.85, on average) of conventional market 
benchmarks. Related studies also highlight the fact that renewable energy indexes experience 
relatively high betas (Bohl et al., 2013; Kumar et al., 2012; Ortas and Moneva, 2013; 
Sadorsky, 2012b). 
 According to the Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) as discussed in Chapter 2.6 
'Systematic risk, Idiosyncratic risk, and Diversification', higher risk exposures shall lead to 
higher expected returns. While the MPT explains the return and risk relationship of 
renewable energy equity indexes in the pre-crisis period, it fails to do so in the post-crisis 
period as beta coefficients continue at a high rate throughout. It could be that my findings 
concur better with behavioural finance explanations because it seems more likely the case 
that irrational investors were rapidly driving up the prices of renewable energy companies 
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towards the peak in mid 2007, creating a price bubble. The over-valued renewable energy 
indexes then reverted to their fundamental prices as a result of the financial crisis. 
 My empirical analysis leads to the conclusion that time-varying fundamental 
investment styles help explain the sudden rise and fall of global and regional renewable 
energy indexes before and after the financial crisis, as well as during two phases of the EU 
ETS. This finding aligns with results from the performance and risk literature of specific 
regional renewable energy indexes and portfolios, while it also provides fresh evidence on 
global renewable energy equity indexes' return and risk behaviour over a long sample period. 
 This chapter is subject to the following limitations, which could potentially be useful 
to inform future research directions. First, due to data availability restrictions, my empirical 
analysis focuses on renewable energy indexes from predominantly developed economies. 
Future research could comprehensively and directly investigate the financial performance 
differences between renewable energy stocks in developed and emerging economies. Second, 
my analysis does not distinguish between the screening intensity or purity of a renewable 
energy equity index. While some indexes are more liberal in their selection of businesses, 
others tend to be pure-play renewable indexes only. Analysing renewable equities with this 
distinction could provide additional insight into the financial performance and risk 
characteristics of renewable energies. Finally, while Ortas and Moneva (2013) suggest 
geographical differences between renewable energy investments, future reserach could focus 
on the substantial heterogenity within sub-sectors of renewable energy such as biofuels, solar, 
and wind energy and use sector rather than geographical benchmarks. 
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6 The Risks of Investing in Renewable and Conventional Energy Stock 
Markets 
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Abstract 
This chapter studies investment risks between an international sample of fourteen renewable energy 
equity indexes and eighteen fossil-fuel based energy equity indexes. The majority of renewable 
energy equity indexes' return volatilities are much higher compared to conventional energy equity 
indexes. This suggest they carry more investment risk. Concentrated renewable energy indexes within 
sub-sectors of renewables, such as technology-focused indexes, tend to experience lower return 
volatilities. Lower volatility renewable energy indexes also correlate stronger with conventional 
energy indexes. My findings are robust to different measures of risk and benchmark settings. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Energy markets impact on the economy (Filis and Chatziantoniou, 2013; Hedi Arouri and 
Khuong Nguyen, 2010; Jones and Kaul, 1996). According to the International Energy 
Agency (2013), global investments in renewable energy are continuing at a high rate with 
USD 240 billion in 2012. European governments collectively agree that renewable energy 
investments are an integral part of achieving the abatement objective of the European Council 
of an 80 percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of the 1990 levels by 2050 (ECF, 
2010). Despite continuing investments in existing renewable energies, RD&D (Research, 
Development, and Demonstration) and innovation spending by major governments has only 
been about 3 to 4 percent since 2000 (International Energy Agency, 2013). Although 
European governments find it difficult in the current recessionary economic environment to 
invest in RD&D and Innovation, the interest and investment in renewable energy has been 
steadily rising, in particular from emerging markets (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2013: 
3; The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012). Other indicators of increased investing and financing 
activities in renewable energy are the mere amount of existing and newly launched thematic 
renewable energy mutual funds and renewable energy indexes. Recent figures of mutual 
funds with renewable energy themes total between 107 (Muñoz et al., 2013) and 139 (US 
SIF, 2013) with 14 renewable energy equity indexes covering several geographic regions (see 
Table 13). 
 I aim to study the return volatilities of investing in international renewable energy 
equity indexes relative to conventional (fossil-fuel) energy equity indexes. Investigating the 
risk relationship between renewable and conventional energy stocks is essential to 
understanding whether renewable energy investments can act as a substitute for conventional 
fossil-fuelled energy stocks in the future. The rapid advent of renewable energy in the past 
couple of years has shown that the business model of many traditional energy and utilities 
firms may have become obsolete. Hence, investors need to focus on renewable energy assets 
too. My study tries to contribute to the understanding of the risk properties of renewable 
energy indexes. I investigate how the risk behaviour of renewable energy firms varies across 
regions and compares to conventional energy businesses operating in coal, gas, nuclear, and 
oil sectors. First, I investigate whether there is a positive relationship between risk with 
renewables and conventional energy indexes in my sample. Second, I use tracking error 
volatility to advance my understanding of this relationship. Third, I model a downside 
tracking error, based on the regression-based tracking error volatility of Cremers and 
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Petajisto (2009), to further enhance my understanding of risk. These analyses increase my 
understanding of the differences in the risk pricing of international renewable energy firms 
and their interrelations and dependencies with conventional energy firms. 
 Related studies investigating the drivers of renewable energy company risk 
(Sadorsky, 2012b) and the relation between oil prices and renewable energy stock prices 
(Henriques and Sadorsky, 2008; Kumar et al., 2012) shed some light on the impact of this 
relationship. Rising oil prices increase systematic risk and may therefore encourage energy 
producers to diversify into renewable sources of energy. A direct assessment of the 
investment risk characteristics between renewable and conventional energy sources adds to 
this discussion. Hence, my research question is the following:  
1) Does the risk of international renewable energy equity indexes relate to that of 
fossil-fuel ones? 
2) How does this relation differ geographically?  
3) Do returns of renewable energy companies trail those of fossil fuel energy 
companies?  
To my knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the investment risk behaviour of a 
comprehensive international sample of renewable energy equity indexes that establishes a 
direct comparison between the returns of traditional (fossil-fuelled) and renewable equity 
indexes. 
 I observe a strong and positive relationship between the traditional and the renewable 
energy index returns. Strikingly, I find very high correlations for a specific sub-set of index 
pairs, namely the most focussed renewable indexes. I show that there are substantial absolute 
and relative investment risks across the renewable energy equity indexes. My investment risk 
proxies such as annualised return volatilities, semi-standard deviations and lower partial 
moments of renewable energy indexes are about twice the size of conventional energy equity 
indexes. These findings are in line with Sadorsky (2012b) and Lüthi and Wüstenhagen (2012; 
2012b), and highlight the fact that renewable energy businesses are volatile, probably as a 
result of high uncertainties related to their current business models (i.e. small start-ups with 
specialised individual projects) and local government incentive programmes that intend to 
support the development of renewable energy, both of which require a substantial risk-
premium from investors.82 I also find positive and substantially varying tracking errors for all 
                                                 
82 Clearly, conventional energy companies carry high risks, too. For example, Kawashima and Takeda (2012) 
show that after the Fukushima nuclear accident, stock prices of utilities with nuclear plants declined sharply 
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pair-wise relations. My findings suggest that about 70 percent of sampled renewable energy 
equity indexes tend to have relatively more return volatility than their conventional peers. As 
volatility is a measure of the dispersion of returns in both directions, positive and negative, it 
does not distinguish between good and bad variation and thus could under-estimate downside 
volatility that is of major concern to the risk-averse investor (Ang et al., 2006). Economists 
have long established that investors care differently about losses than gains (Ang et al., 2006; 
Roy, 1952)83. Hence, I will also try to account for asymmetric risk behaviour by the downside 
tracking error. I observe that also with this measure most renewable energy indexes are to be 
regarded as riskier than conventional ones. More concentrated renewable energy indexes 
within the renewable energy sector tend to experience lower investment risk than more 
diversified renewable energy indexes, especially in the case of North America, given that 
diversification reduces risk.84 These findings are in line with studies investigating the 
performance of concentrated mutual fund holdings in selected industries and degrees of 
specialisation in socially responsible investments (Gil-Bazo et al., 2010; Huij and Derwall, 
2011; Kacperczyk et al., 2005). In all, I contribute to the existing literature by extending the 
methodologies used and investigate hitherto unexplored financial instruments. 
 The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Chapter 6.2. 'Background' 
provides the background of investing in renewable energy (indexes). The data is introduced 
in Chapter 6.3. 'Data Description'. The methods applied to analyse my data are presented in 
Chapter 6.4. 'Methods'. Chapter 6.5. 'Results' presents my results. My conclusions are in 
Chapter 6.6. 
6.2 Background 
I investigate risk deviations between the returns of renewable and conventional energy equity 
markets such as oil, coal, gas and nuclear energy. There is a vast empirical literature on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
after the accident relative to utilities without nuclear plants. However, during normal market conditions one 
would expect the return volatilities of conventional energy companies to be lower. Lower investment risks are 
also plausible due to the enourmous subventions that go to the conventional energy sector each year (See Table 
9 'Worldwide Energy Consumption Subsidies').  
83 The idea that investors care (more) about losses is also compatible with a Behavioural Finance view and the 
observed cognitive bias of loss aversion (See e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1983). From a psychological 
perspective, loss averse investors strongly dislike losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1983).   
84 In the context of the Modern Portfolio Theory, and as previously discussed in Chapter 2.6.1. 'Diversification 
and ESG information', environmental screens (or any ESG screen for that matter) tend to reduce the investible 
stock universe and leave the investor with a suboptimal portfolio (Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964). A 
suboptimal portfolio within the mean-variance efficiency frontier that is tilted towards a less favourable risk-
return tradeoff relative to a conventional portfolio without any ESG screens (Renneboog et al., 2008a). Thus, 
renewable energy equity indexes are thought to underperform relative to conventional energy equity indexes due 
to a diversification penalty. 
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role of oil price changes and their impact on the economy (Hamilton, 1983, 2003), developed 
and emerging stock markets (Asteriou and Bashmakova, 2013; Driesprong et al., 2008; Park 
and Ratti, 2008), and industry stock market returns (Scholtens and Yurtsever, 2012). Most 
papers predict a negative relation between rising oil prices and the economy or stock markets 
for mainly two reasons. First, rising oil prices lead to increases in the production costs of 
goods and services resulting in lower cash flows for the business and ultimately depreciating 
stock prices (Kumar et al., 2012). Second, rising oil prices affect discount rates which are 
used in cash flow calculations to assess the valuation of stock prices85 (Mohamed, 2012). 
Recent studies show that the predicted negative relationship is not necessarily homogenous 
across industries (Mohamed, 2012; Scholtens and Yurtsever, 2012).  
 I am especially interested in the relationship between renewable energy stock prices 
and conventional energy stock prices. To date, only a very small number of studies 
investigate how macroeconomic variables affect renewable energy stock prices. Henriques 
and Sadorsky (2008) empirically analyse whether the generally accepted view that increasing 
oil prices positively affect the financial performance of renewable energy companies can be 
verified. Using vector autoregression methods they establish that a dynamic relation exists 
between the Wilderhill Clean Energy Index, the Arca Tech 100 Index, and West Texas 
Intermediate crude oil futures contracts over the period from January 2001 to May 2007. 
Expanding the empirical analysis to three renewable energy indexes, Kumar, Managi and 
Matsuda (2012) confirm this positive relationship. Both studies show that oil price changes 
are a significant driver of renewable energy stock returns, however, other factors such as 
technology stock prices and interest rates, seem to matter as well. Especially, prices of 
technology stocks tend to correlate strongly with renewable energy stocks (Sadorsky, 2012a). 
Two arguments explain the close relationship between technology and renewable energy 
stocks. First, there are similarities in company size between the two sectors. Renewable 
energy companies tend to be small start-ups concentrating on specific alternative 
technologies to produce energy and are thus highly dependent on the success or failure of 
specific projects, similar to the information technology sector (Sadorsky, 2012a). Second, due 
to the small size and unexpected outcome of specific stocks, the risk of renewable energy 
investments is much higher than that of conventional energy producers. However, so far, very 
little is known about the risk behaviour of international renewable energy equity indexes 
compared to conventional, fossil-fuel intense energy equity indexes. In particular, the direct 
                                                 
85 The value of a stock equals the sum of discounted future cash-flows, which are influenced by economic 
conditions and macroeconomic events such as oil shocks (Mohamed, 2012).  
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risk relationship between renewable and conventional energy equity indexes is unexplored in 
the existing literature. 
 In studying an international sample of renewable and conventional energy equity 
indexes across regions, I also want to investigate geographical aspects of the risk profiles of 
my sampled indexes. Geographical investment risks tend to be driven by the resourcefulness 
of the local natural environment and promotion policies by local governments. The first 
argument is straightforward: Some countries or regions tend to have more favourable 
conditions with regard to the availability of natural resources such as oil rich members 
representing the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Hamilton, 2009). 
Similarly, some forms of renewable energy will realise their full potential better in some 
regions than in others (Iskin et al., 2012). Another influential reason why investment risks 
might differ geographically are the different approaches taken by governments to promote or 
hamper conventional and alternative ways of energy production through policies, subsidies, 
taxes and other regulations (Fischer and Newell, 2008). I also observe shifting investor 
interest towards risk management and risk reduction, especially due to the aftermath of the 
2008 economic downturn. This shift towards improved beta management is generally desired 
by large institutional investors such as pension funds (Franzen, 2010; McKillop and Pogue, 
2010) and more recently, a growing interest from alternative investments such as highly 
volatile renewable energy companies (Sadorsky, 2012a, b).  
 This chapter relates to a small number of studies that examine the risks of investing in 
renewable energy equity indexes. Henriques and Sadorsky (2008) provide evidence that the 
Wilderhill Clean Energy Index, a renewable energy index, is about 40 percent riskier than the 
S&P 500, a broad all-industry equity index. Sadorsky (2012b) investigates drivers of 
systematic risk for renewable energy companies and finds that rising oil prices tend to 
increase systematic risks (or beta) of renewable energy firms during periods of steep oil price 
increases. Only moderate oil price increases coupled with rising company sales growth can 
reduce systematic risks for renewable energy firms. Kumar et al. (2012) and Sadorsky 
(2012a) find positive and significant correlations between the returns of renewable energy 
indexes, oil prices and one technology index.  
 I aim to complement this literature in several ways. First, none of the previous studies 
directly compares the risk characteristics of renewable with conventional, fossil-fuel intense 
energy equity indexes. Second, I extend the analyses in the literature by including a very 
diversified sample of 14 international renewable energy and 18 conventional energy equity 
indexes. Third, I compare the risk characteristics between renewable and conventional energy 
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equity indexes by using risk measures for relative residual volatilities, which are widely used 
in practice. Fourth, I introduce an alternative measure to allow for investors' asymmetric risk 
appetites and tolerance.  
6.3 Data Description  
6.3.1 Renewable Energy Indexes 
I seek to examine the risk relationship between a sample of renewable and conventional 
energy equity indexes. My sample consists of fourteen renewable energy indexes for which I 
collect monthly total return data from three different data sources, Thomson Reuters 
Datastream, Global Financial Data (GFD), and Ardour Global (Alternative Energy Indexes). I 
restrict my attention to energy indexes which track the performance of energy producing 
firms, specialised in renewable energy (such as solar, wind, and hydro), alternative fuels (bio-
fuels) and related renewable technologies (such as storage and efficiency of renewable 
energy). In defining whether a company qualifies as renewable, the index providers employ 
the following three screens: (i) sector, (ii) renewable income, and (iii) liquidity. The sector 
screen is to rule out any firms not having any business activities related to alternative energy 
firms. The renewable income screen is to ensure that companies generate sufficient revenues 
or net income from renewable business activities to be classified as such. In addition, 
renewable energy index providers use a liquidity screen, either a liquidity ratio (calculated as 
average 3-month daily trading volume divided by the average 3-month market capitalisation) 
or minimum trading volume and market capitalisation, to screen out less frequently traded 
firms. 
 Panel A of Table 13 summarises how and to what extent each renewable energy index 
uses the screens. Sector screens vary to some extent. For example, indexes with global 
investment objectives tend to be broader and less selective in their inclusion of energy 
businesses. This contrasts with more specialised indexes such as NASDAQ Renewable Edge 
index, HFRX Alternative Energy, Ardour Global Alternative Energy Solar and S&P Asia 
Alternative Energy. Table 13 shows that the majority of indexes use a renewable income 
threshold of over 50 percent, except for Ardour Global Alternative Energy Solar who uses 66 
percent of gross revenues or net income. Finally, approximately half of the sample uses 
minimum average trading volumes of 1 million USD and average free-float market 
capitalisations of 100 million USD. The sample of renewable energy indexes tracks the 
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performance of renewable energy firms in various regions such as Asia, Europe, US and 
Worldwide.  
 Panel A of Table 13 also presents annualised summary statistics for the full sample 
period of fourteen renewable energy indexes. I find annualised average returns of ten 
renewable energy indexes to be negative. This is in line with previous studies (Bohl et al., 
2013).  
 However, DaxGlobal Alternative, S&P Global Alternative, NASDAQ Renewable 
Edge and European Renewable Energy, generate low, but positive annualised average 
returns. Although absolute positive performances of these four renewable energy indexes are 
not dominated by one specific region (one European, one US and two Global indexes), it 
appears that specific sub-segments of renewable energy are much more attractive than others. 
I argue that the observed positive performance specifically relates to the industry rather than 
to geography. To give one example, the pure solar energy index (AGAE Solar) produced the 
lowest annualised return combined with the highest volatility and the worst loss. In contrast, 
the more specific and technology focused NASDAQ Renewable Edge generates, on average, 
a positive return with the lowest maximum loss and volatility. This finding is in line with that 
of Statman (2006), who compared socially responsible with conventional indexes. 
 Total volatility, proxied by the annualised standard deviation, shows that all 
renewable energy indexes are volatile investments indeed. Annualised standard deviations 
range from 35 to 40 percent. In contrast, standard deviations for conventional oil and gas 
indexes cluster at around 15 to 30 percent (see Panel B of Table 13). Annualised semi-
standard deviations and lower partial moments are on average 7 to 10 percent higher than for 
traditional energy companies. Previous studies confirm high volatilities and Sadorsky 
highlights this by pointing out that "Renewable Energy companies are often among the 
riskiest types of companies to invest in" (Sadorsky, 2012b:39). They are risky for mainly two 
reasons. First, renewable energy companies tend to be small start-up types of businesses that 
concentrate their resources to develop one specific type of renewable energy technology. 
From an investor perspective, the uncertainty attached to one project is very high, as its 
success or failure wholly depends on individual projects. Adding to uncertainty, it is 
questionable which of the alternative energy technologies will penetrate the market in the 
future. Second, due to relatively high up-front investment costs, the renewable energy sector 
has received governmental support in various industrial countries (Morris et al., 2012). One 
example is the European solar sector, where the dominant method of subsidies are "feed-in-
tariffs" and where the growth of the overall Photovoltaics market was "largely driven by 
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policy investments" (Lüthi and Wüstenhagen, 2012: 1001). Notable risks of policy investing 
are the administrative process, policy stability, and support duration. Thus, it is not surprising 
that high uncertainty about the outcome of policy investing requires a risk premium by 
investors and justifies my findings of high absolute volatilities across different renewable 
energy indexes. Descriptive statistics such as the third and fourth moments show additional 
characteristics of renewable energy return distributions. The sample skewness is about -1 for 
all renewable energy indexes and indicates return distributions skewed to the left. The sample 
Kurtosis strongly exceeds three, which implies fat-tailed distributions. I reject the hypothesis 
of normality from the Jarque-Bera test statistic for all returns of the renewable indexes. 
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Table 13: Renewable and Conventional Energy Sample and Summary Statistics 
ID Clean Energy Index From To Obs 
Ann. 
Mean 
Ann. 
Median 
Ann. 
Std.Dev 
Jarque- 
Bera Region Clean Income Screen Liquidity Screen Index Impurity 
Income Ratio (Ann.) 
Liquidity 
Ratio^ 
Trading Volume 
(Min) Market Cap (Min) 
% of Non-Renewable firms 
listed 
Panel A: Renewable Energy 
C1 Ardour Global Alt. Energy 31/12/1999 28/02/2013 158 -0.0515 0.1755 0.3795 66.47*** World > 50% of gross revenues >25% 6% 
C2 
Ardour Global Alt. Energy Extra 
Liq. 31/01/2000 28/02/2013 157 -0.0790 0.1058 0.3869 82.58*** World > 50% of gross revenues >25% 13% 
C3 
Ardour Global Alt. Energy N. 
America 31/12/1999 28/02/2013 158 -0.0737 0.0019 0.3977 25.20*** N-America > 50% of gross revenues >25% 7% 
C4 Ardour Global Alt. Energy Europe 30/06/2005 28/02/2013 92 -0.0950 0.1371 0.4063 56.24*** Europe > 50% of gross revenues >25% 0% 
C5 Ardour Global Alt. Energy Solar 31/12/2004 28/02/2013 98 -0.1086 0.2196 0.5463 22.26*** World > 66% of gross revenues > $1 million 0% 
C6 Daxglobal Alternative Energy 29/12/2000 28/02/2013 146 0.0114 0.1545 0.2839 20.40*** World > 50% of gross revenues $1.2 million $150 million 33% 
C7 
World Renewable Energy 
(Renixx) 31/01/2002 28/02/2013 133 -0.1567 0.1251 0.3943 26.92*** World > 50% of gross revenues 
Highest f-f mkt. 
cap. 7% 
C8 S&P Global Alternative Energy 28/11/2003 28/02/2013 111 0.0198 0.2274 0.2747 134.20*** World > 50% of gross revenues $3 million $300 million 46% 
C9 S&P Asia Alternative Energy 30/06/2008 28/02/2013 56 -0.1302 -0.0810 0.3570 5.96* Asia Not available > $2 million^^ > $250 million 45% 
C10 HFRX Alternative Energy 31/01/2006 28/02/2013 111 -0.0714 0.2146 0.3618 181.09*** World Not available Not available Not available Not available 
C11 
NASDAQ Renewable Edge US 
Liq. 30/11/2006 28/02/2013 85 0.0328 0.0723 0.1772 99.08*** US > 50% of gross revenues 100,000 shares $150 million 0% 
C12 S&P Global Renewable Energy 28/11/2003 28/02/2013 75 -0.0880 0.2122 0.3569 28.60*** World > 50% of gross revenues $3 million $300 million 18% 
C13 European Renewable Energy 30/09/2003 31/01/2012 100 0.0108 0.1831 0.4110 85.21*** Europe > 50% of gross revenues 10 largest in sector 
10 largest in 
sector 0% 
C14 Wilderhill New Energy Global Inn. 29/12/2000 28/02/2013 146 -0.0090 0.1638 0.2976 140.73*** US 
> 10% to > 50% of market 
value $1 million $100 million** 8% 
Panel B: Conventional Energy 
D1 
MSCI World Oil, Gas & Cons. 
Fuels  30/12/1994 28/02/2013 158 0.0824 0.1196 0.1982 5.61* World 
D2 FTSE World Oil & Gas 30/12/1992 28/02/2013 158 0.0857 0.1214 0.2042 5.06* World 
D3 
ThomsonReuters Global Oil & 
Gas 30/12/1992 28/02/2013 158 0.0762 0.1234 0.1984 5.55* World 
D4 Dow Jones Titans Oil & Gas 30 30/12/1991 28/02/2013 158 0.0761 0.1239 0.2108 5.92* World 
D5 MSCI World Metals & Mining 30/12/1994 28/02/2013 158 0.0803 0.1721 0.2926 143.83*** World 
D6 S&P 500 Oil, Gas & Cons. Fuels 30/09/1989 28/02/2013 158 0.0778 0.0865 0.1948 6.83** US 
D7 Dow Jones US Int. Oil & Gas 29/02/1992 28/02/2013 158 0.0687 0.0540 0.1836 2.65 US 
D8 NYSE Arca Oil 16/11/1984 28/02/2013 158 0.0734 0.1157 0.2191 2.94 US 
D9 Dow Jones US Coal 02/01/1992 28/02/2013 152 0.0386 0.1417 0.4870 12.46*** US 
D10 EURO STOXX Oil & Gas 31/12/1992 28/02/2013 158 0.0249 0.0980 0.1850 4.96* Europe 
D11 Dow Jones Europe Oil & Gas 31/12/1992 28/02/2013 158 0.0163 0.0662 0.2197 7.49** Europe 
D12 Daxglobal Coal Perf. 28/09/2001 28/02/2013 137 0.1258 0.2029 0.3757 37.76*** World 
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Table 13: Renewable and Conventional Energy Sample and Summary Statistics 
ID Clean Energy Index From To Obs 
Ann. 
Mean 
Ann. 
Median 
Ann. 
Std.Dev 
Jarque- 
Bera Region Clean Income Screen Liquidity Screen Index Impurity 
Income Ratio (Ann.) 
Liquidity 
Ratio^ 
Trading Volume 
(Min) Market Cap (Min) 
% of Non-Renewable firms 
listed 
D13 Daxglobal Nuclear Energy Perf. 28/09/2001 28/02/2013 137 0.0024 0.0543 0.2621 1.52 World 
D14 Daxglobal Asia Oil & Gas Perf. 28/09/2001 28/02/2013 137 0.1773 0.0529 0.2714 209.61*** Asia 
D15 
DJGL Asia Pac. Dev. Int. Oil & 
Gas 30/03/2001 28/02/2013 143 0.0121 0.0118 0.3292 1.54 Asia 
D16 DJGL Asia Pac. Dev. Oil & Gas 30/03/2001 28/02/2013 158 0.1198 0.1678 0.2740 83.96*** Asia 
D17 HFRX EH Energy Basic Materials 31/01/2005 28/02/2013 97 0.0423 0.0762 0.1377 79.03*** World 
D18 NASDAQ/SIG Oil Explor. & Prod. 28/06/2005 28/02/2013 92 0.0849 0.2153 0.3354 7.52** US 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics and general information for each of the fourteen renewable and eighteen conventional energy indexes. The first two columns display my ID and full index name. The next three columns 
indicate data availability. Columns 6 to 9 display descriptive statistics. I compute descriptive statistics over the sample period December 1999 to February 2013. Note that mean, median, and standard deviation are annualized numbers. 
I annualize my monthly estimates by multiplying that number with twelve. Standard deviations are multiplied with the square root of twelve. Column 10 represent investmen regions of each index. The next four columns summarise three 
most frequently used screens for identifying eligible energy companies by clean energy index providers. First, index providers calculate clean income screen as the annual income ratio of gross revenues from renewable sources to total 
gross revenues. At least 50 percent of a companies' income has to be generated through clean business activities. Second, liquidity screens are based on either liquidity ratios (trading volume to market capitalization) or a combination 
of minimum trading volume and market capitalization. Third, sector screens exclude companies with activities other than sourcing energy from renewable activities. All three screens are equally important in excluding non-compliant 
companies. The final column shows whether and to what extent the indexes are "pure play". For this, I manually check the holdings of each index and count companies that are considerably or partially operating in the coal, metals &
mining, nuclear, and oil & gas sector. I report proportions of impure companies to total companies in each respective index. ^ Defined as average 3-month daily trading volume divided by the average 3-month market capitalization in 
USD. ^^ Three-month average market capitalisation. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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6.3.2 Conventional Energy Indexes 
My aim is to compare the risk characteristics of renewable energy indexes with conventional 
energy indexes. Thus, I collect total monthly return data for 18 conventional energy indexes 
with similar characteristics relative to my sample of renewable energy indexes from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream and Global Financial Data. Panel B of Table 13 lists my sample of 18 
conventional energy indexes and their characteristics. I restrict my sample to oil and gas, coal 
and nuclear energy indexes, to provide a direct counterpart to my sample of renewable energy 
indexes. I broadly select conventional energy indexes according to four criteria: (a) index 
factsheet benchmarks, (b) index family, (c) investment objective/market, and (d) age. Panel B 
of Table 13 shows that I choose my sample of 18 conventional energy indexes according to 
similar characteristics that correspond to renewable energy index characteristics such as time 
frame and regional characteristics. In other words, I select the same geographical regions for 
my conventional energy indexes which are Asia, Europe, US and Worldwide. The only 
noteworthy difference between my two samples is that, generally, conventional energy 
indexes tend to be somewhat older than their renewable energy counterparts. This finding is 
intuitive as most renewable energy companies have only developed in the last decade.  
 Panel B of Table 13 reports annualised summary statistics for my full sample of 
conventional energy indexes over the period from December 1999 to February 2013. Average 
annualised returns for all eighteen indexes are positive. I observe that fifteen out of eighteen 
conventional indexes produce mean returns of at least seven percent. Four conventional 
indexes generate annualised returns between one and four percent, and one index generates 
0.24 percent. Compared to my sample of renewable energy firms, the conventional sample 
performs much better. Total volatilities indicate that conventional energy firms tend to be less 
volatile than their renewable counterparts during my sample period. For the majority, 
annualised return standard deviations range from 15 to 30 percent. This is in line with 
findings of Sadorsky (2001) and Boyer & Filion (2007). Using multifactor oil beta models, 
they investigate the expected return on Canadian oil companies and find the oil and gas 
industry to be somewhat less risky than the Canadian market. My computed total volatilities 
for conventional energy firms are in line with annualised price volatilities for crude oil, which 
was found to be about 25 percent per annum (Sadorsky, 2001).  
 From an investor perspective, these findings suggest that the oil sector carries less 
systematic risk on an absolute basis. At this point, I cannot make any assumptions about 
relative volatilities between conventional and renewable energy firms. Neither can I state 
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how their downside risk behaves relative to renewable energy producers. The next chapter 
describes the methods used to facilitate a direct comparison of the volatility and downside 
risk of renewable and conventional energy stock indexes. 
6.4 Methods 
6.4.1 Renewable vs. Conventional Energy Stock Index Returns 
The goal of this chapter is to compare the risk profiles of renewable and conventional 
equity index returns. In particular, I aim to investigate what drives the risk behaviour in 
international renewable energy firms. To facilitate a direct comparison, I compute pair-wise 
correlations and tracking errors of the returns of renewable and conventional energy indexes. 
Table 14 shows correlation coefficients between the returns of each of the fourteen renewable 
and eighteen conventional energy indexes. Over the entire sample period, both sets of indexes 
show strong positive correlations, ranging from 28 to 84 percent. This suggests that there are 
similarities between the composition of renewable and conventional indexes, and some scope 
for diversification. 
 I find region-specific renewable energy indexes correlate strongest with regional-
themed conventional energy indexes. For example, S&P Asia Alternative has the strongest 
exposure to MSCI Metals and Mining (64 percent) and DJGL Asia Int. Oil and Gas (59 
percent). Another example is the European Renewable Energy index which correlates 
strongly with DJ Europe Oil & Gas (72 percent). Furthermore, I arrive at high correlations for 
a specific sub-set of index pairs. In particular, the four renewable energy indexes with 
positive mean returns tend to be highly correlated to the identical set of seven conventional 
energy indexes. The correlations range between 70 and 85 percent. I find correlations of 
NASDAQ Renewable Edge and S&P Global Alternative with conventional energy 
counterparts to be the highest. Given these strong correlations, I assume that renewable 
energy indexes are more likely to have a positive mean return if they correlate stronger with 
conventional energy indexes. An explanation for this strong relation is the liberal renewable 
income screen of 50 and 66 percent. Such screens aim to filter out energy companies that rely 
heavily on burning fossil fuels to generate energy. However, after investigating return 
differences of renewable and conventional energy indexes, I observe that almost all of the 
renewable energy indexes correlate strongly and significantly with their conventional 
counterparts. It seems that the screening is not as rigorous as suggested and that many 
conventional energy producers, manage to be listed on renewable energy indexes. The final 
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column of Table 13, 'Index Impurity: % of Non-renewable firms listed', illustrates that many 
conventional energy producers (particularly in the gas sector) happen to be listed on 
renewable energy indexes due to their broader definition and understanding of 'Renewable 
Energy'. For example, the S&P Global Alternative Index, lists the highest number of non-
renewable firms with 46 percent. Other renewable energy indexes such as the Daxglobal 
Alternative Energy has a proportion of 33 percent of non-renewable firms. Among the full 
sample, only four renewable energy indexes are pure plays, and without the influence of non-
renewable firms. 
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Table 14: Correlations 
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 D13 D14 D15 D16 D17 D18 
C1 0.54* 0.57* 0.57* 0.60* 0.61* 0.49* 0.43* 0.51* 0.56* 0.46* 0.53* 0.65* 0.56* 0.53* 0.44* 0.50* 0.69* 0.69* 
C2 0.55* 0.58* 0.58* 0.61* 0.62* 0.49* 0.42* 0.53* 0.59* 0.49* 0.56* 0.64* 0.54* 0.54* 0.42* 0.51* 0.67* 0.68* 
C3 0.46* 0.49* 0.48* 0.51* 0.51* 0.42* 0.36* 0.43* 0.53* 0.43* 0.44* 0.65* 0.54* 0.53* 0.36* 0.40* 0.67* 0.69* 
C4 0.75* 0.77* 0.78* 0.78* 0.79* 0.69* 0.61* 0.74* 0.64* 0.57* 0.76* 0.59* 0.52* 0.48* 0.65* 0.79* 0.68* 0.65* 
C5 0.67* 0.68* 0.70* 0.70* 0.70* 0.60* 0.52* 0.67* 0.60* 0.55* 0.67* 0.60* 0.54* 0.53* 0.53* 0.70* 0.61* 0.59* 
C6 0.74* 0.76* 0.77* 0.77* 0.74* 0.71* 0.65* 0.74* 0.65* 0.61* 0.73* 0.62* 0.54* 0.52* 0.52* 0.71* 0.75* 0.70* 
C7 0.58* 0.60* 0.61* 0.61* 0.60* 0.56* 0.50* 0.59* 0.50* 0.56* 0.56* 0.55* 0.56* 0.55* 0.43* 0.59* 0.62* 0.60* 
C8 0.80* 0.81* 0.83* 0.82* 0.85* 0.72* 0.63* 0.78* 0.71* 0.64* 0.80* 0.69* 0.66* 0.53* 0.61* 0.83* 0.76* 0.72* 
C9 0.48* 0.49* 0.50* 0.49* 0.64* 0.43* 0.41* 0.47* 0.42* 0.28 0.44* 0.42* 0.45* 0.41* 0.59* 0.54* 0.43* 0.41* 
C10 0.72* 0.74* 0.76* 0.75* 0.78* 0.65* 0.57* 0.71* 0.66* 0.55* 0.73* 0.63* 0.53* 0.53* 0.56* 0.77* 0.67* 0.66* 
C11 0.77* 0.77* 0.79* 0.78* 0.85* 0.68* 0.57* 0.73* 0.72* 0.64* 0.76* 0.76* 0.63* 0.45* 0.65* 0.80* 0.76* 0.71* 
C12 0.75* 0.76* 0.79* 0.78* 0.77* 0.69* 0.58* 0.76* 0.69* 0.62* 0.74* 0.71* 0.60* 0.57* 0.60* 0.77* 0.68* 0.71* 
C13 0.71* 0.73* 0.73* 0.74* 0.73* 0.66* 0.60* 0.71* 0.61* 0.53* 0.72* 0.57* 0.48* 0.47* 0.57* 0.75* 0.66* 0.61* 
C14 0.71* 0.73* 0.74* 0.74* 0.80* 0.65* 0.57* 0.70* 0.65* 0.58* 0.71* 0.66* 0.59* 0.55* 0.47* 0.75* 0.73* 0.69* 
Notes: This table reports pair-wise correlation coefficients between the returns of renewable and conventional energy indexes. "*", indicates statistical significance at the 1% significance level. 
 
 
155 
6.4.2 Conventional Tracking Error  
Investment risk is the unexpected future outcome of price changes in an investors' 
(stock) holdings (Welch, 2011). Variability of price changes is therefore regarded as a 
fundamental source of investment risk. Risk can be idiosyncratic (firm-specific) or systematic 
(market-wide) and absolute or relative (see Eling and Schuhmacher, 2007; Ross et al., 2008 
for a comprehensive overview of risk measures). The simplest methods for assessing 
idiosyncratic investment risks are measures such as variance, standard deviations, semi-
standard deviations, Sharpe ratios, which compare the variability within one investment. In 
contrast, popular methods to evaluate systematic investment risk are Beta (estimated using 
the capital asset pricing model), Treynor Ratio, and Lower Partial Moments (if the 
benchmark target return is a broad market return). Systematic risk measures compare return 
variability between two or more investments, generally in relation to a benchmark such as 
global or country stock indexes. Following my assessment of absolute risk properties 
between renewable and conventional energy equity indexes in Table 15, I continue my 
empirical risk analysis on relative risk measures, in particular, tracking error volatilities. The 
traditional tracking error is defined as the standard deviation of the time-series difference 
between a portfolio return and a selected benchmark portfolio return (Ammann and 
Zimmermann, 2001; Cremers and Petajisto, 2009). To give one example in how to interpret 
the tracking error in statistical terms, a tracking error of 5 percent, assuming a normal 
distribution 86 with mean 0 and standard deviation of 1, will have a 68 percent chance (one 
standard deviation) of losing or gaining up to 5 percent in excess of benchmark returns 
(Polakow, 2011). Tracking error volatility as a relative risk measure can be used for three 
purposes. First, it is used to determine the level of portfolio risk (Ammann and Zimmermann, 
2001). Second, it is used to value active management. In other words, it describes to what 
extent a fund manager's portfolio deviates from a given benchmark portfolio. Third, it is an 
alternative risk-adjusted performance measure (Treynor and Black, 1973).87 
                                                 
86 Excess return data of my sample is leptokurtic rather than normally distributed. Assuming normally 
distributed excess returns when they are leptokurtic could lead to an under-estimation of the tracking error 
(Huisman et al., 1998). However, a potential under-estimation of the tracking error would affect all sampled 
energy indexes to the same extent. For my sample this means that both, renewable and conventional energy 
indexes would be affected to the same degree. 
87 Several studies discuss the "tracking-error problem" or "optimization problem", which aims to reduce tracking 
error volatility when replicating a selected benchmark given security selection restrictions (see e.g. Jorion, 2003; 
Stoyanov et al., 2008). I do not enter this discussion, but focus on the tracking error as an index/portfolio risk 
measure. 
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I will use tracking error volatility as my preferred risk measure for the following 
reasons: First, due to their simplicity and intuitive appeal, tracking errors are widely used risk 
measures in practice. It is "one of the main industry standards as a measure of relative risk" 
(Berkelaar et al., 2006:64). Furthermore, many institutional investors explicitly state a 
maximum acceptable tracking error in mandates to limit investment risks of their fund 
managers (Maspero and Saita, 2005). This allows us to draw practically relevant conclusions 
regarding the risk behaviour of renewable and conventional energy investments. Finally, 
studies show that tracking error volatility accurately predicts investment risks for both small 
and large portfolios in the short-term (Scowcroft and Sefton, 2001). Critics of the tracking 
error mainly argue against its ability to assess and compare the financial performance of 
competing actively managed funds (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; Huij and Derwall, 2011; 
Israelsen and Cogswell, 2007). They feel it is not a sufficiently robust indicator for ranking 
and selecting superior investments. In particular, Huij & Derwall (2011), and Israelsen & 
Cogswell (2007) argue that tracking error should not be used as the only indicator for 
financial performance. These critiques are mainly targeted at the ability to compare financial 
performance across mutual funds. In my study, tracking error is expressed as the residual 
volatility of renewable energy index returns in excess of conventional energy index returns, 
which emphasise bets on systematic risks in the conventional energy industry.  
Directly comparing renewable with conventional energy index returns is sensible 
from a research design and a practical perspective (see also Schröder, 2007). A direct 
comparison between the risks of renewable and conventional energy indexes is also intuitive 
from a practical perspective, because trustees of large institutional funds such as pension 
funds tend to have very specialised investment mandates with selected investment funds. The 
contracted mutual funds can have different investment styles (such as growth, emerging 
markets, long/short) that require specialised benchmarks, rather than a broad and general 
equity benchmark. Thus, the selection of appropriate benchmarks in itself requires some 
expertise (Ansell et al., 2003; Bailey, 1992). I choose to benchmark my sample of renewable 
energy indexes with conventional energy indexes to mimic a specialised energy mandate 
from investors. I obtain the tracking error by (i) regressing excess returns of renewable 
energy indexes on conventional energy indexes and (ii) computing the standard deviation of 
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the resulting regression residual. Thus, I compute the traditional regression-based tracking 
error88 (TE) as shown in Equation (15) and (16): 
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I will estimate Equation (15) using ordinary least squares and Newey-West corrected 
standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The 
interpretation of tracking error is straightforward. High (low) tracking errors indicate large 
(small) return deviations from a portfolio to its benchmark and vice versa. In the context of 
this chapter, high tracking errors increase relative return volatility of renewable energy firms 
compared to conventional energy firms, whereas a low tracking error results in a reduction of 
the relative return volatility of the firms in the renewable energy index.  
6.4.3 Downside Tracking Error 
Several studies assert that risk-averse investors are more concerned about how much they can 
lose versus how much they can profit from their investments (Alles and Murray, 2013; An et 
al., 2013). According to the principle of Safety First, investors try to minimise the probability 
of catastrophic events to shelter their wealth (Roy, 1952). This phenomenon has been widely 
recognised and can also be explained from a behavioural perspective (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) which suggests that people do not always exhibit rational behaviour when 
making decisions under risk. For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) show that people 
are loss averse, a phenomenon where investors are reluctant to sell stocks that lose value 
(Shleifer, 2000). People also tend to systematically over-estimate probability outcomes of 
                                                 
88Some studies use a measure labelled Active Share, which simply computes "the fraction of the portfolio that is 
different from the benchmark index" (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009: 3330). I refrain from computing Active 
Share for two reasons. First, I do not intend to assess active management. Second, in order to compute Active 
Share, holdings data is necessary, which I do not have available. Thus, I limit my study to computing tracking 
error in the traditional way. 
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future uncertain events, which results from emphasising on recent historical events that may 
have resulted by chance alone and disregarding events over longer past periods. 
 Traditional tracking errors from Equation (16) do not account for investors' 
asymmetric risk tolerance because the volatility is computed as the standard deviation and 
therefore assumed to be symmetric. In light of the convincing evidence that investors 
perceive risk differently, the major drawback of the standard deviation, as a proxy for 
volatility, is that it measures upside and downside volatilities equally. In order to overcome 
this shortcoming, I modify the traditional tracking error. My modified tracking error 
acknowledges the fact that investors have different risk appetites and will worry much more 
about losses than about gains. I implement the asymmetric risk tolerance by following 
Markowitz's (1959) recommendation to use semi-variance in the denominator, instead of the 
standard deviation. The advantage of the semi-variance is that it better captures downside 
volatilities which are of greater concern to risk-averse investors. More specifically, I develop 
an alternative to the traditional regression-based tracking error, which accounts for the 
asymmetric risk tolerance of investors. The Downside Tracking Error measures residual 
return volatilities below the mean. More specifically, the downside tracking error increases 
my understanding of the magnitude of below average volatilities relative to a benchmark.  
 I obtain the downside tracking error by (i) regressing excess returns of renewable 
energy indexes on conventional energy indexes and (ii) computing the semi-standard 
deviation of the resulting regression residual. Thus, I compute the regression-based downside 
tracking error TEDOWN as shown in Equations (17) and (18). 
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The interpretation of the downside tracking error from Equation (18) is very similar to the 
conventional tracking error, which I have discussed in the previous chapter. High (low) 
downside tracking errors indicate large (small) below mean return deviations from a portfolio 
to its benchmark and vice versa. In other words, high downside tracking errors increase 
relative downside return variance of renewable energy firms compared to conventional 
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energy firms, which makes them very risky investments. I expect to find even higher 
downside tracking errors between renewable and conventional energy index returns than with 
the traditional tracking error. 
6.5 Results  
I examine the riskiness of renewable and conventional energy index returns by investigating 
how far the volatility of returns deviates from one another. I begin my discussion of 
investment risks, proxied by traditional and downside tracking errors, for renewable energy 
and conventional energy equity indexes and conclude by contrasting the two. 
6.5.1 Renewable Energy 
Table 15 reports my regression results for the traditional tracking error from Equations (15) 
and (16). I observe traditional tracking errors of about 2 to 13 percent for all renewable 
energy indexes on a monthly basis. Asian, European, North American, and Global renewable 
energy equity indexes have positive tracking error volatility. This means that their total 
volatility is larger than that of the conventional energy firms. To be specific, I find for about 
70 percent of my sample of renewable energy indexes that they are more volatile than their 
conventional energy peers. Similarly, when using my adjusted measure for relative 
volatilities, my results show that downside tracking errors are positive and tend to be 
somewhat larger in magnitude than traditional tracking errors. Downside tracking error 
volatilities range from 2.5 to 15.4 percent on a monthly basis. This finding indicates that, on 
average, downside variance is greater and that renewable energy indexes tend to be more 
volatile than traditional energy index benchmarks. 
 I argue that there are three reasons behind the relatively high volatilities for renewable 
energy indexes. First, as previous studies note, renewable energy companies are risky 
because they seem to relate very closely to technology-intensive companies due to the 
similarities in their core businesses, which is to develop innovative technologies to produce 
renewable sources of energy (Sadorsky, 2012b). Second, renewable energy index returns also 
are driven by changes in macroeconomic factors such as carbon and oil prices89. Particularly 
the carbon price, as a fundamental influence to stock returns of renewable energy companies, 
has been very low during the second phase of the EU ETS and arguably appears to be 
                                                 
89 Kumar et al. (2012) test the contemporaneous relationship between carbon prices and renewable energy prices 
and find carbon prices to be significantly related to renewable energy prices, using a multifactor model. While 
the carbon price correlates negatively with the returns of the Wilderhill New Energy Global Innovation Index 
and the S&P Global Clean Energy Index, it correlates positively with the Wilderhill Clean Energy Index (Kumar 
et al., 2012). 
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systematically undervalued (Creti et al., 2012). During the first phase of the EU ETS, 
generous permit allocations depressed the carbon price even further to almost zero Euros in 
2007, down from about 20 Euros per ton of carbon dioxide at the beginning of the scheme in 
2005 (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008). Clearly, the carbon price measured by the EU ETS 
applies to carbon emitted in European countries, as a truly global carbon emission scheme 
does not exist, at this moment in time. However, recent mandatory regional developments in 
North America and Asia show that more governments are willing and committed to put a 
price on carbon (Haug et al., 2014). For example, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative was 
the first mandatory carbon emission trading scheme in the US and covers companies in nine90 
federal states since 2009. This was followed by the Western Climate Initiative, a carbon 
trading system covering the four91 largest Canadian provinces and California in the US (Haug 
et al., 2014). Mandatory emission trading schemes also exist in Asia since 2010. Japan and 
Korea (being the second biggest after the EU ETS) were the first Asian countries to launch 
such schemes, with China's mandatory ETS following in 2016 (Haug et al., 2014). Third, 
although public capital investments in the renewable energy sector are crucial, they have been 
stagnating due to the lasting recession which restrained governments to continue with public 
funding for that sector (International Energy Agency, 2012, 2013). In the recent past, major 
capital investments for the construction and development of renewable energy technologies 
have originated from public finance. Yet, governments find it increasingly difficult to support 
the sector due to the lasting recession. A recent report highlights this situation: "The current 
economic crisis has reduced the amount of public finance available to support low-carbon 
energy technologies" (International Energy Agency, 2012: 68). With lacking capital 
investments from public finances and insufficient demand from the private sector, uncertainty 
will remain high and as a result investment risks as well.  
 On closer inspection of my empirical results, I find four out of fourteen (about 30 
percent) renewable energy indexes to have substantially lower tracking errors (less return 
volatility), these are Daxglobal Alternative, S&P Global Alternative, Nasdaq Renewable 
Edge, and S&P Global Renewable Energy. The first three indexes invest in global renewable 
energy businesses and the last one in purely US-based renewable energy technology firms. 
Tracking errors for those four range from 2.68 to 8.46 percent. Surprisingly, the returns of 
these four indexes have been previously found to generate positive annualised mean returns 
                                                 
90 Including Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode 
Island, Vermon (Haug et al., 2014). 
91 British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Québec (Haug et al., 2014). 
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as well as correlate more strongly with traditional energy indexes (see Panel A of Table 13 
and Table 14, respectively). Interestingly, Nasdaq Renewable Edge, a highly technology 
oriented index, reports the lowest tracking error volatility among my sample of renewable 
energy indexes. Sector screens, highlight that this index only includes renewable energy firms 
from three very specific business areas including solar photovoltaics, biofuels, and advanced 
batteries. As such, these findings suggest that more concentrated renewable energy indexes 
tend to have lower relative investment risks compared to broader renewable energy indexes. 
Although this finding contradicts Modern Portfolio Theory and what would be expected of a 
less diversified portfolio, recent related studies on portfolio concentration in the mutual fund 
environment show that investment managers with more concentrated holdings in specific 
market sectors report better financial performance than broadly diversified funds (Huij and 
Derwall, 2011; Kacperczyk et al., 2005). Furthermore, Statman (2006) finds industry 
concentration to be the major reason for low tracking errors between socially responsible and 
conventional equity indexes. 
6.5.2 Conventional Energy 
The regression results in the previous chapter reveal that major renewable energy indexes 
tend to be more risky relative to conventional (fossil-fuelled) ones. In Table 15, I report 
regression results for the traditional tracking error from Equations (15) and (16) and for the 
downside tracking errors from Equations (17) and (18).  
 Across my full sample of conventional energy indexes, I observe that 13 out of 18 
energy indexes have monthly pair-wise tracking errors of 9 percent or more. To interpret 
tracking error volatilities from the perspective of a conventional energy investor, rather than a 
renewable energy investors (see previous chapter), higher pair-wise tracking errors actually 
indicate lower investment risks for conventional energy investors. The reason is that my 
dependent variables are renewable energy index returns and my independent variable are 
conventional energy index returns. Higher pair-wise tracking error volatilities should 
therefore be interpreted as high for renewable energy indexes relative to conventional energy 
indexes. My finding supports the argument that major conventional energy indexes have 
lower investment risks relative to renewable energy indexes. Similarly, downside tracking 
error estimates support my finding of lower downside tracking error volatilities for 
conventional energy indexes, while being generally somewhat larger in magnitude than the 
traditional risk measure.  
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 Based on my findings, there could be two plausible explanations why the return 
volatilities of conventional fossil-fuelled energy producers have been historically lower 
relative to the returns of renewable energy firms. First, lower return volatility in the 
conventional energy sector such as oil and gas producers is driven by the level of capital 
investment (Sadorsky, 2001). Historically, as Sadorsky (2001) notes, capital investments to 
develop more advanced energy technologies, have been much higher in the oil and gas sector 
than in the renewable energy sector. A direct relationship between capital investment and 
return volatility was documented by Haushalter et al. (2002), who find that increased capital 
investment reduces stock return volatility. This means, when capital investments to the oil 
and gas sector remain high, then this could reduce the return volatilities of oil and gas 
companies. Second, an influential driver that could lower return volatilities of conventional 
(fossil-fuelled) energy companies is a high price for crude oil. Several studies have found that 
crude oil positively impacts on the stock returns of conventional energy producers, whereby 
increasing oil prices result in higher profit margins/cash flows for conventional energy 
companies and ultimately materialise in a higher stock price (Mohamed, 2012; Scholtens and 
Yurtsever, 2012). It is evident that during my sample period the oil price was on a steady 
increase. An increasing oil price could have been driven by strong demand, but it seems 
likely that the enormous subventions to the coventional fossil-fuel sector (see Table 9 
'Worldwide Energy Consumption Subsidies') have played its role as well. For example, since 
2009, the oil and gas sector has received at least 5 times the amount of subsidies relative to 
the renewable energy sector. Another indication for conventional energies' lower return 
volatilities can be found in the volatility of the crude oil price. As the volatility of the firm is 
largely driven by changes in the crude oil price and the volatility of crude oil has been found 
to be around 25 percent, energy producers' stock return volatility is expected to be about the 
same (Boyer and Filion, 2007; Sadorsky, 2001). 
I further partition Table 15 into four panels in order to group renewable and 
conventional energy indexes according to geographic characteristics. Panel A of Table 15 
contrasts different geographic regions of renewable and conventional energy indexes. Panel 
B, C and D compare European, North American and Asian energy equity indexes, 
respectively. I find North American energy equity indexes to experience the lowest tracking 
and downside tracking errors. This implies that renewable and conventional energy indexes 
have more similar return volatility patterns in North America than in any other region. Global 
energy indexes have the second lowest risk profile. European and Asian conventional energy 
equity indexes have lower return volatilities, i.e. lower investment risk compared to Global 
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and North American energy equity indexes. In particular, Euro Stoxx Oil & Gas and DJ 
Europe Oil & Gas, have the lowest investment risk compared to their European renewable 
energy peers, AGAE Europe and European Renewable Energy. Comparing average 
investment risks across all geographic regions and the full sample of 18 conventional energy 
indexes, I find four indexes to have the lowest return volatilities. In particular, these are Euro 
Stoxx Oil & Gas, HFRX EH Energy, DJ US Int. Oil & Gas, and Daxglobal Asia Oil & Gas. 
164 
Table 15: Tracking Error and Downside Tracking Error Regressions 
  Global Europe North America Asia D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D12 D13 D17 D10 D11 D6 D7 D8 D9 D18 D14 D15 D16 
Panel A: Global 
C1 TE 0.0923 0.0899 0.0903 0.0880 0.0870 0.0745 0.0811 0.0729 0.0972 0.0929 0.0955 0.0991 0.0940 0.0861 0.0743 0.0827 0.0902 0.0945 
TE Down 0.0931 0.0897 0.0903 0.0878 0.0846 0.0819 0.0903 0.0905 0.1030 0.0984 0.0969 0.1035 0.0952 0.0903 0.0867 0.1010 0.0981 0.0963 
C2 TE 0.0932 0.0907 0.0908 0.0888 0.0876 0.0772 0.0843 0.0767 0.0973 0.0924 0.0972 0.1012 0.0947 0.0846 0.0773 0.0840 0.0928 0.0959 
TE Down 0.0941 0.0913 0.0941 0.0905 0.0852 0.0852 0.0947 0.0948 0.1065 0.0999 0.0994 0.1051 0.0970 0.0954 0.0880 0.0974 0.1066 0.0981 
C5 TE 0.1179 0.1152 0.1131 0.1131 0.1130 0.1265 0.1332 0.1251 0.1316 0.1175 0.1259 0.1353 0.1175 0.1259 0.1261 0.1338 0.1333 0.1129 
TE Down 0.1200 0.1142 0.1146 0.1138 0.1146 0.1500 0.1539 0.1432 0.1520 0.1230 0.1269 0.1445 0.1191 0.1396 0.1342 0.1541 0.1411 0.1151 
C6 TE 0.0549 0.0528 0.0526 0.0520 0.0547 0.0635 0.0680 0.0563 0.0649 0.0564 0.0580 0.0622 0.0550 0.0617 0.0594 0.0689 0.0695 0.0577 
TE Down 0.0602 0.0566 0.0584 0.0562 0.0539 0.0638 0.0698 0.0626 0.0680 0.0623 0.0604 0.0655 0.0588 0.0671 0.0642 0.0717 0.0740 0.0630 
C7 TE 0.0926 0.0909 0.0903 0.0900 0.0909 0.0952 0.0939 0.0900 0.0944 0.0942 0.0945 0.0989 0.0915 0.0987 0.0925 0.0948 0.1028 0.0919 
TE Down 0.0987 0.0988 0.0977 0.0970 0.0887 0.1054 0.0992 0.1113 0.1005 0.1028 0.0996 0.1038 0.0961 0.1108 0.1063 0.1074 0.1143 0.0992 
C8 TE 0.0481 0.0466 0.0448 0.0455 0.0422 0.0572 0.0592 0.0551 0.0606 0.0476 0.0551 0.0613 0.0501 0.0556 0.0588 0.0668 0.0624 0.0443 
TE Down 0.0480 0.0456 0.0470 0.0452 0.0416 0.0615 0.0719 0.0651 0.0694 0.0515 0.0591 0.0661 0.0496 0.0631 0.0637 0.0791 0.0639 0.0419 
C10 TE 0.0724 0.0703 0.0683 0.0687 0.0653 0.0810 0.0883 0.0820 0.0870 0.0717 0.0790 0.0858 0.0733 0.0786 0.0843 0.0886 0.0862 0.0671 
TE Down 0.0770 0.0730 0.0731 0.0721 0.0674 0.0931 0.1145 0.1063 0.0996 0.0796 0.0870 0.0948 0.0754 0.0975 0.0988 0.1085 0.0975 0.0698 
C12 TE 0.0677 0.0665 0.0636 0.0651 0.0652 0.0720 0.0823 0.0757 0.0805 0.0695 0.0745 0.0843 0.0669 0.0744 0.0724 0.0846 0.0821 0.0660 
TE Down 0.0758 0.0757 0.0717 0.0745 0.0706 0.0789 0.0962 0.0909 0.0927 0.0776 0.0822 0.0941 0.0719 0.0799 0.0806 0.1051 0.0874 0.0667 
Panel B: Europe 
C4 TE 0.0778 0.0753 0.0739 0.0734 0.0721 0.0941 0.1004 0.0862 0.0967 0.0760 0.0852 0.0927 0.0792 0.0903 0.0893 0.1026 0.0890 0.0719 
TE Down 0.0776 0.0752 0.0747 0.0709 0.0748 0.1068 0.1146 0.1067 0.1129 0.0792 0.0891 0.0982 0.0798 0.1057 0.1018 0.1203 0.0921 0.0687 
C13 TE 0.0837 0.0815 0.0808 0.0799 0.0815 0.0977 0.1043 0.0952 0.1004 0.0822 0.0889 0.0949 0.0832 0.0939 0.1014 0.1043 0.0973 0.0779 
TE Down 0.0818 0.0772 0.0790 0.0773 0.0797 0.1070 0.1241 0.1142 0.1098 0.0820 0.0920 0.1042 0.0795 0.1029 0.1130 0.1255 0.1071 0.0759 
Panel C: North America 
C3 TE 0.1022 0.1002 0.1006 0.0986 0.0989 0.0730 0.0805 0.0671 0.1038 0.1031 0.1043 0.1071 0.1036 0.0899 0.0659 0.0813 0.0932 0.1052 
TE Down 0.1024 0.0996 0.1007 0.1010 0.0984 0.0757 0.0830 0.0796 0.1107 0.1087 0.1057 0.1108 0.1034 0.0829 0.0718 0.0958 0.0968 0.1066 
C11 TE 0.0326 0.0325 0.0316 0.0321 0.0268 0.0335 0.0398 0.0335 0.0394 0.0330 0.0376 0.0419 0.0348 0.0358 0.0361 0.0456 0.0387 0.0308 
TE Down 0.0366 0.0373 0.0354 0.0356 0.0252 0.0370 0.0442 0.0399 0.0480 0.0399 0.0414 0.0457 0.0412 0.0418 0.0404 0.0572 0.0406 0.0302 
C14 TE 0.0608 0.0587 0.0574 0.0574 0.0510 0.0628 0.0673 0.0635 0.0699 0.0609 0.0652 0.0707 0.0615 0.0644 0.0680 0.0699 0.0752 0.0571 
TE Down 0.0664 0.0641 0.0644 0.0623 0.0523 0.0694 0.0740 0.0808 0.0769 0.0679 0.0730 0.0818 0.0651 0.0735 0.0727 0.0829 0.0844 0.0569 
Panel D: Asia
C9 TE 0.0903 0.0896 0.0891 0.0899 0.0788 0.0937 0.0921 0.0930 0.0989 0.0924 0.0929 0.0940 0.0909 0.0937 0.0939 0.0940 0.0831 0.0869 
TE Down 0.0916 0.0917 0.0910 0.0937 0.0876 0.1042 0.0958 0.1035 0.1050 0.0979 0.0965 0.0949 0.0943 0.1079 0.1010 0.1028 0.0748 0.1015 
Notes: This table reports monthly pair-wise tracking errors and downside tracking errors between my sample of fourteen renewable energy and eighteen conventional energy indexes 
from the first observation of each renewable energy index until February 2013. I compute pair-wise tracking errors from equations 10 and 11 in two stages. First, we regress excess 
renewable energy returns on excess conventional energy index returns. Second, I save the regression residual and compute the standard deviation for each of the 252 pairs. I obtain 
downside tracking errors by repeating the beforementioned procedure. Instead of computing standard deviations of regression residuals, I compute semi-standard deviations of 
regression residuals. I estimate linear OLS regressions with standard errors robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Newey and West, 1987). Renewable and conventional 
energy indexes are grouped according to geographic regions. Boxed and shaded areas indicate energy indexes belonging to the same geographic investment region. All returns are 
denominated in US dollars. 
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6.5.3 Robustness Checks 
In this chapter, I investigate whether my findings are sensitive to my previous research 
design choices. I conduct three robustness tests. First, I test alternative absolute risk measures 
such as downside risks. Second, I use an alternative all-industry benchmark such as MSCI 
world and re-compute tracking errors for both, renewable and conventional energy index 
returns to investigate any deviations from my main results. Finally, I investigate economic 
and statistical differences between tracking and downside tracking errors in different 
variations. 
6.5.3.1 Absolute Downside Risk 
My previous analyses proxy absolute total risk with the standard deviation of returns. 
From the perspective of a risk-averse investor, downside risk measures are more appropriate 
because of their ability to explain asymmetrical risk behaviour, i.e. more weight on losses 
rather than gains. In Panel A of Table 16, I compare the annualised semi-standard deviations, 
lower partial moments and minimum returns of global renewable and conventional energy 
indexes. I find 6 out of 8 renewable energy indexes to have semi-standard deviations of 44 
percent or higher. The AGAE Solar Index has the highest semi-deviation of approximately 65 
percent. Annualised lower partial moments and minimum returns show the same pattern. 
Interestingly, two renewable energy indexes, Daxglobal Alternative and S&P Global 
Alternative, have somewhat lower downside return volatilities of 33 and 34 percent 
respectively. In contrast, annualised semi-standard deviations for the majority of global 
conventional energy indexes range between 15 and 28 percent. Two conventional indexes, 
Daxglobal Coal and MSCI World Metals and Mining, clearly exceed this range of downside 
variation with 34 and 41 percent respectively. Comparing my downside risk findings across 
global renewable and conventional energy samples, I can conclude that the majority of 
renewable energy indexes experiences much higher downside volatilities compared to 
conventional energy indexes. These findings are in line with my previous findings and with 
the literature. Although I find many global renewable energy indexes to be much riskier, the 
two renewables with lowest downside risk perform better than two conventionals with 
highest downside risk. 
 Panel B and Panel D of Table 16 report downside risks for European and Asian 
energy equity indexes, respectively. Again, I find renewable energy indexes to report 
downside risks of about twice the size of conventional energy indexes. In Panel C, I compare 
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downside risks of North American energy equity indexes. Unlike the other regions, North 
American and more specifically US renewable energy indexes have an extremely positive 
downside protection. Nasdaq Clean Edge US, a highly specialised index, is by far the best 
renewable energy index in my sample with an annualised semi-deviation of 22 percent, lower 
partial moments of 19 percent and minimum returns of -22 percent. These results suggest that 
renewable energy indexes from North America are competitive with conventional energy 
indexes.   
6.5.3.2 Relative Risk - MSCI World 
I conduct my previous analyses with renewable energy index returns in excess of 
conventional energy index returns and then compute the relative residual volatilities of these 
two competing forms of energy equity indexes. The advantage from this approach is that I 
directly compare the risk variation between renewable and conventional energy equity 
indexes. One might argue, however, that residual return volatilities of renewable energy 
equity indexes are also related to all industries that I overlook and that may be important in 
explaining investment risks. To investigate whether renewable energy risk is similarly related 
to non-energy equity indexes, I repeat my previous analyses comparing both forms of energy 
indexes, renewable and conventional, with the all-industry benchmark MSCI World. In Table 
16, I report tracking errors and downside tracking errors between all renewable and 
conventional energy indexes versus MSCI's global equity market index. I sort indexes 
according to geographic region into Global, Europe, North America and Asia.  
 Panel A of Table 16 shows that among Global renewable energy indexes, S&P Global 
Alternative Energy and Daxglobal Alternative have the lowest and almost identical tracking 
errors. Panel C reports the lowest tracking errors for two North American renewable energy 
indexes (Nasdaq Clean Edge and Wilderhill New Energy). These findings are in line with 
previous estimations. The same four renewable energy indexes experience low relative 
investment risks. In Panel A, I also compare conventional energy equity indexes' relative risk 
across my four investment regions. I find European and Global traditional energy indexes to 
show the lowest risk compared to MSCI's equity index, on average. I find North American 
and Asian energy equity indexes to experience comparably higher risks.  
6.5.3.3 Tracking Error and Downside Tracking Error 
In Table 16, I report how strong tracking error and downside tracking error estimates 
deviate from each other. I compute the deviation as the difference between each traditional 
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and downside tracking error estimate and test whether the difference is statistically 
significant, using Wilcoxon nonparametric rank-sum test. Differences in regression estimates 
confirm that about 80 percent (11 out of 14) of renewable energy indexes have higher 
downside volatilities, i.e. downside tracking error volatilities are larger than traditional 
tracking error volatilities. This means that the majority of renewable energy indexes have had 
periods of relatively poor risk management. Furthermore, the difference between traditional 
tracking errors and downside tracking errors can be large in magnitude. I find monthly 
differences between the two measures of up to 1.03 percent. Although, the difference can be 
large in individual cases, tests on the statistical significance of the deviation show that none 
of the differences is significantly different. Meaning that both relative risk measures, tracking 
error and downside tracking error, should deliver identical results. One explanation for why 
the two measures perform very similar is the fact that I investigate passive index investments. 
In other words, I would expect to find larger differences in the two risk measures when 
observing actively managed mutual funds as they change their investment styles more 
dynamically and may specifically try to reduce downside variation compared to a passive 
index investment with a less dynamic tracking strategy. 
 Rather than only examine deviations between tracking error and downside tracking 
error estimates overall, I can rank energy indexes according to their risk performance relative 
to MSCI's all-industry equity index. I rank each energy index risk performance in two steps. 
First, I identify the energy index with the lowest tracking error within each geographic region 
and type of energy index (renewable or conventional). Second, I compute the difference 
between the lowest index relative to its peers. For example, I separately look at the magnitude 
of the difference between the lowest global renewable energy index with the highest global 
renewable energy index. Subsequently, I compute the statistical significance of the 
difference, using Wilcoxon nonparametric rank-sum test. In Panel A of Table 16, I identify 
S&P Global Alternative Energy to have the lowest tracking error among renewable energy 
indexes with global investment objectives. The monthly differences for my sample of global 
renewable and conventional energy indexes can be large (ranging from 1.22 to 6.88 percent 
and 0.8 to 5.72 percent, respectively). These findings suggest that my samples of global 
energy indexes vary substantially, which I formally confirm with Wilcoxon's nonparametric 
significance test. 
 Panel B of Table 16 shows that both, renewable and conventional energy indexes' 
relative risks are identical, as I cannot reject Wilcoxon's null hypothesis that the two series 
come from the same population. In Panel C, I report energy indexes investing in North 
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American energy firms. In line with previous observations, I find renewable Nasdaq Clean 
Edge index to have the lowest tracking error across the North American sample of energy 
indexes and except for one globally oriented index to almost have the lowest relative risks 
across the entire sample of renewable and conventional energy indexes relative to MSCI 
world. Panel D shows that across my Asian sample of energy indexes, conventional DJGL 
Asia Oil & Gas has the best risk protection, very closely followed by another conventional 
energy index, Daxglobal Asia Oil & Gas. 
 Overall, the robustness checks suggest that my conclusions from previous analyses 
hold irrespective of whether a) I use absolute downside risk measures such as semi-standard 
deviation, lower partial moments and worst losses, or use total absolute risk measures such as 
standard deviation of returns b) I use an all industry benchmark such as MSCI world, or 
directly compare relative investment risks between renewable and conventional energy 
indexes, and c) I use traditional tracking errors to compute relative investment risks or use my 
modified downside tracking error to compute these risks. 
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Table 16: Tracking Error and Downside Tracking Error Regressions relative to MSCI World 
  Absolute Risk Relative Risk  
ID Energy Indexes Ann. Semi-Std. Dev. Ann. LPM Min. TE TE Down 
TE - TE 
Down Wilcoxon TE - TE lowest Wilcoxon 
TE Down - TE 
Down lowest Wilcoxon 
Panel A: Global     C1 AGAE Composite 0.441 0.374 -0.490 0.068 0.061 0.007 0.195 0.030 4.04*** 0.023 3.04*** 
C2 AGAE Extra Liquid 0.452 0.386 -0.512 0.066 0.063 0.003 0.328 0.028 3.90*** 0.025 2.74*** 
C5 AGAE Solar 0.651 0.530 -0.548 0.106 0.102 0.004 0.090 0.069 7.26*** 0.065 5.47*** 
C6 Daxglobal Alternative 0.329 0.265 -0.313 0.050 0.047 0.003 0.484 0.012 2.94*** 0.009 2.51** 
C7 World Renewable Energy 0.455 0.373 -0.477 0.083 0.083 0.000 0.369 0.045 7.11*** 0.045 4.91*** 
C8 S&P Global Alternative Energy 0.336 0.296 -0.360 0.037 0.038 0.000 0.093 Lowest Lowest 
C10 HFRX Alternative Energy 0.469 0.410 -0.510 0.056 0.059 -0.002 0.431 0.019 2.55** 0.021 1.40
C12 S&P Global Clean Energy 0.445 0.364 -0.392 0.051 0.048 0.002 0.464   0.013 2.42** 0.011 1.25  
D1 MSCI World Oil & Gas 0.215 0.171 -0.158 0.039 0.041 -0.002 0.424 0.010 3.75*** 0.011 2.85*** 
D2 FTSE World Oil & Gas 0.217 0.173 -0.175 0.039 0.041 -0.002 0.682 0.010 3.80*** 0.011 3.29*** 
D3 TR Global Oil & Gas 0.214 0.170 -0.176 0.036 0.038 -0.001 0.652 0.008 3.16*** 0.008 2.72*** 
D4 DJ Titans Oil & Gas 30 0.227 0.181 -0.191 0.039 0.041 -0.002 0.403 0.010 3.98*** 0.011 3.13*** 
D5 MSCI World Metals & Mining 0.339 0.299 -0.387 0.052 0.058 -0.006 1.019 0.023 5.67*** 0.028 4.54*** 
D12 Daxglobal Coal 0.410 0.350 -0.440 0.086 0.087 -0.001 0.236 0.057 7.79*** 0.057 5.27*** 
D13 Daxglobal Nuclear 0.282 0.221 -0.226 0.064 0.058 0.006 0.694 0.035 5.41*** 0.028 3.54*** 
D17 HFRX EH: Energy 0.156 0.138 -0.177 0.029 0.030 -0.001 0.038 Lowest Lowest 
Panel B: Europe 
C4 AGAE Europe 0.494 0.417 -0.519 0.068 0.062 0.006 0.609 Lowest Lowest 
C13 European Renewable Energy 0.496 0.430 -0.525 0.075 0.077 -0.002 0.650   0.007 0.67  0.015 1.56  
D10 EURO STOXX Oil & Gas 0.201 0.159 -0.162 0.041 0.041 0.000 0.424 0.000 0.24 -0.001 0.02
D11 DJ Europe Oil & Gas 0.240 0.192 -0.212 0.041 0.042 -0.001 0.169 Lowest Lowest 
Panel C: North America 
C3 AGAE North America 0.436 0.363 -0.396 0.080 0.070 0.010 0.194 0.048 5.72*** 0.040 4.15*** 
C11 NASDAQ Clean Edge US Liq. 0.218 0.191 -0.219 0.032 0.030 0.001 0.141 Lowest Lowest 
C14 Wilderhill New Energy Global Inn. 0.363 0.313 -0.431 0.041 0.041 0.000 0.191   0.009 3.15*** 0.011 1.96* 
D6 S&P 500 Oil & Gas 0.210 0.168 -0.159 0.042 0.043 -0.001 0.146 Lowest Lowest 
D7 DJ US Int. Oil & Gas 0.188 0.149 -0.135 0.042 0.043 -0.001 0.246 0.001 0.11 0.000 0.23
D8 NYSE Arca Oil 0.233 0.184 -0.189 0.044 0.046 -0.002 0.266 0.003 0.65 0.003 0.57
D9 DJ US Coal 0.533 0.433 -0.466 0.113 0.116 -0.003 0.399 0.071 8.66*** 0.073 6.15*** 
D18 NASDAQ/SIG Oil 0.368 0.297 -0.296 0.070 0.074 -0.005 0.277 0.028 3.35*** 0.031 2.42** 
Panel D: Asia 
C9 S&P Asia Alternative Energy 0.407 0.329 -0.295 0.082 0.083 -0.001 0.698   NA   NA 
D14 Daxglobal Asia Oil & Gas 0.252 0.212 -0.251 0.067 0.054 0.013 0.715 0.006 0.29 Lowest 
D15 DJGL Asia Int. Oil & Gas 0.335 0.261 -0.287 0.087 0.080 0.007 0.693 0.026 3.41*** 0.026 2.68*** 
D16 DJGL Asia Oil & Gas 0.315 0.270 -0.367 0.061 0.061 0.000 0.865 Lowest 0.007 0.06
Notes: In this table, I report absolute and relative risk measures between my combined sample of 32 energy indexes relative to MSCI World all-industry equity index. In particular, I compute three absolute risk measures, annualised 
semi-standard deviations, lower partial moments and minimum returns. Relative risk measures include tracking error and downside tracking error volatilities. Columns 3 to 5 list absolute risk measures. Columns 6 to 8 report relative risk 
measures including the exact difference between tracking error and downside tracking error estimates relative to MSCI world index. I compute tracking errors and downside tracking errors according to equations 10 to 12. Using 
Wilcoxon nonparametric rank-sum test, I compute statistical significances for the difference in medians between tracking error and downside tracking error estimates in column 9. Column 10 reports the difference between the lowest 
tracking error estimate and energy indexes that are from the same region and energy type. For example, Panel A lists global energy indexes of which 8 are renewable energy indexes. After identifying the global renewable energy index 
with the lowest tracking error in that group, I compute the difference between the lowest tracking error with the 7 others belonging to the same group. Column 9 reports Wilcoxon nonparametric rank-sum test for statistical differences 
between the lowest tracking errors and reported tracking errors. I repeat this process for downside tracking errors and report the difference between the lowest downside tracking errors and their significance in the last two columns of 
this table. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
This study investigates absolute and relative risk relations between renewable and non-
renewable energy equity indexes. Using return data on fourteen international renewable 
energy indexes from 2000 to 2013 and eighteen conventional energy indexes over the same 
time period, I find strong positive correlations between their returns, indicating similarities in 
their underlying return generating processes. Despite strong associations between the returns 
of renewable and traditional energy equity indexes such as fossil-fuel generated companies, I 
find return volatilities to be substantially higher for 70 percent of my sampled renewable 
energy indexes relative to my benchmarked conventional energy indexes. 
 By introducing a novel approach to assess relative downside return volatilities that 
account for investors' asymmetric risk appetites (i.e. risk-averse investors), namely the 
downside tracking error, I capture the real risk exposure that matters to risk-averse investors. 
Using the modified tracking error for downside residual return volatilities, my empirical 
analysis suggests that the majority of renewable energy indexes experience higher downside 
tracking errors relative to their conventional energy benchmarks. 
 My empirical analysis leads to the conclusion that major international renewable 
energy indexes carry higher absolute, downside and relative investment risks compared to a 
large sample of conventional fossil-fuelled energy indexes. This conclusion turns out to be 
robust, since it holds across different risk specifications and alternative non-energy industry 
benchmarks. My conclusion is generally consistent with findings from the renewable energy 
literature that return volatilities of renewable energy indexes tend to be high (Henriques and 
Sadorsky, 2008; Kumar et al., 2012; Sadorsky, 2012a, b). The high return volatilities are a 
result of high uncertainties regarding the nature of renewable technology businesses and 
future prospects of the renewable energy industry in several respects. First, renewable tech 
companies tend to be small and technology-oriented businesses with a selected focus on few 
projects. Private sector investors perceive companies with only a few projects, whose 
outcome is unknown, as risky. Second, the renewable energy sector is very capital intensive. 
Due to the capital intensity of renewable energy projects, the government has substantially 
supported the sector by policy investments in the past, which was especially the case in the 
solar industry. One of the major risks of policy investing is the duration of financial support, 
which if discontinued (for example due to a recession) can produce devastating effects to a 
sector, as seen by the recent wave of bankruptcies in the German solar industry (Bohl et al., 
2013). Furthermore, the weak carbon price does not contribute to the growth of the renewable 
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energy sector. My empirical findings also show that several more specialised or 
"concentrated" renewable energy indexes have substantially lower tracking error volatilities. 
These indexes are specialised in specific sub-segments of renewable energy technologies 
such as biofuels or advanced batteries. Further, direct comparisons between more traditional 
measures of relative risk and my alternative approach indicate that the former are well suited 
to explain the risk behaviour of renewable energy equity indexes as the results obtained from 
tracking error are generally in line with results from the downside tracking error. A formal 
non-parametric significance test between these two risk measures shows that the difference is 
tiny and not statistically significant. As the difference between the traditional tracking error 
and the downside tracking error is not significantly significant, the two risk proxies lead to 
the same result. Meaning that the traditional tracking errors sufficiently explain the risk 
relationship between renewable and conventional energy equity indexes. 
 My results may be useful to policymakers and investors as they seek to understand 
differences in the assessment and perception of risk in international renewable energy equity 
indexes. This is increasingly relevant as renewables make up larger and larger parts of total 
energy and power capacity. For policymakers, an investigation of these risks can help to 
shape future financial support in RD&D activities. In order to increase the participation of 
private sector investors, understanding perceived risks in renewable energy investments is of 
great importance. Particularly, to reduce investment risks in renewable energy to cater for 
more risk-averse private sector investors such as large institutional funds. Innovative products 
such as fixed-income renewable energy funds or green bonds have the potential to achieve 
this goal. I hope my findings will be useful for future research to increase the understanding 
of risk in renewable energy equity indexes.  
 My findings are, however, limited due to the following restrictions. First, my risk 
findings apply to equity investments in renewable energy and in particular to equity indexes 
only. More recently, the renewable energy sector has seen growing demand for green bonds 
and fixed income products, which could substantially reduce uncertainties and risks in the 
sector. Second, my results largely apply to renewable energy equity indexes in developed 
countries only. Renewable energy equity and bond markets in emerging economies are 
growing at enormous speeds. So far, data limitations on individual firms or indexes have 
made comparisons rather difficult. Further research should look at the drivers of risk in 
renewable energy equity indexes in relation to traditional energy equity indexes. Also, to 
advance the development of more appropriate risk measures to evaluate renewable energy 
investments.  
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Abstract 
This chapter empirically investigates the effects of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) 
disclosure quality on the expected cost of equity as well as the cost of debt. To investigate these 
effects, my analysis is based on a large sample of US S&P 500 companies over the sample period 
from 2004 to 2014. Using several alternative approaches to compute the expected cost of equity and 
debt (based on Graham and Harvey's expected market premium and inferred from several asset 
pricing models), my results show a negative and statistically significant association between ESG 
disclosure quality and my expected cost of equity and debt variables, while also controlling for 
company- and debt-specific characteristics. My results suggest that companies with high ESG 
disclosure quality have lower expected cost of equities and debt, everything else equal. Accordingly, 
my findings of the relation between ESG disclosure quality and the expected cost of equity and debt 
imply that the market prices a company's ESG disclosure quality along with other factors. My results 
are robust over time and alternative regression specifications. 
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7.1  Introduction 
This chapter empirically investigates the effects of Environmental, Social, and Governance 
(ESG) disclosure quality on the cost of equity and debt capital on a large sample of US S&P 
500 companies from 2004 to 2014. Over the last decade, corporate disclosures of 
environmental, social, and governance activities have substantially increased. According to 
KPMG's annual survey on corporate disclosures of ESG activities of the world's largest 
companies, the rate of disclosure has risen from 64 percent in 2005 to 93 percent in 2013 
(KPMG, 2005; 2013)92. Since then many North American companies have committed to 
make ESG disclosures, and have now overtaken leading European companies in this type of 
disclosure (KPMG, 2013).  
The rapid increase of corporate ESG disclosures raises the question: What are the motives 
behind companies' ESG disclosure?  
 The reasons for companies to disclose on their ESG activities vary, but the following 
three motives could potentially answer the question. First, corporations are under constant 
scrutiny now more than ever due to a series of recent corporate scandals that have adversely 
impacted society and the economy's stability. Companies who are trying to re-build that trust 
and to increase their reputation could have the incentive to increase disclosure on 
environmental, social, and governance issues. Some scholars (see e.g. Brammer and Pavelin, 
2006; Lii and Lee, 2012) have argued that poorly managed ESG risks have shown to impact a 
company's reputation and sales. For instance, British Petroleum (BP) has been struggling for 
several years and have invested more than 90 billion US dollars in environmental liabilities to 
strengthen its reputation after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
(Chazan and Crooks, 2013; Gordon, 2013). Second, the rise in ESG disclosure could also be 
driven by large institutional investors such as pension and investment funds who have called 
on companies to provide more transparency with regard to their environmental, social, and 
governance activities to be able to incorporate such information into their investment 
decision-making processes (PRI, 2014). Finally, the rapid growth of socially responsible 
investments in the US and globally could have triggered increased corporate disclosure on 
ESG activities. According to the US Social Investment Forum (USSIF, 2014), from 1995 to 
2014, assets under management using socially responsible investment strategies in the US 
have grown from $639 billion to $6,570 billion. 
                                                 
92 The rate of disclosure is defined as the quality of CR (Corporate Responsibility) Reporting measured against 
seven key criteria, which are based on current reporting guidelines including: 1) Strategy, risk and opportunity, 
2) Materiality, 3) Targets and indicators, 4) Suppliers and the value chain, 5) Stakeholder engagement, 6) 
Governance of CR (Corporate Responsibility), and 7) Transparency and balance (See KPMG, 2005; 2013). 
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 Thus, in this chapter, I empirically investigate whether a reduction in companies' cost 
of capital explains the rise in ESG disclosure quality. I focus on the cost of equity and cost of 
debt because they represent the two main sources of a company's financing as well as play a 
pivotal role in a company's financing decision making. In addition, corporate executives feel 
that voluntarily increasing information to investors can reduce their companie's cost of capital 
(Armitage and Marston, 2008). Also, there is a long-established interest in the academic 
community in the relation between ESG disclosure and the cost of capital (Clarkson et al., 
2013; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Plumlee, 2008; 2010). 
 Based on Heinkel et al.'s (2001) and Merton's (1987) theoretical framework, and 
consistent with the Efficient Market Theory (which I discuss in Chapter 2 'Theory: The 
Efficient Market Theory'), I hypothesise that companies with high Environmental, Social, and 
Governance (ESG) disclosure quality have lower expected cost of equity and debt, everything 
else being equal. The theoretical mechanisms through which ESG disclosure quality could 
affect the expected cost of equity and debt are the depth's of a companies investor base, 
reductions in companies' beta or systematic risk, and future litigation and reputational risks 
(Lambert et al., 2007; Merton, 1987). I will explain the three mechanisms in more detail in 
Chapter 7.2.1. 'ESG Disclosure and the cost of capital', as well as why ESG disclosure quality 
could be "priced" in the cost of capital (See Chapter 7.2.1.4. 'ESG Disclosure and 
Diversification'). 
 To empirically test whether ESG disclosure quality is related to a company's expected 
cost of equity and debt capital, I use a large sample of US companies based on the historical 
constituents of the S&P 500 index. My empirical analysis shows that ESG disclosure quality 
is negatively associated with all of my expected cost of equity and cost of debt variables, 
controlling for company-and bond-specific characteristics. My results are generally 
statistically significant at the 1 and 5 percent significance level and consistent across 
alternative proxies for the expected cost of equity (based on Graham and Harvey's, 2015 
expected market premium and inferred from three different asset pricing models including 
CAPM, Fama/French, and Carhart using daily, weekly, and monthly data frequencies) and 
different regression specifications. My results are consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 2, which 
predict that companies with high ESG disclosure quality have lower expected cost of equities 
and cost of debt, everything else equal. Additional robustness tests for temporal consistency 
and stepwise regressions support my prior findings. On the cost of equity side, my findings 
are in line with Dhaliwal et al. (2011), El Ghoul et al. (2011) and Sharfman and Fernando 
(2008). They all report that some form of ESG activities such as the initiation of standalone 
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ESG disclosures, environmental management, or human rights reduce a company's cost of 
equity. On the cost of debt side, my findings tend to be generally in line with Bauer and Hann 
(2010) and Oikonomou et al. (2014), who find several ESG dimensions such as corporate 
environmental management, community strengths, and product safety and quality strengths to 
reduce the cost of debt.  
 To the best of my knowledge, my chapter is the first to investigate both, the effects of 
the cost of equity and debt capital on a novel ESG disclosure quality variable. I contribute to 
the existing literature by extending the research on voluntary ESG disclosure. To date, no 
study has investigated the effects of ESG disclosure quality on the cost of debt. Further, the 
literature on ESG disclosure focuses predominantly on self-constructed ESG disclosure 
variables that indicate whether or not companies disclose standalone ESG reports. In contrast, 
my ESG disclosure variable is a novel indicator that measures the extent (or the quality) to 
which companies report on specific ESG information. Furthermore, I contribute to the 
existing literature by using alternative approaches to compute the cost of equity as well as the 
cost of debt capital. The existing literature on ESG disclosure focuses primarily on the 
implied cost of equity. In contrast, my expected cost of equity is based on Graham and 
Harvey's survey data of the expected market premium (Graham and Harvey, 2015). My 
chapter aims to increase the reliability and validity of previous studies investigating the 
relevance of ESG disclosure for equity and debt investors. 
 My chapter is closely related, but differs from the studies of Sharfman and Fernando 
(2008), Dhaliwal et al. (2011), El Ghoul et al. (2011), Bauer and Hann (2010), and 
Oikonomou et al. (2014). Sharfman and Fernando (2008) and Bauer and Hann (2010) 
investigate the impact of environmental risk management on the realised cost of equity 
capital and cost of debt capital, respectively. My chapter investigates a different concept of 
ESG, which is concerned with corporate disclosures of ESG activities.  
 My chapter also differs from Dhaliwal et al. (2011), who examine the impact of self-
constructed standalone ESG disclosures on the implied cost of equity. In my chapter, I use a 
ESG disclosure variable that is different from Dhaliwal's et al. (2011) self-constructed ESG 
disclosure variable. I use a proxy that measures the accuracy (or quality) to which companies 
disclose environmental, social, and governance information, while Dhaliwal et al. (2011) use 
a dichotomous variable that indicates whether or not companies publish ESG reports.      
 My chapter also differs from El Ghoul et al. (2011), who examine the impacts of 
several dimensions of ESG activities on the implied cost of equity. My chapter investigates 
the effects of ESG disclosure on both, the cost of equity and cost of debt financing separately. 
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 Methodologically, my chapter differs from Sharfman and Fernando (2008), Dhaliwal 
et al. (2011), and El Ghoul et al. (2011) by employing an alternative method to obtain the cost 
of equity capital. My approach to compute the cost of equity is based on Graham and 
Harvey's (2015) expected market premium which is obtained by the author's quarterly survey 
of US Chief Financial Officers from S&P 500 companies and inferred from three alternative 
asset pricing models including CAPM, Fama and French, and Carhart models. My approach 
overcomes the well-known problem of excluding companies with negative earnings per share 
(EPS) forecasts in the computation of implied cost of equities that could potentially result in a 
substantial loss of sample size. My measure also overcomes another documented bias in the 
computation of the implied cost of equity, namely, the analyst forecast optimism bias (El 
Ghoul et al., 2011).   
 Finally, my chapter differs from Oikonomou et al. (2014), who test the effects of 
several ESG dimensions on the corporate spreads of bonds, i.e. cost of debt. In my chapter, I 
use a different and novel proxy for the cost of debt. My proxy uses corporate spreads of 
bonds adjusted for a company's credit rating, while Oikonomou et al. (2014) use the former 
without adjustments for a company's credit ratings.   
 In sum, my chapter contributes to the existing literature by complementing and 
extending the works of Sharfman and Fernando (2008), Dhaliwal et al. (2011), El Ghoul et al. 
(2011), Bauer and Hann (2010), and Oikonomou et al. (2014). 
 My chapter is organised as follows. Chapter 7.2. 'Literature Review and Hypotheses', 
provides a literature review and theoretical motivation on the potential effects of ESG criteria 
(more generally) and ESG disclosure (more specifically) on the cost of equity and cost of 
debt capital. The literature review leads to the development of my hypotheses. In Chapter 7.3. 
'Research Design', I discuss my research design, including sample and methodology. Chapter 
7.4. 'Empirical Results', provide empirical evidence on the effects of ESG disclosure quality 
on the expected cost of equity and debt. Chapter 7.5. concludes. 
7.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
To locate where my chapter fits in with the existing literature, I examine previous work on 
the effects of companies' ESG disclosure activities and the cost of capital. Furthermore, my 
aim is to discuss theoretical arguments that could motivate a negative relation between the 
cost of capital and ESG disclosure, all else being equal.  
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7.2.1 ESG Disclosure and the cost of capital 
Prior research on the relation between corporate disclosures of ESG activities and the cost of 
capital focuses on self-constructed ESG disclosure variables and the implied cost of equity 
capital (See e.g. Chava, 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Plumlee et al., 
2010). The consensus appears to be a negative relationship between ESG disclosure and the 
cost of equity capital. Surprisingly, only very few studies investigate such effects on the cost 
of debt (Bauer and Hann, 2010; Oikonomou et al., 2014). However, the few studies that do, 
also report a negative relationship between companies' ESG activities and the cost of debt.  
 For example, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) empirically show that companies enjoy lower cost 
of equities after the initiation of increased ESG disclosure. Their findings are based on a large 
sample of 1,300 US companies, on average, and over the sample period from 1993 to 2007. 
In line with Dhaliwal et al.'s (2011) findings, El Ghoul et al. (2014) also report a negative 
relation between a company's environmental performance and the implied cost of equity for 
global manufacturing companies and high polluting sectors in the US. 
 Although the available evidence on the relationship between a company's ESG 
activities and the cost of debt is rather scarce, the empirical evidence is similar to prior 
findings related to the cost of equity. While Oikonomou et al. (2014) empirically establish 
that several dimensions of ESG concerns are negatively related to the cost of debt, Bauer and 
Hann (2010) corroborate these findings by focussing on one sub-dimensions of ESG, namely 
corporate environmental practices and its potential effects on a company's cost of debt 
capital. More specifically, using environmental management strengths and weaknesses, Bauer 
and Hann (2010) show that companies with better corporate environmental management 
enjoy lower cost of debt financing relative to companies with environmental concerns. 
Oikonomou et al. (2014) extend the analysis to a comprehensive list of several ESG 
dimensions and report that several fine-grained ESG themes such as sustainable community, 
employment, environment, and product safety and quality initiatives are negatively related to 
the cost of debt. In contrast, ESG controversies related to community and employment tend to 
increase the cost of debt (Oikonomou et al., 2014).  
 In the following chapter, my aim is to discuss theoretical arguments that could 
motivate a negative relation between the cost of capital and ESG disclosure, all else being 
equal. Drawing from Merton's (1987) model of market equilibrium with incomplete 
information, my theoretical arguments are related to the depths of a companies' investor base, 
180 
reductions in companies' beta (systematic risk), and reductions in companies' future litigation 
and reputational risks. 
7.2.1.1 Depth of Companies' investor base 
According to the Efficient Market Theory, when companies immediately materialise on 
profitable investment strategies they rapidly eliminate market abnormalities and 
inefficiencies93 (Fama, 1970; Jensen, 1968). This mechanism only works under the perfect 
market assumption that companies can immediately raise sufficient capital to trade on 
profitable investment strategies (Merton, 1987). However, as Merton (1987) and others (see 
e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) highlight, "the dealer business is neither costless nor 
instantaneous" (Merton, 1987:485). Investment professionals have to follow regulatory 
capital requirements that could restrict the pursuit of every profitable investment strategy 
(Merton, 1987). Similarly, the assumption that any type of publicly available information will 
reach all investors immediately and that investors act on it instantly, may be somewhat 
simple (Merton, 1987:484).94  
 As a result, Merton (1987) developed a capital market equilibrium model with 
incomplete information by departing from the complete and instantaneous information 
assumptions. The key assumption in Merton's theoretical framework is that "an investor uses 
security k in constructing his optimal portfolio only if the investor knows about security k" 
(Merton, 1987:488). He argues that the information exchange between firm k and the investor 
only occurs after considerable "set-up" costs95 have been incurred. If investors have to pay 
considerable set-up costs for any company they wish to follow, then they will likely only 
follow a subset of all traded companies in the market (Merton, 1987).  
 With respect to a company's cost of capital, this implies that according to Merton's 
(1987) capital market equilibrium model with incomplete information, companies have an 
incentive to disclose more information as this increases investors' awarness of a company's 
existence and expands the investor base, which will reduce the firm's cost of capital and 
increase the market value of the company (Merton, 1987). In other words, to increase the 
depth of a company's investor base (and thereby reduce the cost of capital), management is 
                                                 
93 For example, through arbitrage. 
94 For example, while some information such as companies' earnings or dividend announcements could be 
readily analysed by investors, other information such as published empirical discoveries (including the size 
anomaly) could take some time to be properly assessed by investors (Merton, 1987). 
95 Set-up costs are fixed costs incurred by the investor for setting up a company's information exchange (Merton, 
1987). If an investor has to pay a significant set-up cost for each company, then any investor will likely only 
follow a subset of all traded companies (Merton, 1987).  
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encouraged to disclose more information to attract new investors who are not currently 
shareholders to incur the set-up costs that allow for a seamless information exchange between 
the investor and security k 96 (Merton, 1987). 
7.2.1.2 Reductions in companies' beta 
Another mechanism through which corporate disclosures on ESG activities could affect the 
cost of capital is beta or systematic risk (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Within a framework consitent 
with a traditional model of market equilibrium, i.e. capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
Lambert et al. (2007) investigate how better information disclosure quality or more precise 
firm-specific disclosures influence the cost of capital. Lambert et al. (2007) show that not 
only does better disclosure lower the variance of a copmany's cash flows, it also affects the 
covariances with other companies, which brings a company's cost of capital closer to the risk-
free rate. According to Lambert et al.'s (2007) theoretical framework, these effects are 
nondiversifiable (systematic): "Moreover, this effect is not diversifiable because it is present 
for each of the firm's covariance terms and hence does not disappear in large economies." 
(Lambert et al., 2007:387). Lambert et al.'s (2007) study provides theoretical guidance for 
empirical assessments on the relationship between corporate disclosures of financial and non-
financial activities and the cost of capital.   
7.2.1.3 Future Litigation and Reputational Risks 
Lastly, prior work suggests that socially irresponsible companies 97 are perceived as riskier 
investments because of potential future litigation and reputational risks (Bauer and Hann, 
2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Starks, 2009).98 Brammer and Pavelin 
(2004) argue that ethically and socially unsound companies could face unexpected future 
claims based on companies' non-compliant behaviour. To give one example, if a company 
provides deliberately misleading information on their products and services, then this will 
increase the likelihood of future lawsuits against the company. Bankers Trust was involved in 
a controversy whereby employees of the bank had repeatedly misled customers with false 
valuations of their derivative contracts (Forbes, 1996). As a result, Procter and Gamble and 
                                                 
96 As mentioned in the previous section, security k refers to any security that an investor could consider when 
constructing his optimal portfolio, only when he knows about a security (Merton, 1987). 
97 Irresponsible companies are defined as companies pursuing irresponsible activities with negative 
environmental and social impacts and externalities for stakeholders (Heal, 2005).  
98 Such as idiosyncratic business risks, which include risks such as lawsuits, strikes, brand and reputation loss, 
and consumer boycotts (Lee and Faff, 2009). 
182 
other former clients of the bank started a lawsuit against the bank, which cost the bank tens of 
millions of dollars in settlements (Forbes, 1996). 99   
 Companies that behave irresponsibly by violating environmental, social, or 
governance standards will likely be subject to fines, penalties, government sanctions and 
other associated litigation costs (Bauer and Hann, 2010; Oikonomou et al., 2014). These 
negative events could then manifest itself in higher cost of capital financing. As an 
illustration, Oikonomou et al. (2014) point out the increase of BP's bond yield spreads and 
downgrade of BP's credit rating from AA to BBB, immediately after the 2010 Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.  
 Furthermore, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) provide evidence that "sin" companies' 
products 100 are more likely to be associated with increased litigation risks. "For example, 
tobacco companies faced substantial litigation risk until their settlement with state 
governments in 1997" (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009:17). Similarly, Brammer and Pavelin 
(2004) argue that companies in the alcohol sector face increased litigation risks because they 
are associated with visible social issues such as crime and health related issues. 
7.2.1.4 ESG Disclosure and Diversification 
One could argue that these higher risks of low ESG disclosure companies (socially 
irresponsible companies) could be diversified away in a broad investor portfolio and not be 
"priced" in the cost of capital. My following arguments will explain why ESG disclosure 
could be "priced" in the cost of capital. First, as mentioned in Chapter 2.5.1. 'Pricing of ESG 
information', socially responsible investors do not have a preference for investing in 
companies with low ESG disclosures due to differences in tastes for certain assets (Fama and 
French, 2007; Galema et al., 2008; Hamilton et al., 1993; Heinkel et al., 2001). Consistent 
with efficient capital markets, Heinkel et al.'s (2001) capital market equilibrium model, 
shows that when fewer investors are available to hold the shares of irresponsible companies, 
then this will reduce diversification (risk-sharing) and increase companies' cost of capital. 
This means, if low ESG disclosure companies have a smaller investor base due to socially 
                                                 
99 My examination committee pointed out that future litigation costs could harm a company's expected cash 
flows and growth opportunities only when future litigation costs exceed a certain threshold. While this is the 
case for "direct" costs, "indirect" long-term costs due to reputational loss could also lead to substantial financial 
harm (Brammer and Pavelin, 2004). 
100 "Sin" companies are involved in the production of alcohol, tobacco, and gaming products (Hong and 
Kacperczyk, 2009). 
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responsible investors' tastes, then their cost of capital will be higher (Merton, 1987).101 
Second, according to Merton's (1987) equilibrium model "...expected returns seem to depend 
on both market risk and total variance", meaning that not just beta but also idiosyncratic risk 
matters for pricing (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). Ultimately, low ESG disclosure companies 
could have higher cost of capital due to higher non-diversifiable risks.102 Based on the 
beforementioned arguments and discussion, I state my hypotheses as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Companies with high Environmental, Social, and Governance 
(ESG) disclosure quality have lower expected cost of equity. 
Hypothesis 2: Companies with high Environmental, Social, and Governance 
(ESG) disclosure quality have lower expected cost of debt. 
 
In the following chapter, I will continue to describe the more technical details of my chapter 
including my empirical models to test the above hypotheses. 
7.3 Research Design 
7.3.1 Sample Selection 
To empirically examine the relevance of ESG disclosure quality for the cost of capital, I 
require a representative sample of large, liquid, and publicly traded companies that have 
continous access to capital markets for precise cost of capital estimates. Also, I require 
companies to be transparent with respect to their coverage on several dimensions of the ESG 
disclosure spectrum. Based on these criteria, I choose the S&P 500 (Standard and Poor's), as 
it represents all major, large and publicly traded companies in the United States. Samples 
based on the S&P 500 have been used in related studies in this field before (See e.g. Bauer 
and Hann, 2010; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; Oikonomou et al., 2014). 
7.3.2 ESG Disclosure 
Bloomberg is the database for my ESG disclosure data. Bloomberg is originally known to 
provide a wide range of financial data services via its terminals. Since 2009, the company has 
dedicated resources to extend their data sources beyond accounting and market-based 
                                                 
101 This, of course, depends on the amount of funds controlled by socially responsible investors (Heinkel et al., 
2001). 
102 All in all, whether ESG disclosure quality has an effect on the expected cost of capital and is relevant for 
equity and debt investors is an empirical question, which my chapter aims to address. 
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financial information and now also offers a wide range of non-financial information such as 
environmental, social, and governance information (Ediger, 2013). ESG disclosure is one of 
the newer non-financial data sources that Bloomberg offers to its subscribers. Information on 
ESG disclosure is collected by Bloomberg analysts based on companies' annual reports, 
standalone environmental, social, and governance reports, CSR reports, sustainability reports, 
and corporate websites (Ediger, 2013). Companies' ESG information that contributes to ESG 
disclosure include companies' performance on climate risks, carbon emissions, energy 
efficiency and intensity, community programmes, health and safety policies, waste creation, 
water consumption, recycling, and many more (see Bloomberg Fundamentals ESG). 
The more accurate a company discloses on any of Bloomberg's ESG data variables, the better 
a company's ESG disclosure quality. Bloomberg's ESG disclosure variable is updated 
regularly, but generally available on an annual basis at the end of each calendar year. A firm's 
ESG disclosure can vary from '0' to '100' percent in any given year. '0' indicates very poor 
ESG disclosure quality and practices, whereas '100' would indicate very strong ESG 
disclosure quality and practices. 
 The main advantage of using Bloomberg's ESG disclosure variable over self-
constructed ESG disclosure variables, are that of comparability and standardisation across 
companies. While previous research on ESG disclosure has relied on self-constructed ESG 
disclosure variables (see e.g. Clarkson et al., 2013; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Plumlee et al., 
2010), I aim to overcome the shortcomings of self-constructing an ESG disclosure variable 
by using Bloomberg's standardised ESG disclosure variable.103 Another advantage of using 
Bloomberg's ESG disclosure variable relative to self-constructed ESG disclosure variables, is 
to increase the reliability and validity of the relationship between ESG disclosure and the cost 
of capital, using an alternative proxy for ESG disclosure quality.   
7.3.3 Dependent Variables 
The following chapter describes my choice of key variables of the cost of capital to 
investigate the relevance of ESG disclosure for debt and equity investors.   
7.3.3.1 Expected Cost of Equity 
I use four key variables to capture the expected cost of equity to empirically test the relevance 
of ESG disclosure for equity investors: Bloomberg's cost of equity, cost of equity based on 
                                                 
103 As there is currently no regulation on voluntary ESG disclosure, companies tend to report their data in 
different formats, which could introduce a bias when self-constructing ESG disclosure variables.  
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the capital asset pricing model, cost of equity based on Fama and French's three-factor model, 
and cost of equity based on Carhart's four-factor model. To compute all alternative versions 
of the cost of equity, I obtain data from Bloomberg, Graham and Harvey's survey data on the 
Equity Risk Premium104, Kenneth French's Data Library105, and Thomson Reuters 
Datastream.  My first dependent variable is based on Bloomberg's cost of equity. 
Bloomberg's cost of equity in a given year equals the risk-free rate plus the company's beta 
coefficient multiplied by the expected equity market premium. Bloomberg estimates a 
company's beta coefficient using the capital asset pricing model (See e.g. Equation 4 in 
Chapter 3.6.3.2. 'Regression Analysis') based on weekly observations over the previous two 
years. My remaining dependent variables are based on my own computations and represent 
alternative versions of the expected cost of equity and differ somewhat from Bloomberg's 
cost of equity.  
 My second dependent variable is the expected cost of equity based on Graham and 
Harvey's annual surveys on the expected market premium. The expected cost of equity equals 
the risk-free rate plus a company's beta coefficient multiplied by the expected equity market 
premium which I obtain from Graham and Harvey's annual surveys on the expected equity 
risk premium based on survey data of US Chief Financial Officers from S&P 500 companies. 
Using survey data of expected equity risk premia is similar to using analyst earnings per 
share forecasts (EPS) commonly used to compute implied cost of equities (See e.g. Dhaliwal 
et al., 2011, 2012; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Plumlee et al., 2010). I infer a company's beta 
coefficient by estimating the capital asset pricing model based on daily, weekly, and monthly 
observations using Equation 4 in Chapter 3.6.3.2. 'Regression Analysis'). I use daily, weekly, 
and monthly data frequencies to increase the robustness of my estimations as well as to avoid 
known biases such as the trading frequency bias with short-interval data (See e.g. Dimson, 
1979; Roll, 1981; Scholes and Williams, 1977).    
 My third dependent variable expands the second dependent variable and adds a 
company's size coefficient multiplied by the size premium as well as a value coefficient 
multiplied by the value premium. I infer the additional size and value coefficients using Fama 
and French's three factor model (See e.g. Equation 5 in Chapter 3.6.3.2. 'Regression 
Analysis').  
                                                 
104 Graham and Harvey (2015) conduct and publish quarterly surveys of US Chief Financial Officers from S&P 
500 companies to obtain the expected risk premium. Graham and Harvey's (2015) survey data on the expected 
equity risk premium goes back to 1996 and is available online on SSRN and the following website: 
http://www.cfosurvey.org/past-results-2015.html). 
105 Kenneth French's Data Library is available online: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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 My fourth dependent variable expands the third dependent variable once more and 
adds a company's momentum coefficient multiplied by the momentum premium. I infer the 
additional momentum coefficient using Carhart's four factor model (See e.g. Equation 6 in 
Chapter 3.6.3.2. 'Regression Analysis'). I re-estimate and calculate each of my dependent 
variables using daily, weekly, and monthly data frequencies. Overall, I produce nine expected 
cost of equities inferred from three asset pricing models including CAPM, Fama and French, 
and Carhart (See Equations 4 to 6 in Chapter 3.6.3.2. 'Regression Analysis'). 
 My expected cost of equity models relative to implied cost of equity models require 
fewer assumptions about earnings forecasts. Even the simplest implied cost of equity model 
(see e.g. Easton's, 2004 implied cost of equity based on the Price-Earnings-Growth Ratio) 
requires at least two year ahead positive earnings forecasts (El Ghoul et al., 2011). In 
addition, companies require positive actual earnings per share figures. Companies with 
negative earnings forecasts will be either excluded from the sample or "replaced by the value 
implied by a 6% return on assets" (El Ghoul et al., 2011:2402). Excluding companies with 
negative earnings forecasts considerably reduces the sample size and representativeness of 
the sample. Thus, to overcome the shortcomings of the implied cost of equity model by 
shortening my sample size due to companies' negative earnings forecasts, I use Graham and 
Harvey's survey data on the expected equity risk premium to infer my expected cost of 
equities. This ensures that my initial sample size stays intact. 
 A second shortcoming of the implied cost of equity approach is a common bias called 
the analyst's forecast optimism bias. It is common among analysts to provide overly 
optimistic company earnings forecasts, which could introduce a bias in the implied cost of 
equity estimate (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Kothari, 2001). Controlling for this bias is not always 
straigthforward. Thus, my approach to compute the expected cost of equity based on Graham 
and Harvey's survey data on the expected equity risk premium is a more conservative 
approach.  
7.3.3.2 Cost of Debt 
I use one key variable to capture the cost of debt to test the relevance of ESG disclosure for 
debt investors: corporate yield spreads. The corporate yield spread of a certain bond class 
represents the average yield spread between corporate bonds and government bonds. 
Bloomberg computes a 'debt adjustment factor' which reflects a company's credit rating in the 
calculation of the cost of debt. I collect the cost of debt variable directly from Bloomberg. 
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Bloomberg's cost of debt variable is available on an annual basis at the end of each calendar 
year. 
7.3.4 Control Variables 
In my empirical analysis, I include a number of independent variables in my regression 
models, inspired by the existing literature related to the determinants of the cost of equity and 
the cost of debt (See e.g. Bradley and Chen, 2015; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 
2011; Oikonomou et al. 2014; Harjoto and Jo, 2014; Bauer and Hann, 2010). I distinguish the 
included independent variables as controls for cost of equity firm characteristics and cost of 
debt bond characteristics.  
7.3.4.1 Cost of Equity Firm Characteristics 
The first set of control variables are cost of equity firm characteristics, which I obtain from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream.  
 Size measures company size and is defined as the natural logarithm of companies' 
total assets. As larger companies tend to have lower operating and financial risks they could 
enjoy reduced cost of equity valuations (Harjoto and Jo, 2014; Oikonomou et al., 2014). 
Leverage is the financial leverage of a company and is defined as the ratio of total liabilities 
to total assets. Companies with higher leverage and debt levels are associated with increasing 
risk of default. Thus, highly leveraged companies tend to have increased cost of equity 
capitals (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Fama and French, 1992). Market-to-
Book is the ratio of a company's market value relative to its book value and is defined as the 
ratio of a company's total assets minus common shareholder's equity plus the company's 
market value divided by total assets. The Market-to-Book ratio is an additional indicator of 
distress (Oikonomou et al., 2014). ROA is the accounting return on assets and is defined as 
the ratio of income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. It appears that 
companies with a weaker profitability position are more eager to increase ESG disclosure 
quality (See e.g. Aerts et al., 2008). Return Volatility represents a company's stock return 
volatility and is defined as the natural logarithm of the annualised standard deviation. I 
compute the annualised standard deviation based on daily stock returns for company i for at 
least 100 daily observations per year. Interest Coverage represents the interest coverage ratio 
which is defined as the ratio of operating income before depreciation and amortization over 
total interest expenses. Companies that are better able to serve its debt obligations are seen as 
less risky and therefore tend to have lower cost of equity valuations (Bauer and Hann, 2010). 
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Research and Development (R&D) intensity is a company's  R&D expenditure and is defined 
as the ratio of R&D expenses over total assets. It has been shown that companies investing in 
R&D could be exposed to increasing levels of risk (Oikonomou et al., 2014). Capex equals 
the capital expenditure ratio which describes a company's capital expenses on new or existing 
fixed assets. Capex is the ratio of capital expenditure over total assets. Capital intensity is 
computed as the ratio of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) over total assets. Both, Capex 
and Capital intensity are common proxies for companies' financial risks (Bauer and Hann, 
2010). Meaning that companies with increased capital intensity are perceived as having 
greater financial risks (Bauer and Hann, 2010). Advertising intensity is a company's 
advertising expenditure and defined as the ratio of advertising expenses over total assets. 
Companies with increased advertising intensity (or advertising expenditures) incur higher 
costs and could be therefore seen as riskier (Harjoto and Jo, 2014). Sales Growth represents a 
company's one-year sales growth and is defined as the ratio of the natural logarithm of total 
net sales at time t divided by total net sales at time t-1. A company's improved sales growth 
signals its ability to better cover costs and maintain solvent (Bradley and Chen, 2015). Free 
Cash Flows represent a company's cash flows after accounting for capital expenditures and 
are defined as the ratio of income before extraordianry income minus depreciation over the 
lag of property, plant, and equipment. Cash flow can be understood as a measure of the short-
term liquidity and more importantly the solvency of a company (Oikonomou et al., 2014). 
7.3.4.2 Cost of Debt Bond Characteristics 
The second set of control variables are bond-specific and control for cost of debt bond 
characteristics, which I obtain from Thomson Reuters Datastream.   
 Bond Liquidity represents the amount of debt originally issued. I compute the natural 
logarithm of the amount issued at par value to proxy for bond liquidity. Bond Rating 
represents S&P's historical bond ratings. I convert the original ratings issued by S&P into 
numerical time-series and groups as follows: Bond ratings with AAA are equal to bond group 
7. Bond ratings <= AA+ and >= AA- are equal to bond group 6. Bond ratings <= A+ and >= 
A- are equal to bond group 5. Bond ratings <= BBB+ and >= BBB- are equal bond group 4. 
Bond ratings <= BB+ and >= BB- are equal bond group 3. Bond ratings <= B+ and >= B- are 
equal bond group 2. All other corporate bonds that have been rated CCC+ and below are 
equal to bond group 1. Bond Maturity represent the years to maturity of a company's bonds 
and are defined as the natural logarithm of the number of years the bonds have been issued. 
Bond Duration equals the modified duration of a bond in years and measures a bond's interest 
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rate risk. It is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of years. Bond Convexity 
measures the relation between a bond's price and yield duration. It is defined as the natural 
logarithm of the convexity of a bond. Finally, Subordinated Debt is a dummy variable and 
equals 1 if the bonds of a company are classified as subordinated debt, and 0 otherwise. 
7.3.5 Regression Models 
To empirically analyse the effects of ESG disclosure quality on the expected cost of equity 
and cost of debt, and to test my two hypotheses, I use the following regression models (19) to 
(23): 
i,tE(Bloomberg) i,t-1 , 1
C =  (ESGdisc ,Company Characteristics ) (19)i tf   
i,tE(Capm) i,t-1 , 1
C =  (ESGdisc ,Company Characteristics ) (20)i tf   
i,tE(Fama&French) i,t-1 , 1
C =  (ESGdisc ,Company Characteristics ) (21)i tf   
i,tE(Carhart) i,t-1 , 1
C =  (ESGdisc ,Company Characteristics ) (22)i tf   
i,tD(Bloomberg) i,t-1 , 1 , 1
C =  (ESGdisc ,Company Characteristics ,Bond Characteristics ) (23)i t i tf  
 
where, 
i,tE(Bloomberg)
C is my first proxy for the expected cost of equity, which I obtain from 
Bloomberg. The cost of equity is associated with company i in year t. Firm characteristics are 
the variables described in Chapter 7.3.4.1. 'Cost of Equity Firm Characteristics', and are the 
same across all alternative specifications as well as for the cost of debt regression. 
i,tE(Capm)
C , 
i,tE(Fama&French)
C , 
i,tE(Carhart)
C are my additional proxies for the expected cost of equity. These are 
based on Graham and Harvey's annual survey on the expected market premium and inferred 
from three alternative asset pricing models including CAPM, Fama and French, and Carhart 
models using daily, weekly, and monthly data frequencies. The expected cost of equities are 
associated with company i in year t. My final depenent variable, 
i,tD(Bloomberg)
C represents my 
proxy for the cost of debt, which I obtain from Bloomberg. The cost of debt is associated 
with company i in year t. In addition to firm characteristics, I also include bond 
characteristics, which are all variables described in Chapter 7.3.4.2. 'Cost of Debt Bond 
Characteristics'.  
 Consistent with previous literature on the relationship between the cost of capital and 
disclosure (see e.g. Clarkson et al., 2013; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Harjoto 
and Jo, 2014; Oikonomou et al., 2014) my ESG disclosure quality variable and all other 
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independent variables are lagged in all models. This is done to overcome potential issues 
related to reverse causality and simultaneity (Harjoto and Jo, 2014; Oikonomou et al., 2014), 
as well as to ensure that the information content in my ESG disclosure variable has been fully 
disseminated to all investors (Clarkson et al., 2013). Thus, lagging my ESG disclosure 
variable helps to ensure that this information is public knowledge at time t, and has begun to 
be incorporated by the market in the price formation process (Godfrey et al., 2009; 
Oikonomou et al., 2014). 
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7.4 Empirical Results 
7.4.1 Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Table 17 provides summary statistics for my dependent variables including expected cost of 
equity and cost of debt proxies. The table reports individual summary statistics for each of the 
ten expected cost equity and one cost of debt capital such as mean, median (p50), standard 
deviation (sd), minimum, maximum, and the average annual number of companies over the 
full sample period for each of ICB's ten super sectors (these include 1-Oil and Gas, 1000-
Basic Materials, 2000-Industrials, 3000-Consumer Goods, 4000-Health Care, 5000-
Consumer Services, 6000-Telecommunications, 7000-Utilities, 8000-Financials, 9000-
Technology.  
 Across all sectors the average expected cost of equity ranges from 5.94 percent to 
11.1 percent, per annum. Bloomberg's cost of equity estimates are always highest across all 
sectors and also within sectors relative to my alternative versions of the cost of equity. For 
example, my expected cost of equity capital proxies which I infer from Graham and Harvey's 
(2015) expected market risk premium and estimate via traditional asset pricing models are 
more similar to El Ghoul et al.'s (2011) average implied cost of equity. They report an 
average implied cost of equity of 4.75 percent over the sample period from 1992 to 2007, per 
annum. While, Bloomberg's expected cost of equity is more similar to Dhaliwal et al.'s (2011) 
average implied cost of equity of 11.98 percent per annum.  
 Table 17 also reports on individual sectors' average cost of equities. Companies with 
higher cost of equities relative to the all sector average tend to be found in the Oil and Gas, 
Basic Materials, Industrials, and Technology sectors. While companies with relatively lower 
cost of equties are found in the Consumer Goods, Health Care, Consumer Services, 
Telecommunications, and Utilities sectors. These findings are consistent across all ten 
alternative cost of equity proxies. An exception is the Financial Sector's cost of equity, which 
is not consistent across different measures and displays higher or lower cost of equities 
relative to the all sector average depending on the method used. For example, the Financial's 
cost of equity tends to be higher than the all sector average when using the CAPM model 
rather than Fama and French or Carhart asset pricing models.  
 In Table 17, I also report summary statistics for my cost of debt proxy. All sectors 
combined have an average cost of debt capital of 2.96 percent per annum, over the full 
sample period. The cost of debt figure is very similar to Oikonomou et al.'s (2014) average 
annual yield spread of 2.9 percent over the sample period from 1992 to 2008. 
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 To investigate individual sectors' cost of debt capital, Table 17 distinguishes between 
the cost of debt for ICB's ten super sectors. Individual sectors that display relatively higher 
cost of debt capitals include the Oil and Gas (3.07), Basic Materials (3.44), Consumer Goods 
(3.03), Health Care (3.02), Telecommunications (3.45), Utilities (3.03), and Financials (2.97). 
While, companies in sectors with relatively lower cost of debt are found in the Industrials 
(2.94), Consumer Services (2.86), and Technology sectors (2.62). 
 The following section continues with a correlation analysis between my dependent 
variables and summary statistics for my ESG disclosure variable. 
 Table 18 reports Pearson correlation coefficients between my eleven dependent 
variables including Bloomberg's cost of debt, Bloomberg's cost of equity, cost of equities 
based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) equity market premium estimated with CAPM, Fama 
and French, and Carhart asset pricing models using daily, weekly, and monthly data 
frequencies. My results show that all cost of equity estimates are positively correlated to 
some degree. For example, Bloomberg's cost of equity and my alternative versions of the cost 
of equity are very similar. The correlations between Bloomberg's cost of equity and the cost 
of equities based on my computations range between 54.74 percent and 75.64 percent. All 
correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level. 
Similarly, the correlations among my alternative cost of equities tend to correlate in the range 
of 55.02 percent and 96.79 percent. My findings indicate that all cost of equities are generally 
very similar over the estimated sample period. Table 18 also displays the correlations 
between Bloomberg's cost of debt capital and my cost of equity estimates. As expected 
Pearson correlation coefficients are much lower between the cost of debt and cost of equity 
capital. The correlations between Bloomberg's cost of debt and all cost of equity proxies 
ranges between 1.05 percent and 15.21 percent. 
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Table 17: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables by Sector 
Daily Data Weekly Data Monthly Data 
Sector   
CD 
Bloomberg 
CE 
Bloomberg CE CAPM 
CE 
Fama/French CE Carhart CE CAPM 
CE 
Fama/French CE Carhart CE CAPM 
CE 
Fama/French CE Carhart 
All Sectors 
mean 0.0296 0.1111 0.0595 0.0599 0.0594 0.0611 0.0609 0.0605 0.0618 0.0634 0.0628 
p50 0.0294 0.1072 0.0577 0.0578 0.0576 0.0586 0.0581 0.0581 0.0572 0.0597 0.0590 
sd 0.0154 0.0287 0.0182 0.0199 0.0195 0.0220 0.0240 0.0244 0.0270 0.0283 0.0282 
min 0.0000 -0.0639 -0.0226 -0.0265 -0.0201 -0.0103 -0.0739 -0.0755 -0.0126 -0.0287 -0.0861 
max 0.1133 0.8650 0.1636 0.2039 0.1924 0.2740 0.2978 0.2818 0.4104 0.4046 0.4124 
n 6238 6236 6074 6074 6074 6074 6014 6014 5998 5998 5998 
0001 
Oil & Gas 
mean 0.0307 0.1175 0.0657 0.0720 0.0751 0.0678 0.0708 0.0752 0.0619 0.0709 0.0767 
p51 0.0304 0.1185 0.0655 0.0749 0.0740 0.0681 0.0702 0.0703 0.0594 0.0671 0.0749 
sd 0.0126 0.0230 0.0146 0.0247 0.0252 0.0172 0.0258 0.0278 0.0190 0.0226 0.0245 
min 0.0035 0.0594 0.0240 -0.0011 0.0225 0.0144 -0.0339 -0.0287 0.0239 0.0205 0.0199 
max 0.0786 0.1855 0.1060 0.1332 0.1439 0.1186 0.1380 0.1592 0.1417 0.2048 0.1977 
n 497 497 487 487 487 485 479 479 477 477 477 
1000 
Basic Materials 
mean 0.0344 0.1235 0.0691 0.0731 0.0745 0.0709 0.0732 0.0750 0.0716 0.0799 0.0823 
p52 0.0341 0.1180 0.0671 0.0677 0.0673 0.0688 0.0677 0.0693 0.0663 0.0718 0.0731 
sd 0.0163 0.0293 0.0206 0.0293 0.0298 0.0230 0.0307 0.0329 0.0286 0.0339 0.0370 
min 0.0000 0.0323 0.0159 0.0008 0.0101 -0.0103 -0.0293 -0.0198 0.0007 -0.0099 -0.0087 
max 0.0803 0.2116 0.1500 0.2039 0.1924 0.1401 0.2021 0.2033 0.1971 0.2049 0.2108 
n 322 322 320 320 320 320 317 317 315 315 315 
2000 
Industrials 
mean 0.0294 0.1133 0.0610 0.0618 0.0615 0.0635 0.0636 0.0634 0.0642 0.0667 0.0657 
p53 0.0293 0.1110 0.0604 0.0606 0.0602 0.0629 0.0621 0.0620 0.0614 0.0636 0.0633 
sd 0.0146 0.0209 0.0145 0.0156 0.0155 0.0180 0.0198 0.0203 0.0225 0.0253 0.0245 
min 0.0000 0.0324 0.0129 0.0131 0.0134 0.0149 0.0036 0.0020 -0.0107 -0.0263 -0.0427 
max 0.0789 0.1976 0.1227 0.1238 0.1294 0.1454 0.1520 0.1578 0.1798 0.2517 0.2533 
n 960 960 922 922 922 926 920 920 920 920 920 
3000 
Consumer Goods 
mean 0.0303 0.1044 0.0532 0.0544 0.0536 0.0552 0.0558 0.0552 0.0547 0.0558 0.0541 
p54 0.0304 0.0977 0.0513 0.0513 0.0518 0.0514 0.0518 0.0521 0.0506 0.0524 0.0512 
sd 0.0142 0.0273 0.0165 0.0178 0.0161 0.0219 0.0225 0.0218 0.0232 0.0243 0.0230 
min 0.0000 0.0592 -0.0226 -0.0265 -0.0201 0.0129 0.0049 0.0005 0.0036 -0.0048 -0.0054 
max 0.0813 0.2368 0.1101 0.1228 0.1265 0.1598 0.1398 0.1488 0.1476 0.1543 0.1436 
n 730 730 709 709 709 707 700 700 696 696 696 
4000 
Health Care 
mean 0.0302 0.0978 0.0518 0.0537 0.0530 0.0520 0.0541 0.0535 0.0480 0.0498 0.0505 
p55 0.0301 0.0959 0.0506 0.0531 0.0529 0.0501 0.0527 0.0522 0.0440 0.0471 0.0480 
sd 0.0148 0.0175 0.0132 0.0140 0.0138 0.0175 0.0192 0.0194 0.0188 0.0194 0.0200 
min 0.0000 0.0582 0.0133 0.0132 0.0039 0.0055 -0.0125 -0.0169 0.0055 0.0049 -0.0111 
max 0.0806 0.2244 0.1144 0.1145 0.1134 0.1516 0.1268 0.1254 0.1479 0.1558 0.1440 
n 573 572 561 561 561 556 549 549 550 550 550 
5000 
Consumer Services 
mean 0.0286 0.1089 0.0565 0.0577 0.0560 0.0584 0.0586 0.0569 0.0598 0.0603 0.0580 
p56 0.0286 0.1053 0.0560 0.0567 0.0560 0.0553 0.0554 0.0549 0.0571 0.0579 0.0557 
sd 0.0145 0.0242 0.0151 0.0152 0.0137 0.0206 0.0217 0.0207 0.0242 0.0251 0.0247 
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min 0.0000 -0.0432 0.0167 0.0162 0.0130 -0.0001 -0.0107 -0.0016 -0.0126 -0.0132 -0.0861 
max 0.0807 0.2377 0.1067 0.1157 0.1016 0.1545 0.1738 0.1769 0.2240 0.2001 0.2012 
n 902 902 868 868 868 862 855 855 852 852 852 
6000 
Telecommunications 
mean 0.0345 0.0985 0.0478 0.0484 0.0489 0.0507 0.0503 0.0512 0.0558 0.0600 0.0580 
p57 0.0349 0.0951 0.0467 0.0469 0.0463 0.0487 0.0491 0.0520 0.0543 0.0551 0.0555 
sd 0.0140 0.0197 0.0139 0.0141 0.0125 0.0171 0.0152 0.0128 0.0248 0.0279 0.0268 
min 0.0149 0.0748 0.0251 0.0252 0.0312 0.0241 0.0125 0.0228 0.0181 0.0176 0.0174 
max 0.0741 0.1848 0.0891 0.0907 0.0876 0.1170 0.1047 0.0947 0.1549 0.1612 0.1694 
n 70 70 58 58 58 60 57 57 55 55 55 
7000 
Utilities 
mean 0.0303 0.0898 0.0457 0.0488 0.0507 0.0456 0.0490 0.0504 0.0419 0.0502 0.0500 
p58 0.0303 0.0889 0.0472 0.0510 0.0522 0.0463 0.0517 0.0523 0.0415 0.0485 0.0495 
sd 0.0123 0.0158 0.0137 0.0176 0.0184 0.0154 0.0200 0.0223 0.0177 0.0267 0.0249 
min 0.0102 0.0037 0.0115 0.0100 0.0115 -0.0011 -0.0033 -0.0089 0.0040 0.0058 0.0051 
max 0.0740 0.1551 0.0926 0.0992 0.1112 0.1002 0.1068 0.1285 0.1121 0.2455 0.2221 
n 389 389 378 378 378 378 375 375 376 376 376 
8000 
Financials 
mean 0.0297 0.1190 0.0657 0.0597 0.0573 0.0661 0.0599 0.0572 0.0664 0.0609 0.0595 
p59 0.0287 0.1100 0.0609 0.0567 0.0562 0.0612 0.0566 0.0559 0.0605 0.0560 0.0559 
sd 0.0148 0.0367 0.0223 0.0219 0.0202 0.0262 0.0271 0.0266 0.0317 0.0329 0.0317 
min 0.0000 -0.0639 0.0095 -0.0132 -0.0180 -0.0063 -0.0739 -0.0755 0.0087 -0.0287 -0.0339 
max 0.1133 0.4089 0.1636 0.1520 0.1323 0.2740 0.2978 0.2818 0.4104 0.4046 0.4124 
n 1053 1053 1065 1065 1065 1056 1046 1046 1048 1048 1048 
9000 
Technology 
mean 0.0262 0.1191 0.0642 0.0639 0.0630 0.0668 0.0673 0.0664 0.0786 0.0791 0.0771 
p60 0.0258 0.1152 0.0626 0.0625 0.0617 0.0626 0.0656 0.0636 0.0735 0.0752 0.0737 
sd 0.0208 0.0343 0.0173 0.0168 0.0162 0.0217 0.0222 0.0219 0.0303 0.0267 0.0263 
min 0.0000 0.0359 0.0033 0.0024 -0.0051 0.0121 -0.0009 0.0115 0.0160 0.0049 0.0003 
max 0.0796 0.8650 0.1214 0.1320 0.1312 0.1792 0.1668 0.1716 0.1826 0.1757 0.1659 
n 742 741 706 706 706 724 716 716 709 709 709 
Notes: This table displays summary statistics for my cost of capital proxies such as Bloomberg's cost of debt, Bloomberg's cost of equity, cost of equities estimates based on CAPM, Fama and French, and 
Carhart models for each of ICB's ten super-sectors. Summary statistics include mean, median (p50), standard deviations, minimum, maximum, and the average number of firms in each sector over the sample 
period from 2004 to 2014.  
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In Table 19, I report summary statistics for my ESG Disclosure quality variable for each of 
ICB's ten super-sectors over the full sample period from 2004 to 2014. The figures are 
presented in percentages and show strong variation over time. Table 19 shows the total 
average ESG disclosure quality of all industries is 26.67 percent. Companies from four 
sectors including Industrials, Health Care, Consumer Services, and Financials have a 
disclosure quality below the all sector average, while companies from six sectors such as Oil 
& Gas, Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Telecommunications, Utilities, and Technology 
have higher than the all sector average ESG disclosure quality. These figures are consistent 
with Dhaliwal et al. (2011) and Plumlee et al. (2010), which show that companies in the 
Utilities, Chemicals, and Food sectors tend to disclose more information, using self-
constructed ESG Disclosure variables to measure ESG activities. Table 19 also reports sector 
medians. Sector medians are almost identical with sector averages, except for the Oil & Gas 
sector, which falls below the sector median of 21.90 percent. While companies in the two 
super-sectors Basic Materials and Industrials have the lowest ESG disclosures of 2.89 percent 
on average, companies in the Oil & Gas and Technologies sector disclose the most, with 
78.01 percent and 77.27, respectively. Further, Table 19 displays skewness and kurtosis of 
my ESG disclosure quality variable. Across all sectors, my ESG disclosure variable has a 
skewness and kurtosis of 0.98 and 3.12, respectively. While the results on the skewness of 
my ESG disclosure quality variable show that it tends to be somewhat positively skewed 
relative to a normal (Gaussian) distribution, my results on the excess kurtosis show that my 
variable is identical to a normal distribution. 
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Table 18: Correlations between Dependent Variables 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 
  Cost of Debt Bloomberg [1] 1                                         
Cost of Equity Bloomberg [2] 0.0105 *** 1 
Daily 
Cost of Equity CAPM [3] 0.1454 *** 0.7012 *** 1 
Cost of Equity Fama/French [4] 0.0981 *** 0.6213 *** 0.9267 *** 1 
Cost of Equity Carhart [5] 0.0848 *** 0.5474 *** 0.8591 *** 0.9539 *** 1 
Weekly 
Cost of Equity CAPM [6] 0.1521 *** 0.7564 *** 0.8984 *** 0.8294 *** 0.7685 *** 1 
Cost of Equity Fama/French [7] 0.0917 *** 0.6400 *** 0.7734 *** 0.8414 *** 0.8164 *** 0.8859 *** 1 
Cost of Equity Carhart [8] 0.0873 *** 0.5625 *** 0.7020 *** 0.7842 *** 0.8270 *** 0.8191 *** 0.9583 *** 1 
Monthly 
Cost of Equity CAPM [9] 0.0886 *** 0.6655 *** 0.7083 *** 0.6629 *** 0.6246 *** 0.6980 *** 0.6030 *** 0.5502 *** 1 
Cost of Equity Fama/French [10] 0.1240 *** 0.6044 *** 0.6892 *** 0.6717 *** 0.6313 *** 0.6813 *** 0.6134 *** 0.5590 *** 0.9408 *** 1 
Cost of Equity Carhart [11] 0.1032 *** 0.5857 *** 0.6807 *** 0.6839 *** 0.6491 *** 0.6684 *** 0.6222 *** 0.5736 *** 0.9009 *** 0.9679 *** 1 
Notes: This table displays Pearson's pair-wise correlation coefficients between my dependent variables including Bloomberg's cost of debt, Bloomberg's cost of equity, cost of equities estimated 
with the CAPM, Fama and French's three factor model, and Carhart's four factor model based on daily, weekly, and monthly data frequencies. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 
5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
 
Table 19: Summary Statistics for my ESG Disclosure Quality variable 
ESG Disclosure by Sector mean p50 sd min max skew exc.kurt N 
All Sectors 26.67 21.90 13.92 2.89 78.01 0.98 3.12 3976 
0001 Oil & Gas 27.12 20.66 15.51 7.85 78.01 1.26 3.84 319 
1000 Basic Materials 33.38 30.37 16.22 2.89 74.38 0.49 2.16 204 
2000 Industrials 25.22 21.49 12.35 2.89 65.70 0.97 3.09 619 
3000 Consumer Goods 30.56 28.93 14.67 5.79 70.25 0.59 2.40 476 
4000 Health Care 26.56 20.66 14.58 6.61 72.31 0.84 2.48 371 
5000 Consumer Services 22.46 19.01 9.80 6.20 51.24 0.91 2.87 580 
6000 Telecommunications 29.14 25.51 13.55 13.99 62.96 0.58 2.39 42 
7000 Utilities 32.83 31.32 13.70 11.70 67.55 0.38 2.18 255 
8000 Financials 22.27 16.67 12.26 8.68 71.93 1.66 5.16 643 
9000 Technology 29.18 24.38 15.00 10.74 77.27 0.70 2.53 467 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for my ESG Disclosure Quality variable including mean, median (p50), standard deviations, minimum, maximum, 
skewness, kurtosis, and the average number of firms in ten different sectors over the sample period from 2004 to 2014.  
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The next table, Table 20, displays the essential summary statistics for all of my explanatory 
variables including mean, median (p50), standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and mean 
observations over the full sample period from 2004 to 2014, all of which I will be using in 
my multivariate regression analysis. Table 20 includes cost of equity company-specific 
explanatory variables as well as cost of debt bond-specific explanatory variables.     
Table 20: Summary Statistics for Independent Variables 
  mean p50 sd min max N 
Panel A: 
ESG Disclosure Quality 26.67 21.90 13.92 2.89 78.01 3976 
Size (log $millions) 16.25 16.11 1.46 10.36 21.61 6234 
Leverage (%) 0.60 0.59 0.22 -0.16 2.03 6211 
Market-to-Book (%) 0.61 0.61 0.22 -0.16 1.80 6048 
ROA (%) 0.06 0.05 0.08 -0.89 0.77 6212 
Volatility (log $millions) 5.37 5.43 1.73 -3.57 13.82 6049 
Interest Coverage 2.51 2.38 1.36 -8.44 10.22 5690 
R&D Intensity (%) 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.85 2689 
Capex (%) 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.47 6025 
Cash Flows 0.40 0.15 2.42 -52.00 58.14 5961 
Capital Intensity (%) 0.28 0.18 0.26 0.00 0.97 6138 
Advertising 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.00 1.18 5735 
Sales Growth 1.71 1.07 47.08 0.13 3702.47 6182 
Panel B: 
Bond Liquidity (log $millions) 12.96 12.99 0.65 8.61 17.04 5330 
Bond Rating 3.65 4.00 1.26 1.00 7.00 3964 
Years to Maturity (years) 12.47 10.84 5.99 0.00 43.94 5332 
Convexity (log years) 3.72 3.94 1.03 -0.23 5.83 3013 
Duration (log years) 1.70 1.74 0.59 -2.01 4.86 4272 
Subordinated 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.00 6656 
Notes: This table displays summary statistics for my Independent variables including mean, median (p50), standard 
deviations, minimum, maximum, and the average number of firms over the sample period from 2004 to 2014.  
Further, in Table 21, I report Pearson correlation coefficients between my independent 
regression variables to investigate any potential Multicollinearity that could bias my 
multivariate regression results. I find two variables, namely, Leverage and Market-to-Book 
ratio to be particularly highly correlated (98.95 percent), which could cause Multicollinearity 
issues. To avoid estimation bias through Multicollinearity, I exclude the Market-to-Book 
ratio from all of my multivariate regressions and always only include the Leverage variable. 
The second highest correlation of -54.79 percent is found between the Interest Coverage and 
Market-to-Book ratio. Generally, this correlation level should not be a concern for 
Multicollineartiy, but given that I entirely exclude the Market-to-Book ratio from my 
analysis, due to the initial correlation with the leverage variable, I further reduce the 
probability of estimation bias in my regression analysis. 
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Table 21: Correlations between Independent Variables 
    [1]   [2]    [3]    [4]    [5]    [6]    [7]    [8]    [9]    [10]    [11]    [12]    [13]   [14]    [15]    [16]    [17]    [18]    [19]
[1] 
ESG 
Disclosure 
Quality 1
[2] Size 0.3593*** 1
[3] Leverage 0.0051 0.3176*** 1
[4] 
Market-to-
Book 0.0024 0.3379*** 0.9895*** 1
[5] ROA 0.0560*** -0.0572*** -0.0729*** -0.0771*** 1
[6] Volatility 0.1018*** 0.1056*** -0.1563*** -0.1651*** 0.0093 1
[7] 
Interest 
Coverage 0.0347** -0.2354*** -0.5171*** -0.5479*** 0.4748*** 0.1701*** 1
[8] 
R&D 
Intensity -0.0944*** -0.3267*** -0.1596*** -0.1792*** -0.2602*** -0.0997*** 0.2043*** 1
[9] Capex 0.0205 -0.0825*** -0.0930*** -0.0787*** 0.0307*** 0.0314*** 0.0443*** -0.0473*** 1
[10] 
Cash 
Flows 0.0088 0.0541*** -0.0346*** -0.0326*** 0.0907*** 0.0326*** 0.1745*** -0.2051*** -0.0750*** 1
[11] 
Capital 
Intensity 0.1104*** -0.0122 -0.0064 0.0078 -0.0166 -0.0112 -0.2185*** -0.2629*** 0.6058*** -0.0828*** 1
[12] Advertising -0.0384** -0.4118*** -0.0759*** -0.1079*** 0.0376*** 0.0458*** 0.2449*** 0.5282*** -0.0660*** -0.0091 -0.2294*** 1
[13] 
Sales 
Growth -0.0450*** -0.0093 -0.0052 -0.0057 -0.0086 -0.0056 0.0892*** 0.0597*** 0.0555*** -0.0029 0.0136 -0.0134 1
[14] 
Bond 
Liquidity 0.0635*** 0.0806*** -0.1439*** -0.1320*** 0.0294** -0.0010 0.1806*** 0.2822*** -0.0033 0.0276** -0.0570*** -0.0226* -0.0091 1
[15] 
Bond 
Rating 0.2095*** 0.4365*** -0.0862*** -0.0668*** 0.0632*** 0.2872*** 0.2180*** -0.1568*** -0.0498*** 0.0658*** -0.1126*** -0.0748*** -0.0282* 0.0823*** 1
[16] 
Years to 
Maturity 0.1119*** 0.1330*** 0.0028 -0.0044 0.0265** 0.0379*** 0.0138 -0.1513*** 0.0329** 0.0047 0.1221*** -0.0787*** -0.0020 -0.0155 0.2527*** 1
[17] Convexity 0.0584*** 0.0917*** 0.0256 0.0095 -0.0392** 0.1132*** -0.0193 0.0125 0.0118 -0.0195 -0.0089 0.0300 -0.0172 -0.0543*** 0.0576*** 0.0903*** 1
[18] Duration 0.1620*** 0.1420*** -0.1038*** -0.0910*** 0.0220 0.0099 0.0890*** -0.0426* 0.0517*** 0.0287** 0.0343** 0.0110 0.0138 0.1475*** 0.1773*** 0.4239*** 0.0372** 1
[19] Subord. 0.0424*** 0.1582*** 0.0490*** 0.0563*** -0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0894*** -0.0356** -0.0146 -0.0180 -0.0076 -0.0587*** -0.0015 -0.0276** 0.0133 -0.0328*** 0.0530*** -0.0023 1
Notes: This table displays Pearson's pair-wise correlation coefficients between my independent regression variables. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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7.4.2 Univariate Analysis 
Following my initial summary statistics and correlation analysis of all dependent and 
independent variables, I will now continue with a univariate comparison analysis.  
 Table 22 displays the results of my univariate comparison analysis between the cost 
of capital of "high" ESG disclosure quality (Group of companies with ESG Disclosure >= 70 
percentile) and "low" ESG disclosure quality (Group of companies with ESG Disclosure <= 
30 percentile) groups. My univariate analysis compares the mean cost of equity and debt 
differential between the two groups. The mean cost of equity for companies with "high" ESG 
disclosure quality tends to be significantly lower relative to companies with "low" ESG 
disclosure quality. For example, for 8 out of 10 cost of equity proxies the mean difference is 
statistically significant at the 1 or 5 percent significance level. For the remaining two cost of 
equity proxies (Cost of Equity Carhart estimated with daily and weekly data) the mean 
difference is also negative, but not statistically significant. My results suggest that the mean 
cost of equity for companies with "high" ESG disclosure quality is lower than for "low" ESG 
disclosure quality. The difference in the cost of equity can be as high as 1.51 percent per 
annum (Bloomberg's Cost of Equity) and as low as 0.24 percent per annum (Cost of Equity 
Fama/French estimated with daily data).    
 Table 22 also compares the mean cost of debt differential between "high" ESG 
disclosure quality (Group of companies with ESG Disclosure >= 70 percentile) and "low" 
ESG disclosure quality (Group of companies with ESG Disclosure <= 30 percentile) groups. 
In contrast to the cost of equity findings, my results on the mean cost of debt differential 
suggest that the mean cost of debt for companies with "high" ESG disclosure quality is 
significantly higher than for companies with "low" ESG disclosure quality. The cost of debt 
differential amounts to 0.83 percent, on average, and is statistically significant at the 1 
percent significance level. One explanation for my cost of debt result is related to investors' 
computation and forecast of the cost of debt. Unlike the cost of equity, which is based on 
estimates derived from asset pricing models or earnings forecasts, the cost of debt can be 
computed more directly (Armitage and Marston, 2008). As the cost of debt is already very 
transparent and easy to obtain for investors, it could be that additional information in form of 
a company's ESG disclosure quality helps to increase the accuracy of cost of equity estimates 
and forecasts, but could have no additional value for debt investors.  
 Thus, in the next chapter, I will aim to shed more light on the effects of ESG 
disclosure quality on the cost of equity and cost of debt by extending the univariate 
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comparison analysis to a multivariate regression setting that also controls for company-
specific and bond-specific characteristics. 
Table 22: Univariate Tests 
     
ESGD >= 70 
percentile 
"High" ESG 
Disclosure 
ESGD <= 30 
Percentile 
"Low" ESG 
Disclosure 
Difference   T-Stat 
[1] [2] [1] - [2] 
Cost of Debt - Bloomberg 0.0339 0.0256 0.0083 *** 11.81 
N 3386 571 2815 
Cost of Equity - Bloomberg 0.1064 0.1215 -0.0151 *** -11.60 
N 3384 571 2813 
Da
ily
 D
ata
 Cost of Equity - CAPM 0.0591 0.0649 -0.0058 *** -7.20 N 3273 558 2715 
Cost of Equity - Fama & French 0.0610 0.0634 -0.0024 ** -2.56 
N 3273 558 2715 
Cost of Equity - Carhart 0.0609 0.0620 -0.0011 -1.15 
N 3273 558 2715 
W
ee
kly
 D
ata
 Cost of Equity - CAPM 0.0610 0.0662 -0.0052 *** -5.21 
N 3274 560 2714 
Cost of Equity - Fama & French 0.0622 0.0647 -0.0025 ** -2.27 
N 3226 553 2673 
Cost of Equity - Carhart 0.0620 0.0633 -0.0013 -1.12 
N 3226 553 2673 
Mo
nth
ly 
Da
ta 
Cost of Equity - CAPM 0.0601 0.0693 -0.0092 *** -7.23 
N 3210 553 2657 
Cost of Equity - Fama & French 0.0647 0.0675 -0.0028 ** -2.05 
N 3210 553 2657 
Cost of Equity - Carhart 0.0641 0.0677 -0.0035 *** -2.66 
N 3210 553 2657 
Notes: This table reports univariate comparison T-tests for one cost of debt and ten cost of equity estimates of "high" 
ESG Disclosure (ESG Disclosure >= 70 percentile) versus "low" ESG Disclosure (ESG Disclosure <= 30 percentile)
groups.The 5th column reports the relative difference between these two groups. The final two columns report
statistical significance levels and t-ratios. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
significance levels. 
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7.4.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
To investigate the association between ESG disclosure quality and several proxies for the 
expected cost of equity and cost of debt through space and time, I use cross-sectional as well 
as panel regression analysis with fixed effects and robust standard errors (Huber/White 
heteroskedasticity-consitent standard errors) as well as robust standard errors clustered at the 
sector level (2 digit ICB sector codes). Related studies (see e.g. Bauer and Hann, 2010; El 
Ghoul et al., 2011; Oikonomou et al., 2014) use similar estimation strategies.  
7.4.3.1 Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis 
To examine the cost of capital effects of ESG disclosure quality, I separately regress my ten 
proxies for the cost of equity capital on my ESG disclosure quality variable and several 
company-specific control variables using OLS cross-sectional regressions with robust 
standard errors.106 Further, I repeat my analysis and also regress my cost of debt variable on 
my ESG disclosure quality variable, company-specific, and bond-specific control variables 
using the same approach. Table 23 displays my main results estimated over the full sample 
period from 2004 to 2014. In each model, the dependent variable is the individual proxy for 
the cost of equity or cost of debt such as Bloomberg's cost of debt, Bloomberg's expected cost 
of equity, expected cost of equity based on Graham and Harvey's expected market premium 
and inferred from three alternative capital asset pricing models including the CAPM, Fama 
and French, and Carhart models, which I compute using daily, weekly, and monthly data 
frequencies. The independent variables include my ESG disclosure quality variable, eleven 
company-specific variables, and six bond-specific variables. Consistent with my previous 
univariate comparison analysis results on the expected cost of equity and debt, I find strong 
and consistent evidence of ESG disclosure quality effects on the cost of equity and debt. 
 Columns 3 to 12 of Table 23, report the effects of ESG disclosure quality on several 
alternative proxies for the expected cost of equity capital, while also controlling for company-
specific characteristics. The coefficient on ESG disclosure quality is consistently negative 
and significant at the 1 percent significance level (t-ratios ranging from a minimum of -7.66 
to -12.08). The negative association between my ESG disclosure quality variable and the 
expected cost of equity is consistent across alternative specifications. My results are 
consistent with Hypothesis 1, which posits that companies with high ESG disclosure quality 
have lower expected cost of equities. For example, an increase in a company's ESG 
                                                 
106 All of my cross-sectional regressions are run with robust standard errors, using Huber/White 
heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. 
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disclosure quality would have reduced the expected cost of equity, on average, by at least 
2.76 percent up to 3.71 percent over the estimated sample period, everything else held 
constant. My findings are also in line with Dhaliwal et al. (2011), El Ghoul et al. (2011) and 
Sharfman and Fernando (2008). They all report that some form of ESG such as the initiation 
of standalone ESG disclosures, environmental management, or human rights reduce a 
company's cost of equity.  
 Column 2 of Table 23, displays the effects of ESG disclosure quality on the cost of 
debt, while also controlling for company-specific and bond-specific variables. The coefficient 
on ESG disclosure quality is negative and significant at the 1 percent significance level (t-
ratio of -3.66). My result suggests, consistent with Hypothesis 2, that companies with high 
ESG disclosure quality have lower cost of debt capital. To give one example, an increase in a 
company's ESG disclosure quality would have reduced the company's cost of debt by 1.33 
percent, on average, over the estimated sample period, all else equal. My findings are in line 
with Bauer and Hann (2010) and Oikonomou et al. (2014) 107. They report that several ESG 
dimensions such as corporate environmental management, community strengths, and product 
safety and quality strengths reduce corporate yield spreads (cost of debt).  
 To better isolate the effect of ESG disclosure quality on the expected cost of equity 
and cost of debt, my regressions reported in Table 23 also display the estimated coefficients 
and t-ratios of all company-specific and bond-specific control variables. For example, the 
coefficient on size is negative and generally statistically significant at either the 1 or 5 percent 
significance level across different specifications. This result is plausible as larger companies 
tend to be less exposed to business and financial risks and are therefore expected to have 
lower cost of equity and debt capitals (Oikonomou et al. 2014). The negative association 
between size and the expected cost of equity is consistent with Sharfman and Fernando's 
(2008) findings, as well as Brammer & Pavelin (2008) who find that a company's 
environmental disclosure quality is negatively related to company size. Meaning that high 
quality disclosures are associated with larger firms and in sectors closely related to 
environmental concerns (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). The coefficients on ROA, Interest 
coverage, Capex, Advertising expense, Sales growth, and R&D intensity generally have the 
expected sign. To be more specific, negative and statistically significant coefficients are 
reported for Roa, Interest coverage (in the cost of debt regression), and advertising expense. 
                                                 
107 Bauer and Hann (2010) report that environmental management strengths (as measured by KLD) reduce the 
cost of debt by -3.87 percent, while environmental management concerns increase the cost of debt by 4.91 
percent. Similarly, Oikonomou et al. (2014) also report that KLD's aggregated ESG strengths reduce the cost of 
debt by -6.08 percent, while KLD's aggregated ESG concerns increase the cost of debt by 65.12 percent.  
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While positive and statistically significant coefficients are reported for Capex, Sales growth, 
and R&D intensity. My findings on the coefficient exposures of the control variables are 
consistent with Bauer and Hann (2010), El Ghoul et al. (2011), and Harjoto and Jo (2014). 
One exception is the coefficient on my leverage control variable which is expected to have a 
positive association with the cost of capital. As Bauer and Hann (2010) and Oikonomou et al. 
(2014) note, companies with higher leverage are supposed to have higher default risk and this 
should thus be reflected in higher cost of equity and debt capital. However, my results 
indicate that the coefficient on leverage is generally not statistically significant and negative, 
across various specifications.  
 Overall, the results of my analysis contribute to the existing literature by 
complementing and extending the works of Sharfman and Fernando (2008), Dhaliwal et al. 
(2011), El Ghoul et al. (2011), Bauer and Hann (2010), and Oikonomou et al. (2014). More 
specifically, my results extend the research on voluntary ESG disclosure. My results 
contribute to this literature by using a novel proxy for ESG disclosure quality, which has not 
been studied before. The closest studies to mine are Dhaliwhal et al. (2011) and Plumlee et al. 
(2010), both of which use self-constructed ESG disclosure variables. For example, Dhaliwal 
et al. (2011) use a dichotomous variable that indicates whether or not companies publish ESG 
reports. In contrast, I use a proxy that indicates how accurately companies disclose on their 
environmental, social, and governance performance. Methodologically, my chapter differs 
from Sharfman and Fernando (2008), Dhaliwal et al. (2011), and El Ghoul et al. (2011) by 
employing an alternative method to obtain the cost of equity capital. My approach to compute 
the cost of equity is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium which 
is obtained by the author's quarterly survey of US Chief Financial Officers from S&P 500 
companies and inferred from three alternative asset pricing models including CAPM, Fama 
and French, and Carhart models.108 Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, my chapter is 
the first to study the effects of ESG disclosure quality on the cost of debt.  
 All in all, my results provide additional evidence, in line with the existing literature, 
that companies with high ESG disclosure quality have lower cost of equity and debt capital, 
everything else held equal. 
                                                 
108 My approach overcomes the well-known problem of excluding companies with negative earnings per share 
(EPS) forecasts in the computation of implied cost of equities that could substantiall reduce the sample size. My 
alternative measure also overcomes another documented bias in the computation of the implied cost of equity, 
namely, the analyst forecast optimism bias (El Ghoul et al., 2011). The forecast optimism bias suggests that 
analysts rarely provide negative outlooks of companies' earnings, which leads to an upward bias of EPS 
estimates (El Ghoul et al., 2011).  
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Table 23: Cross-Sectional Cost of Debt & Cost of Equity Regressions 
          Daily Data Weekly Data Monthly Data 
  
CD 
Bloomberg 
CE 
Bloomberg 
CE 
CAPM 
CE Fama & 
French CE Carhart 
CE 
CAPM 
CE Fama & 
French CE Carhart 
CE 
CAPM 
CE Fama & 
French CE Carhart 
ESG Disclosure -0.0133 *** -0.0340 *** -0.0325 *** -0.0307 *** -0.0276 *** -0.0369 *** -0.0321 *** -0.0301 *** -0.0371 *** -0.0354 *** -0.0340 *** -3.66 -8.07 -12.08 -10.75 -9.86 -11.10 -9.03 -8.20 -8.57 -8.19 -7.66 
Size 0.0004 -0.0022 *** -0.0010 *** -0.0011 *** -0.0007 ** -0.0007 -0.0010 ** -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0010 * -0.0014 ** 0.65 -4.07 -2.90 -3.09 -2.09 -1.59 -2.19 -1.05 -1.49 -1.93 -2.51 
Leverage -0.0025 -0.0001 -0.0036 -0.0055 ** -0.0052 ** -0.0023 -0.0059 * -0.0048 0.0003 -0.0031 -0.0026 -0.78 -0.03 -1.55 -2.35 -2.34 -0.79 -1.90 -1.51 0.07 -0.83 -0.69 
ROA -0.0036 -0.0639 *** -0.0285 *** -0.0089 -0.0052 -0.0325 *** -0.0061 -0.0092 -0.0463 *** -0.0308 *** -0.0240 ** -0.39 -5.55 -4.18 -1.25 -0.78 -3.90 -0.65 -0.91 -3.72 -2.63 -1.99 
Volatility -0.0003 0.0006 * 0.0004 0.0004 ** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0008 ** -0.0009 ** -0.99 1.93 1.56 2.00 1.10 0.68 0.70 -0.30 -1.61 -2.38 -2.35 
Interest 
Coverage 
-0.0023 *** -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0006 
-2.77 -1.62 -1.33 -1.54 -0.61 -1.17 -1.49 -0.86 -0.88 -1.29 -0.76 
Capex 0.0341 0.1728 *** 0.0992 *** 0.1016 *** 0.0905 *** 0.1242 *** 0.1041 *** 0.1041 *** 0.1527 *** 0.2040 *** 0.2270 *** 1.08 5.98 4.94 4.89 4.10 4.96 3.68 3.50 4.43 6.33 6.40 
Cash Flows -0.0010 ** 0.0010 ** 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 -2.16 2.46 1.18 -0.49 -0.10 0.37 -1.32 0.39 0.35 0.64 0.55 
Capital 
Intensity 
0.0009 -0.0046 0.0040 -0.0033 0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0071 -0.0034 -0.0127 * -0.0205 *** -0.0210 *** 
0.17 -0.65 0.86 -0.69 0.22 -0.11 -1.19 -0.53 -1.71 -2.89 -2.74 
Advertising -0.0016 -0.0385 *** -0.0213 *** -0.0150 *** -0.0149 *** -0.0241 *** -0.0164 *** -0.0181 *** -0.0280 *** -0.0359 *** -0.0404 *** -0.50 -7.35 -6.95 -4.52 -4.80 -5.99 -3.81 -4.06 -5.36 -7.07 -7.61 
Sales Growth -0.0089 *** 0.0075 ** 0.0064 *** 0.0103 *** 0.0127 *** 0.0035 0.0122 *** 0.0141 *** -0.0011 0.0044 0.0061 * -2.92 2.36 3.24 4.87 5.28 1.33 4.37 4.24 -0.31 1.36 1.81 
R&D Intensity 0.0594 *** 0.0581 *** 0.0474 *** 0.0594 *** 0.0429 *** 0.0410 *** 0.0593 *** 0.0496 *** 0.0698 *** 0.1043 *** 0.1029 *** 5.01 3.81 4.90 5.77 4.10 3.05 4.28 3.24 3.92 5.97 5.88 
Bond Liquidity 0.0006 0.60 
Bond Rating -0.0003 -0.59 
Years to 
Maturity 
0.0001 
1.15 
Convexity 0.0000 
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-0.03 
Duration -0.0013 -1.07 
Subordinated 0.0059 ** 2.01 
Intercept 0.0326 *** 0.1527 *** 0.0769 *** 0.0739 *** 0.0641 *** 0.0790 *** 0.0748 *** 0.0633 *** 0.0940 *** 0.0941 *** 0.0959 *** 2.76 15.98 12.50 11.76 10.09 10.17 9.07 7.54 9.39 9.92 9.79 
N 574 1579 1580 1580 1580 1580 1580 1580 1580 1580 1580 
Adj. R2 0.1632 0.1927 0.2081 0.1874 0.1654 0.1691 0.1345 0.1140 0.1256 0.1615 0.1642 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional regressions from regressing ten expected cost of equity and one cost of debt estimates on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-
specific and bond-specific control variables over my full sample period from 2004 to 2014. My ten proxies for the expected cost of equity are based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected 
market premium and are inferred from three capital asset pricing models including the CAPM, Fama/French, and Carhart models using daily, weekly, and monthly data frequencies. I regress 
each of the dependent variables for the expected cost of equity and debt separately. My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White 
heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported under each coefficient in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance 
levels. 
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7.4.3.2 Panel Regression Analysis (Fixed Effects) 
To further examine the cost of capital effects of ESG disclosure quality through space and 
time, I separately regress my ten proxies for the cost of equity capital on my ESG disclosure 
quality variable and several company-specific control variables using Panel regressions with 
fixed effects and robust standard errors as well as robust standard errors clustered at the 
sector level (2 digit ICB sector codes).109 Further, I repeat my analysis and also regress my 
cost of debt variable on my ESG disclosure quality variable, company-specific, and bond-
specific control variables using panel regressions with fixed effects. 
 To formally determine which of my tested panel models, fixed vs. random effects, are 
more efficient in producing the estimators, I conduct the Hausman specification test for each 
of my regression specifications (Brooks, 2008).110 My results of the Hausman specification 
test show that the fixed effects model is the more appropriate model for all panel regression 
specifications. Based on the results of the Hausman specification test, I report the results of 
my panel regressions with fixed effects. 
 Table 24 displays my main results of the panel analysis with fixed effects, which I 
estimate over the sample period from 2004 to 2014. Identical to my prior analysis, in each 
model, the dependent variable is the individual proxy for the cost of equity or cost of debt 
such as Bloomberg's cost of debt, Bloomberg's expected cost of equity, expected cost of 
equity based on Graham and Harvey's expected market premium and inferred from three 
alternative capital asset pricing models including the CAPM, Fama and French, and Carhart 
models, which I compute using daily, weekly, and monthly data frequencies. The 
independent variables include my ESG disclosure quality variable, eleven company-specific 
variables, and six bond-specific variables. Consistent with my previous cross-sectional 
regression results on the expected cost of equity and debt, I find strong and consistent 
evidence of ESG disclosure quality effects (through space and time) on the cost of equity and 
debt, using panel regressions. 
                                                 
109 All of my panel regressions with fixed effects are run with robust standard errors, using Huber/White 
heteroskedasticity-consitent standard errors. In addition, I repeat my panel regression analysis with fixed effects 
using robust standard errors clustered at the sector level. Clustering standard errors at sector level means that my 
observations are independent across different sectors, however not within sectors (Bauer and Hann, 2010).   
110 I perfomed this test as follows: First, I ran the fixed effects model (without robust standard errors) and stored 
the estimates of the fixed effects model. Second, I ran the random effects model (without robust standard 
errors). Finally, I compared the estimates of the fixed effects model with those of the random effects model. For 
each of my eleven regression specifications, my results convincingly show that the fixed effects model is the 
appropriate panel regression model.  
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 Columns 3 to 12 of Table 24, report the effects of ESG disclosure quality on several 
alternative proxies for the expected cost of equity capital, while also controlling for company-
specific characteristics. Consistent with my previous results (cross-sectional regressions), the 
coefficient on ESG disclosure quality is consistently negative and significant at the 1 percent 
significance level (t-ratios ranging from a minimum of -4.33 to -8.88). The negative 
association between my ESG disclosure quality variable and the expected cost of equity is 
consistent across alternative specifications. My results are consistent with Hypothesis 1, 
which posits that companies with high ESG disclosure quality have lower expected cost of 
equities. For example, an increase in a company's ESG disclosure quality would have reduced 
the expected cost of equity, on average, by at least 2.71 percent up to 5.13 percent over the 
estimated sample period, everything else held constant.111 My findings are in line with 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011), El Ghoul et al. (2011) and Sharfman and Fernando (2008). They all 
report that some form of ESG information such as the initiation of standalone ESG 
disclosures, environmental management, or human rights reduce a company's cost of equity. 
 Column 2 of Table 24, reports the effects of ESG disclosure quality on the cost of 
debt, while also controlling for company-specific and bond-specific variables, using panel 
regressions with fixed effects. In line with prior estimations, the coefficient on ESG 
disclosure quality is negative and significant at the 1 percent significance level (t-ratio of -
5.31). My result suggests, consistent with Hypothesis 2, that companies with high ESG 
disclosure quality have lower cost of debt capital. To give one example, an increase in a 
company's ESG disclosure quality would have reduced the company's cost of debt by 3.41 
percent, on average, over the estimated sample period, all else being equal. Once again, my 
findings are in line with Bauer and Hann (2010) and Oikonomou et al. (2014) 112. They report 
that several ESG dimensions such as corporate environmental management, community 
strengths, and product safety and quality strengths reduce corporate yield spreads (cost of 
debt). 
                                                 
111 My panel regression results with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the sector level are in 
line with my panel regression results with fixed effects and Huber/White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors. The coefficients on the ESG Disclosure variable are all negative and statistically significant at the 1 
percent significance level across all alternative panel regression specifications (-0.0340609 / -0.0270562 /  
-0.0441928 / -0.0418715 / -0.0404504 / -0.0490779 / -0.0465872 / -0.0471093 / -0.0512565 / -0.0466694 /  
-0.0452047) and t-stats (-4.09 / -3.33 / -10.62 / -5.59 / -5.01 / -8.22 / -5.18 / -4.93 / -5.39 / -5.95 / -7.14), 
respectively. 
112 Bauer and Hann (2010) report that environmental management strengths (as measured by KLD) reduce the 
cost of debt by -3.87 percent, while environmental management concerns increase the cost of debt by 4.91 
percent. Similarly, Oikonomou et al. (2014) also report that KLD's aggregated ESG strengths reduce the cost of 
debt by -6.08 percent, while KLD's aggregated ESG concerns increase the cost of debt by 65.12 percent.  
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 To better isolate the effect of ESG disclosure quality on the expected cost of equity 
and cost of debt, my regressions reported in Table 24 also display the estimated coefficients 
and t-ratios of all company-specific and bond-specific control variables.113 For example, the 
coefficient on size is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level 
across alternative specifications. As explained in my previous section, my result seems 
intuitive as larger companies tend to be less exposed to business and financial risks and are 
therefore expected to have lower cost of equity and debt capitals (Oikonomou et al. 2014). 
The negative association between size and the expected cost of equity is consistent with 
Sharfman and Fernando's (2008) findings, as well as Brammer & Pavelin (2008) who find 
that a company's environmental disclosure quality is negatively related to company size. 
Meaning that high quality disclosures are associated with larger firms and in sectors closely 
related to environmental concerns (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). The coefficients on 
Volatility, Cash Flows, and Sales Growth generally have the expected sign. More 
specifically, negative and statistically significant coefficients are reported for Cash Flows, 
while positive and statistically significant coefficients are reported for Volatility and Sales 
Growth. My findings on the coefficient exposures of the control variables are consistent with 
Bauer and Hann (2010), Bradley and Chen (2015), and Harjoto and Jo (2014). One exception 
is the coefficient on ROA, which is expected to be negatively associated with the cost of 
capital. As Oikonomou et al. (2014) note, ROA is related to a company's efficient use of its 
assets to generate profits. Meaning that an increase in a company's ROA should lead to a 
decrease in its cost of capital because the company stands a better chance of serving its debt 
and equity obligations (Bauer and Hann, 2010; Oikonomou et al., 2014). However, my results 
show that the coefficient on ROA is positive and statistically significant, across alternative 
specifications.114 
 To conclude, my main regression results using cross-sectional and panel regressions 
with fixed effects and robust standard errors as well as robust standard errors clustered at the 
sector level, support both hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 predicts that companies with high ESG 
disclosure quality have lower expected cost of equities. My regression results show a 
negative association between ESG disclosure quality and the expected cost of equity, 
                                                 
113 Please note that my panel regressions with fixed effects for the cost of debt variable exclude four bond-
specific characteristics (including Bond Liquidity, Years to Maturity, Convexity, and Subordinate Dummy) 
because these four variables do not have a time component, they stay constant across the full sample period and 
are therefore automatically excluded.  
114 One reason for this deviation could be related to the way Oikonomou et al. (2014) compute ROA, which 
differs from my computation. Oikonomou et al. (2014) use EBIT over Total Assets, whereas my chapter uses 
Net Income before Extraordinary Items over Total Assets (in line with Bauer and Hann, 2010).  
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controlling for company-specific characteristics. My finding is consistent across various 
specifications. Hypothesis 2 predicts that companies with high ESG disclosure quality have 
lower cost of debt. Again, my results show a significantly negative relationship between ESG 
disclosure quality and the cost of debt, while also controlling for company- and debt-specific 
characteristics. As a result, my findings of the relation between ESG disclosure quality and 
the expected cost of equity and debt imply that the market prices a company's ESG disclosure 
quality along with other factors. Thus, my results contribute to the existing literature by 
complementing and extending the works of Sharfman and Fernando (2008), Dhaliwal et al. 
(2011), El Ghoul et al. (2011), Bauer and Hann (2010), and Oikonomou et al. (2014), which 
also report that companies with high ESG are associated with lower cost of equity and debt 
capital, using alternative proxies for ESG, the expected cost of equity, and cost of debt.  
7.4.4 Robustness Tests 
7.4.4.1 Cross-Sectional Year-by-Year Analysis (Temporal consistency) 
To test whether my observed negative association between ESG disclosure quality and the 
cost of capital changes over time, I repeat my main analysis for each year of my sample 
period and for each of my expected cost of equity and debt proxies, separately. Overall, the 
expected cost of equity results from my robustness tests are strongly consistent and in-line 
with my previous results. However, the cost of debt results from my robustness tests for 
temporal consistency deviate from my main analysis. I will discuss the findings of my 
robustness analysis in the following paragraph. All additional tables of my robustness tests 
for temporal stability can be found in Chapter 7.6. 'Chapter Appendix'. 
 Tables 25 to 34 display the effects of ESG disclosure quality on several alternative 
proxies for the expected cost of equity capital for each year of my overall sample period, 
while controlling for company-specific characteristics. Overall, the coefficient on ESG 
disclosure quality is consistently negative and generally statistically significant across all 
individual years and ten different specifications. The negative association between ESG 
disclosure quality and the expected cost of equity tends to be strongest for Bloomberg's 
expected cost of equiy and those inferred from asset pricing models with daily data 
frequencies. Furthermore, the observed relationship is strongest for expected cost of equities 
from Bloomberg and inferred from the CAPM and Fama and French asset pricing models. 
 Thus, the results of my first robustness test for temporal stability provide additional 
support to prior results, consistent with Hypothesis 1, confirming that companies with high 
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ESG disclosure quality have lower expected cost of equities. Accordingly, my additional 
findings of the relation between ESG disclosure quality and the expected cost of equity imply 
that the market prices a company's ESG disclosure quality along with other factors over the 
full sample period as well as multiple individual years.  
 Table 24 reports the effects of ESG disclosure on my cost of debt proxy for each year 
of my overall sample period, while controlling for company- and bond-specific 
characteristics. In contrast to prior results, the coefficient on ESG disclosure quality is not 
consistently negative and also not statistically significant in any of the individual years. 
While this result contradicts my previous finding of a negative and statistically significant 
association between ESG disclosure quality and the cost of debt, the results in Table 24 
should be interpreted with some caution due to the small number of observations in each 
annual regression. For example, the regressions of my robustness test have a minimum of 24 
and a maximum of 81 observations. 
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Table 24: Panel Fixed Effects Cost of Debt & Cost of Equity Regressions 
          Daily Data Weekly Data Monthly Data 
  
CD 
Bloomberg 
CE 
Bloomberg 
CE 
CAPM 
CE Fama & 
French CE Carhart 
CE 
CAPM 
CE Fama & 
French CE Carhart 
CE 
CAPM 
CE Fama & 
French CE Carhart 
ESG Disclosure -0.0341 *** -0.0271 *** -0.0442 *** -0.0419 *** -0.0405 *** -0.0491 *** -0.0466 *** -0.0471 *** -0.0513 *** -0.0467 *** -0.0452 *** 
-5.31 -4.33 -8.88 -7.04 -7.01 -8.38 -6.84 -6.74 -6.88 -6.27 -6.34 
Size -0.0092 *** -0.0056 ** -0.0122 *** -0.0126 *** -0.0133 *** -0.0108 *** -0.0106 *** -0.0112 *** -0.0161 *** -0.0107 *** -0.0109 *** 
-3.92 -2.16 -5.80 -4.73 -5.21 -4.62 -3.18 -3.13 -5.50 -4.01 -3.83 
Leverage 0.0137 * -0.0019 -0.0071 -0.0073 -0.0081 -0.0059 -0.0047 -0.0033 -0.0147 -0.0169 * -0.0129 
1.87 -0.31 -1.14 -1.04 -1.27 -0.93 -0.71 -0.53 -1.39 -1.83 -1.45 
ROA 0.0081 -0.0103 0.0069 0.0230 ** 0.0238 ** 0.0138 * 0.0450 *** 0.0390 *** 0.0231 ** 0.0282 *** 0.0350 *** 
0.88 -1.06 0.86 2.10 2.24 1.82 3.75 3.27 2.15 2.63 3.13 
Volatility 0.0010 0.0045 *** 0.0030 *** 0.0043 *** 0.0020 *** 0.0019 ** 0.0036 *** 0.0020 ** 0.0008 0.0018 ** 0.0021 ** 
1.05 5.17 4.98 6.38 3.21 2.26 3.86 2.05 1.02 2.03 2.43 
Interest Coverage -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0013 0.0012 -0.0003 0.0001 
-0.21 -0.40 -1.09 -1.58 -1.46 -0.50 -1.64 -1.51 1.15 -0.39 0.09 
Capex 0.0542 -0.0749 *** -0.0279 0.0120 0.0014 0.0151 0.0364 0.0233 0.0117 0.0142 0.0493 
1.44 -2.62 -1.06 0.41 0.05 0.34 0.82 0.53 0.36 0.44 1.49 
Cash Flows -0.0024 *** -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0008 ** -0.0007 -0.0010 *** -0.0020 *** -0.0014 -0.0014 ** -0.0011 ** -0.0013 ** 
-3.64 -0.12 -1.35 -2.14 -1.60 -2.71 -2.89 -1.55 -2.40 -2.04 -2.39 
Capital Intensity 0.0255 ** 0.0085 -0.0149 -0.0425 -0.0409 -0.0174 -0.0498 -0.0419 -0.0309 -0.0279 -0.0641 
2.11 0.44 -1.16 -2.02 -2.18 -0.94 -1.84 -1.59 -1.76 -1.44 -2.93 
Advertising -0.0025 0.0122 0.0059 0.0225 0.0173 -0.0082 0.0068 -0.0026 0.0253 0.0484 ** 0.0585 *** 
-0.16 0.64 0.41 1.25 1.04 -0.49 0.33 -0.11 1.13 2.43 3.08 
Sales Growth -0.0055 * 0.0131 *** 0.0068 *** 0.0084 *** 0.0107 *** 0.0066 *** 0.0131 *** 0.0142 *** 0.0072 *** 0.0082 *** 0.0106 *** 
-1.87 4.62 3.53 3.67 4.16 2.71 3.96 4.10 3.02 3.20 4.25 
R&D Intensity -0.0356 -0.0146 -0.0627 * -0.0637 * -0.0324 0.0020 0.0290 0.0676 -0.1499 * -0.1008 * -0.0842 
-0.63 -0.24 -1.78 -1.72 -0.87 0.04 0.56 1.09 -1.90 -1.93 -1.40 
Bond Liquidity 
Bond Rating 0.0018 
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1.48 
Years to Maturity 
Convexity 
Duration -0.0007 
-0.45 
Subordinated 
Intercept 0.1714 *** 0.1722 *** 0.2558 *** 0.2551 *** 0.2751 *** 0.2390 *** 0.2203 *** 0.2366 *** 0.3372 *** 0.2397 *** 0.2360 *** 
4.67 3.95 7.35 5.52 6.26 6.08 3.79 3.79 6.89 5.39 4.98 
N 574 1579 1580 1580 1580 1580 1580 1580 1580 1580 1580 
Adj. R2 0.1913 0.0936 0.2401 0.2077 0.2168 0.1666 0.1439 0.1355 0.2520 0.1933 0.2058 
Notes: This table reports panel regressions with fixed effects from regressing ten expected cost of equity and one cost of debt estimates on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of
company-specific and bond-specific control variables over my full sample period from 2004 to 2014. My ten proxies for the expected cost of equity are based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) 
expected market premium and are inferred from three capital asset pricing models including the CAPM, Fama/French, and Carhart models using daily, weekly, and monthly data frequencies. I 
regress each of the dependent variables for the expected cost of equity and debt separately. My panel regressions with fixed effects are estimated with robust standard errors, using 
Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. My cost of debt regressions exclude four bond-specific characteristics including Bond Liquidity, Years to Maturity, Convexity, and 
Subordinated Dummy, because these variables do not have a time component their values are constant across time. T-ratios are reported under each coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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7.4.4.2 Cross-Sectional Stepwise Regression Analysis 
To test whether my observed negative association between ESG disclosure quality and the 
cost of capital is influenced by the inclusion and/or exclusion of certain company-specific or 
bond-specific characteristics, I repeat my analysis, using a stepwise regression approach, 
whereby I re-run my original regression model by consecutively adding one control variable 
at a time. For example, in my first stepwise regression model, I regress my dependent 
variable on the ESG disclosure quality variable excluding all company- and bond-specific 
characteristics, such as size, leverage, ROA, Volatility, Interest Coverage, Capex, Cash 
Flows, Capital Intensity, Advertising, Sales Growth, R&D Intensity, Bond Liquidity, Bond 
Rating, Years to Maturity, Convexity, Duration, and a dummy for Subordinate Debt. In my 
second stepwise regression model, I regress my dependent variable on the ESG disclosure 
quality variable and the size variable. I continue with the stepwise regression approach until I 
include all company- and bond-specific characteristic.  
 Overall, the results from my additional stepwise regression analyses in Tables 35 to 
45 are highly consistent with prior results of my primary regression analysis. 
 Tables 36 to 45 display the effects of ESG disclosure quality on ten alternative 
proxies for the expected cost of equity using the stepwise regression analysis approach over 
my full sample period. My results show that the coefficient on ESG disclosure quality is 
consistently negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level across all 
alternative stepwise regression specifications. Generally, my findings tend to be strongest for 
Bloomberg's expected cost of equity estimate and expected cost of equities inferred from the 
CAPM model. For example, t-ratios for the coefficient on ESG disclosure quality across all 
stepwise regressions range between -5.96 and -15.97. The results of my second robustness 
test provide additional support to my previous main findings, because the coefficient on ESG 
disclosure quality is also consistently negative, statistically significant, and similar in 
magnitude. Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 1, I can confirm that companies with high ESG 
disclosure quality have lower expected cost of equities. 
 Further, Table 35 displays the effects of ESG disclosure quality on my cost of debt 
variable using the stepwise regression analysis approach. The coefficient on ESG disclosure 
quality is also consistently negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent significance 
level across all specifications. Therefore, my additional regression results provide additional 
support to prior results, consistent with Hypothesis 2, that companies with high ESG 
disclosure quality have lower cost of debt.  
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7.5 Conclusion 
My chapter empirically investigates whether Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) 
disclosure quality affects a company's expected cost of equity and debt capital. I hypothesise 
that companies with high ESG disclosure quality have lower expected cost of equity and 
debt, due to low ESG disclosure quality companies' smaller-sized investor base (Merton, 
1987), higher systematic risk (Lambert et al., 2007), and higher company-specific risks such 
as future litigation and reputational risks (Bauer and Hann, 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El 
Ghoul et al., 2011; Starks, 2009). Investigating a large sample of S&P 500 US companies 
from 2004 to 2014, and controlling for company- and bond-specific characteristics as well as 
temporal consistency and stepwise regression analysis tests, I find ESG disclosure quality to 
have a negative and statistically significant impact on both, cost of equity and debt financing. 
In other words, companies with high ESG disclosure quality have lower expected cost of 
equities and cost of debt. The empirical results are consistent with both of my hypotheses. 
My chapter adds to the existing literature on the effects of ESG criteria, more generally, and 
ESG disclosure, more specifically, on the cost of equity and cost of debt, by showing that a 
company's ESG disclosure quality can increase company value by reducing a company's 
expected cost of equity and debt.  
 Future research could investigate the effects of ESG disclosure quality on the 
expected cost of equity and debt globally. It could be that in other geographical contexts a 
different association between ESG disclosure quality and the expected cost of equity and debt 
exists. Also, future research could investigate this relationship beyond the constituents of the 
S&P 500 index. Methodologically, future research could use alternative proxies of the cost of 
equity and cost of debt. For example, releated studies (see e.g. Bauer and Hann, 2010; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Oikonomou et al., 2014) use implied cost of 
equities or corporate bond yield spread. Future research could then empirically re-examine 
the relation between ESG disclosure quality and these alternative proxies. This would 
increase the reliability and validity of empirical studies' findings researching the relevance of 
ESG disclosure quality for equity and debt investors. 
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7.6 Chapter Appendix 
 
Table 25: Cost of Debt Bloomberg - Annual Regressions 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ESG Disclosure 0.0112 0.73 -0.0013 -0.11 0.0105 1.00 0.0037 0.33 0.0084 0.86 0.0022 0.35 -0.0017 -0.40 0.0072 1.13 -0.0022 -0.59 
Size -0.0039 * -1.75 0.0015 1.04 0.0006 0.44 -0.0002 -0.10 0.0009 0.75 -0.0010 * -1.66 -0.0007 -1.29 -0.0010 -1.50 0.0000 0.04 
Leverage 0.0125 0.37 -0.0252 * -1.74 -0.0148 ** -2.28 -0.0130 * -1.71 0.0021 0.24 -0.0054 -1.38 -0.0034 -0.79 0.0013 0.24 -0.0077 ** -2.22 
ROA -0.2062 -0.74 0.0683 1.41 0.0212 0.72 0.0465 * 1.76 -0.0037 -0.24 0.0230 1.32 0.0011 0.09 -0.0051 -0.39 0.0102 0.82 
Volatility 0.0032 * 1.81 0.0020 1.59 0.0006 0.58 0.0008 0.59 -0.0008 -0.90 0.0003 0.87 -0.0006 -1.48 -0.0019 *** -4.58 -0.0002 -0.73 
Interest Coverage 0.0047 1.02 -0.0084 ** -2.30 -0.0010 -1.23 -0.0034 -1.38 -0.0023 -1.43 -0.0034 *** -2.94 -0.0017 ** -2.31 -0.0017 -1.19 -0.0036 *** -3.61 
Capex 0.1966 1.26 0.1145 1.37 -0.0125 -0.18 -0.0744 -0.75 -0.0952 -1.11 0.0108 0.29 0.0432 1.46 -0.0029 -0.08 0.0268 1.08 
Cash Flows -0.0144 -0.30 -0.0057 *** -2.86 -0.0061 -1.02 -0.0106 *** -2.70 -0.0015 -0.43 0.0002 0.20 0.0001 0.20 -0.0002 -0.39 -0.0006 *** -3.76 
Capital Intensity 0.0204 0.52 -0.0274 ** -2.03 -0.0022 -0.17 -0.0004 -0.02 0.0043 0.45 -0.0013 -0.22 -0.0068 -1.29 -0.0017 -0.20 -0.0095 -1.60 
Advertising 0.1323 * 1.86 -0.0214 -1.12 0.0080 0.75 -0.0056 -0.67 -0.0073 -1.27 -0.0059 -1.35 -0.0030 -0.50 -0.0069 ** -2.18 -0.0018 -0.47 
Sales Growth 0.0021 0.05 0.0084 1.08 -0.0103 -0.95 -0.0166 -1.37 -0.0106 -1.64 -0.0057 * -1.78 0.0097 * 1.67 -0.0005 -0.08 0.0031 1.01 
R&D Intensity -0.2550 -1.26 0.1555 *** 3.53 0.0386 1.16 0.0432 1.53 0.0418 1.32 0.0214 1.57 0.0336 ** 2.26 0.0439 *** 3.00 0.0273 * 1.95 
Bond Liquidity -0.0002 -0.07 -0.0061 -1.56 -0.0014 -0.66 0.0015 0.58 -0.0018 -0.66 0.0005 0.47 0.0021 ** 2.14 0.0023 ** 2.32 0.0008 0.81 
Bond Rating 0.0037 1.19 -0.0013 -0.85 -0.0022 -1.64 -0.0025 ** -2.13 0.0003 0.21 -0.0005 -0.99 -0.0010 ** -2.36 -0.0022 *** -3.81 -0.0012 *** -2.77 
Years to Maturity 0.0009 1.51 -0.0004 -1.30 0.0001 0.54 0.0002 0.91 0.0004 1.57 -0.0002 -1.36 0.0000 0.30 0.0002 1.55 -0.0001 -0.92 
Convexity 0.0032 0.79 -0.0014 -0.94 -0.0001 -0.07 0.0007 0.60 0.0018 1.16 0.0008 1.44 -0.0009 -1.42 0.0017 ** 2.21 -0.0005 -1.10 
Duration -0.0048 -0.60 -0.0007 -0.29 -0.0009 -0.40 -0.0005 -0.33 -0.0058 -1.22 0.0036 1.45 0.0017 0.95 -0.0009 -0.42 0.0023 0.90 
Subordinated 0.0011 0.07 -0.0022 -0.34 -0.0039 -0.63 -0.0013 -0.27 -0.0018 -0.35 0.0077 *** 2.62 0.0032 1.07 0.0080 *** 5.15 0.0069 *** 3.14 
Intercept 0.0258 0.51 0.1217 *** 3.21 0.0525 * 1.91 0.0532 * 1.76 0.0551 * 1.83 0.0366 *** 2.86 0.0042 0.33 0.0285 ** 2.03 0.0260 *** 2.72 
N 21 39 64 69 69 73 78 81 80 
Adj. R2 0.5393 0.5397 0.0066 0.1376 0.1243 0.3827 0.3292 0.4960 0.3996 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional regressions from regressing Bloomberg's cost of debt estimate on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific and bond-specific characteristics 
over each year of my sample period separately. My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are 
reported next to each coefficient's statistical significance. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 26: Cost of Equity Bloomberg - Annual Regressions 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ESG Disclosure -0.0363 ** -2.07 -0.0104 -0.64 -0.0220 -1.52 -0.0269 *** -2.82 -0.0583 *** -4.74 -0.0401 *** -2.90 -0.0248 ** -2.14 -0.0186 ** -2.15 -0.0270 *** -3.34 
Size -0.0040 *** -2.64 -0.0038 ** -2.21 -0.0026 -1.40 -0.0017 -1.35 0.0006 0.29 -0.0027 -1.55 -0.0016 -1.10 -0.0023 ** -2.28 -0.0006 -0.51 
Leverage 0.0335 ** 2.09 0.0203 * 1.71 0.0136 1.11 0.0094 1.26 -0.0017 -0.19 -0.0002 -0.02 -0.0167 * -1.83 -0.0030 -0.49 -0.0089 -1.19 
ROA -0.0884 -1.39 -0.0112 -0.33 -0.0364 -1.10 -0.0690 *** -3.60 -0.0619 ** -2.39 -0.0977 -1.43 -0.0851 *** -3.28 -0.0789 *** -3.28 -0.0064 -0.17 
Volatility 0.0001 0.04 0.0001 0.14 0.0013 1.27 0.0013 * 1.74 0.0015 1.35 0.0000 0.03 0.0002 0.14 -0.0011 * -1.71 0.0001 0.07 
Interest Coverage 0.0086 *** 3.19 0.0022 1.32 0.0001 0.03 -0.0019 -1.45 -0.0040 * -1.92 -0.0031 * -1.76 -0.0020 -1.10 0.0008 0.56 -0.0013 -0.80 
Capex 0.0299 0.34 0.0485 0.74 0.2548 *** 3.43 0.3392 *** 5.96 0.0377 0.43 0.3138 *** 3.29 0.2960 *** 3.20 0.1534 ** 2.17 0.1422 ** 2.40 
Cash Flows -0.0021 -0.45 0.0006 0.35 0.0006 0.95 0.0015 1.13 -0.0003 -0.09 0.0005 0.11 0.0025 1.58 0.0001 0.08 -0.0015 *** -2.78 
Capital Intensity 0.0093 0.43 0.0035 0.24 -0.0331 -1.64 -0.0486 *** -3.20 0.0292 1.47 -0.0054 -0.27 -0.0272 -1.14 -0.0144 -0.82 -0.0260 * -1.76 
Advertising -0.0639 *** -3.36 -0.0537 *** -2.93 -0.0450 *** -3.29 -0.0262 *** -2.63 -0.0306 * -1.94 -0.0604 *** -3.27 -0.0463 *** -3.10 -0.0224 * -1.69 -0.0279 *** -2.62 
Sales Growth -0.0019 -0.12 -0.0059 -0.70 -0.0015 -0.14 -0.0380 *** -4.67 0.0244 *** 3.73 0.0306 *** 3.60 -0.0006 -0.05 -0.0111 -0.94 0.0033 0.44 
R&D Intensity 0.0893 ** 2.01 0.1126 *** 2.71 0.0183 0.40 -0.0038 -0.14 -0.0117 -0.31 0.1407 *** 3.17 0.0851 1.45 0.0437 1.06 0.0532 ** 2.07 
Intercept 0.1476 *** 4.09 0.1659 *** 6.42 0.1609 *** 5.30 0.1784 *** 8.29 0.1050 *** 3.21 0.1498 *** 5.61 0.1657 *** 5.99 0.1688 *** 8.34 0.1257 *** 5.62 
N 62 124 203 211 202 197 194 194 186 
Adj. R2 0.3437 0.1270 0.0970 0.3998 0.3050 0.2711 0.1878 0.2020 0.1400 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional regressions from regressing Bloomberg's expected cost of equity estimate on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific characteristics over each 
year of my sample period separately. My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported next to 
each coefficient's statistical significance. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 27: Cost of Equity CAPM (Daily) - Annual Regressions 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ESG Disclosure -0.0211 * -1.79 -0.0032 -0.28 -0.0264 *** -3.35 -0.0132 * -1.81 -0.0192 *** -4.19 -0.0207 *** -2.73 -0.0221 *** -3.25 -0.0133 *** -3.33 -0.0165 *** -2.79 
Size -0.0039 *** -3.28 -0.0015 -1.53 -0.0003 -0.39 -0.0022 *** -2.62 -0.0011 * -1.67 -0.0020 ** -2.17 -0.0010 -1.09 -0.0010 ** -2.09 -0.0016 * -1.92 
Leverage 0.0189 * 1.80 0.0110 1.44 0.0034 0.62 0.0092 * 1.71 0.0020 0.61 -0.0052 -0.93 -0.0130 ** -2.14 -0.0039 -1.46 -0.0080 -1.56 
ROA -0.1028 ** -2.54 -0.0178 -0.84 -0.0021 -0.13 -0.0488 *** -3.38 -0.0366 *** -3.73 -0.0552 -1.30 -0.0308 -1.19 -0.0228 ** -2.28 -0.0502 ** -2.11 
Volatility 0.0010 0.92 0.0001 0.15 0.0007 1.43 0.0008 1.57 0.0006 1.42 -0.0006 -0.98 -0.0001 -0.24 -0.0003 -0.87 0.0000 -0.06 
Interest Coverage 0.0048 *** 2.59 0.0022 ** 2.19 0.0001 0.19 -0.0002 -0.26 -0.0012 * -1.75 -0.0024 ** -2.29 -0.0016 -1.34 -0.0016 ** -2.56 -0.0006 -0.49 
Capex 0.1623 *** 2.65 0.0122 0.32 0.1386 *** 3.68 0.1672 *** 4.75 0.0750 ** 2.17 0.1291 ** 2.46 0.1394 *** 2.73 0.0402 1.21 0.1680 *** 3.73 
Cash Flows 0.0012 0.35 0.0008 0.67 -0.0002 -0.58 0.0005 0.51 0.0006 0.49 -0.0001 -0.05 0.0001 0.09 0.0004 1.20 0.0001 0.22 
Capital Intensity -0.0032 -0.22 0.0092 0.90 -0.0053 -0.48 -0.0233 ** -2.12 0.0003 0.04 -0.0010 -0.10 -0.0073 -0.53 -0.0017 -0.21 -0.0265 ** -2.43 
Advertising -0.0432 *** -3.34 -0.0332 *** -3.55 -0.0307 *** -4.37 -0.0228 *** -3.28 -0.0189 *** -3.09 -0.0307 *** -3.57 -0.0279 *** -2.58 -0.0080 -1.32 -0.0200 *** -3.68 
Sales Growth 0.0091 0.83 0.0014 0.25 0.0024 0.59 -0.0377 *** -5.79 0.0135 *** 4.34 0.0162 *** 3.31 0.0040 0.59 0.0039 0.76 0.0214 ** 2.57 
R&D Intensity 0.1383 *** 3.94 0.0334 1.27 0.0111 0.50 -0.0160 -0.95 0.0279 * 1.85 0.0652 *** 2.63 0.0944 ** 2.43 0.0382 *** 3.12 0.0535 *** 3.16 
Intercept 0.0967 *** 4.21 0.0788 *** 5.02 0.0736 *** 5.32 0.1297 *** 9.42 0.0633 *** 5.62 0.1015 *** 7.17 0.0870 *** 5.06 0.0640 *** 6.68 0.0675 *** 3.88 
N 62 124 203 211 202 198 194 194 186 
Adj. R2 0.5503 0.0931 0.2214 0.4473 0.4014 0.2860 0.2278 0.2319 0.3155 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific characteristics over over each year of my 
sample period separately. My proxy for the expected cost of equity is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from the CAPM using daily data frequencies. My cross-
sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported next to each coefficient's statistical significance. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 28: Cost of Equity Fama/French (Daily) - Annual Regressions 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ESG Disclosure -0.0207 -1.18 -0.0055 -0.46 -0.0288 *** -3.28 -0.0113 * -1.68 -0.0054 -1.46 -0.0242 *** -2.97 -0.0235 *** -3.52 -0.0088 * -1.88 -0.0121 * -1.95 
Size -0.0033 ** -2.10 -0.0023 ** -2.21 -0.0018 ** -2.00 -0.0011 -1.55 -0.0004 -1.03 -0.0013 -1.37 -0.0010 -1.17 -0.0008 -1.49 -0.0011 -1.23 
Leverage 0.0112 0.82 0.0081 1.05 0.0042 0.67 0.0020 0.47 -0.0014 -0.46 -0.0078 -1.30 -0.0140 ** -2.31 -0.0034 -1.07 -0.0040 -0.71 
ROA -0.0585 -0.92 -0.0070 -0.34 -0.0017 -0.09 -0.0126 -0.91 -0.0446 *** -4.62 -0.0507 -1.19 -0.0095 -0.35 0.0027 0.20 -0.0435 -1.63 
Volatility 0.0004 0.29 0.0001 0.08 0.0009 1.58 0.0006 1.51 0.0002 0.54 -0.0005 -0.88 -0.0002 -0.33 0.0001 0.34 0.0000 -0.06 
Interest Coverage 0.0027 1.10 0.0012 1.16 0.0002 0.29 0.0002 0.27 -0.0004 -0.99 -0.0018 -1.53 -0.0008 -0.71 -0.0021 ** -2.46 0.0000 -0.01 
Capex 0.2099 ** 2.01 -0.0256 -0.61 0.1661 *** 3.95 0.1533 *** 6.11 0.0582 ** 2.46 0.1779 *** 3.08 0.1216 *** 2.61 0.0390 1.19 0.0958 * 1.81 
Cash Flows 0.0007 0.15 0.0006 0.56 -0.0002 -0.53 0.0005 0.51 0.0026 *** 2.59 0.0010 0.34 -0.0006 -0.51 0.0001 0.20 -0.0002 -0.52 
Capital Intensity 0.0043 0.17 0.0252 ** 2.28 -0.0108 -0.88 -0.0174 * -1.94 -0.0121 ** -2.37 -0.0096 -0.82 -0.0099 -0.77 -0.0188 ** -2.41 -0.0261 ** -2.18 
Advertising -0.0743 *** -3.64 -0.0356 *** -3.66 -0.0346 *** -4.79 -0.0125 ** -2.08 -0.0075 -1.47 -0.0195 ** -2.08 -0.0206 ** -2.01 0.0014 0.22 -0.0111 ** -2.30 
Sales Growth 0.0167 0.77 -0.0044 -0.74 0.0008 0.17 -0.0126 ** -2.22 0.0058 ** 2.04 0.0218 *** 3.99 0.0087 1.34 0.0226 *** 3.38 0.0379 *** 3.54 
R&D Intensity 0.0928 ** 2.36 0.0147 0.55 0.0193 0.79 0.0273 1.53 0.0456 *** 3.49 0.0983 *** 3.74 0.0930 ** 2.22 0.0657 *** 3.26 0.0924 *** 4.13 
Intercept 0.0919 ** 2.52 0.0999 *** 6.09 0.1022 *** 6.71 0.0886 *** 7.08 0.0608 *** 7.91 0.0829 *** 5.62 0.0804 *** 4.82 0.0392 *** 3.42 0.0341 * 1.76 
N 62 124 203 211 202 198 194 194 186 
Adj. R2 0.3729 0.1519 0.2411 0.2349 0.2740 0.2687 0.2296 0.3076 0.4000 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific characteristics over each year of my sample 
period separately. My proxy for the expected cost of equity is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from Fama/French's asset pricing model using daily data 
frequencies. My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported next to each coefficient's 
statistical significance. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 29: Cost of Equity Carhart (Daily) - Annual Regressions 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ESG Disclosure -0.0218 -1.30 0.0004 0.02 -0.0265 *** -2.96 -0.0092 -1.63 -0.0036 -0.97 -0.0200 ** -2.34 -0.0230 *** -3.89 -0.0053 -1.32 -0.0128 ** -2.02 
Size -0.0031 ** -2.02 -0.0032 ** -2.45 -0.0008 -0.84 -0.0005 -0.73 0.0000 -0.05 -0.0015 -1.56 -0.0006 -0.82 -0.0007 -1.27 -0.0005 -0.51 
Leverage 0.0120 0.91 0.0129 1.34 0.0009 0.13 -0.0012 -0.34 -0.0027 -0.89 -0.0096 -1.49 -0.0119 ** -2.20 -0.0037 -1.32 -0.0046 -0.82 
ROA -0.0627 -1.04 0.0122 0.47 0.0300 1.59 -0.0018 -0.16 -0.0475 *** -4.14 -0.0552 -1.40 -0.0017 -0.07 -0.0068 -0.61 -0.0412 -1.59 
Volatility 0.0005 0.32 0.0001 0.15 0.0004 0.71 0.0005 1.48 0.0003 0.79 -0.0006 -1.00 -0.0001 -0.22 0.0001 0.30 -0.0005 -1.08 
Interest Coverage 0.0026 1.14 0.0020 1.49 0.0006 1.03 0.0003 0.46 -0.0005 -1.29 -0.0019 -1.63 -0.0009 -0.91 -0.0013 -1.58 -0.0001 -0.09 
Capex 0.2008 ** 2.02 -0.0207 -0.45 0.1098 * 1.81 0.0924 *** 3.74 0.0478 ** 2.16 0.1846 *** 3.21 0.0800 * 1.91 0.0765 *** 2.63 0.1900 *** 3.55 
Cash Flows 0.0013 0.27 -0.0004 -0.31 -0.0007 -1.59 0.0001 0.13 0.0033 *** 2.66 0.0012 0.44 -0.0006 -0.62 0.0003 0.53 0.0001 0.17 
Capital Intensity 0.0059 0.24 0.0229 * 1.90 0.0108 0.71 -0.0078 -0.99 -0.0109 ** -2.24 -0.0139 -1.12 -0.0036 -0.32 -0.0205 *** -2.85 -0.0290 ** -2.40 
Advertising -0.0676 *** -3.49 -0.0515 *** -4.53 -0.0376 *** -4.55 -0.0053 -1.13 -0.0059 -1.22 -0.0217 ** -2.35 -0.0140 -1.60 -0.0006 -0.14 -0.0153 *** -2.71 
Sales Growth 0.0143 0.70 -0.0014 -0.19 0.0202 *** 3.70 -0.0047 -0.97 0.0033 1.30 0.0210 *** 3.99 0.0110 * 1.92 0.0112 ** 2.01 0.0186 ** 2.22 
R&D Intensity 0.0955 ** 2.47 0.0107 0.34 -0.0056 -0.20 0.0282 * 1.77 0.0409 *** 3.10 0.1072 *** 3.75 0.0829 ** 2.26 0.0345 ** 2.39 0.0459 ** 2.11 
Intercept 0.0884 ** 2.55 0.1096 *** 5.66 0.0627 *** 3.63 0.0693 *** 6.06 0.0561 *** 8.02 0.0892 *** 5.79 0.0675 *** 4.55 0.0469 *** 4.13 0.0475 *** 2.63 
N 62 124 203 211 202 198 194 194 186 
Adj. R2 0.3587 0.1738 0.2855 0.1330 0.2390 0.2600 0.2124 0.1787 0.2227 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific characteristics over each year of my sample 
period separately. My proxy for the expected cost of equity is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from Carhart's asset pricing model using daily data frequencies. My
cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported next to each coefficient's statistical significance. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 30: Cost of Equity CAPM (Weekly) - Annual Regressions 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ESG Disclosure -0.0391 ** -2.35 -0.0026 -0.17 -0.0284 *** -2.62 -0.0191 ** -2.30 -0.0262 *** -4.85 -0.0210 ** -2.22 -0.0249 *** -3.20 -0.0091 0.01 -0.0263 *** -2.93 
Size -0.0047 *** -2.92 -0.0014 -0.85 -0.0007 -0.48 -0.0011 -1.02 -0.0003 -0.40 -0.0023 ** -2.00 -0.0007 -0.65 -0.0017 0.00 -0.0007 -0.52 
Leverage 0.0305 * 1.78 0.0154 1.57 0.0103 1.27 0.0074 1.16 0.0034 0.83 -0.0028 -0.40 -0.0143 ** -2.14 0.0033 0.00 -0.0150 * -1.80 
ROA -0.1590 ** -2.19 -0.0114 -0.36 -0.0401 * -1.85 -0.0496 *** -3.03 -0.0283 ** -2.17 -0.0798 -1.43 -0.0343 -1.35 -0.0424 0.02 -0.0106 -0.26 
Volatility 0.0011 0.64 -0.0006 -0.76 0.0008 1.18 0.0005 0.77 0.0011 ** 2.30 -0.0006 -0.79 -0.0005 -0.76 -0.0005 0.00 -0.0001 -0.15 
Interest Coverage 0.0091 *** 3.56 0.0016 1.19 -0.0003 -0.30 -0.0008 -0.72 -0.0013 -1.61 -0.0020 -1.49 -0.0028 ** -2.08 0.0013 0.00 -0.0019 -1.12 
Capex 0.0598 0.82 0.0156 0.25 0.2538 *** 4.86 0.1598 *** 3.63 0.0775 * 1.82 0.2448 *** 3.31 0.1457 ** 2.30 0.0743 0.05 0.1781 *** 2.64 
Cash Flows -0.0017 -0.34 -0.0001 -0.05 0.0006 1.42 -0.0002 -0.18 -0.0008 -0.54 0.0013 0.37 0.0012 0.91 -0.0010 0.00 -0.0004 -0.54 
Capital Intensity 0.0048 0.21 0.0096 0.75 -0.0300 * -1.95 -0.0240 ** -1.99 0.0014 0.16 -0.0102 -0.71 -0.0066 -0.40 -0.0137 0.01 -0.0258 -1.50 
Advertising -0.0466 *** -2.67 -0.0229 -1.48 -0.0347 *** -3.79 -0.0194 ** -2.27 -0.0217 *** -3.10 -0.0399 *** -3.44 -0.0279 ** -1.96 -0.0086 0.01 -0.0371 *** -4.72 
Sales Growth -0.0080 -0.49 -0.0045 -0.61 -0.0055 -0.74 -0.0376 *** -6.16 0.0139 *** 3.75 0.0236 *** 4.06 -0.0025 -0.29 0.0009 0.01 -0.0062 -0.63 
R&D Intensity 0.1449 *** 3.09 0.0086 0.26 0.0240 0.74 -0.0337 -1.55 0.0072 0.42 0.0967 *** 3.16 0.0959 ** 2.01 0.0292 0.03 0.0369 0.99 
Intercept 0.1237 *** 3.67 0.0859 *** 3.64 0.0923 *** 4.19 0.1190 *** 6.62 0.0502 *** 3.61 0.0964 *** 5.23 0.0935 *** 4.73 0.0708 0.02 0.0932 *** 3.73 
N 62 124 203 211 202 198 194 194 186 
Adj. R2 0.4588 0.0868 0.1710 0.3644 0.3392 0.2717 0.1925 0.1298 0.1246 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific characteristics over each year of my sample 
period separately. My proxy for the expected cost of equity is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from the CAPM using weekly data frequencies. My cross-sectional 
OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported next to each coefficient's statistical significance. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 31: Cost of Equity Fama/French (Weekly) - Annual Regressions 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ESG Disclosure -0.0287 -1.16 -0.0070 -0.42 -0.0250 ** -2.35 -0.0118 -1.47 -0.0120 ** -2.22 -0.0198 ** -1.96 -0.0247 *** -3.20 -0.0028 -0.38 -0.0145 -1.61 
Size -0.0049 ** -2.48 -0.0020 -1.20 -0.0022 * -1.68 -0.0007 -0.66 0.0002 0.23 -0.0023 * -1.78 -0.0003 -0.27 -0.0022 ** -2.40 -0.0016 -1.16 
Leverage 0.0170 0.78 0.0123 1.16 0.0147 * 1.68 -0.0076 -1.13 0.0008 0.17 -0.0076 -0.98 -0.0167 ** -2.34 0.0039 0.66 -0.0096 -1.05 
ROA -0.0993 -0.91 0.0177 0.48 -0.0516 ** -2.40 0.0111 0.70 -0.0326 ** -2.16 -0.0745 -1.21 0.0073 0.20 -0.0284 -1.05 -0.0164 -0.39 
Volatility -0.0007 -0.32 -0.0004 -0.43 0.0016 ** 2.11 0.0009 1.44 0.0000 -0.06 -0.0004 -0.49 -0.0007 -1.15 -0.0009 -1.48 -0.0001 -0.09 
Interest Coverage 0.0064 * 1.91 0.0003 0.19 0.0006 0.51 0.0006 0.40 -0.0005 -0.63 -0.0021 -1.36 -0.0029 * -1.90 0.0009 0.71 -0.0008 -0.46 
Capex 0.0961 0.79 -0.0812 -1.24 0.2761 *** 5.41 0.1264 *** 2.66 0.0082 0.19 0.3148 *** 3.50 0.1076 * 1.76 0.0831 * 1.75 0.0609 0.87 
Cash Flows -0.0018 -0.25 -0.0009 -0.52 0.0008 1.63 -0.0013 -0.85 0.0010 0.60 0.0017 0.41 0.0012 0.81 -0.0007 -0.69 -0.0007 -0.85 
Capital Intensity 0.0173 0.43 0.0327 ** 2.00 -0.0344 ** -2.12 -0.0203 -1.51 -0.0001 -0.01 -0.0260 -1.64 -0.0098 -0.65 -0.0206 * -1.91 -0.0350 ** -2.11 
Advertising -0.0855 *** -3.34 -0.0252 * -1.65 -0.0433 *** -4.07 -0.0106 -1.15 -0.0163 * -1.88 -0.0241 ** -1.97 -0.0152 -1.13 0.0031 0.48 -0.0174 * -1.90 
Sales Growth -0.0037 -0.12 -0.0110 -1.34 -0.0060 -0.83 -0.0063 -1.08 0.0057 1.36 0.0266 *** 4.13 0.0089 1.04 0.0219 *** 2.99 0.0281 * 1.86 
R&D Intensity 0.1081 ** 2.01 -0.0093 -0.24 0.0270 0.78 0.0013 0.05 0.0729 *** 3.08 0.0899 *** 2.99 0.0737 1.34 0.0751 ** 2.33 0.1166 *** 3.42 
Intercept 0.1437 *** 3.14 0.1032 *** 4.44 0.1130 *** 5.19 0.0797 *** 4.18 0.0535 *** 4.13 0.0937 *** 4.44 0.0746 *** 3.65 0.0549 *** 2.91 0.0617 ** 2.01 
N 62 124 203 211 202 198 194 194 186 
Adj. R2 0.2650 0.0758 0.1869 0.0683 0.1498 0.2400 0.1366 0.2258 0.2449 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific characteristics over each year of my sample 
period separately. My proxy for the expected cost of equity is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from Fama/French's asset pricing model using weekly data
frequencies. My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported next to each coefficient's 
statistical significance. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 32: Cost of Equity Carhart (Weekly) - Annual Regressions 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ESG Disclosure -0.0310 -1.33 -0.0003 -0.01 -0.0264 ** -2.37 -0.0114 -1.44 -0.0107 ** -1.98 -0.0145 -1.41 -0.0252 *** -3.60 0.0017 0.20 -0.0143 -1.33 
Size -0.0046 ** -2.47 -0.0023 -1.20 -0.0004 -0.32 -0.0007 -0.66 0.0009 1.21 -0.0021 * -1.66 0.0004 0.44 -0.0026 ** -2.35 -0.0005 -0.30 
Leverage 0.0219 1.04 0.0160 1.29 0.0105 1.12 -0.0075 -1.12 -0.0003 -0.06 -0.0074 -0.93 -0.0138 ** -2.11 0.0090 1.21 -0.0098 -0.94 
ROA -0.1037 -0.99 0.0374 0.87 -0.0173 -0.77 0.0124 0.79 -0.0399 ** -2.43 -0.0873 -1.41 0.0255 0.71 -0.0360 -0.96 -0.0515 -1.11 
Volatility -0.0010 -0.50 -0.0008 -0.77 0.0006 0.77 0.0009 1.51 0.0001 0.26 -0.0007 -0.83 -0.0008 -1.29 -0.0009 -1.39 -0.0010 -1.10 
Interest Coverage 0.0066 ** 2.03 0.0017 0.85 0.0005 0.42 0.0007 0.54 -0.0007 -0.87 -0.0022 -1.43 -0.0029 ** -2.02 0.0024 1.48 -0.0005 -0.24 
Capex 0.0958 0.87 -0.0657 -0.86 0.2004 *** 2.75 0.1146 ** 2.44 0.0082 0.20 0.3389 *** 3.79 0.0175 0.27 0.0976 * 1.83 0.1856 ** 1.99 
Cash Flows -0.0017 -0.24 -0.0016 -0.79 0.0007 1.52 -0.0013 -0.82 0.0020 1.11 0.0028 0.66 0.0014 0.78 -0.0012 -0.99 0.0015 ** 2.04 
Capital Intensity 0.0169 0.45 0.0319 * 1.71 -0.0157 -0.81 -0.0182 -1.37 0.0009 0.09 -0.0302 * -1.87 0.0058 0.42 -0.0266 ** -2.13 -0.0379 * -1.81 
Advertising -0.0756 *** -3.15 -0.0419 ** -2.31 -0.0389 *** -3.91 -0.0098 -1.09 -0.0139 -1.57 -0.0273 ** -2.30 -0.0087 -0.71 -0.0076 -1.17 -0.0318 *** -3.08 
Sales Growth -0.0082 -0.30 -0.0083 -0.93 0.0229 *** 2.83 -0.0049 -0.86 0.0030 0.80 0.0275 *** 4.12 0.0123 1.47 0.0187 ** 2.23 0.0085 0.61 
R&D Intensity 0.1193 ** 2.33 -0.0307 -0.65 -0.0029 -0.08 0.0046 0.19 0.0698 *** 2.85 0.1054 *** 3.28 0.0698 * 1.69 0.0655 1.29 0.0992 *** 3.02 
Intercept 0.1397 *** 3.41 0.1047 *** 3.98 0.0576 ** 2.50 0.0769 *** 4.06 0.0441 *** 3.61 0.0902 *** 4.21 0.0539 *** 2.81 0.0590 *** 2.94 0.0709 ** 2.23 
N 62 124 203 211 202 198 194 194 186 
Adj. R2 0.2585 0.0981 0.1601 0.0644 0.1335 0.2448 0.1118 0.1685 0.1031 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific characteristics over each year of my sample 
period separately. My proxy for the expected cost of equity is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from Carhart's asset pricing model using weekly data frequencies. 
My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported next to each coefficient's statistical 
significance. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 33: Cost of Equity CAPM (Monthly) - Annual Regressions 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ESG Disclosure -0.0410 * -1.83 -0.0155 -0.88 -0.0329 ** -2.02 -0.0112 -1.21 -0.0197 *** -2.86 -0.0221 ** -2.00 -0.0139 -1.42 -0.0089 -1.00 -0.0127 -1.25 
Size 0.0005 0.21 -0.0024 -1.22 -0.0036 ** -2.07 -0.0017 -1.49 0.0000 0.05 -0.0013 -0.90 -0.0003 -0.19 0.0001 0.11 -0.0013 -0.84 
Leverage 0.0240 1.03 0.0099 0.65 0.0115 0.99 0.0153 ** 2.06 0.0062 1.11 0.0060 0.64 -0.0108 -1.28 -0.0012 -0.17 -0.0140 * -1.70 
ROA -0.1532 -1.30 -0.0906 -1.45 -0.0273 -0.68 -0.0620 *** -3.09 -0.0541 *** -3.73 -0.0586 -0.92 -0.0318 -1.03 -0.0563 ** -2.04 -0.0397 -0.92 
Volatility -0.0022 -0.83 -0.0003 -0.23 -0.0004 -0.36 0.0001 0.16 0.0007 1.22 -0.0008 -0.93 -0.0004 -0.46 -0.0014 ** -2.01 -0.0012 -1.47 
Interest Coverage 0.0125 *** 4.58 0.0014 0.55 0.0003 0.18 -0.0005 -0.36 -0.0026 ** -2.22 -0.0047 *** -2.92 -0.0053 *** -3.01 -0.0029 * -1.85 -0.0027 -1.58 
Capex -0.1821 * -1.70 0.2518 * 1.91 0.2963 *** 2.66 0.1818 *** 2.88 0.0447 0.81 0.1247 1.37 0.1956 ** 2.46 0.1038 1.55 0.1776 ** 2.02 
Cash Flows -0.0104 -1.18 0.0047 ** 2.05 -0.0002 -0.29 0.0016 0.96 0.0009 0.43 -0.0017 -0.38 0.0004 0.22 0.0005 0.59 -0.0003 -0.45 
Capital Intensity 0.0067 0.24 -0.0487 ** -2.33 -0.0556 ** -2.40 -0.0371 ** -2.31 -0.0004 -0.03 -0.0040 -0.23 -0.0272 -1.35 -0.0171 -0.99 -0.0356 * -1.69 
Advertising -0.0238 -0.97 -0.0747 *** -4.00 -0.0537 *** -3.39 -0.0204 ** -2.37 -0.0094 -1.08 -0.0380 ** -2.27 -0.0298 ** -1.99 -0.0235 * -1.87 -0.0365 ** -2.12 
Sales Growth 0.0187 0.79 -0.0121 -0.87 -0.0128 -1.17 -0.0403 *** -5.00 0.0082 * 1.70 0.0092 1.25 -0.0038 -0.36 -0.0054 -0.57 -0.0149 -1.62 
R&D Intensity 0.2220 *** 3.40 0.2434 *** 4.57 0.0915 ** 1.96 0.0128 0.57 0.0335 1.62 0.1226 *** 3.30 0.0535 0.99 0.0161 0.46 0.0322 0.91 
Intercept 0.0189 0.40 0.1311 *** 3.46 0.1657 *** 5.68 0.1308 *** 6.98 0.0536 *** 3.34 0.1037 *** 4.30 0.0967 *** 3.47 0.0693 *** 2.83 0.1203 *** 4.65 
N 62 124 203 211 202 198 194 194 186 
Adj. R2 0.4009 0.3005 0.1433 0.2993 0.2672 0.1788 0.0983 0.1078 0.0959 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific characteristics over each year of my sample 
period separately. My proxy for the expected cost of equity is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from the CAPM using monthly data frequencies. My cross-sectional 
OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported next to each coefficient's statistical significance. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 34: Cost of Equity Fama/French (Monthly) - Annual Regressions 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ESG Disclosure -0.0327 -1.10 -0.0154 -0.84 -0.0325 ** -2.06 -0.0117 -1.02 -0.0220 *** -2.79 -0.0234 * -1.91 -0.0129 -1.23 -0.0127 -1.28 0.0004 0.04 
Size -0.0039 -1.43 -0.0006 -0.27 -0.0029 * -1.72 -0.0027 * -1.91 -0.0010 -0.93 -0.0014 -0.95 -0.0003 -0.28 -0.0002 -0.20 -0.0003 -0.18 
Leverage 0.0425 1.53 0.0142 1.00 0.0110 1.02 0.0114 1.28 0.0009 0.13 -0.0043 -0.46 -0.0163 ** -2.23 -0.0073 -1.08 -0.0040 -0.48 
ROA -0.0836 -0.58 -0.0569 -1.04 -0.0193 -0.52 -0.0477 * -1.82 -0.0394 ** -2.52 -0.0414 -0.64 -0.0178 -0.77 -0.0475 -1.41 -0.0386 -0.92 
Volatility -0.0018 -0.67 -0.0005 -0.39 -0.0007 -0.66 0.0004 0.57 0.0001 0.18 -0.0012 -1.35 -0.0006 -0.75 -0.0019 *** -2.61 -0.0023 *** -2.94 
Interest Coverage 0.0130 *** 4.44 0.0002 0.09 -0.0002 -0.11 0.0000 0.00 -0.0018 -1.57 -0.0037 ** -2.26 -0.0042 *** -2.59 -0.0009 -0.51 -0.0017 -1.10 
Capex -0.1646 -1.23 0.0762 0.66 0.2804 *** 2.66 0.2971 *** 4.23 0.1685 ** 2.46 0.3388 *** 3.98 0.3071 *** 3.81 0.2197 *** 3.43 0.1466 * 1.71 
Cash Flows -0.0180 * -1.92 0.0046 ** 2.08 -0.0002 -0.35 0.0030 1.44 -0.0003 -0.14 0.0000 0.01 0.0018 1.30 0.0006 0.74 0.0012 ** 2.06 
Capital Intensity -0.0007 -0.02 -0.0078 -0.41 -0.0516 ** -2.31 -0.0537 *** -3.01 -0.0168 -1.19 -0.0231 -1.34 -0.0377 ** -2.07 -0.0338 ** -2.09 -0.0468 ** -2.37 
Advertising -0.0625 ** -2.37 -0.0659 *** -3.58 -0.0511 *** -3.30 -0.0380 *** -4.08 -0.0261 *** -2.60 -0.0579 *** -3.42 -0.0371 *** -2.72 -0.0285 ** -2.29 -0.0242 * -1.81 
Sales Growth 0.0273 1.13 -0.0118 -0.86 -0.0151 -1.41 -0.0275 *** -2.79 0.0142 ** 2.05 0.0226 ** 2.49 0.0070 0.62 0.0005 0.05 0.0098 0.91 
R&D Intensity 0.1755 ** 2.32 0.2085 *** 4.63 0.0788 * 1.78 0.0703 ** 2.33 0.0716 ** 2.56 0.1504 *** 3.57 0.0790 1.30 0.0923 * 1.93 0.0966 *** 2.87 
Intercept 0.0760 1.48 0.0954 *** 2.61 0.1585 *** 5.51 0.1336 *** 5.47 0.0709 *** 3.81 0.0944 *** 3.86 0.0839 *** 3.31 0.0695 *** 3.37 0.0681 ** 2.55 
N 62 124 203 211 202 198 194 194 186 
Adj. R2 0.2835 0.1502 0.1269 0.2418 0.2379 0.2241 0.1684 0.1966 0.1393 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific characteristics over each year of my sample 
period separately. My proxy for the expected cost of equity is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from Fama/French's asset pricing model using monthly data 
frequencies. My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported next to each coefficient's 
statistical significance. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 35: Cost of Equity Carhart (Monthly) - Annual Regressions 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ESG Disclosure -0.0298 -0.90 -0.0136 -0.56 -0.0387 ** -2.15 -0.0108 -0.95 -0.0213 *** -2.72 -0.0240 * -1.95 -0.0126 -1.20 -0.0119 -1.19 -0.0006 -0.06 
Size -0.0038 -1.64 -0.0020 -0.75 -0.0030 -1.59 -0.0027 ** -1.97 -0.0010 -0.96 -0.0014 -0.92 -0.0004 -0.33 -0.0004 -0.30 -0.0003 -0.22 
Leverage 0.0359 1.51 0.0191 1.29 0.0131 1.00 0.0100 1.15 0.0003 0.04 -0.0046 -0.48 -0.0168 ** -2.34 -0.0079 -1.13 -0.0036 -0.43 
ROA -0.0534 -0.50 -0.0229 -0.36 0.0067 0.15 -0.0353 -1.39 -0.0382 ** -2.43 -0.0396 -0.60 -0.0163 -0.72 -0.0499 -1.45 -0.0421 -1.00 
Volatility -0.0017 -0.63 -0.0003 -0.21 -0.0016 -1.30 0.0005 0.63 0.0001 0.17 -0.0013 -1.37 -0.0005 -0.64 -0.0017 ** -2.33 -0.0025 *** -2.88 
Interest Coverage 0.0101 *** 2.58 0.0012 0.45 0.0010 0.46 0.0006 0.32 -0.0017 -1.45 -0.0038 ** -2.30 -0.0041 *** -2.59 -0.0008 -0.47 -0.0016 -1.04 
Capex 0.1144 0.71 0.1001 0.71 0.3445 *** 2.61 0.2814 *** 4.00 0.1686 ** 2.46 0.3383 *** 3.94 0.3000 *** 3.73 0.2156 *** 3.34 0.1428 1.64 
Cash Flows -0.0132 -1.57 0.0041 1.39 -0.0007 -0.80 0.0029 1.54 -0.0002 -0.09 -0.0001 -0.02 0.0019 1.40 0.0006 0.72 0.0011 * 1.87 
Capital Intensity -0.0301 -0.98 -0.0006 -0.02 -0.0483 * -1.82 -0.0484 *** -2.73 -0.0166 -1.18 -0.0233 -1.35 -0.0361 ** -2.00 -0.0338 ** -2.08 -0.0466 ** -2.33 
Advertising -0.0675 *** -2.64 -0.0809 *** -3.49 -0.0719 *** -3.99 -0.0404 *** -4.25 -0.0265 *** -2.64 -0.0583 *** -3.42 -0.0364 *** -2.70 -0.0280 ** -2.24 -0.0240 * -1.81 
Sales Growth 0.0155 0.78 -0.0061 -0.46 -0.0076 -0.63 -0.0260 *** -2.71 0.0141 ** 2.03 0.0222 ** 2.44 0.0068 0.61 -0.0003 -0.04 0.0104 0.96 
R&D Intensity 0.1318 * 1.72 0.2171 *** 4.64 0.0804 1.53 0.0785 *** 2.60 0.0718 ** 2.57 0.1511 *** 3.56 0.0774 1.30 0.0872 * 1.80 0.0978 *** 2.84 
Intercept 0.0892 * 1.80 0.1030 *** 2.75 0.1538 *** 4.69 0.1294 *** 5.37 0.0708 *** 3.86 0.0952 *** 3.87 0.0839 *** 3.37 0.0718 *** 3.44 0.0695 *** 2.59 
N 62 124 203 211 202 198 194 194 186 
Adj. R2 0.2010 0.1502 0.1591 0.2396 0.2313 0.2236 0.1664 0.1819 0.1385 
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific characteristics over each year of my sample 
period separately. My proxy for the expected cost of equity is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from Carhart's asset pricing model using monthly data frequencies. 
My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported next to each coefficient's statistical 
significance. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 36: Cost of Debt Bloomberg - Stepwise Regressions 
  [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5]   [6]   [7]   [8]   [9]   [10]   [11]   [12]   [13]   [14]   [15]   [16]   [17]   [18]   
ESG 
Disclosure 
-0.0054 *** -0.0067 *** -0.0053 *** -0.0040 *** -0.0039 *** -0.0043 *** -0.0042 *** -0.0042 *** -0.0037 *** -0.0035 ** -0.0040 *** -0.0124 *** -0.0143 *** -0.0159 *** -0.0159 *** -0.0160 *** -0.0136 *** -0.0133 *** 
-4.25 -5.06 -4.03 -3.00 -2.97 -3.35 -3.26 -3.20 -2.80 -2.52 -2.91 -5.89 -6.44 -6.84 -6.85 -4.52 -3.78 -3.66 
Size 0.0005 *** -0.0002 -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0008 *** -0.0007 *** -0.0007 *** -0.0007 *** -0.0005 ** -0.0006 *** 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 0.0004 3.01 -1.17 -3.01 -3.04 -5.31 -4.26 -4.09 -4.04 -2.54 -2.94 0.58 0.36 0.41 0.40 0.28 0.92 0.65 
Leverage 0.0089 *** 0.0072 *** 0.0067 *** -0.0005 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0006 0.0006 0.0009 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0027 -0.0036 -0.0025 8.79 7.44 6.72 -0.47 0.05 0.03 -0.39 0.23 -0.56 0.36 0.45 -0.86 -0.86 -0.89 -1.12 -0.78 
ROA -0.0255 *** -0.0266 *** -0.0122 *** -0.0118 *** -0.0102 *** -0.0099 *** -0.0100 ** -0.0099 ** -0.0146 *** -0.0184 *** -0.0139 ** -0.0139 ** -0.0104 -0.0021 -0.0036 -8.13 -8.87 -3.47 -3.37 -2.70 -2.60 -2.57 -2.56 -2.67 -3.22 -2.15 -2.14 -1.14 -0.22 -0.39 
Volatility -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 -1.29 -1.12 -0.43 -0.55 -0.55 -0.33 -0.65 -0.56 -1.43 -0.80 -0.80 -1.07 -1.42 -0.99 
Interest 
Coverage 
-0.0015 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0017 *** -0.0017 *** -0.0017 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0022 *** -0.0022 *** -0.0014 ** -0.0024 *** -0.0023 *** 
-6.45 -6.24 -6.31 -6.72 -6.12 -6.12 -4.42 -2.79 -3.95 -3.92 -2.13 -2.82 -2.77 
Capex 0.0190 *** 0.0185 *** 0.0306 *** 0.0315 *** 0.0325 *** 0.0270 0.0271 0.0036 0.0036 0.0156 0.0286 0.0341 4.42 4.21 4.65 4.71 5.16 1.64 1.55 0.18 0.18 0.52 0.92 1.08 
Cash Flows -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0009 ** -0.0010 ** -0.96 -1.06 -1.13 -1.00 1.48 0.74 -0.29 -0.29 -0.38 -2.19 -2.16 
Capital 
Intensity 
-0.0033 *** -0.0048 *** -0.0048 *** 0.0049 0.0063 * 0.0091 ** 0.0091 ** 0.0063 0.0021 0.0009 
-2.87 -3.91 -4.07 1.46 1.81 2.44 2.44 1.18 0.40 0.17 
Advertising -0.0020 -0.0025 ** -0.0033 -0.0061 *** -0.0045 * -0.0045 * -0.0022 -0.0003 -0.0016 -1.56 -1.98 -1.45 -2.62 -1.85 -1.84 -0.66 -0.09 -0.50 
Sales Growth -0.0078 *** -0.0055 *** -0.0061 *** -0.0083 *** -0.0083 *** -0.0096 *** -0.0090 *** -0.0089 *** -5.71 -2.90 -3.03 -3.72 -3.72 -3.09 -2.95 -2.92 
R&D Intensity 0.0353 *** 0.0398 *** 0.0554 *** 0.0554 *** 0.0586 *** 0.0582 *** 0.0594 *** 4.29 4.76 6.66 6.62 4.93 4.86 5.01 
Bond Liquidity -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0008 0.0005 0.0006 -1.27 -0.41 -0.40 0.71 0.47 0.60 
Bond Rating -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.45 -0.45 -1.35 -1.05 -0.59 
Years to 
Maturity 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
-0.02 -0.10 1.15 1.15 
Convexity -0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 -0.60 0.30 -0.03 
Duration -0.0016 -0.0013 -1.31 -1.07 
Subordinated 0.0059 ** 2.01 
Intercept 0.0255 *** 0.0183 *** 0.0231 *** 0.0302 *** 0.0315 *** 0.0451 *** 0.0412 *** 0.0410 *** 0.0420 *** 0.0392 *** 0.0498 *** 0.0361 *** 0.0477 *** 0.0477 *** 0.0477 *** 0.0363 *** 0.0341 *** 0.0326 *** 
59.02 7.46 9.71 11.85 12.23 17.01 14.27 14.04 14.26 12.04 13.21 6.70 6.35 5.71 5.63 3.18 2.86 2.76 
N 3955 3906 3890 3890 3855 3605 3508 3495 3492 3282 3281 1579 1423 1170 1170 618 574 574 
Adj. R2 0.0036 0.0055 0.0266 0.0512 0.0519 0.0486 0.0527 0.0532 0.0555 0.0562 0.0716 0.0809 0.0872 0.1281 0.1274 0.1069 0.1303 0.1360 
Notes: This table reports stepwise cross-sectional regressions from regressing my cost of debt estimate on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific and bond-specific control variables over my full sample 
period from 2004 to 2014. My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported under each coefficient. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 37: Cost of Equity Bloomberg - Stepwise Regressions 
  [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5]   [6]   [7]   [8]   [9]   [10]   [11]   [12]   
ESG Disclosure -0.0389 *** -0.0471 *** -0.0463 *** -0.0426 *** -0.0433 *** -0.0409 *** -0.0373 *** -0.0373 *** -0.0353 *** -0.0304 *** -0.0301 *** -0.0340 *** -11.57 -12.41 -12.36 -11.50 -11.60 -11.00 -10.50 -10.38 -9.58 -7.82 -7.69 -8.07 
Size 0.0023 *** 0.0020 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0007 * -0.0007 * -0.0032 *** -0.0031 *** -0.0022 *** 5.25 4.47 2.69 2.58 1.26 -0.99 -1.67 -1.67 -6.86 -6.84 -4.07 
Leverage 0.0048 ** 0.0005 0.0008 -0.0070 *** -0.0079 *** -0.0078 *** -0.0097 *** -0.0074 *** -0.0071 *** -0.0001 2.18 0.23 0.36 -2.91 -3.41 -3.39 -4.07 -3.07 -2.90 -0.03 
ROA -0.0677 *** -0.0685 *** -0.0544 *** -0.0542 *** -0.0623 *** -0.0610 *** -0.0645 *** -0.0646 *** -0.0639 *** -10.14 -9.86 -6.48 -6.64 -7.27 -7.11 -7.30 -7.32 -5.55 
Volatility 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 * 0.91 1.03 1.29 1.45 1.48 0.75 0.87 1.93 
Interest Coverage -0.0026 *** -0.0024 *** -0.0022 *** -0.0031 *** -0.0013 ** -0.0013 ** -0.0011 -4.14 -4.17 -3.91 -5.45 -2.27 -2.25 -1.62 
Capex 0.0396 *** 0.0437 *** 0.0915 *** 0.0791 *** 0.0785 *** 0.1728 *** 4.74 5.10 6.11 5.26 5.22 5.98 
Cash Flows 0.0005 ** 0.0005 ** 0.0005 ** 0.0005 ** 0.0010 ** 2.45 2.06 2.06 1.98 2.46 
Capital Intensity -0.0131 *** -0.0098 *** -0.0097 *** -0.0046 -3.92 -2.89 -2.85 -0.65 
Advertising -0.0211 *** -0.0208 *** -0.0385 *** -6.81 -6.75 -7.35 
Sales Growth 0.0037 0.0075 ** 1.37 2.36 
R&D Intensity 0.0581 *** 3.81 
Intercept 0.1242 *** 0.0884 *** 0.0910 *** 0.1098 *** 0.1093 *** 0.1278 *** 0.1405 *** 0.1447 *** 0.1488 *** 0.1856 *** 0.1807 *** 0.1527 *** 
116.62 13.13 13.61 15.88 15.45 18.19 19.99 20.77 21.74 25.17 23.08 15.98 
N 3955 3906 3890 3890 3855 3605 3508 3495 3492 3282 3281 1579 
Adj. R2 0.0359 0.0475 0.0482 0.0791 0.0804 0.0827 0.0839 0.0875 0.0943 0.1122 0.1125 0.1865 
Notes: This table reports stepwise cross-sectional regressions from regressing Bloomberg's expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific control 
variables over my full sample period from 2004 to 2014. My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. 
T-ratios are reported under each coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
 
228 
Table 38: Cost of Equity CAPM (Daily) - Stepwise Regressions 
  [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5]   [6]   [7]   [8]   [9]   [10]   [11]   [12]   
ESG Disclosure -0.0326 *** -0.0373 *** -0.0374 *** -0.0355 *** -0.0359 *** -0.0353 *** -0.0336 *** -0.0337 *** -0.0319 *** -0.0270 *** -0.0267 *** -0.0325 *** -15.24 -15.82 -15.97 -15.19 -15.35 -14.96 -14.39 -14.31 -13.57 -11.56 -11.44 -12.08 
Size 0.0014 *** 0.0015 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0009 *** 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0018 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0010 *** 5.09 5.33 3.90 3.80 2.98 1.44 0.79 0.83 -5.63 -5.63 -2.90 
Leverage -0.0014 -0.0035 ** -0.0033 ** -0.0073 *** -0.0079 *** -0.0078 *** -0.0095 *** -0.0082 *** -0.0078 *** -0.0036 -0.94 -2.50 -2.35 -4.37 -4.76 -4.77 -5.77 -4.92 -4.64 -1.55 
ROA -0.0328 *** -0.0335 *** -0.0239 *** -0.0229 *** -0.0263 *** -0.0251 *** -0.0273 *** -0.0276 *** -0.0285 *** -8.34 -8.45 -4.75 -4.56 -4.74 -4.54 -4.88 -4.96 -4.18 
Volatility 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.94 0.95 1.34 1.53 1.56 0.54 0.69 1.56 
Interest Coverage -0.0013 *** -0.0013 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0020 *** -0.0006 -0.0006 * -0.0006 -3.53 -3.52 -3.33 -5.27 -1.64 -1.74 -1.33 
Capex 0.0329 *** 0.0348 *** 0.0788 *** 0.0681 *** 0.0669 *** 0.0992 *** 5.11 5.32 7.61 6.64 6.52 4.94 
Cash Flows 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 1.43 1.05 0.79 0.65 1.18 
Capital Intensity -0.0120 *** -0.0086 *** -0.0087 *** 0.0040 -5.60 -4.03 -4.06 0.86 
Advertising -0.0155 *** -0.0154 *** -0.0213 *** -7.57 -7.53 -6.95 
Sales Growth 0.0045 ** 0.0064 *** 2.25 3.24 
R&D Intensity 0.0474 *** 4.90 
Intercept 0.0663 *** 0.0442 *** 0.0435 *** 0.0529 *** 0.0526 *** 0.0605 *** 0.0652 *** 0.0681 *** 0.0718 *** 0.1023 *** 0.0973 *** 0.0769 *** 
98.45 10.29 10.14 12.06 11.68 12.52 12.90 13.35 14.55 20.18 17.15 12.50 
N 3901 3900 3891 3891 3866 3624 3527 3514 3511 3299 3284 1580 
Adj. R2 0.0558 0.0647 0.0644 0.0798 0.0814 0.0814 0.0859 0.0887 0.1005 0.1247 0.1285 0.2020 
Notes: This table reports stepwise cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific control variables 
over my full sample period from 2004 to 2014. My expected cost of equity proxy is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from the CAPM model using 
daily data frequencies. My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported 
under each coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 39: Cost of Equity Fama/French (Daily) - Stepwise Regressions 
  [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5]   [6]   [7]   [8]   [9]   [10]   [11]   [12]   
ESG Disclosure -0.0308 *** -0.0248 *** -0.0261 *** -0.0259 *** -0.0261 *** -0.0280 *** -0.0274 *** -0.0275 *** -0.0255 *** -0.0244 *** -0.0238 *** -0.0307 *** 
-14.93 -10.94 -11.64 -11.45 -11.54 -12.23 -11.86 -11.79 -10.95 -10.23 -10.07 -10.75 
Size -0.0018 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0013 *** -0.0013 *** -0.0011 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0022 *** -0.0022 *** -0.0011 *** 
-7.05 -4.74 -4.90 -4.93 -4.13 -4.25 -4.81 -4.86 -7.35 -7.33 -3.09 
Leverage -0.0085 *** -0.0088 *** -0.0089 *** -0.0098 *** -0.0098 *** -0.0097 *** -0.0115 *** -0.0102 *** -0.0095 *** -0.0055 ** 
 -6.29 -6.53 -6.45 -6.02 -6.00 -5.97 -7.14 -6.14 -5.69 -2.35 ROA -0.0049 -0.0056 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0014 0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0017 -0.0089 
 -1.24 -1.39 0.01 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -0.23 -0.29 -1.25 Volatility 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 ** 
0.36 0.96 1.40 1.53 1.56 1.41 1.61 2.00 
Interest Coverage -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0012 *** -0.0007 * -0.0007 ** -0.0007 
-1.01 -1.06 -0.87 -3.33 -1.89 -1.97 -1.54 
Capex 0.0326 *** 0.0336 *** 0.0819 *** 0.0777 *** 0.0762 *** 0.1016 *** 
4.43 4.48 7.31 6.90 6.72 4.89 
Cash Flows 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
0.36 -0.14 -0.57 -0.79 -0.49 
Capital Intensity -0.0132 *** -0.0131 *** -0.0132 *** -0.0033 
-6.24 -6.11 -6.13 -0.69 
Advertising -0.0084 *** -0.0081 *** -0.0150 *** 
-3.90 -3.78 -4.52 
Sales Growth 0.0070 *** 0.0103 *** 
3.71 4.87 
R&D Intensity 0.0594 *** 
5.77 
Intercept 0.0647 *** 0.0928 *** 0.0890 *** 0.0904 *** 0.0905 *** 0.0887 *** 0.0881 *** 0.0906 *** 0.0947 *** 0.1079 *** 0.0996 *** 0.0739 *** 
97.76 23.47 22.55 22.18 21.79 19.72 18.58 19.09 20.41 21.89 18.65 11.76 
N 3901 3900 3891 3891 3866 3624 3527 3514 3511 3299 3284 1580 
Adj. R2 0.0510 0.0659 0.0738 0.0739 0.0752 0.0753 0.0844 0.0879 0.1018 0.1150 0.1212 0.1811 
Notes: This table reports stepwise cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific control variables 
over my full sample period from 2004 to 2014. My expected cost of equity proxy is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from Fama/French's asset 
pricing model using daily data frequencies. My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios 
are reported under each coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 40: Cost of Equity Carhart (Daily) - Stepwise Regressions 
  [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5]   [6]   [7]   [8]   [9]   [10]   [11]   [12]   
ESG Disclosure -0.0261 *** -0.0194 *** -0.0209 *** -0.0209 *** -0.0211 *** -0.0232 *** -0.0238 *** -0.0239 *** -0.0226 *** -0.0211 *** -0.0204 *** -0.0276 *** 
-13.02 -8.84 -9.67 -9.60 -9.66 -10.51 -10.69 -10.61 -10.02 -9.21 -8.98 -9.86 
Size -0.0020 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0011 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0021 *** -0.0021 *** -0.0007 ** 
-8.29 -5.46 -5.41 -5.40 -4.63 -3.94 -4.36 -4.36 -7.01 -6.90 -2.09 
Leverage -0.0099 *** -0.0100 *** -0.0102 *** -0.0111 *** -0.0105 *** -0.0105 *** -0.0117 *** -0.0098 *** -0.0086 *** -0.0052 ** 
 -7.74 -7.85 -7.87 -7.26 -6.96 -6.97 -7.67 -6.26 -5.43 -2.34 ROA -0.0005 -0.0010 0.0032 0.0037 0.0027 0.0035 0.0029 0.0025 -0.0052 
 -0.13 -0.28 0.65 0.76 0.49 0.64 0.54 0.46 -0.78 Volatility -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
-0.50 0.28 0.56 0.70 0.73 0.84 1.12 1.10 
Interest Coverage -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0009 *** -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 
-0.87 -1.03 -0.92 -2.60 -0.72 -0.82 -0.61 
Capex 0.0561 *** 0.0569 *** 0.0887 *** 0.0845 *** 0.0824 *** 0.0905 *** 
7.09 7.07 7.37 7.03 6.95 4.10 
Cash Flows 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 
0.35 0.00 -0.79 -1.17 -0.10 
Capital Intensity -0.0087 *** -0.0093 *** -0.0093 *** 0.0011 
-4.14 -4.36 -4.41 0.22 
Advertising -0.0126 *** -0.0121 *** -0.0149 *** 
-6.04 -5.88 -4.80 
Sales Growth 0.0112 *** 0.0127 *** 
5.40 5.28 
R&D Intensity 0.0429 *** 
4.10 
Intercept 0.0628 *** 0.0946 *** 0.0902 *** 0.0903 *** 0.0911 *** 0.0896 *** 0.0843 *** 0.0862 *** 0.0889 *** 0.1033 *** 0.0894 *** 0.0641 *** 
97.43 24.74 23.58 23.01 22.67 20.47 18.42 18.66 19.47 20.92 16.93 10.09 
N 3901 3900 3891 3891 3866 3624 3527 3514 3511 3299 3284 1580 
Adj. R2 0.0387 0.0590 0.0704 0.0702 0.0716 0.0711 0.0930 0.0951 0.1012 0.1158 0.1296 0.1590 
Notes: This table reports stepwise cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific control variables over my 
full sample period from 2004 to 2014. My expected cost of equity proxy is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from Carhart's asset pricing model using daily 
data frequencies. My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported under each 
coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 41: Cost of Equity CAPM (Weekly) - Stepwise Regressions 
  [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5]   [6]   [7]   [8]   [9]   [10]   [11]   [12]   
ESG Disclosure -0.0349 *** -0.0402 *** -0.0399 *** -0.0377 *** -0.0381 *** -0.0372 *** -0.0354 *** -0.0357 *** -0.0335 *** -0.0289 *** -0.0286 *** -0.0369 *** 
-13.62 -14.18 -14.25 -13.51 -13.62 -13.23 -12.74 -12.70 -11.82 -9.96 -9.82 -11.10 
Size 0.0016 *** 0.0016 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0008 ** 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0017 *** -0.0017 *** -0.0007 
4.92 4.73 3.34 3.27 2.48 1.18 0.56 0.58 -4.69 -4.76 -1.59 
Leverage 0.0008 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0060 *** -0.0061 *** -0.0059 *** -0.0079 *** -0.0063 *** -0.0061 *** -0.0023 
 0.47 -0.92 -0.78 -2.95 -3.02 -2.94 -3.86 -3.00 -2.84 -0.79 ROA -0.0382 *** -0.0384 *** -0.0271 *** -0.0271 *** -0.0304 *** -0.0289 *** -0.0323 *** -0.0330 *** -0.0325 *** 
 -7.93 -7.86 -4.43 -4.44 -4.55 -4.37 -4.74 -4.86 -3.90 Volatility 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
0.44 0.39 0.59 0.75 0.79 -0.14 -0.11 0.68 
Interest Coverage -0.0015 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0013 *** -0.0022 *** -0.0008 * -0.0008 * -0.0007 
-3.31 -3.12 -2.84 -4.83 -1.68 -1.70 -1.17 
Capex 0.0418 *** 0.0436 *** 0.0945 *** 0.0843 *** 0.0833 *** 0.1242 *** 
5.31 5.45 7.37 6.58 6.50 4.96 
Cash Flows 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
1.10 0.57 0.68 0.62 0.37 
Capital Intensity -0.0139 *** -0.0110 *** -0.0109 *** -0.0006 
-5.40 -4.22 -4.20 -0.11 
Advertising -0.0148 *** -0.0147 *** -0.0241 *** 
-5.72 -5.72 -5.99 
Sales Growth 0.0030 0.0035 
1.26 1.33 
R&D Intensity 0.0410 *** 
3.05 
Intercept 0.0680 *** 0.0429 *** 0.0431 *** 0.0540 *** 0.0538 *** 0.0633 *** 0.0670 *** 0.0700 *** 0.0745 *** 0.1025 *** 0.0996 *** 0.0790 *** 
82.70 8.49 8.61 10.53 10.32 11.70 11.94 12.52 13.63 17.81 15.27 10.17 
N 3905 3905 3896 3896 3874 3622 3525 3512 3509 3297 3284 1580 
Adj. R2 0.0458 0.0541 0.0536 0.0686 0.0696 0.0696 0.0734 0.0758 0.0872 0.0995 0.1012 0.1627 
Notes: This table reports stepwise cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific control variables 
over my full sample period from 2004 to 2014. My expected cost of equity proxy is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from the CAPM model using 
weekly data frequencies. My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported 
under each coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 42: Cost of Equity Fama/French (Weekly) - Stepwise Regressions 
  [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5]   [6]   [7]   [8]   [9]   [10]   [11]   [12]   
ESG Disclosure -0.0321 *** -0.0260 *** -0.0271 *** -0.0267 *** -0.0265 *** -0.0286 *** -0.0279 *** -0.0281 *** -0.0258 *** -0.0253 *** -0.0245 *** -0.0321 *** 
-12.46 -8.98 -9.50 -9.33 -9.24 -10.00 -9.58 -9.51 -8.63 -8.18 -7.94 -9.03 
Size -0.0019 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0013 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0016 *** -0.0016 *** -0.0024 *** -0.0023 *** -0.0010 ** 
-5.91 -4.35 -4.54 -4.47 -3.84 -4.18 -4.70 -4.75 -6.53 -6.32 -2.19 
Leverage -0.0071 *** -0.0075 *** -0.0077 *** -0.0090 *** -0.0092 *** -0.0090 *** -0.0111 *** -0.0095 *** -0.0085 *** -0.0059 * 
 -3.91 -4.13 -4.17 -4.32 -4.40 -4.31 -5.25 -4.32 -3.83 -1.90 ROA -0.0065 -0.0062 0.0010 0.0005 -0.0013 0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0061 
 -1.31 -1.22 0.15 0.07 -0.18 0.04 -0.19 -0.21 -0.65 Volatility -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 
-1.29 -0.49 -0.13 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.30 0.70 
Interest Coverage -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0016 *** -0.0011 ** -0.0011 ** -0.0009 
-1.35 -1.47 -1.24 -3.36 -2.26 -2.28 -1.49 
Capex 0.0213 ** 0.0227 ** 0.0767 *** 0.0732 *** 0.0718 *** 0.1041 *** 
2.39 2.49 5.41 5.13 5.04 3.68 
Cash Flows 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0005 
0.33 -0.15 -0.44 -0.61 -1.32 
Capital Intensity -0.0148 *** -0.0153 *** -0.0152 *** -0.0071 
-5.39 -5.52 -5.51 -1.19 
Advertising -0.0088 *** -0.0082 *** -0.0164 *** 
-3.21 -2.98 -3.81 
Sales Growth 0.0097 *** 0.0122 *** 
4.32 4.37 
R&D Intensity 0.0593 *** 
4.28 
Intercept 0.0658 *** 0.0948 *** 0.0916 *** 0.0934 *** 0.0946 *** 0.0932 *** 0.0950 *** 0.0976 *** 0.1023 *** 0.1147 *** 0.1019 *** 0.0748 *** 
77.51 19.63 19.07 18.83 18.67 17.49 16.82 17.28 18.37 19.25 15.48 9.07 
N 3888 3888 3879 3879 3864 3613 3516 3503 3500 3288 3284 1580 
Adj. R2 0.0369 0.0475 0.0509 0.0511 0.0512 0.0517 0.0554 0.0581 0.0699 0.0794 0.0850 0.1279 
Notes: This table reports stepwise cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific control variables over my 
full sample period from 2004 to 2014. My expected cost of equity proxy is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from Fama/French's asset pricing model 
using weekly data frequencies. My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported 
under each coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 43: Cost of Equity Carhart (Weekly) - Stepwise Regressions 
  [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5]   [6]   [7]   [8]   [9]   [10]   [11]   [12]   
ESG Disclosure -0.0282 *** -0.0213 *** -0.0225 *** -0.0224 *** -0.0221 *** -0.0243 *** -0.0254 *** -0.0251 *** -0.0233 *** -0.0221 *** -0.0211 *** -0.0301 *** 
-10.72 -7.18 -7.72 -7.62 -7.50 -8.19 -8.48 -8.25 -7.59 -6.99 -6.70 -8.20 
Size -0.0021 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0016 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0013 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0023 *** -0.0022 *** -0.0005 
-6.69 -4.83 -4.85 -4.76 -4.21 -3.60 -3.98 -3.99 -6.01 -5.75 -1.05 
Leverage -0.0084 *** -0.0086 *** -0.0089 *** -0.0098 *** -0.0095 *** -0.0094 *** -0.0110 *** -0.0089 *** -0.0075 *** -0.0048 
 -4.58 -4.70 -4.81 -4.59 -4.46 -4.44 -5.11 -3.98 -3.33 -1.51 ROA -0.0026 -0.0016 0.0019 0.0030 -0.0006 0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0092 
 -0.54 -0.34 0.29 0.45 -0.08 0.07 -0.07 -0.10 -0.91 Volatility -0.0005 ** -0.0004 * -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 
-2.54 -1.72 -1.36 -1.21 -1.16 -1.04 -0.72 -0.30 
Interest Coverage -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0012 *** -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
-0.64 -1.06 -0.90 -2.58 -1.10 -1.14 -0.86 
Capex 0.0502 *** 0.0522 *** 0.0939 *** 0.0903 *** 0.0884 *** 0.1041 *** 
5.17 5.28 6.09 5.84 5.83 3.50 
Cash Flows 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 
1.25 0.90 0.50 0.23 0.39 
Capital Intensity -0.0114 *** -0.0125 *** -0.0125 *** -0.0034 
-4.00 -4.32 -4.33 -0.53 
Advertising -0.0134 *** -0.0125 *** -0.0181 *** 
-4.75 -4.49 -4.06 
Sales Growth 0.0131 *** 0.0141 *** 
5.00 4.24 
R&D Intensity 0.0496 *** 
3.24 
Intercept 0.0643 *** 0.0972 *** 0.0933 *** 0.0941 *** 0.0966 *** 0.0951 *** 0.0903 *** 0.0923 *** 0.0959 *** 0.1101 *** 0.0929 *** 0.0633 *** 
74.60 20.09 19.41 18.96 19.01 17.79 16.05 16.24 16.97 17.92 13.67 7.54 
N 3888 3888 3879 3879 3864 3613 3516 3503 3500 3288 3284 1580 
Adj. R2 0.0274 0.0405 0.0452 0.0450 0.0463 0.0458 0.0564 0.0576 0.0641 0.0739 0.0839 0.1072 
Notes: This table reports stepwise cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific control variables over my full 
sample period from 2004 to 2014. My expected cost of equity proxy is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from Carhart's asset pricing model using weekly 
data frequencies. My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported under each 
coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 44: Cost of Equity CAPM (Monthly) - Stepwise Regressions 
  [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5]   [6]   [7]   [8]   [9]   [10]   [11]   [12]   
ESG Disclosure -0.0348 *** -0.0394 *** -0.0390 *** -0.0363 *** -0.0357 *** -0.0352 *** -0.0320 *** -0.0324 *** -0.0305 *** -0.0292 *** -0.0295 *** -0.0371 *** 
-11.55 -11.76 -11.68 -10.93 -10.79 -10.40 -9.43 -9.50 -8.87 -8.23 -8.24 -8.57 
Size 0.0014 *** 0.0013 *** 0.0008 ** 0.0009 ** 0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0016 *** -0.0017 *** -0.0008 
3.56 3.31 1.96 2.22 1.44 -0.59 -1.15 -1.14 -3.19 -3.34 -1.49 
Leverage 0.0012 -0.0019 -0.0029 -0.0063 *** -0.0084 *** -0.0083 *** -0.0100 *** -0.0081 *** -0.0084 *** 0.0003 
 0.59 -0.94 -1.43 -2.64 -3.53 -3.48 -4.14 -3.16 -3.25 0.07 ROA -0.0462 *** -0.0442 *** -0.0385 *** -0.0371 *** -0.0419 *** -0.0406 *** -0.0433 *** -0.0435 *** -0.0463 *** 
 -7.94 -7.58 -5.14 -4.96 -5.16 -5.00 -5.22 -5.25 -3.72 Volatility -0.0012 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0010 *** -0.0009 *** -0.0009 *** -0.0009 *** -0.0009 *** -0.0006 
-5.04 -4.76 -3.90 -3.65 -3.64 -3.59 -3.62 -1.61 
Interest Coverage -0.0017 *** -0.0019 *** -0.0017 *** -0.0026 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0008 
-2.96 -3.20 -2.98 -4.22 -2.71 -2.76 -0.88 
Capex -0.0009 0.0014 0.0474 *** 0.0419 *** 0.0414 *** 0.1527 *** 
-0.11 0.16 3.44 2.98 2.94 4.43 
Cash Flows 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 
1.19 0.83 0.91 0.91 0.35 
Capital Intensity -0.0126 *** -0.0130 *** -0.0130 *** -0.0127 * 
-4.38 -4.32 -4.32 -1.71 
Advertising -0.0136 *** -0.0138 *** -0.0280 *** 
-4.76 -4.86 -5.36 
Sales Growth -0.0018 -0.0011 
-0.64 -0.31 
R&D Intensity 0.0698 *** 
3.92 
Intercept 0.0705 *** 0.0488 *** 0.0491 *** 0.0620 *** 0.0673 *** 0.0778 *** 0.0905 *** 0.0940 *** 0.0979 *** 0.1154 *** 0.1190 *** 0.0940 *** 
73.56 8.10 8.19 10.11 10.98 11.75 12.82 13.20 13.93 14.66 14.34 9.39 
N 3888 3888 3879 3879 3875 3623 3526 3513 3510 3298 3283 1580 
Adj. R2 0.0337 0.0381 0.0376 0.0538 0.0603 0.0676 0.0620 0.0641 0.0706 0.0804 0.0816 0.1189 
Notes: This table reports stepwise cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific control variables 
over my full sample period from 2004 to 2014. My expected cost of equity proxy is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from the CAPM model using 
monthly data frequencies. My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported 
under each coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 45: Cost of Equity Fama/French (Monthly) - Stepwise Regressions 
  [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5]   [6]   [7]   [8]   [9]   [10]   [11]   [12]   
ESG Disclosure -0.0315 *** -0.0272 *** -0.0289 *** -0.0275 *** -0.0268 *** -0.0278 *** -0.0259 *** -0.0255 *** -0.0232 *** -0.0237 *** -0.0238 *** -0.0354 *** 
-10.33 -7.67 -8.25 -7.87 -7.66 -7.78 -7.21 -6.99 -6.36 -6.38 -6.33 -8.19 
Size -0.0013 *** -0.0006 -0.0009 ** -0.0007 * -0.0009 ** -0.0011 ** -0.0012 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0020 *** -0.0021 *** -0.0010 * 
-3.19 -1.48 -2.14 -1.82 -2.01 -2.40 -2.70 -2.69 -4.12 -4.23 -1.93 
Leverage -0.0104 *** -0.0120 *** -0.0133 *** -0.0144 *** -0.0146 *** -0.0143 *** -0.0164 *** -0.0117 *** -0.0117 *** -0.0031 
 -5.11 -5.87 -6.49 -5.86 -5.93 -5.87 -6.71 -4.60 -4.59 -0.83 ROA -0.0238 *** -0.0210 *** -0.0181 ** -0.0184 ** -0.0234 *** -0.0217 ** -0.0241 *** -0.0241 *** -0.0308 *** 
 -4.03 -3.55 -2.23 -2.29 -2.70 -2.54 -2.79 -2.78 -2.63 
Volatility -0.0016 *** -0.0016 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0013 *** -0.0013 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0008 ** 
-6.59 -6.20 -5.47 -5.35 -5.39 -4.72 -4.74 -2.38 
Interest Coverage -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0016 *** -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0010 
-1.29 -1.15 -0.94 -2.62 -1.18 -1.22 -1.29 
Capex 0.0328 *** 0.0346 *** 0.0907 *** 0.0868 *** 0.0859 *** 0.2040 *** 
3.91 4.03 6.35 5.98 5.91 6.33 
Cash Flows 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 
1.34 0.93 0.42 0.38 0.64 
Capital Intensity -0.0153 *** -0.0195 *** -0.0194 *** -0.0205 *** 
-5.17 -6.42 -6.40 -2.89 
Advertising -0.0211 *** -0.0213 *** -0.0359 *** 
-7.32 -7.40 -7.07 
Sales Growth 0.0008 0.0044 
0.31 1.36 
R&D Intensity 0.1043 *** 
5.97 
Intercept 0.0678 *** 0.0879 *** 0.0832 *** 0.0898 *** 0.0970 *** 0.1013 *** 0.1014 *** 0.1032 *** 0.1080 *** 0.1219 *** 0.1221 *** 0.0941 *** 
69.46 14.34 13.71 14.37 15.50 15.05 14.24 14.28 15.25 15.80 15.13 9.92 
N 3888 3888 3879 3879 3875 3623 3526 3513 3510 3298 3283 1580 
Adj. R2 0.0267 0.0303 0.0362 0.0401 0.0507 0.0520 0.0540 0.0545 0.0638 0.0815 0.0824 0.1551 
Notes: This table reports stepwise cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific control variables
over my full sample period from 2004 to 2014. My expected cost of equity proxy is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from Fama/French's asset
pricing model using monthly data frequencies. My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-
ratios are reported under each coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table 46: Cost of Equity Carhart (Monthly) - Stepwise Regressions 
  [1]   [2]   [3]   [4]   [5]   [6]   [7]   [8]   [9]   [10]   [11]   [12]   
ESG Disclosure -0.0305 *** -0.0250 *** -0.0270 *** -0.0260 *** -0.0252 *** -0.0268 *** -0.0258 *** -0.0254 *** -0.0233 *** -0.0230 *** -0.0229 *** -0.0340 *** 
-9.75 -6.92 -7.58 -7.30 -7.09 -7.34 -7.03 -6.81 -6.27 -6.04 -5.96 -7.66 
Size -0.0017 *** -0.0008 ** -0.0010 ** -0.0009 ** -0.0010 ** -0.0010 ** -0.0012 ** -0.0012 ** -0.0024 *** -0.0024 *** -0.0014 ** 
-4.13 -2.07 -2.50 -2.17 -2.21 -2.24 -2.51 -2.51 -4.60 -4.62 -2.51 
Leverage -0.0124 *** -0.0134 *** -0.0148 *** -0.0157 *** -0.0151 *** -0.0149 *** -0.0167 *** -0.0111 *** -0.0106 *** -0.0026 
 -6.01 -6.52 -7.14 -6.39 -6.16 -6.12 -6.80 -4.35 -4.12 -0.69 ROA -0.0159 *** -0.0130 ** -0.0096 -0.0102 -0.0149 * -0.0135 -0.0145 -0.0146 -0.0240 ** 
 -2.67 -2.17 -1.15 -1.24 -1.68 -1.53 -1.63 -1.62 -1.99 Volatility -0.0017 *** -0.0017 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0009 ** 
-6.69 -6.32 -5.74 -5.62 -5.64 -4.71 -4.69 -2.35 
Interest Coverage -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0012 ** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0006 
-0.95 -0.70 -0.52 -1.97 -0.18 -0.24 -0.76 
Capex 0.0595 *** 0.0613 *** 0.1102 *** 0.1058 *** 0.1045 *** 0.2270 *** 
6.41 6.47 7.19 6.86 6.77 6.40 
Cash Flows 0.0003 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 
1.29 0.94 0.17 0.06 0.55 
Capital Intensity -0.0133 *** -0.0183 *** -0.0183 *** -0.0210 *** 
-4.32 -5.82 -5.82 -2.74 
Advertising -0.0291 *** -0.0290 *** -0.0404 *** 
-9.84 -9.87 -7.61 
Sales Growth 0.0049 * 0.0061 * 
1.66 1.81 
R&D Intensity 0.1029 *** 
5.88 
Intercept 0.0672 *** 0.0933 *** 0.0877 *** 0.0921 *** 0.0996 *** 0.1027 *** 0.0988 *** 0.1006 *** 0.1048 *** 0.1248 *** 0.1194 *** 0.0959 *** 
67.25 15.12 14.29 14.60 15.72 15.13 13.74 13.73 14.54 15.69 14.33 9.79 
N 3888 3888 3879 3879 3875 3623 3526 3513 3510 3298 3283 1580 
Adj. R2 0.0237 0.0298 0.0377 0.0392 0.0502 0.0507 0.0605 0.0608 0.0673 0.0910 0.0931 0.1578 
Notes: This table reports stepwise cross-sectional regressions from regressing my expected cost of equity on my ESG disclosure quality variable and a set of company-specific control variables over my 
full sample period from 2004 to 2014. My expected cost of equity proxy is based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium and is inferred from Carhart's asset pricing model using 
monthly data frequencies. My cross-sectional OLS regressions are estimated with robust standard errors, using Huber/White heteroscedasticity-consitent standard errors. T-ratios are reported under 
each coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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8 Discussion and Conclusion 
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8.1 Discussion and Conclusion 
Given the tremendous growth of ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) Investing 
and the increasing relevance of ESG information for institutional investors, corporate 
managers, and policymakers making different strategic financial decisions, the principal aim 
of my thesis was to empirically investigate the effects and implications of several ESG 
dimensions on the financial performance, idiosyncratic and systematic risk, and expected cost 
of capital of investment portfolios, indexes, and companies. Using asset pricing 
methodologies, consistent with general market equilibrium models which are based on the 
Efficient Market Theory, the empirical chapters of my thesis provide new insights on the 
effects and implications of different ESG dimensions for equity and debt investors as well as 
corporate managers and policymakers. 
 Following Jensen's (1978:96) definition of an efficient capital market (see Chapter 
2.2. 'Definition of the Efficient Market Theory'), which posits that "A market is efficient with 
respect to information set t if it is impossible to make economic profits by trading on the 
basis of information set t ", I will summarise my main findings and subsequently outline 
their implications with respect to the Efficient Market Theory. 
 The main findings of my thesis can be summarised as follows. First, my results 
suggest that institutional investors such as pension funds governed by trust law and fiduciary 
duties shall be allowed to integrate ESG criteria into their investment decision making 
processes as they do no harm to the financial returns of my tested hypothetical equity pension 
portfolios. In other words, my findings show that no portfolio based on corporate 
environmental responsibility significantly over- or underperformed the respective 
conventional market benchmark (See Tables 3 and 4). Under ERISA, pension funds have 
been disallowed to consider environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria, or any 
other non-economic criteria, when such considerations damage the financial well-being of the 
beneficiary (Langbein and Posner, 1980, O'Brien-Hylton, 1992). 
 Second, my results show that ESG criteria can reduce the downside volatility of my 
tested hypothetical equity pension portfolios. This means that my screened hypothetical 
equity pension portfolios115 are no riskier than unscreened portfolios and thus, do not carry a 
diversification penalty (See e.g. Kurtz, 2005; Markowitz, 1952; Rudd, 1981; Sharpe, 1964). 
My analysis shows that those portfolios with high corporate environmental responsibility 
criteria even tend to experience significantly lower idiosyncratic risks relative to portfolios 
                                                 
115 Using e.g. corporate environmental sustainability criteria. 
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with low corporate environmental responsibility, depending on the specific risk measure and 
corporate environmental responsibility criteria used (See Figures 3 to 6). The difference tends 
to be statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. According to 
Modern Portfolio Theory (see e.g. Chapter 2.6.1. 'Diversification and ESG information) some 
scholars may argue that screened portfolios are less diversified relative to unscreened 
portfolios because they represent only a sub-set of the unscreened portfolio and will therefore 
always be riskier and financially less attractive. However, consistent with my findings, recent 
empirical evidence shows that a reduced stock universe does not need to reduce 
diversification and increase risk (Bello, 2005; Kacperczyk et al., 2005; Schroeder, 2007). 
 Third, my results show that an investment trading strategy based on sub-sets of ESG 
information in form of passive renewable energy equity indexes116 can be financially 
attractive as well as costly relative to investing in conventional equity markets, depending on 
the sample period under investigation. To be more specific, over the full sample period, 
several renewable energy equity indexes financially underperform relative to conventional 
benchmarks. Seven out of fourteen alpha coefficients are negative and statistically significant 
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance level (See Panel A of Table 10). This result is similar 
to the second phase of the EU ETS, where I find twelve renewable energy equities to 
significantly underperform their benchmarks (Panel C of Table 10). In contrast, over the first 
phase of the EU ETS, I find positive and statistically significant alphas for three renewable 
energy equity indexes (Panel B of Table 10). Although the two phases of the EU ETS are not 
necessarily related to financial asset prices, but rather institutional arrangements regarding 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions, which have been predetermined in advance (See 
Scholtens and Van der Goot, 2015), it could be that the launch of the EU ETS has triggered 
some general positive investors sentiment that temporarily increased the demand for 
renewable energy companies and thereby pushed up the stock prices. This could explain my 
results over the first phase of the EU ETS. While the results of my dynamic performance 
analysis indicate that renewable energy indexes' financial performance collapsed abruptly 
over the second phase of the EU ETS, which could have been the result of the financial 
crisis.117 
                                                 
116 ESG information sets can be used to generate different investment trading strategies. In Chapters 5 and 6 of 
my thesis, I empirically investigate investment trading strategies related to renewable energy, which represents a 
sub-set of ESG information.   
117 However, this would need to be established by more formal tests of crisis periods such as those employed by 
Bohl et al. (2013).  
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 My findings also suggest that the financial returns of passive renewable energy equity 
indexes tend to be very volatile throughout. Thus, the findings of my pre-crisis period are 
consistent with Modern Portfolio Theory (see e.g. Chapter 2.6.1. 'Diversification and ESG 
information), which posits that higher risk exposures shall lead to higher expected returns. 
While the findings of my post-crisis sample period are contrary to Modern Portfolio Theory. 
Although renewable energy equity indexes' beta coefficients remain at a high level during the 
post-crisis period, their financial returns are significantly negative. 
 Fourth, the results of my thesis show that an investment trading strategy based on sub-
sets of ESG information in form of passive renewable energy equity indexes is associated 
with higher investment risks relative to a trading strategy investing in fossil-fuel energy 
companies. My results suggest that renewable energy equity indexes are not only more 
volatile than conventional equity market benchmarks as well as fossil-fuel energy equity 
indexes, using absolute, downside, and relative investment risk measures (See Tables 13 and 
15). Higher investment risks could be the result of high uncertainties regarding the nature of 
renewable energy technology businesses. Meaning that renewable energy companies tend to 
have more in common with technology-oriented businesses with a selected focus on few 
projects. Investors could perceive companies with few and uncertain projects as riskier 
investments. Also, the renewable energy sector is very capital intensive. Due to the capital 
intensity of renewable energy projects, governments had to substantially support the sector by 
policy investments in the past. However, once subsidies are discontinued or substantially 
reduced (e.g. as a result of a recession), those sectors can be seriously affected, as wittnessed 
by the surge of bankruptcies in the German solar sector (Bohl et al., 2013). Further, the weak 
carbon price of the EU ETS and the lack of a global carbon trading scheme does not 
contribute to the growth of the renewable energy sector, through market-based policies.  
 Thus, consistent with the findings of prior studies and Modern Portfolio Theory, I can 
conclude that renewable energy equity indexes can be financially beneficial, however, they 
are associated with higher risks (see e.g. Henriques and Sadorsky, 2008; Kumar et al., 2012; 
Sadorsky, 2012a, b). 
 Fifth, my results suggest that ESG information in form of high ESG disclosure quality 
lowers a company's expected cost of equity and debt capital, while also controlling for 
company- and bond-specific characteristics. In other words, the relation between ESG 
disclosure quality and the expected cost of equity and debt is consistently negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level (See Table 23). My results imply 
that the market prices a company's ESG disclosure quality along with other factors. 
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Theoretical arguments that could motivate why ESG disclosure quality lowers the expected 
cost of capital are based on companies' investor base (Merton, 1987), reductions in 
companies' systematic risk (Lambert et al., 2007), and reductions in company-specific risks 
such as future litigation and reputational risks (Bauer and Hann, 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; 
El Ghoul et al., 2011; Starks, 2009). To be more specific, according to Merton's (1987) 
capital market equilibrium model, companies have an incentive to disclose more information 
as this increases investors' awarness of a company's existence and expands the investor base, 
which will reduce the firm's cost of capital and increase the market value of the company 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Merton, 1987). Further, Lambert et al. (2007) show that not only does 
better disclosure lower the variance of a copmany's cash flows, it also affects the covariances 
with other companies, which essentially reduces a companies' beta. Finally, irresponsible 
companies tend to be perceived as riskier investments because of potential future litigation 
and reputational risks (Bauer and Hann, 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; 
Starks, 2009). Companies that are ethically and socially unsound, and otherwise deliberately 
disclose misleading information on their products and services will increase the probability of 
future lawsuits against the company.   
8.1.1 Implications for the Efficient Market Theory 
The theoretical roots of my thesis in general, and my empirical methodologies in particular, 
can be found in the Efficient Market Theory. Following the vast majority of Finance research, 
my thesis is assessed from the "home paradigm" in Finance, which is most closely 
represented by Burrell and Morgan's (1979) functionalist research paradigm (See Chapter 3 
'Methodological Position and Research Methodology') . As such, I will proceed to discuss the 
implications of my empirical results with respect to the Efficient Market Theory. 
 As outlined in Chapter 2 'Theory: The Efficient Market Theory', my empirical results 
can be interpreted from two different perspectives. Critics of the Efficient Market Theory 
argue that any persistent and statistically significant outperformance (e.g. as measured by the 
alpha coefficient), shows that capital markets are inefficient with regard to information set t  
(or investment trading strategy). In contrast, supporters of the Efficient Market Theory will 
argue that markets are efficient, however, that the asset pricing models used to test 
information set t  (or investment trading strategy) are misspecified and do not fully price the 
respective information set. I have discussed this issue in Chapter 2.7. 'Joint Hypothesis 
Problem: Simultaneous Tests of Market Efficiency and Models of Market Equilibrium'.  
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 Thus, consistent with Jensen's (1978) definition of an efficient capital market, and as 
outlined previously, any statistically significant economic profit (as measured by the alpha 
coefficient) found in my thesis is interpreted as to whether or not the market is 
informationally efficient with respect to information set t  based on the specific markets and 
sample periods tested. In my thesis, the information set t  equals three related but 
independent ESG dimensions or investment trading strategies, namely corporate 
environmental responsibility, renewable energy, and ESG disclosure quality. Thus, in each of 
my chapters, I test a different information set (or investment trading strategy) related to ESG. 
I do not assume that my three individual ESG dimensions are the only information sets 
available, as there are hundreds and thousands of ESG criteria with millions of possible 
investment trading strategies that could be empirically analysed.        
 My results in Chapter 4 show that none of my hypothetical equity pension portfolios 
generate statistically significant economic profits (as measured by the alpha coefficient) over 
my tested sample period. This means that an investment trading strategy of investing in 
companies with high corporate environmental responsiblity does not generate statistically 
significant abnormal risk-adjusted returns, but neither does an investment trading strategy 
investing in companies with low corporate environmental responsbility.  
 According to Hamilton et al.'s (1993) equal performance hypothesis (as discussed in 
Chapter 2.5.1. 'Pricing of ESG information'), when risk-adjusted returns of high ESG 
portfolios relative to low ESG portfolios are equal, then ESG information may not be priced 
in the market. This is because "responsible investors who sell stocks find enough 
conventional investors ready to buy that the prices of the stocks do not drop" (Hamilton et al., 
1993:63). As Heinkel et al's (2001) capital market equilibrium model (which is consistent 
with the Efficient Market Theory) shows, when fewer investors are available to hold the 
shares of certain companies, then this reduces diversification (risk-sharing) and increases a 
company's cost of capital. Risk-adjusted returns to investors are the cost of capital to the 
company (Hamilton et al., 1993). Thus, the equal performance hypothesis suggests that there 
are sufficient conventional investors available to hold the shares without causing an effect on 
a company's stock price or its cost of capital, and therefore responsible investors cannot 
influence high ESG companies' share prices or cost of capitals by favouring them over low 
ESG companies. As a result, the market seems to be informationally efficient with respect to 
information sets related to my first proxy of ESG information, corporate environmental 
responsibility, over my tested sample period. 
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 However, concluding that capital markets are efficient with respect to information sets 
related to corporate environmental responsibility would be premature, as further empirical 
tests are necessary to establish that capital markets are consistently efficient with regard to 
corporate environmental responsibility in different markets as well as future sample periods. 
Prior literature on the effects of corporate environmental responsibility on risk-adjusted 
returns has shown that corporate environmental responsibility can have a significant effect on 
a company's risk-adjusted returns and cost of capitals (see e.g. Bauer and Hann, 2010; Hart 
and Ahuja, 1996; Horváthová, 2012; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; King and Lennox, 
2001; Oikonomou et al., 2014; Orlitzky et al., 2003;  Renneboog et al., 2008a). 
 Furthermore, the Joint Hypothesis Problem (discussed in Chapter 2.7. 'Joint 
Hypothesis Problem: Simultaneous Tests of Market Efficiency and Models of Market 
Equilibrium') shows that all tests for market efficiency are always joint tests of market 
behaviour and models of asset pricing (Dimson and Mussavian, 1998). Thus, it could well be 
that my asset pricing model used for my regression tests is misspecified and does not 
sufficiently measure corporate environmental responsibility.  
 In contrast to the results of Chapter 4, the results of Chapter 5 suggest that an 
investment trading strategy based on investing in renewable energy equity indexes generates 
statistically signficant economic profits and losses (as measured by the alpha coefficient), 
depending on the sample period tested. My results are consistent with Hamilton et al.'s (1993) 
over- and underperformance hypotheses (which I have discussed in more detail in Chapter 
2.5.1. 'Pricing of ESG information). The overperformance hypothesis states that when the 
risk-adjusted returns of renewable energy equity indexes are higher than the risk-adjusted 
returns of conventional equity indexes, then ESG information in form of renewable energy is 
priced (mispriced) by the market. The reason is that investors tend to underestimate the 
possibility that negative information will be released about conventional firms (Bauer et al., 
2005; Hamilton et al., 1993; Moskowitz, 1972).118 The overperformance hypothesis in 
conjunction with Heinkel et al.'s (2001) framework also suggests that conventional 
companies are being held by fewer investors since responsible investors have a preference for 
renewable energy companies, which as a result lowers the stock prices and increases the cost 
of capital of conventional companies. As a result, the market seems to be informationally 
                                                 
118 For example, conventional investors who consistently underestimate the likelihood of chemical firms having 
issues with uncontrolled chemical spills, will see a drop in the stock prices of these chemical firms following the 
spill. While reduced stock prices will lower the returns of conventional portfolios holding chemical stocks, 
portfolios of socially responsible investors will be unaffected (See e.g. Hamilton, 1995). 
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inefficient with respect to information sets related to my second proxy of ESG information, 
renewable energy, over my tested sample periods, due to investor's mispricing. 
 Hamilton et al.'s (1993) underperformance hypothesis states that when risk-adjusted 
returns of renewable energy equity indexes are lower relative to the risk-adjusted returns of 
conventional equity indexes, then ESG information in form of renewable energy is also 
priced by the market. The underperformance hypothesis in conjunction with Heinkel et al.'s 
(2001) framework suggests that renewable energy companies are being held by fewer 
investors, which results in reduced diversification (risk-sharing), lower stock prices and 
increased cost of capital for renewable energy companies. As a result, both of my findings 
from Chapter 5 show that the market seems to be informationally inefficient with respect to 
information sets related to my second proxy of ESG information, renewable energy, over my 
tested sample periods. 
 Similarly, my empirical analysis of Chapter 7 shows that ESG disclosure quality is 
negatively associated with my expected cost of equity and debt variables, controlling for 
company- and bond-specific characteristics. My results are generally statistically significant 
at the 1 and 5 percent significance level and consistent across alternative proxies for the 
expected cost of equity119 and different regression specifications. My results of the relation 
between ESG disclosure quality and the expected cost of equity and debt imply that the 
market prices a company's ESG disclosure quality along with other factors. In relation to the 
Efficient Market Theory, my results suggest that the market appears to be informationally 
inefficient with respect to information sets related to my third proxy of ESG information, 
ESG disclosure quality, over my sample period. 
 To sum up, althouth the market appears informationally efficient with respect to 
information sets related to corporate environmental responsibility over my tested sample 
period, further empirical tests are necessary to establish that capital markets are consistently 
efficient with regard to corporate environmental responsibility in different markets as well as 
future sample periods. Also, it could be that my asset pricing model is misspecified and does 
not sufficiently account for corporate environmental responsibility as prior studies have 
reported abnormal performances using similar proxies (See e.g. Orlitzky et al., 2003; 
Renneboog et al., 2008a). My empirical tests suggest that the market is informationally 
inefficient with respect to information sets related to renewable energy investment trading 
                                                 
119 My expected cost of equity estimates are based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) expected market premium 
and inferred from three different asset pricing models including CAPM, Fama/French, and Carhart using daily, 
weekly, and monthly data frequencies. 
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strategies and ESG disclosure quality. However, due to the Joint Hypothesis Problem (as 
discussed in Chapter 2.7. 'Joint Hypothesis Problem: Simultaneous Tests of Market 
Efficiency and Models of Market Equilibrium'), it could well be that my asset pricing models 
are also misspecified. 
8.1.2 Contributions 
My thesis contributes to the extant literatures and related academic debates of the effects of 
different ESG dimensions on the investment performance and risk of equity portfolios, 
indexes, as well as companies' expected cost of capital financing (See e.g. Bauer and Hann, 
2010; Bohl et al., 2013; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Henriques and Sadorsky, 
2008; Kempf and Osthoff, 2007; Kumar et al., 2012; Lo and Sheu, 2007; Oikonomou et al., 
2014; Ortas and Moneva, 2013; Scholtens, 2008; Scholtens and Zhou, 2008; Sharfman and 
Fernando, 2008). In particular, my thesis adds to the literature by empirically investigating 
the effects of different dimensions of ESG information (ESG-based investment trading 
strategies) on the financial performance, idiosyncratic and systematic risk, and expected cost 
of capital of portfolios, indexes, and companies. Using empirical methodologies based on 
general models of market equilibrium and consistent with the Efficient Market Theory, I 
especially contribute to the existing literatures on the relationships between different ESG 
dimensions and the investment performance and risk of investment portfolios and equity 
indexes, pension funds' fiduciary duties, and companies' expected cost of capital. 
 Chapter 4 of my thesis, contributes to the existing literature of the relationship 
between corporate environmental responsibility and the investment performance of portfolios 
from the perspective of hypothetical equity pension funds as well as pension funds' legal 
duties under trust law, i.e. fiduciary duties (Berry, 2011; Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 
2005; Richardson, 2006). My chapter not only contributes to empirical studies investigating 
the effects of ESG information on the investment performance of hypothetical investment 
portfolios (e.g. investment trading strategies) (See e.g. Kempf and Osthoff, 2007; Lo and 
Sheu, 2007; Scholtens, 2008; Scholtens and Zhou, 2008), but also on the relationship 
between ESG information and pension funds' legal duties under trust law (Martin, 2009; 
Richardson, 2009; Sandberg, 2011; Woods and Urwin, 2010). 
 Chapter 5 contributes to the existing literature by extending the research on ESG-
themed investment trading strategies of passive renewable energy equity indexes. I 
investigate the relationship between an ESG-themed investment trading strategy in passive 
renewable energy equity companies and the static and dynamic investment performance 
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(Bohl et al., 2013; Kumar et al., 2012; Ortas and Moneva, 2013). My empirical study aims to 
increase the understanding of renewable energy equity indexes' return and risk characteristics 
relative to conventional equities. Building on my results from Chapter 5, in Chapter 6, I also 
contribute to the extant literature by extending the research on ESG-themed investment 
trading strategies of passive renewable energy equity indexes. My chapter studies 
idiosyncratic risks between an ESG-themed investment trading strategy in passive renewable 
energy equity indexes relative to an investment trading strategy in fossil-fuel energy equity 
indexes in the coal, gas, and oil sectors (Henriques and Sadorsky, 2008; Kumar et al., 2012; 
Sadorsky, 2012a, b). Using absolute, downside, and relative investment risk measures, my 
chapter aims to contrast renewable energies' idiosyncratic risks with those of more 
conventional energies such as fossil-fuel equity indexes.   
 In Chapter 7, I contribute to the existing literature by investigating the relevance of a 
third ESG dimension, namely ESG disclosure quality, for equity and debt investors. More 
specifically, I contribute to the existing literature by extending the research on voluntary ESG 
disclosure information (See e.g. Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Plumlee et al., 2010) as well as the 
effects of ESG on the expected cost of equity and debt, more generally (See e.g. Bauer and 
Hann, 2010; Chava, 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Oikonomou et al., 2014). I believe that my 
study contributes to the existing studies by using a novel indicator to measure the extent (or 
quality) of companies' ESG disclosure, using alternative approaches to compute the expected 
cost of equity and debt capital (based on Graham and Harvey's (2015) survey data of the 
expected market premium), and by investigating the effects my ESG disclosure quality 
variable on the cost of debt.  
8.1.3 Future Research Avenues 
My thesis opens new research topics that could be investigated in the future. First, future 
research could conduct a study similar to my 4th Chapter, using fixed-income in addition to 
equity investment processes, as equity and fixed income represent the largest asset classes in 
international pension fund portfolios (OECD, 2013). Further, pension funds' fixed income 
processes tend to differ relative to those of equity investments. For example, the fact that 
pension funds' strategic fixed income investment decisions are influenced by credit rating 
agencies could constrain their ability to take on more risk (Bank for International Settlements, 
2011). Second, future research could investgate the effects of different ESG dimensions on 
the financial and risk performance of hypothetical equity pension funds. In my thesis, I focus 
on corporate environmental responsibility criteria provided by EIRIS, future research could 
247 
study ESG critiera from other data providers as well as extend the analysis to social and 
governance sustainability criteria. Third, future research could also investigate whether my 
results in Chapters 5 and 6 are consistent across different geographical contexts such as 
developing or emerging economies. Limited by data availability issues, I was only able to 
include one renewable energy index from Asia, at the time. Since then, various new regional 
renewable energy indexes from developing and emerging economies have been launched. 
Fourth, and related to my first point, future research could consider analysing renewable 
energy fixed income investments. Although the renewable energy bond market is still small 
relative to the conventional bond market120, it is growing at considerable speed and could be 
especially promising for risk-averse institutional investors such as pension funds, who might 
have been reluctant to invest in renewable energies due to the higher associated risks of 
renewable energy equities (As my results suggest in Chapters 5 and 6). Fifth, future research 
could perform a similar study to Chapter 7 of my thesis, using an extended international 
sample of companies to test whether different cultural or regulatory frameworks have an 
impact on the negative association between ESG disclosure quality and the expected cost of 
equity and debt. Finally, future research could empirically investigate the relationship 
between a company's ESG disclosure quality and cost of debt capital. To the best of my 
knowledge, this relationship seems unexplored to date. In general, empirical studies of the 
effects of different ESG dimensions on the cost of debt are rather scarce (See e.g. Bauer and 
Hann, 2010; Oikonomou et al., 2014). Thus, future research could contribute to the debate on 
the effects of ESG disclosure on the cost of capital and increase the understanding of debt 
investors with respect to the importance of such disclosures.     
8.1.4 Practitioner and Policy Relevance 
The empirical results of my thesis could be relevant for institutional investors, corporate 
managers, and policymakers making different strategic financial decisions.  
 My empirical findings could be relevant for Institutional investors such as pension 
fund trustees who are governed by fiduciary duties and are required to make strategic 
financial decisions on behalf of the pension fund's beneficiaries. Strategic financial decisions 
could include the generation of investment strategies that integrate corporate environmental 
criteria into the pension portfolio construction process. Those strategic financial decisions 
could however interfere with pension trustees' legal duties under trust law, i.e. fiduciary 
duties to invest prudently and for proper purpose, by not providing a financial return that is 
                                                 
120 Valued at around 3.5 billion USD in 2010 (Wood and Grace, 2011). 
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exclusively for the economic benefit of the beneficiary (Berry, 2011; Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer, 2005; Richardson, 2006).121 In examining the implications of such strategic 
financial decisions, my findings suggest that pension fund trustees should consider the 
integration of corporate environmental criteria into their portfolio construction process as 
such investment strategies do no financial harm and appear to have the potential to reduce 
return volatilities of their portfolios, especially pension funds with large equity allocations. 
 My results could also be relevant for corporate managers making strategic financial 
decisions. Strategic investments, such as those that companies make to increase their ESG 
disclosure quality carry a cost that have to be balanced against the potential benefits. In 
assessing the benefits of such strategic investments, my results suggest that corporate 
managers can include the potential for reductions in the cost of capital, especially those 
managers who finance predominantly with equity. Equally informative are my findings on 
the cost of debt, which show that a company's ESG disclosure quality also lowers the cost of 
debt, over my full sample period.  
 Further, my empirical results may be useful for policymakers making strategic 
financial decisions to address issues related to climate change such as meeting or exceeding 
greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. Strategic financial decisions could include 
increased investments to support renewable energy companies. In calculating the benefits or 
costs of such strategic investments, my findings show that the majority of renewable energy 
companies domiciled in developed economies financially underperformed conventional 
market benchmarks during most of my tested sample period. Additionaly, my results suggest 
that renewable energy companies are highly volatile investments relative to conventional 
(fossil-fuelled) energy companies as measured by different idiosyncratic and systematic risk 
proxies. My results could be relevant for those policymakers who seek to understand and 
reduce the investment risks of renewable energy companie by a clear and targeted renewable 
energy policy and one that provides less subsidies to conventional (fossil-fuelled) energy 
companies and lends more support to the development of innovative renewable energy 
technologies. Alternatively, policymakers could reduce renewable energies' investment risks 
by increasing the direct demand for renewable energy which could have a positive impact on 
the sales of renewable energy companies. 
                                                 
121 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) stipulates that any investment decision not 
based on economic (financial) ones is disallowed (Langbein and Posner, 1980, O'Brien-Hylton, 1992). 
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8.1.5 Limitations 
My empirical chapters are subject to some limitations. I will address these limitations in the 
order of my empirical chapters, beginning with Chapter 4. 
 First, I do not consider the costs my hypothetical pension funds incur in acquiring 
ESG criteria from an ESG data provider such as EIRIS. More recently, Gil-Bazo et al. (2010) 
has shown that ESG integrating mutual funds tend to have similar expese ratios relative to 
conventional active mutual funds. This could indicate that ESG integration is about as 
expensive as the average active investment management strategy. Second, my findings are 
based on hypothetical pension portfolios constructed with an equity allocation only and do 
not consider bonds, cash, or other alternative asset allocations. This means that my results are 
directly only relevant for pension funds with a sizable equity allocation or equity investors, 
which is the most important asset class for pension funds next to fixed income investments 
(See e.g. Aglietta et al., 2012; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; OECD, 2013). It seems unlikely that 
considering bonds would change my results substantially as prior research suggests that ESG 
criteria has no detrimental financial effects on bonds (Derwall and Koedijk, 2009; Menz, 
2010). Finally, my findings from Chapter 4 are directly only relevant for corporate 
environmental responsibility criteria produced by EIRIS.  
 The limitations of Chapter 5 are twofold. First, due to data availability limitations, my 
sample of renewable energy equity indexes is only directly representative of developed 
economies without considering renewable energy companies from developing or emerging 
economies. While developed economies used to be the forerunner in the investment and 
development of renewable energy technologies, more recently, developing economies have 
gained influence and should therefore represent an interesting avenue for future research 
(Bohl et al., 2013; World Economic Forum, 2011). Also, when more data on the historical 
performance of developing renewable energy indexes becomes available, meaningful 
empirical analyses can be conducted. Second, my results are applicable to any renewable 
energy equity index that has been defined as such. In other words, I do not distinguish 
between the screening intensity of renewable energy equity indexes neither the index 
provider's policy strictness with respect to listing or delisting renewable energy companies. 
While this distinction will likely not materially influence my previous findings, it could 
provide additional insight into the financial performance and risk characteristics of renewable 
energy companies. 
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 In Chapter 6, my findings are based on renewable energy indexes with equity 
exposure only, while I do not consider renewable energy fixed income investments. Thus, my 
results are predominantly relevant for equity investors, which tend to be the most common 
private investors (such as public markets, project finance, venture capitalists, private equity) 
in the renewable energy sector besides governments (Bürer and Wüstenhagen, 2009; 
McCrone et al., 2015). Also, the renewable energy bond market is still in its infancy and 
relatively small compared to the conventional bond market having not gained as much 
attention by large institutional investors (Wood and Grace, 2011). 
 Chapter 7 has the following three limitations. First, my results are based on a sample 
of large S&P 500 companies and do not consider other countries. This means that my results 
are directly only applicable to large companies domiciled in the US. My sample is consistent 
with prior literature (see e.g. Bauer and Hann, 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 
2011; Oikonomou et al., 2014; Plumlee et al., 2010; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008), which 
also study the effects of ESG criteria on the cost of capital only in a US context. Given 
different cultural and regulatory frameworks in other countries, an investigation beyond the 
US could yield different results. Second, my results are based on expected cost of equity 
estimates inferred from different asset pricing models and only one cost of debt proxy. 
Meaning that my results are directly only relevant to equity and debt investors who compute 
the expected cost of equity and debt in a similar fashion. However, it seems unlikely that 
computing implied cost of equities (as in Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011) would 
change my results considerably, as prior findings also suggest that companies with high ESG 
have lower implied cost of equities. Finally, although Bloomberg's financial and nonfinancial 
data is widely used in practice and academia, further research is needed to verify its validity 
in measuring companies' ESG disclosure quality.    
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